Congo Siasa

Legislative results

2012-01-27T16:40:00.000-08:00

I did a quick back-of-the-envelope analysis to figure out how many seats Kabila's presidential coalition has won. The problem is, the president's strategy was to multiply the number of parties in his coalition, so now it's difficult to see through the thicket of parties to understand where their allegiances lie.

If I'm not mistaken, a total of 94 parties have won seats, along with numerous independent candidates. (The full list is here). Based on the April charter of the majorité présidentielle, along with public statements, I figure that Kabila's coalition has won at least 245 seats so far, out of the 424 announced. Of course, coalitions could shift, and these are only provisional results, based on a charter in April that was quickly made obsolete by the emergence of many new parties supporting Kabila. The majorité présidentielle has already declared that they have more than 250 seats.

Also, I am sure many will contest the results given the many reported incidents of fraud, we are still awaiting 76 seats to be announced, and 7 electoral districts have seen their vote cancelled.

Here are the main parties:

Kabila's coalition:

PPRD (Led by Evariste Boshab) 58 seats
PPPD (Ngoma Binda) 27
MSR (Pierre Lumbi) 25
PALU (Antoine Gizenga) 16
ARC (Olivier Kamitatu) 14
AFDC (Modeste Bahati) 12
ECT 10
MIP (Colette Tshomba) 9
PDC (José Endundo) 7
UNAFEC (Kyungu wa Kumwanza)
UNADEF (Charles Mwando Simba) 6
UDCO (Banza Mukalay) 6
ADH (Jean-Claude Baende) 5
NAD (Athanase Matenda) 5
CCU (Lambert Mende) 5
COFEDEC (Venant Tshipasa) 4
Plus many smaller parties....

Opposition:

UDPS (Etienne Tshisekedi) 34
MLC (Jean-Pierre Bemba) 20
UNC (Vital Kamerhe) 16
UFC (Kengo wa Dondo) 3
UDECF (Pierre Pay-Pay) 4
ATD (José Makila) 4
Plus other smaller parties...

I may have gotten something wrong, feel free to correct me.

Bleak choices for the path ahead in the Congo

2012-01-25T23:01:00.000-08:00

Congolese politics, usually full of fire and scandal, seem devoid of hope these days. The presidential and legislative elections were both so badly botched that it is apparently impossible to figure out who won what. And yet, there is little hope of any far-reaching solution. The donors are divided, with the United States "deeply disappointed", the Belgians wanly congratulatory, and the South Africans outright buoyant. In the meantime, the opposition has not been able to mobilize any significant protests, largely because they are arrested/beaten/tear-gassed. While the Catholic church has announced a major demonstration on February 16 - the twenty-year anniversary of the "March of Christians" of 1992 - it is unclear whether kinois still have the capacity to mobilize on a large scale.

The latest sign of this despondency is an initiative reportedly mooted by Washington in recent days: a power-sharing agreement. According to various sources in the opposition and US government, the proposal that has been put forward in the past several weeks would have the opposition sharing power with Kabila, either by forming government under a UDPS prime minister, or by getting a fair share of ministerial positions. The only problem is: neither Tshisekedi or Kabila seem to be interested (Kamerhe and Kengo have apparently expressed interest).

It is difficult to see how such a power-sharing deal could be pushed through, given the divisions among the donors and Kabila's opposition (he is having hard enough a time managing the quarrels within his coalition without giving half the cabinet positions to the enemy camp). Nor is it clear whether this would make right the glaring flaws of elections; one could argue the opposite, that it could undermine the creation of a strong opposition and just postpone the troubles for a couple of years - the consensus among many Africans is that neither Kenya nor Zimbabwe have been great successes, and that Cote d'Ivoire managed to dodge a bullet by avoiding a power-sharing deal.

But for those who would immediately cry foul, let's consider the options. They aren't pretty:

Declare the elections null and void and hold new polls. In an ideal world, this is probably what should be done. Both legislative and presidential elections were deeply flawed and, except for electoral districts where there is little doubt which MPs won, should probably just be reheld. This could be done at the same time as provincial and local elections, currently scheduled for March but which will almost certainly have to be pushed back to August or September due to delays. But the larger question is: Would Kabila accept this solution? Of course not. And donors, who could apply financial pressure, face a serious collective action problem. None of them seem in the slightest interested in this option. So should we pursue this path, even though it appears hopeless, just out of principle? Advocates of this path are hoping that the demonstration on February 16 will provide traction.

Recount the ballots. Again, Kabila would almost certainly oppose this. But even if he didn't, too many ballots have gone missed or have been tampered with to make this a feasible solution. Also, it wouldn't deal with the fact that many people didn't vote, voter lists may have been flawed, and there wee other abuses before the polls took place.

Give up on the presidential polls and try to salvage the legislative elections, as well as the subsequent polls. A few weeks ago, this seemed to be the approach. Ok, so the presidential polls were a debacle, but perhaps we can save the legislative ones - American election experts arrived and the CENI suggested they were stopping compilation. However, now CENI has indefinitely postponed announcing the results, the foreign experts have departed, saying they weren't able to observe or contribute in a meaningful manner, and many of the legislative ballots have been compromised by weeks of storage in unprotected warehouses and compilation centers. So how can the legislative elections be "saved?" It's unclear, at least to me. As for the following polls, the donors I have spoken with do seem to agree that there have to be changes to the CENI before they continue to fund the rest of the election cycle; many would like to see Mulunda Ngoy resign. I have also heard some say that they want to use the election fiasco to get leverage on Kabila: "we'll let you off this time, but now carry out the reforms you have been promising (justice, security sector, etc.) or we will cut aid."

Do nothing. Nobody will say this, but it is a possibility. But consider this scenario: Kabila manages to get his coalition to agree on a distribution of seats in parliament and imposes himself over the divided opposition. His coalition forms a majority in parliament, forms a government and makes some key concessions (governance reforms, bringing in opposition parties, reforming CENI). Already, the moderates around Kabila seem very sensible, ignoring Tshisekedi's calls for an army mutiny. What will donors do then? Prevent the consolidation of democracy and not fund the rest of the elections? Withdraw aid and punish the Congolese people?

Which brings us back to the power-sharing deal. If these reports are true, the Americans should be applauded for at least not just giving up (which is apparently what the Belgians have done) and accepting the botched polls. But will it work?

Kabila's parties have strong lead in legislative elections

2012-01-15T02:14:00.000-08:00

With over half of the seats in the legislative elections decided, Kabila's fractious coalition has a strong lead. We could well we looking forward to another five years of the ruling coalition controlling both parliament and the presidency.

Or perhaps I should say "tentatively decided." The legislative election results have been postponed to January 26, after which we can expect a protracted period of disputes, both inside and outside of courts. Kabila's Majorité présidentielle coalition has reportedly even set up an internal committee to deal with disputes. Stalwarts like Bahati Lukwebo, former member of the national assembly leadership, have made harsh accusations against the election commission and other MP candidates for fraud.

Nonetheless, according to my back-of-the-envelope count (don't sue me), here are the preliminary results as of today:

Parties supporting Kabila:

PPRD 39 seats
PPPD 18
MSR (led by Pierre Lumbi) 16
ARC (Olivier Kamitatu) 11
PALU (Antoine Gizenga) 9
AFDC (Modeste Bahati) 4
ADH (Jean-Claude Baende) 4
UNADEF (Charles Mwando Simba) 4
CCU (Lambert Mende) 3
COFEDEC (Venant Tshipasa) 3
NAD (Athanase Matenda) 3

Opposition parties:

UDPS 21
MLC 13
UNC 9
UFC 3

Many other parties only won one or two seats, but it is clear that the ruling coalition has a strong lead, with over half of the 500 seats announced, although their ruling coalition looks like it will be even more fractious than the last one.

According to the published results, Lukwebo lost his seat in Kabare territory (South Kivu). So how have other legislative candidates fared?

There are some notable winners. Two of the president's siblings won in landslides: his twin sister Jaynet Kabila in the Kalemie (Katanga) constituency, and his brother Zoé Kabila in Manono (Katanga). Meanwhile, presidential advisor Katumba Mwanke won in Pweto territory (Katanga), and two brothers of the election commissioner won - despite controversies surrounding their campaigns - in separate Katangan electoral districts. Other Kabila allies who won: Evariste Boshab (speaker of the national assembly, Mweka territory); Aubin Minaku (head of the Majorité présidentielle coalition, Idiofa); Olivier Kamitatu (minister of planning, ); Jeannine Mabunda (minister of state companies, Bumba); Médard Autsai (governor of Province Orientale, Aru); Adolphe Muzito (prime minister, Kikwit); Konde Vila Kikanda (former governor of North Kivu under Mobutu, Goma); Norbert Katintima (minister of agriculture, Walungu); Jean-Marie Bulambo (minister of medium and small business, Bukavu).

Winners from the opposition include: Anzuluni Bembe (former speaker of parliament under Mobutu, Fizi); Gilbert Kiakwama (opposition leader, Mbanza-Ngungu); Jean Claude Vuemba (opposition leader, Kasangulu); Eve Bazaiba (former opposition spokeswoman, Basoko); Kizito Mushizi (former radio director, Bukavu); Omer Engwake (opposition leader and former minister, Bumba); Delly Sessanga (opposition leader, Luiza); Christian Badibangi (opposition leader, Dimbelenge).

The losers include several officials from the ruling coalition: Alexis Thambe Mwamba (minister of foreign affairs, Kindu); Claude Nyamugabo (minister of sports, Kabare); José Endundo (minister of environment, Mbandaka); Marcellin Cisambo (governor of South Kivu); Shenila Mwanza (senator, Fizi).

The FDLR suffer another blow and launch reprisals

2012-01-14T04:36:00.000-08:00

While electoral wrangling continues, there has been an escalation of fighting in the eastern Congo over the past few months. Much of this fighting has taken place between the FDLR and local Congolese militia - the Raia Mutomboki in Shabunda territory and a new group called the Forces de défense congolaise (FDC) in Walikale. These skirmishes have often led the local population to be caught in between, and at the beginning of the year the FDLR reportedly killed around forty civilians in Shabunda in reprisal attacks.

But some of the worst fighting has been in Walikale territory, where a series of assassinations have had a serious impact on the FDLR, which has already lost around half of its troops over the past 3 years. On Wednesday, 11 January, a group of soldiers - some reliable reports claim they were a unit of Rwandan special forces, guided by the FDC - penetrated into the FDLR headquarters in Walikale and ambushed FDLR leaders around a fire. They killed the FDLR chief of staff Brigadier Leodomir Mugaragu. The overall FDLR commander General Mudacumura was also apparently present but was able to escape.

Mugaragu, aka Leon Manzi, was one of the only remaining FDLR commanders with concrete allegations against him of involvement in the 1994 genocide. According to one report, he was a major and battalion commander in 1994 in Ruhengeri, where he was involved in mobilizing militias and setting up roadblocks to kill Tutsi. He had children living in Lubumbashi and Rwanda.

The killing of Brigadier Mugaragu is the last in a series of assassinations that began with Lt Col Sadiki Soleil, who was killed on 20 November, and Lt Col Furaha Honoré, killed on 6 December. All of these attacks have been linked by some sources - although not confirmed - to the Rwandan government, which has allegedly become more sophisticated in using local militia like Mai-Mai Cheka (for the Sadiki killing) and FDLR officers themselves (for the Furaha killing).

While these deaths may be heralded by some as good news, the immediate consequence has been a series of reprisal killings against local militia and, very often, against the local population.

The Catholic church maintains fierce criticism of elections

2012-01-14T04:12:00.000-08:00

The Catholic church overcame internal divisions this week in the national assembly of their episcopal conference (CENCO) to fiercely denounce the elections. In a message entitled "The Congolese people are hungry and thirsty for justice and peace," the CENCO came out with its firmest denunciation of the electoral process yet. Saying that the elections had been "marred by serious irregularities that call into question the published results," and "what is currently happening with regard to the compilation of legislative results is unacceptable," CENCO concluded that "one does not build a state of law in a culture of cheating, lies and terror, of militarization and flagrant attacks on the freedom of expression."

While Cardinal Monsengwo, the head of the Catholic church in the Congo, had previously made critical remarks, other members of the Catholic clergy were said to be more reticent to oppose the government. This joint statement is an important step for the church, which is very influential in Congolese society. While the previous Cardinal Etsou had also been critical of the 2006 elections, the church had been much less united in its opposition then. The church's stance, along with the numerous local NGOs that have said the elections are not credible - Voix des Sans Voix, Toges Noires, Linelit, Ligue des Electeurs, and others - may augur a more confrontational relation between the government and civil society. Nonetheless, some Congolese media suggested that the statement could have been much more severe, as the bishops did not ask for the government to resign or for a national unity government. (They did ask for the CENI to resign if it was unable to correct its mistakes). Nor did they ask, as some bishops close to Monsengwo had before, for the population to protest the elections.

The church's statement is in contrast with what the Congo's international partners have said. While France, Belgium, the EU, the United Kingdom and the United States all expressed varying degrees of concern and criticism after the deep flaws in the polls became obvious, major donors have since been relatively quiet. One notable exception has been Belgium, whose new prime minister recently sent a letter of congratulations to President Kabila. He said: "As I take up my position as prime minister, I would like to congratulate the Congolese people for holding elections that brought you back to the post of President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo." The letter was criticized by some in the opposition in Belgium as a "diplomatic gaffe," and Foreign Minister Didier Reynders had maintained that he will wait until the legislative elections (the results of which have been postponed to January 26) have played themselves out.

While American policy-makers have been more vociferous in their condemnation of the elections, internal rifts have appeared there, as well. In December, US Senators Coons and Isakson called for a transparent review of the elections, while Secretary of State Clinton said she was "deeply disappointed" in the Supreme Court's failure to evaluate the allegations of irregularities.

Will these policy-makers walk the talk? Denouncing the elections is one thing, taking concrete steps another. There are many governments around the world that hold seriously flawed elections and that continue to have cordial and financially beneficial relations with donors - Ethiopia, pre-revolution Egypt, Rwanda, etc. It will be interesting to see what impact the electoral fallout will have on donor aid.

Does the UN think Dodd-Frank has "backfired"?

2012-01-06T00:55:00.000-08:00

The UN Group of Experts' most recent report was released just before the New Year (you can access it here). Unfortunately, it did not receive much coverage in either local or international press, despite its detailed research into the financing and arming of armed groups in the eastern Congo. Other highlights include a Hollywood-worthy case of gold smuggling involving a basketball star, a war criminal and American businessmen; and how Burundian opposition politicians are dabbling in armed rebellion.

I will be posting an interview with the Group here shortly about the whole report, but let's first take a look at one issue that did receive coverage in the press: conflict minerals. A Reuters article published on Friday, December 30 was headlined "Conflict Minerals Crackdown Backfiring in the Congo," and suggested the Group's report had concluded that the Dodd-Frank legislation in the United States had failed by pushing the mineral trade underground.

This produced consternation at the UN. Members of the Group of Experts were alarmed, as this was not the impression they had tried to give in the report. In an emailed comment, Steve Hege - who is in charge of armed groups for the Group of Experts - wrote to Congo Siasa:

[The story's] content and headline misrepresented the Group’s findings on the impact on Dodd Frank bill in the eastern DRC. As per our previous letter to the SEC, the Group of Experts findings and recommendations have remained consistent that the U.S. legislation on supply chain due diligence in Central Africa has overall been quite positive and a critical catalyst for reform.

Advocacy groups in the US were also jerked from their New Year revelry, as this news came almost at the same time as the Securities and Exchange Commission announced yet another delay in the issuing of regulations to enforce the Dodd-Frank bill and the prospects of a watering-down of these rules appeared to grow.

So what does the Group's report say?

Unsurprisingly, the report steers somewhere between the stark opposites of "Dodd-Frank is going to bring peace to the eastern Congo" and "Dodd-Frank has plunged hundreds of thousands into misery." On the one hand, it says that the yet-to-be-enforced legislation (as well as the recent California state law) has led to a steep fall in production in the eastern Congo, producing "rising unemployment and worsened poverty among the tens of thousands of people who depend on artisanal mining, with a consequent sharply negative impact for the economies of the affected regions as a whole." (para. 368) In addition, there has been an increase in smuggling of ores, which has benefited select military officers.

But it also says that the legislation and advocacy efforts have led to a shift in mineral production from conflict to non-conflict sites, bringing about "a reduction in the level of conflict financing provided by these minerals." In particular, sites in northern Katanga and Rwanda that have begun complying with due diligence guidelines have seen an increase in production (although the Group also warns that some minerals appear to be smuggled into Rwanda and then passed off as "clean.")

Given this nuanced picture, what should the US government do? Steve Hege again:

The only solution to these outcomes is for the SEC to publish its rules expeditiously which should allow responsible commercial actors to begin once again purchasing minerals from the Kivus while conducting supply chain due diligence in compliance with the UN Group of Experts and OECD guidelines. This can happen if the key concept of mitigation is incorporated into the SEC rules allowing for purchases of supply chains where military criminal network involvement is identified provided that they can demonstrate time-bound progress in marginalizing military involvement.

This sentiment is echoed in the Group's submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission from October 21, 2011:

Scrapping or weakening Dodd Frank is not the solution to [these problems]. The solution is for SEC regulations to incorporate the UN Group of Experts and OECD due diligence guidelines' concept of mitigation. Mitigation allows companies purchasing from mines where FARDC criminal networks are in operation to continue purchasing provided they have put in place mitigation strategies and can prove they are working. [my emphasis]

By this, the Group is referring to their own due diligence guidelines (see here), which were endorsed by the Security Council in 2010, and which place greater emphasis on risk-mitigation than the Dodd-Frank law.

Blogging problems

2012-01-01T22:57:00.001-08:00

My blog was down for a short period several days ago. It's still unclear why Blogger took it down, although "irregular access" appears to have played a role. I'm still trying to find out more. Thanks to those who expressed concern.

Siasa hiatus

2011-12-21T13:13:00.000-08:00

I will be absent from this space for a few days. It's a shame - so much to discuss: Kabila's inauguration, attended by the full diplomatic corps of Kinshasa, along with Robert Mugabe. Hillary Clinton's strong statement on the elections, slamming the Supreme Court's cursory treatment of Kamerhe's dispute. Tshisekedi's increasingly radical statements - arrest Kabila! - juxtaposed with his reluctance to call his supporters out onto the streets. The ongoing controversies over irregularities in the legislative polls, as first results are released (no trends yet, although Moba had some weird results, now posted on the CENI website).

Anyway, happy holidays to all.

Statement on Congolese elections

2011-12-20T00:41:00.000-08:00

Below is a statement released by a group of concerned individuals and organizations this morning, ahead of President Kabila's inauguration.

December 20, 2011

We, the undersigned organizations and individuals, are deeply troubled by the lack of critical engagement that the international community has shown throughout the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Carter Center, the European Union, the Catholic Church and other national election observation organizations found that the elections held on November 28, 2011 were deeply flawed and marred by widespread irregularities. In order to prevent further violence and provide legitimacy to the government, we call on the United States and other members of the international community to take these immediate steps:

1) State clearly that they do not perceive the election results as legitimate and call on President Kabila to delay his inauguration ceremony until steps are taken to address these serious allegations. If the inauguration proceeds as scheduled, the United States and other international missions should consider non-attendance or at a minimum send a lower ranking diplomatic officer instead of the Ambassador.

2) Immediately ask for the deployment of an independent international mediation commission formed under international and regional auspices. The Commission will have a mandate to review the technical aspects of the electoral process and facilitate a solution to the crisis.

3) Call on the appropriate authorities to immediately halt the counting of the parliamentary election ballots until clear guarantees are put in place to ensure the credibility of the tallying process.

4) Make clear statements that the U.S. and other members of the international community are determined to ensure accountability for perpetrators of electoral and post-electoral violence in the appropriate international or national fora. Call on Congolese state security forces, in particular the Republican Guard, to cease immediately all abuses against civilians.

The following organizations and individuals support this statement:

Eastern Congo Initiative
Enough
Humanity United
International Crisis Group
Open Society Foundations
Anthony W. Gambino, Fellow, Eastern Congo Initiative
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution
Jason Stearns

The US response to the elections

2011-12-16T11:35:00.000-08:00

On Thursday, the US Senate held a hearing on elections in the Congo. It is worthwhile reading the statement submitted by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jonnie Carson. After stating that the elections "were deficient in many ways," he says:

We continue to advocate that all Congolese political leaders and their supporters act responsibly, renounce violence, and resolve any disagreements through peaceful constructive dialogue and existing legal remedies. We believe that a rapid technical review of the electoral process by the Congolese authorities may shed light on the cause of the irregularities, suggest ways in which governance could be structured to give better effect to the will of the Congolese people, and provide guidance for future elections (my italics).

At the moment I write this, the Supreme Court has apparently rejected Kamerhe's lawsuit and will no doubt confirm Kabila as president, so the "existing legal remedies" have been exhausted. As far as I can tell, this statement means the United States is not calling for anything but a technical review to "provide guidance for future elections," not to provide redress for this vote.

One of the reasons seems to be the following logical fallacy: There were serious irregularities, but we don't know if these would have changed the outcome of the elections - so we shouldn't be so alarmed? I admit, I am paraphrasing, but that logic has been expressed by the Congolese government, as well as perhaps even by Carson:

It is important to note that we do not know—and it might not be possible to determine with any certainty whether the final order of candidates would have been different from the provisional results had the management of the process been better.

It's not clear to me how this matters. If there were massive irregularities, and we don't know who won - isn't that a good reason to push for steps to address the flaws in the current elections, not just to make policy five years down the road? Instead, the Congolese government has interpreted this as meaning, "we don't call into question who won the elections," which neither the Carter Center or EU missions said. Instead, these missions concluded: We don't know who won these elections. And we should.

The testimonies by Carson, as well as those of Tony Gambino (ECI), Mark Schneider (ICG), Mvemba Dizolele (Hoover Institution) and Jonnie Carson can be found here.

Will Kamerhe's lawsuit succed?

2011-12-13T22:45:00.000-08:00

Shortly after Vital Kamerhe submitted a lawsuit to the Supreme Court yesterday, doubts were raised in public and private about the case. (You can read it here). In the complaint, Kamerhe asked for the cancellation of the polls and a new vote.

Of course, the main doubt about Kamerhe's success resides in the perceived bias of the Supreme Court - just a month before elections, the president named 18 new judges to add the eight previous members, ostensibly to help with their heavy work burden. However, many opposition and civil society members think that these newcomers are politically biased.

Other doubts have also been raised regarding Kamerhe's complaint.

Le Potentiel, hardly a newspaper favorable to the government, suggested that Kamerhe may not have fulfilled the legal requirements. The electoral law requires complaints to be filed either in the name of an organization or as an individual. Kamerhe submits his claim in the name of his UNC party (although I'm not sure he annexed his nomination as president of the party), which leaves him unable to raise points concerning Tshisekedi and the opposition as a whole. I am not too concerned by this procedural nuance, as the UNC is not arguing the fine points of the elections - he wants the whole thing to be cancelled, so it doesn't really matter whether he does this in the name of the opposition or the UNC.

I am more concerned by the substance. I am not a lawyer, but it seems to me that a lawsuit should submit as much proof as possible to substantiate its claims. In this document, the UNC makes the following points:

The voter list should be published and posted in polling stations thirty days before the vote. It was not;
The list of polling stations itself should be published 30 days before the vote. It was not;
In many polling stations, opposition witnesses were not allowed to sign the proces verbaux (minutes) and were prevented from accompanying the ballots from polling station to compilation center;
UNC witnesses were not given access to the National Treatment Center were comprehensive results were compiled;
Pre-marked ballots favoring Kabila were found before elections began, and in many polling stations there were not enough ballots for the voters;
Kabila used state assets for his campaign, including airplanes and public vehicles, and putting posters on public buildings;
Finally, he cites around a dozen polling stations with suspicious results.

All of these complaints may well be true; they mirror what the Carter Center and the EU have said. But there was no proof (PVs, pre-marked ballots, police reports, affidavits) that accompanied this claim, at least to my knowledge.

One problem was that Kamerhe had little time to produce the lawsuit - the law only provides for two working days after the declaration of preliminary results. The Supreme Court then only has 7 days to judge the matter.

One positive note is that the Supreme Court has decided to hear the case in a public hearing, not behind closed doors as was initially feared.

Random thoughts and facts

2011-12-13T04:18:00.000-08:00

In no particular order:

1. Kamerhe officially challenged the election results at the Supreme Court in the name of the opposition. I don't know what exactly his case is, or what it means that he submitted it for the entire opposition (Tshisekedi's son Felix was with him when he submitted the claim). The Supreme Court has until Saturday to pass a verdict. They have the mandate to confirm the election outcome, or to invalidate all or part of the results. I'm not sure whether they can also say they need more time - given the number of irregularities, I don't know how they could possibly pass judgement in four days. As has frequently been reported, 18 new judges were named to the Supreme Court just weeks before the elections, giving rise to accusations of bias toward the presidency.

2. As has been widely reported, the Catholic Cardinal Monsengwo has panned the elections, saying the results are "not conform to the truth or to justice." In a radio interview, he also seems to be saying that he think Tshisekedi has won the elections. Shortly afterwards, however, the head of the protestant Church of Christ in the Congo, Marini Bodho, shot back: "These elections do conform to the truth and justice." A battle of the men of the cloth; the elections might have an impact on state-church relations for some time. (Ngoy Mulunda was reported as reacting: I had expected nothing less from the Cardinal). Meanwhile, Amnesty International was forced to publicly dismiss a press statement released in its name endorsing the election results.

3. However, Ngoy Mulunda has now hit back, saying that the Carter Center did not have a comprehensive view of the results, as they were only present in 14,79% of voting stations.

4. There has been some talk about the vote par dérogation (h/t to Mwana Kin). This is the list of people who are allowed to vote outside of the districts where they registered. It is usually for state employees who have to travel for work, including the families of security personnel and election officials. This year it was incredibly high: over 3,5 million out of 18,9 million voters, almost 20% of voters. In 2006, the number of votes by derogation was denounced by observers, and it was only 6,6%. The reason this list is dangerous is that it eliminates one of the safeguards against fraud, namely checking the name of the voter against the list of voters provided to the polling station in advance. If, for example, someone had been able to obtain a fake voter card, as well as an official "ordre de mission" saying he had to travel during this period, she would be able to vote anywhere she wanted to.

In this case, my guess is that the flawed voter registers led to such huge listes des dérogations. Because of confusion in the run-up to the vote, many voters were not able to find the polling stations where they were supposed to vote. So the election commission decreed that voters could vote anywhere in the district where they had registered. But since election officials could not find their names on the voter registers, they were placed on the liste des dérogations, instead of the liste des omis as they should have been. In fact, I have not seen a liste des omis, leading me to wonder if they just merged the two.

4. A few other strange results that have popped up in recent days. How come the turnout rate for the remote province of Walikale, where voters had to walk long distances to get to polling stations, was 92%, while that of the rest of the province was 63%? In the same province, Kivu Confidential highlights the almost perfect scores that Kabila got in areas controlled by CNDP troops, averaging 96%. Meanwhile, on the other side of the country, why did the territory of Kwamouth in Bandundu have a turnout of a measly 26%, in contrast to the 56% average for the province? None of these facts are proof of anything, just peculiarities worth looking into.

5. Missing results: In addition to the roughly 2,000 missing polling stations in Kinshasa, there are 156 mission stations in Kiri (Bandundu) and 122 in Mbuji-Mayi. The Carter Center said there may be over 1,000 polling station outside of Kinshasa that have not been counted. The number of voters per polling station varies, with most seeing between 300 and 500 voters.

As criticism of election proliferates, time runs out for opposition

2011-12-12T00:42:00.000-08:00

Joseph Kabila was proclaimed winner of the presidential elections on Friday, obtaining 49% of the votes. Etienne Tshisekedi was a distant second, with 32%.

As expected, many Congolese have rejected the results, setting tyres on fire in Kinshasa and launching isolated protests around the country. Tshisekedi has now announced a large opposition demonstration in Kinshasa and other cities for Tuesday, while the opposition UNC party will hold a protest today in Bukavu, focusing on both the election results and the killing of two students over the weekend.

It is not only some Congolese who find the results hard to believe - foreign observers have also expressed skepticism. The Atlanta-based Carter Center published a brief report on Saturday, saying the results "lack credibility." The European Union will be publishing a report today or tomorrow, reportedly with very similar conclusions.

What are the main problems with the vote?

Perhaps the most obvious flaw is the loss of ballots of between 3,000 and 4,000 polling stations around the country, including 2,000 from Kinshasa and all the results from the territory of Kiri in Bandundu. In the case of the lost Kinshasa votes, some foreign observers believe that these are the same polling stations that Ngoy Mulunda had wanted to invalidate earlier in the week, but was forced to set aside after protests from observers.

Then there are the suspicious turnout figures. In several districts, turnout was almost 100%, rates the Carter Center finds "impossibly high." This was the case in several territories of northern Katanga, Joseph Kabila's home turf (or, to be more precise, that of his father). The problem was not just the high turnout, but the fact that it coincided with almost 100% support for Kabila. In the territory of Malemba Nkulu, for example, turnout was 99,46%, with not a single one of the 266,866 votes going to anyone but the incumbent. In Kabongo territory, Kabila also received a perfect score (turnout was 91%), while in Manono, where Kabila received 99,98% of the vote, turnout was 100,14%.

While Tshisekedi received very high scores in the Kasais, as well, turnout there was much lower, around 50-60%. The national turnout was 58 percent.

Some observers have told me that one way of detecting suspicious turnout figures is to calculate how many voters cast their ballots in a polling station on election day, then multiplying by the number of minutes it takes them on average to cast a vote, taking into account that several people can vote at the same time. If the total is over 20 hours, it is likely that there was something wrong with polling in that station.

Another figure that raised eyebrows were registration numbers. In some rural parts of northern Katanga, the growth in registered voters since 2006 is more than double the national growth rates. In Manono, for example, the number of voters grew by 52% in five years, while in four other Katangan territories growth was over 38% in the same period. The national increase in voters between the two elections was 26%.

Finally, the process was flawed. Ballots were seen transported by private means - in several cases even by candidates - and in some cases ballot bags were opened and altered in violation of official procedures. The Carter Center suggested that in 15% of the compilation centers, security personnel could have influenced compilation; they also pointed out that some election official obstructed access for observers, including in the National Results Center in Kinshasa. In one flagrant case in the capital, the compilation center was closed and when it re-opened a large number of ballots had gone missing.

I should emphasize that none of the observers I have spoken with has weighed in on what he or she thinks the real results were. Tshisekedi would have to win 1,5 million votes and Kabila lose the same number for the final results to change.

What next? The opposition has until tomorrow to contest the results officially, or the Supreme Court may just confirm Kabila as the winner (at the moment of writing, I don't think the UDPS had done so). The opposition has little faith in the court, as in the run-up to elections a large number of new judges were appointed, many of whom reportedly favorable to Kabila. If a suit is filed by tomorrow, the Supreme Court only has until Saturday to consider it before it has to announce a winner. That amount of time is clearly insufficient given the complexity of the results.

Time is hence of the essence. Several solutions have been bandied about in diplomatic circles, some of which involve the creation of an independent commission to audit the results and propose a solution. Who should be a member of the commission and to whom should it report? Not clear - the United Nations is very unlikely to take on this kind of role, given the politics in the Security Council. The southern African body SADC, which sent the largest observation mission, is seen by the opposition as pro-Kabila, and South African President Zuma has approved of the official tallies. Others have suggested that a mediator or special envoy should be appointed. However, Kofi Annan has reportedly already turned down an offer - other names that have come up are John Kufuor and Alpha Oumar Konare.

What could a possible solution look like to electoral disputes? Here, again, different solutions are being mulled over. The official line, taken by many diplomats, is that legal avenues should be pursued - i.e. the Supreme Court. However, as mentioned, the opposition does not find this credible. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon added that mediation efforts should also be considered, notably by the National Mediation Commission. But many members of this commission, named shortly before the elections, are also considered to be close to the presidency.

Some suggest that there only needs to be a re-tally of the results put together at the 169 compilation centers (CLCR). That, however, would not be able to come to grips with the kind of fraud listed above. Others have suggested a re-vote in selected areas with reported irregularities, a solution that would not address problems of the voter register, but could address many of the other irregularities. Another solution that I have heard of would be to hold another presidential vote, just between Kabila and Tshisekedi - this run-off ballot, however, would contravene the electoral law, which states that the presidential ballot is a one-round, plurality-wins vote.

The longer it takes to decide on a way forward, the more likely it is that the Supreme Court will declare Joseph Kabila winner and Tshisekedi's supporters will take their frustrations to the streets.

As election results approach, a long road lies ahead

2011-12-08T12:49:00.000-08:00

Kinshasa was in a weird mood this evening, as parts of town celebrated, thinking Tshisekedi had won the polls. Elsewhere, people sulked, thinking that Kabila had been declared victor. But as this went to cyber-press, the electoral commission had just pushed back the final announcement to Friday. According to one source close to the election commission, the vice-president from the political opposition was blocking the announcement, refusing to sign off on the final figures until the commissioner had agreed to publish disaggregated results by polling station at the same time. According to the election commissioner, they needed "to cross-check results received from across the country."

But it would be good at this time to remember that this announcement is not the end of the process. Even if Kabila is declared victor, as is expected, the opposition will contest the results, both in the streets and in courts. If this scenario plays out, two factors will be key: how many people Tshisekedi can mobilize in the streets, and how clear it is that the elections were rigged.

For the former, there is no doubt that Kinshasa would seethe with anger if Kabila was declared victor. But thousands - perhaps tens of thousands - of soldiers and policemen are deployed in the streets, and the game would almost certainly be to disperse any crowd that was trying to gather, with rubber bullets, tear gas and even live ammunition. It is not clear how long the opposition could hold out and how many casualties the regime would be able to inflict before one side backed down.

As for the proof of rigging: this is a crucial point, and one I think has not been muddled. We know that there have been widespread irregularities and rigging, probably amounting to hundreds or even thousands of incidents. Some minor, others large. What has not yet been put in the public domain is the exact scale of this fraud. Kabila now leads by over 2 million votes; one would imagine that that kind of lead should be relatively easy to detect. But it will take time to bring this evidence to bear.

The best indicator we have of massive fraud will the the proces verbaux, the minutes from each individual polling station. Witnesses from political parties receive a signed copy of these minutes after the ballots are counted in front of them. So if political parties have enough of these PVs, and they don't match up with those provided by the government, they will be able to prove fraud. Observers like the Catholic church, or the Carter Center, can write down the results but don't have signed copies.

But apparently none of the political parties had complete coverage of the country (I don't know the exact coverage), nor did the Catholic church and NGOs. So they will be able to prove fraud in certain areas, but perhaps not for the whole country - or, at least, it is not clear. In some areas like Katanga, where some have accused the government of stuffing ballots and registering children, there was poor coverage, and in other areas witnesses were chased out of polling stations.

In addition, it is always possible that fictitious polling stations will send in results, where there could be no observers or witnesses because they don't exist. Observers and witnesses would have to go through the final list of polling stations and their results to see which ones did not exist in a particular town or area; after all, when the initial list of stations was released, many observers complained that there were numerous stations that didn't exist or were at the wrong address.

All of this will take time. It may be, of course, that there is no doubt, that the gap between the two candidates is too large, or that there are so much proven fraud that the election must be thrown out.

But it is also possible that we never get an exact real count of the vote, and - if the election is close - that doubts will remain about the possible winner. This would be the worst scenario, as it would leave is in legal and political limbo. But some actors seem to be preparing for exactly this. There is talk of mediators at the UN - Kofi Annan was reportedly asked to come to help "mediate," but he said he would not be able to make it (because he was too busy or didn't want to be involved in such a messy process?). Others suggest that the South Africans have been positioning themselves for this kind of "mediation". The reason for the inverted commas is that, as of now, there is nothing to mediate, we still believe that we will find out who won the polls.

But what if we don't? I know this is anathema to many Congolese, who firmly believe that their candidate won. I also have my guesses and inclinations (it's better not to air them here), but proof may be harder to come by that we think and hope.

In any case, there will also be a race against time. The electoral calendar says the Supreme Court will confirm the final results on December 17, which only leaves eight days for the defeated party to sue in court.

Preliminary analysis of results

2011-12-07T01:27:00.000-08:00

Yesterday we got the fifth installment of election results. The election commissioner says we are now at 89,29% of total votes. While they did not want to declare a winner until Friday (they have postponed the results), it is virtually impossible for Tshisekedi still to win. That is, if these results are correct.

By my back-of-the-envelope calculus, Kabila now has 8,353,573 votes and Tshisekedi 5,927,528, with only around two million votes left to count.

So what does a preliminary analysis of the votes that have been counted say?

Here are the current figures by province, with turnout and Joseph Kabila's percentages for both rounds of 2006 elections.

Province	Kabila	Kabila 2006 1^st round	Kabila 2006 2^nd	Tshisekedi	Turnout
Bandundu	63%	3%	40%	20%	57%
Bas-Congo	20%	14%	25%	74%	56%
Equateur	10%	2%	2,8%	36%	51%
Kasai-Occ	15%	11%	23%	79%	50%
Kasai-Or	20%	36%	32%	71%	50%
Katanga	90%	77%	93%	7%	68%
Kinshasa	30%	14%	32%	64%	68%
P Orientale	62%	70%	79%	14%	62%
Maniema	87%	90%	98%	3%	57%
North Kivu	37%	77%	96%	22%	62%
South Kivu	45%	95%	98%	9%	69%

There are a few comments to make, all with the proviso that these are preliminary results.

Kabila scores surprisingly high in Bandundu - he did receive the endorsement of Antoine Gizenga, who helped him get a good result in the province in 2006. But even then, he only got 40% of the votes there - he has increased his score to 63% of votes now. While there are tensions between the Luba (Tshisekedi's community) and other groups in the province, this result is still striking.

Kabila also scores surprisingly well in areas with large Luba communities - the Kasais, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. In the Kasais, it is striking that the turnout remained low, barely higher than 2006, when many boycotted the vote. Considering how immensely popular Tshisekedi is in part of these provinces, this is strange (but is surely linked to the violence on election day). It is also strange that Tshisekedi would get almost the same results as Bemba in Katanga - there is a very large Luba community there, and tensions between southerners and northerners (Kabila's community). As for Kinshasa, few people in this opposition stronghold thought Kabila would be able to hold onto 30% of the vote there.

People in South Kivu have also been scratching their heads about Kabila's score there - he has fallen out of favor with many in the province, and Kamerhe was considered to be a favorite by many. However, there is probably an urban bias against Kabila, and most of the people I have spoken to are in urban areas. Equateur is also a bit puzzling, as it is difficult to see how the president gained in popularity in this opposition bastion, even if he is still at a low 10%.

If the figures are accurate (despite all of the many allegations of fraud and rigging), then Kabila will have won the elections by gaining support in the West of the country, even as he suffered a steep decline in support in the East. It will also show that his tactic of dividing the opposition worked - a coalition of Tshisekedi, Kamerhe and Kengo would have beaten Kabila, if they had been able to carry over their votes to a common opposition candidate.

Again, this is all still speculation, since there final results have not been announced, and these figures are still steeped in controversy as thick as Masisi mud.

Other views on elections

2011-12-06T11:10:00.000-08:00

I am traveling today, but check out the following pieces on elections, by Tony Gambino/Michael O'Hanlon and Emily Paddon/Guillaume Lacaille. I apologize for the lack of Congolese editorials - more of those soon.

http://www.opencanada.org/features/beyond-elections-congo/

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/06/congos-crucial-crossroads/

Op-Ed: Stability vs. transparency

2011-12-05T13:00:00.000-08:00

The following is an opinion piece I published in the Guardian today. More tomorrow on the tense situation in Kinshasa and the imminent announcement of election results.

Tens of millions of Congolese went to the polls last Monday. It was an emotional day: women with infants strapped to their back waited for hours in the sun, while elsewhere old men hobbled through knee-deep water to cast their ballots. And yet, as the country heads towards a post-election crisis, western diplomats seem ready to see the voters' verdict sacrificed for a misguided notion of stability.

These elections, the second since the end of a bloody civil war, have been mired in controversy for the past year. In January, President Joseph Kabila's party orchestrated a change in the constitution, getting rid of a runoff round of polls for the presidency. This effectively pitted opposition candidates against each other, improving Kabila's chances. The election law was also changed, allowing the ruling coalition to appoint the head of the election commission. Nonetheless, the incumbent has faced stiff competition, especially from firebrand opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, who has been able to attract crowds of over 100,000 people. There has been no reliable polling, but preliminary results from voting stations suggest that the race is tight, meaning even minor rigging could be a game-changer.

Then, election day came with a crescendo of controversy. While most of the country voted peacefully, there were hundreds of incidents small and large. In the central Kasai provinces, dozens of polling stations had to close or were burned down by mobs following allegations of fraud. In the east, soldiers in Masisi territory forced voters in dozens of villages to vote for their candidate, in one case tying up voters and taking their ID cards to vote for them. In the western city of Mbandaka, the provincial governor chased opposition witnesses out of his polling station and then spent almost an hour inside before leaving.

Election results are now being compiled, with official tallies showing Kabila leading by a hefty margin. But these figures are again hotly contested, not least because the election commission has not disaggregated the results by polling station, so they can be crosschecked with those of independent observers. Opposition parties, which had officials in most polling stations countrywide, say they have proof the tallies are false. This is the basic bind the country is in: with the credibility of the election commission tarnished, neither of the main contenders will accept defeat. Tshisekedi had declared himself the winner, while Kabila's campaign has said it can't lose.

The sad truth is that it is no longer a question of whether there will be a crisis tomorrow, when official results are supposed to be announced; the question is how bad it will be. Kinshasa is simmering with rumours and anger, while police and presidential guards have been deployed in force throughout town. If Kabila is announced the winner, there will be urban unrest. If Tshisekedi perseveres, army officers in various parts of the country have threatened violence.

In the face of this predicament, the reaction of senior diplomats has been half-hearted. In a closed-door meeting of the UN security council on Friday, some European countries voiced concern at the irregularities, but the body was too divided to take a strong stance. Only one ambassador took part in the meeting; others were too busy working on Syria and Egypt. According to sources present at the meeting, the council thinks it will be difficult to know how much fraud took place and whether it affected the outcome. The priority is to prevent the UN from becoming an arbiter and to ensure stability. The fact that ambassadors find Tshisekedi an unsavoury leader does not help matters.

Their analysis and priorities are ill-founded. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has suffered from violence for the past 15 years, often due to unaccountable leadership. Looking the other way as polls are rigged will hardly make the country more stable. It is also not true that we may never get to the bottom of electoral fraud. There are around 40,000 Congolese observers from churches and civil society monitoring the polls, alongside several hundred foreigners. The election commission must urgently publish poll results in a disaggregated form, so observers can verify them. Polls should then be held again in the many places where they were cancelled, and allegations of fraud jointly investigated with international observers.

We are entering a critical period in Congolese history. Foreign countries, which provide over $3bn in aid a year to Congo, have a heavy responsibility to allow the Congolese decide their own fate. They should not shirk it.

Criticism of how the votes are being compiled

2011-12-04T01:35:00.000-08:00

Further to my post yesterday, foreign diplomats have asked election commissioner Ngoy Mulunda why he is invalidating entire polling stations in Kinshasa but not in other provinces. Apparently, the commission has now said he would not invalidate votes in Kinshasa - observers are waiting to see if the disqualified bundles of votes will be entered into the system now.

In general, the main complaint has been the lack of transparency in vote compilation. The election commission is releasing bulk results by entire electoral districts, which makes it impossible for observers and political parties to check individual polling station results with the official tally. Observer missions (including the Catholic church and civil society) feel that they had representative in a majority of polling stations and will be able to check for large incidents of fraud.

Publishing results by polling station will also help (although not completely solve) address allegations of fake voting stations. When the list of voting stations was published before elections, allegations came forward that some of the stations on the list did not exist, which raised the possibility that the poll would rigged in stations where by definition there could be no independent witnesses. But here, too, disaggregated results could pinpoint stations where there were no opposition witnesses or observers. If results there were questionable, they could then be scrutinized further.

Foreign ambassadors have raised this matter with Ngoy Mulunda, who has cited logistical problems - including the fact that their website was hacked - as a reason for not publishing disaggregated results.

As Kinshasa heads toward a crisis, donors prevaricate

2011-12-03T12:17:00.000-08:00

The election commission has published their first and second days of preliminary results, and has said they will be announced the results of their compilation every day. The results elicited a lot of controversy, especially because they compilation is taking place unevenly across the country. According to the results, which comprise 33% of polling stations, Kabila has around 51%, Tshisekedi 34% and Kamerhe 5%. But there is a huge difference in the number of stations counted between the different provinces - in Kinshasa, only 3,33% have been counted, while in Bas-Congo the figure is 67,85%.

While many have complained that the figures could hardly be correct - some can't understand that Kabila is far ahead of Kamerhe in South Kivu, others protest that he can't have 90% of the vote in Katanga - other allegations of impropriety have come forward.

The election commissioner Mulunda Ngoy has decreed that all packages that are not in order should be invalidated, which has led the election commission to invalidate results 130 polling stations in the Kinshasa I circonscription (Lukunga) alone, around 5% of all votes there, and 30 stations in Kinshasa II. The opposition (and some diplomats) claim that Mulunda does not have the legal authority to do this, and argues that the government is invalidating votes in opposition strongholds.

Other reports have come in suggesting that the chain of custody of votes has been broken in many places, with in some cases election candidates transporting votes from polling stations to compilation centers.

In the meantime, the Security Council has met in a closed session on the Congolese elections. According to people familiar with details of the meeting, the Council is deeply divided, with some western powers expressing concern (Germany and France, in particular), and Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa backing the Congolese government's version. However, even the western powers say they don't know whether fraud was widespread enough to qualify for terms like "systematic" or "large-scale." In general, the Council wants to keep UN involvement limited, trying to avoid the role of arbiter, while at the same time they are worried about violence next week.

In general, the priority of Council members does not seem to be to push for accurate results, in part because they think they will never be able to get them, and also because even accurate results would, in their eyes, not bring peace. In any case, the Council is too divided to take any ambitious stance.

In general, it is almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which definitive results are announced and all sides accept them. It is almost certain that there will be some degree of violence - although it is unclear how much and how it will play out - during the coming week. But, in the words of one UN official I spoke with in Kinshasa, "the donors seem to be almost entirely oblivious of this." The French ambassador was the only permanent representative who attended the Council's meeting, all other officials were lower-ranking. The attention of the big embassies seems to be focused on Syria and Egypt.

How the cookie crumbles

2011-12-01T12:13:00.000-08:00

Results are trickling in slowly, while speculations are flying around in all possible directions. Tshisekedi's people claim that they will win 55% of the vote, while the president's people are sure of victory. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which one of the hopefuls gracefully concedes; it is easy to imagine how violent escalation could take place.

I have posted some results below, all of which stem from Congolese civil society observers.

First, however, some developments. The compilation is proceeding very slowly, with only a few percent of votes in each province officially compiled. People who visit the four national compilation centers in Kinshasa report somewhat chaotic scenes, with some ballot envelopes torn and strewn about. Election commission president Ngoy Mulunda told reporters that election officials will invalidate any package that do not meet the requirements - which raised questions of what will happen with torn envelopes. In addition, he had previously been reported as saying that elections will not be repeated in areas where voters burned down polling stations, raising further question of voter disenfranchisement. The election commission is not making results known as it goes, and the media authority has banned any announcement of preliminary results in the press.

UDPS officials have been sending text messages around the country reporting the arrival of airplanes full of ballots after election day. Diplomats confirm that three airplanes arrived at Njili airport in Kinshasa - one on November 29, two on the morning of November 30 - from South Africa. While some sources suggest that the first plane had 20 tons of election material on it, I have not been able to confirm the freight of the second two planes. It would, of course, be strange for the government to be importing ballots to the country when voting had ended in the vast majority of areas.

In the meantime, all major observation missions have put out preliminary statements on the process. All congratulated the Congolese on elections and the election commission on rising to the huge logistical challenge. None of them passed judgment on the elections in general - that will have to wait for their final report - and only the Congolese Renosec monitors from civil society confirmed that there had been fraud, "but not enough to call into question the process." The Carter Center suggested that in 16% of cases irregularities led to a negative evaluation of voting, while the European Union provided an exhaustive list of flaws but did not suggest that this had compromised the overall process. We will have to wait for 5 days (and perhaps longer?) for a final conclusion.

Nonetheless, some preliminary results, to be taken with care (also, these are all urban areas):

Kananga town (53,000 votes counted):

Tshisekedi 95,7%
Kabila 3,5%

Uvira (38,000)

Kabila 65%
Kamerhe 30%
Tshisekedi 5%

Butembo town (63,000)

Mbusa Nyamwisi 37%
Kamerhe: 26%
Kabila: 22%

Beni town (54,000)

Mbusa Nyamwisi 33%
Kabila 24%
Kamerhe 21%

Bukavu (103,000)

Kamerhe 66%
Kabila 34%

Kisangani (unknown number of votes counted)

Kamerhe 2%-10%
Tshisekedi 2%-20%
Kabila 20%-80%

The day(s) after: Reflection on elections

2011-11-30T05:09:00.000-08:00

Elections have passed throughout most of the Congo - voters are now suspended in a weird limbo of several weeks as they wait for election results to be announced. Sitting in bars and living rooms, people in Bukavu send and receive dozens of text messages a day regarding the results seen outside voting offices and compilation centers - "Vital is ahead in 8 out of 32 centers in Goma!" "Tshisekedi takes a surprising lead in Beni territory!"

I won't delve into too much speculation about the result yet. It is too early to do so; results just began trickling into the central compilation centers in Kinshasa yesterday. It looks like Tshisekedi did well, and that the race will be close, but beyond scattered results here and there, there is more speculation than anything else.

So how did the voting go? The election was Janus-faced. On one hand, it was peaceful in most of the country, with what appeared to be relatively high turnout. I would wager than in 70-80% of polling stations, the elections went fairly well, even in many parts of Kinshasa. People I spoke with in Bukavu - and echoed by what my colleagues heard elsewhere in the country - were enthusiastic and highly motivated. I saw women queuing for hours in the sun with their infants, old men who had hobbled on their canes for miles to come to voting stations. Moving stuff.

The other face of the elections was ugly. There were hundreds of cases of election irregularities, many of which could have probably been avoided through more meticulous preparation. The most frequent irregularities, which have been covered extensively in the press, are the following:

Many voters could not find their names on the polling stations, due to flaws in the electoral lists and misunderstandings about where they should vote. Although the election commission announced repeatedly that people could vote anywhere in their electoral district with a valid ID card, many voters were sent home or sent from station to station. This probably disenfranchised tens of thousands of voters (out of 30 million);
There were many dozens accusations of ballot-stuffing across the country. Some of these incidents can be explained by misunderstandings as ballots ran out and new ballots had to be dispatched, leading some to think these ballots were for stuffing. In other cases, however, there seems to be little doubt that there was rigging, as marked ballots were found before polling began, in many cases outside of the chain of custody of the polling commission. In other cases, stuffing happened in front of witnesses. The arrival of 10 tons of ballots from South Africa in Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, which were then unloaded by military police, one day after elections had closed in most of the country did not help matter. It is unclear how many votes these kinds of irregularities might concern;
Frustrated voters attacked polling stations in many parts of the country, burning down dozens of stations in Kasai Occidental alone (reported 143 were either forced to close or burned down there). The frustrations stemmed from accusations of ballot-stuffing, long delays and incomplete lists. Some estimates suggest than hundreds of thousands of people were not able to vote, but it is very difficult to pin numbers to these allegations for now;
In some areas, security forces interfered in the electoral process. In Kinshasa, the army took over security for polling stations from the police in some areas, while in Masisi (North Kivu) ex-CNDP soldiers reportedly forced thousands of voters to vote for their candidates. There were also reports of witnesses of political parties being chased out of polling stations by soldiers or police;

Given these irregularities, the question is: what next? Four presidential candidates - Kamerhe, Kengo, Mbusa and Bombole - are asking for elections to be canceled, but both the main opposition candidate Etienne Tshisekedi and the incumbent Joseph Kabila have said they will respect the results. Some foreign observations missions made statements today, outlining the above irregularities but not making any broader judgments.

The reason that Tshisekedi and Kabila are going ahead with the process is clear: They both think they can win. Obviously, there will only be one president. So one will lose. What will his reaction be? Neither side appears ready to step down without a fight. Key questions for the coming days will be: Did political parties and civil society observers have enough people on the ground to carry out an independent tallying of votes? Will the compilation process - which is already fairly chaotic - be transparent? If Tshisekedi loses, how many people can he mobilize in the streets for how long? If Kabila loses, will he admit defeat or simulate a crisis to prevent a handover of power? In case of a crisis, what position will the army and police take?

Elections update: 10pm (Bukavu)

2011-11-28T12:08:00.000-08:00

Voting has wrapped up in many places in the eastern Congo, but continues in some areas and in many places in the West.

Some more information, with the caveat that I have not been able to verify all incidents, so they should be taken a grain of salt.

Kinshasa, which has been mostly calm today, saw some problems this evening as Tshisekedi prepared to vote. He was tailed by a crowd of supporters as the police blocked his path several times in Limete as he tried to get to a polling station. According to AFP photographers, police blocked him access to a station later. Apparently he finally voted and returned home;
Also in Kinshasa, UDPS supporters clashed with police in Bandal (at the school Joyeux Lutins) after they claimed they weren't able to vote;
Across the country, thousands of people couldn't find their names on the voters' lists - the election commission said they could vote anywhere in the electoral district where they registered, but many don't seem to know this and are protesting. This is the situation, for example, in Matete and Kingabwa in Kinshasa;
More allegations have surfaced of pre-marked ballots in favor of a presidential candidate, including in Songololo (Bas-Congo) and Idiofa (Bandundu);
In North Kivu, an angry crowd destroyed a voting station at Kasindi-Lubiliha, accusing Gen Kakolele (former rebel commander, now close to Kabila) of fraud. Five people have allegedly been arrested;
In Mwenga (South Kivu) six polling stations were not able to open on the Itombwe plateau due to Banyamulenge soldiers' interference;
The president of the voting station in Kalima (Maniema) was arrested due to fraud, as he was discovered with ballots in his private possession on the evening before the vote;
Around 100 voting stations were not able to open in Kasai Occidential, including some 43 that were burned down;
In South Kivu, fighting broke out between different ethnic communities in Kalehe as Hutu Kabila supporters clashes with Kamerhe supporters from Shi and Havu communities (not clear when this took place), leaving at least seven people injured;

I just heard that the election commission has now extended voting for one more day.

Elections update: Violence in Lubumbashi and Kananga; irregularities elsewhere

2011-11-28T03:53:00.000-08:00

Voting has begun peacefully in much of the country, with high turnout in many areas (including Bukavu, where I am).

However, several serious incidents have been reported. While my sources are reliable (mostly foreign observation missions, journalists and the United Nations), things are developing rapidly and I have not been able to cross-check all of the information below.

In Lubumbashi, serious violence has erupted in various areas of town. Opposition supporters denounced the delays in opening polling stations in the Bel-Air neighborhoods where many UDPS supporters live. Road blocks were set up and protests broke out. Some time afterwards, UN reports came in regarding the blowing up of two trucks full of ballot papers that had allegedly already been filled out before voting began. Around the same time, two trucks full of sensitive election materials were set on fire in the Kenya neighborhood of town. All the while, numerous abuses have been reported by election observers in polling stations (no further information available). Armed civilians wearing red bandanas have opened fire on civilians at polling stations at Sapin Cemetary in the Ruashi neighborhood, while armed gunmen stormed another polling station in Bel Air and set it on fire. The MONUSCO staff has been forced to retreat into their compound; there are even reports of mortar fire in town;
Election materials arrived late in much of Kinshasa. According to one international source, in Kinshasa IV (where around a quarter of the population lives) the presidential ballot papers had not arrived by noon. Heavy rain has disrupted or slowed down some of the electoral operations in town. Still the situation seems to be relatively calm, with no reports of violence in the capital;
In several places around the country there have been reports of ballot papers being found already filled out before the elections began. This was the case in Goma (Himbi or Ndosho neighborhood), where the head of a voting center was attacked (one report has him being arrested) by voters after they found him with a stack of filled out ballots; a similar case occured in Kananga, where a woman is in critical condition - some reports suggest that she was trying to expose the fraudsters when she was attacked, others say she herself was the culprit. In Lubumbashi, Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi there have been similar reports;
In Kananga (Kasai Occidental), there have also been numerous violent incidents. Very few voting stations reportedly opened on time, due to the lack of polling materials. Some stations told voters to come back at noon, while in others observers alleged that ballot boxes already had ballots in them before voting began. Several voting stations - including those in religious institutions - have been attacked by "mobs," in some cases these seem to be angry voters throwing stones. Several injuries have been reported and some polling stations are now closed;
Irregularities are been reported in too many areas to list here - they include ballot boxes found filled before voting began in Penga Yengo (Kasai-Occidental); voting officials refusing to show witnesses that boxes are empty before voting began (as required by law) in Mbandaka (Equateur); opposition witnesses refused entry in Kananga and Bakwa Kenge (Kasai-Occidental); in Ndesha and Bena Leka (Kasai-Occidental) polling stations burned down;
In Luiza (Kasai-Occidental), opposition supporters loyal to Delly Sesanga's Envol party have attacked (not clear how serious) the guest house where election officials were staying, accusing them of fraud;
In Masisi (North Kivu), there have been accusations of CNDP soldiers stealing voters card and then voting for them, of soldiers telling people to vote for CNDP candidates, and of blocking the entrance fo non-CNDP witnesses into voting centers;
Fears of violence have prompted the European Union to withdraw observers from Mbuji Mayi and MONUSCO from pulling people from Mwene Ditu (Kasai Oriental)

Again, I emphasize that this is a huge country and in other areas voting has been happenin.g peacefully. Nonetheless, this violence and persistent accusations of fraud are very troubling.

Last minute update on elections

2011-11-27T09:50:00.000-08:00

I am now in Bukavu, where I will be observing elections. A few rushed updates:

The situation in Kinshasa is tense following clashes yesterday between UDPS supporters and the police. Following clashes in the morning, Kinshasa's governor decided to cancel all political rallies in Kinshasa on the last day of the election campaign. The police blocked Tshisekedi from exiting the airport, which provoked clashes with police; at least two people died. This infuriated the UDPS supporters, who claim that Kabila did this on purpose, as he was unlikely to get anywhere close to as many followers at his rally as Tshisekedi. The European Union seemed to agree, condemning the attack on freedom of expression and assembly.
Accusations of election irregularities have proliferated over the past days - first, observers noticed that hundreds of polling stations either didn't exist or had been planned without informing the locales. Then, hundreds of thousands of voters in Ituri and Idjwi (South Kivu) discovered that their names were not on the list of voters. Finally, numerous accusations have emerged of ballot having been found with Kabila's name already checked. It is difficult to verify all of the accusations or to know where some or due to disorganization or manipulation.
As I write this, some places in South Kivu have not received election materials - according to one report, large parts of Fizi territory had not received election material by this evening. Similar situations may prevail elsewhere, as well.
The last several days of campaigning saw huge rallies for Tshisekedi in Bas-Congo, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi and Bandundu.

More tomorrow,

As election dates approaches, fears of delays grow

2011-11-21T11:57:00.000-08:00

A last-minute delay in the election appears to be likely, according to several separate diplomatic sources in Kinshasa. The sources, who wished the remain anonymous given the insistence by the election commission that elections will be held on November 28, said that it would extremely difficult to deploy all necessary materials on time. However, one of the diplomats suggested that the commission thinks it will be less controversial to present the various actors with a fait accompli: a brief delay of the polls.

However, other sources, including the election commission and the UN peacekeeping mission, believe it is still possible to hold elections on time.

The logistical task for the election commission is daunting. The last election materials are reportedly arriving today or tomorrow and have to be distributed to 210 distribution centers. The United Nations has mobilized its substantial fleet of airplanes and helicopters, but the materials will have to be distributed to 64,000 polling centers. In addition, the Congolese government has been able to obtain crucial support from both the Angolan and South African governments, who are deploying aircraft to the country, as well.

If the elections are indeed postponed, it could create unrest, depending on how the UDPS and other opposition parties react to the news. The main opposition party has been adamant that elections be held on schedule and that results be announced by December 6, when Kabila's constitutional mandate expires. However, some UDPS officials have in private suggested that they could accept a very short delay, as long as elections are held by December 6. It is not clear if this view is shared by the entire leadership.

Crucially, on Friday the Comité national de médiation du processus électorale was set up in Kinshasa, a "group of wise men" that is supposed to mediate in case of electoral unrest. The group is composed of seven Congolese civil society and religious leaders.

Website on Congolese mining

2011-11-18T22:40:00.000-08:00

If you want to know more about the complex web of sales, valuations and shell companies that is the Congolese mining sector - the Congo Mines website is the best resource out there. Run by the Carter Center, the website provides a database of news stories, but also contracts and financial payments. It includes over 400 documents on mining in Katanga and is expanding.

Selling the state: Kinshasa loses up to $5,5 billion in assets

2011-11-18T22:34:00.000-08:00

The British parliamentarian released a statement yesterday suggesting that the Congo had lost up to $5,5 billion in state assets through the undervaluation of mining concessions. Eric Joyce, who is head of his legislature's Great Lakes working group, backed up his allegation with a raft of documents from the Congo, the British Virgin Islands and the United Kingdom.

Those of you following this blog and the excellent reporting published by Bloomberg (which is quoted here) will not find it surprising that assets have been undervalued. It is the person making the claim, however, that raises eyebrows - as does his direct accusation of Joseph Kabila, the IMF and (somewhat less direct) Israeli businessman Dan Gertler. Plus, for the first time a concrete figure has been put to the fire sale of Congolese mines.

$5,5 billion. That is over 80% of the country's entire budget. It is also far more than the 3,1 billion in foreign aid the country receives a year.

The statement singles out the IMF, which provided a $551 million credit line to the Congolese government in return for reforms and greater transparency, especially in the mining sector. Joyce does not mince his words: "The IMF has not been firm enough with the DRC government and has allowed the presidents and his advisors to run rings around them." He calls on his own government to hold the IMF to account "and to end this scandal."

The modus operandi is by now well known: Congolese mining concessions are sold at prices a fraction of their real value to mysterious shell companies in the British Virgin Islands. In the past four years, at least 45 such companies have been involved in purchases from the Congo. Joyce has documents for nine of these outfits. The sales he is able to document pertain to four major mining concessions (see below) - they were sold for less than 5% of their market price. Three of these concessions, worth $3,6 billion, were sold to companies linked to Dan Gertler.

"These transactions were not disclosed by the DRC government. None of these asset sales were put out to public tender. None of the BVI companies have any known track-record of expertise in the mining or resource sectors."

This is big news that should have a serious impact on budgetary aid to the Congo and in donors' attitudes in general.

Clarification

2011-11-18T08:36:00.000-08:00

In response to press statements that were issued today citing my blog, as well as suggestions by other analysts, it is important to clarify that I am not predicting a winner in the election. Nor was my analysis commissioned by a political party.

I have not endorsed a candidate. My analysis merely intended to highlight possible trends and voting patterns. Given the lack of reliable polling, and the size and the diversity of the Congolese population, any analyses will inevitably delve into some speculation. I do, however, think that the race will be close.

Sources of election information

2011-11-18T03:02:00.000-08:00

Addition: I had forgotten to mention the wonderful blog/website Local Voices that has been reporting from Bunyakiri (South Kivu) for the entire election period, including pictures and interviews.

In preparation for the big day, here are some important sources of information on the elections:

2006 elections:

I've uploaded the following documents here:

an Excel break-down of the 2006 presidential results by province: 1st round (slight incomplete, go to "Province Wise" for best view;
an Excel break-down of the 2006 presidential results by province: 2nd round (go to "Province Wise" for best view;
a nice analysis of the first round presidential results by Léon de Saint Moulin and Eléonore Wolff, along with a series of good maps;
an Excel spreadsheet of current national assembly members and their political affiliation;
an Excel spreadsheet of current senators with their political affiliation;
an analysis of the parliamentary elections of 2006 by Jean-Claude Willame;
an analysis of the 2006 provincial elections by MONUC;
the electoral law (2011 revised version);
the amended electoral law with distribution of seats in parliament (August 2011);

In addition, check out the following websites:

The Congolese election commission (CENI) has a list of all voters, candidates and polling booths here;
The Congolese civil society coalition AETA (Agir pour les élections transparentes et apaisées) has regular updates on its website;
Now African, a website run by two Congolese activists (Priscilla Kounkou Hoveyda and Camille Ntoto) featuring blogs on how Congolese in the East perceive elections;
Alex Engwete (aka Jimmy Yuma) has an excellent blog on Congolese politics and culture from the ground up;
Mutaani FM, a Congolese radio station broadcasting from Goma with a good website ;
Congolese journalist Mvemba Dizolele has a good blog here;
Uhaki News, a group of 25 Congolese female journalists reporting on local issues in the East;
Amy Ernst has a good blog on her work for a local NGO in the eastern Congo, as well as ruminations on Congolese politics and history from a local perspective;
Congo Ba Leki, a grouping of young Congolese bloggers. Unfortunately, they haven't had any postings since October.
For a look at Kasai, Le Grand Kasai has a blog here;
I am sure Laura Seay will be blogging on the elections from Texas in Africa;
The official campaign websites of Etienne Tshisekedi, Vital Kamerhe, and Joseph Kabila;
And of course, the incomparable Radio Okapi, the UN radio in the country.

Who will win the presidential elections? A long, rough guess

2011-11-16T22:49:00.000-08:00

Disclaimer: The figures below are rough estimates, and there has been no reliable polling. The inclinations of the Congolese population are very difficult to divine - this exercise is not so much a prognosis, but a guidelines to possible trends in voting across the provinces.

I should also point out that abstention rates will probably vary (and will be incredibly important) - turnout is likely to be higher in the Kasais than in the Kivus, for example. That will affect the vote. I have slightly adjusted the final spread to reflect this, although I do not provide turnout estimates here.

Finally, these figures assume that there is no rigging at the polling stations or in the electoral commission.

Who will win the 2011 presidential election in the Congo? Uncertainty has shrouded the run-up to the vote - there have been no reliable polls, a lot of hyperbole by all of the candidates, and many analysts seem to think that Kabila will have a easy time of it now that he only has to win a plurality of votes.

The elections will be a more local affair this time, as some of the cleavages (anti-RCD vs. anti-Kabila; East vs. West) that determined the 2006 elections will no longer apply. While in many areas discontent with the regime (and general anti-Kabila sentiment) will sway popular opinion, elsewhere local politics will trump, as each parties tries to stitch together an alliance of influential local leaders, such as priests, singers, parliamentarians and civil society leaders. In many other places, people will want to vote for change, but will not be sure whether any of the opposition candidates can provide.

Here's a look province-by-province how the vote might pan out:

Kinshasa (3,2 million voters):

Kinshasa is the hub of the opposition, a city bursting at the seams with disaffection with the government and a desire for change. In 2006, Kabila only got 14% here in the first round, but was still able to garner 32% in the second round. This is a bastion for Tshisekedi's UDPS party, and many other opposition politicians have strong mobilization networks here, as well.

Nonetheless, the current president can count on the support of some members of the Pende community from Bandundu (see above) due to Antoine Gizenga's support, and the ruling party has stitched together strong patronage networks in the town, whose beneficiaries will not want to see him go. Last but not least, some of the many infrastructure project the president promised are being realized, including a large hospital (Hopital du Cinquantenaire) and the reconstruction of the Boulevard 30 Juin and 20 Novembre. Also, the UDPS opposition has not been able to mobilize more than several thousand demonstrators, with several notable exceptions. This has led some to the fatalistic conclusion that Kabila will win no matter what.

Joseph Kabila: Kabila is very unpopular here, but, as everywhere in the world, political opinions depend first and foremost on your social circles, and Kabila has a lot of people on the payroll in the capital, which could matter. He will also, of course, benefit from cash handouts and the manipulation of the media, factors that are easier to control in a large city. Projection: 5%-20%.

Vital Kamerhe: He may attract some of the intellectuals and youths in town, people who dislike Kabila but are uneasy about Tshisekedi. He has been working very hard in the poor cités of Kinshasa, but there are few signs that he has gained much ground. Projection: 5%-10%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: This is his town - he has shown over the past year that he can mobilize tens, possibly hundreds of thousands of people here. In addition to his strong support among the youth, many opposition parties have endorsed him that have a good following in town (although this is not nearly as important as "Ya TshiTshi" himself). This include Martin Fayulu, Diomi Ndongala, Franck Diongo and Steve Mbikayi. However, the veteran opposition leader is reportedly tired and sick, which will limit his campiagning. Projection: 55%-80%.

Bas-Congo (1,5 million voters):

Bas-Congo was won overwhelmingly by Jean-Pierre Bemba in 2006 with 36% in the first round and 74% in the second. There have been some modest infrastructure projects in the province since then, including repairs on the Route Nationale #1 (Matadi-Kinshasa), other repairs to roads and bridges, as well as the construction of several schools and health centers. Will this, however, be enough to overcome the distrust toward the central government? The Ne-Kongo community is fiercely proud and has generally been dismissive of the current regime. The brutal suppression of the (often irredentist) Bundu dia Kongo political-spiritual movement in 2002, 2007 and 2008 in Bas-Congo, which resulted in over a hundred death, is still vivid in the Kongolese memory. One will also often hear complaints about how Bas-Congo provides the most customs revenues, as well as the most electricity of all provinces, but receives precious little of public spending.

Joseph Kabila: Has the advantage of having built a network of patronage in the provinces that includes employees at port in Matadi, the airbase in Kitona and the Inga dam (to what extent these beneficiaries of largesse will vote for him is not clear). His allies in the provinces include Antoine Ghonda (itinerant ambassador), Luzolo Bambi (minister of justice), Yerodia Ndombasi (senator, former minister of foreign affairs), and Simon Mbatshi (current governor of Bas-Congo). Many of these people are unpopular, but can still pull some strings. In addition, Kabila has the support of the official head of the Kimbanguist church, which is very strong in the province. Projection: 10%-30% of the vote.

Vital Kamerhe: Has received the key endorsement of Ne Muanda Nsemi, the head of the Bundu dia Kongo/Bundu dia Mayala movement. He visited Bas-Congo recently and, speaking partly in Kikongo, was warmly received by much of the population. Projection: 20%-40%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: The UDPS has had strong local chapters in Bas-Congo since Mobutu's days, and Tshisekedi is likely to get some default votes from those who don't trust Kabila and see Kamerhe as too close to the current president. In addition, Tshisekedi has the endorsement of Jean Claude Vuemba (head of the MPCR party), Diomi Ndongala (Démocratie chrétienne) and Marie-Therese Nlandu (who won 25% in Luozi territory in the 2006 presidential campaign). However, at the current pace, it is not clear whether he will be able to visit the province. Projection: 40%-65%

Léon Kengo wa Dondo: Has a relatively strong local party structure, as well as the support of Gilbert Kiakwama, a popular MP from Mbanza-Ngungu territory. Projection: 5%-10%

Bandundu (3,5 million voters):

Bandundu is a peculiar province, where one man and his party have enormous influence: Antoine Gizenga and the PALU party. According to sources from Bandundu, Gizenga, who was an ally of Patrice Lumumba and a key figure in the rebellion after is murder in 1961, will be able to transfer a substantial number of votes from his Pende community to Kabila. The Pende are the majority in the center and south of the province, including in the largest town of Kikwit.

In 2006, Gizenga won 80% of the votes in Bandundu in the first round. With his support, Kabila increased his share from 3% in the first round to 40% in the second round.

Joseph Kabila: The Route Nationale N1 is being repaired (financed by the African Development Bank and the World Bank), which for Bandundu has meant a drastic improvement in the 525km road connecting its largest city Kikwit with Kinshasa. In addition, the Loange bridge has been repaired, making travel between Kikwit and the Kasaian town of Tshikapa possible again. This has lowered food prices and made travel much easier. In addition, a hydroelectric dam is being built at Kakobola, which should help bring electricity to many in the province.

Besides Gizenga, Kabila can also count on leaders from other communities, such as Kin-Key Mulumba from Masimanimba, Mboso Nkodia from Kenge, and Olivier Kamitatu from Bulungu. Also, he recently named a new head of his Majorité présidentielle coalition, Aubin Minaku, who is from Idiofa. Projection: 25%-40%.

Vital Kamerhe: Kamerhe spent over two years in Bandundu province growing up (1975-1977), and he speaks fluent Lingala and Kikongo, which many in the province understand. His recent visit to Kikwit was marred by violence as his followers clashed with Kabila supporters, but he also received messages of support from local chiefs of the Yaka community. He is likely to pick up the votes of those who are dissatisfied with Kabila but do not like Tshisekedi (see below). Projection: 10%-20%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: There is a longstanding rivalry between Tshisekedi and Gizenga, which will have a negative impact on UDPS leaders' chances among the older generation of the Pende community. Tshisekedi was a minister in several governments - including that of Mobutu - that opposed the rebellion led by Gizenga. In addition, much of the local trade is being run by Luba traders from Kasai, which has rankled those native to the province. This could count against Tshisekedi.

While Tshisekedi has also lost the support of some of the UDPS stalwarts from the province (Mboso Nkodia, Jacques Matanda), he has the endorsement of politicians like Thérèse Pakasa. He is likely to pick of the votes of those who dislike Kabila and think that Kamerhe is too close to the current president. Projection: 30%-40%.

Equateur (3,9 million votes):

This province will be interesting to watch. It voted overwhelmingly for Jean-Pierre Bemba in 2006 - 97% of the population here voted for him in the second round. But the leader of the MLC is locked up in The Hague - will his votes transfer easily to Tshisekedi, the long-standing rival of Mobutu Sese Seko, who still has many fans here? Or has Kabila been able to infiltrate the province through a network of alliances with local leaders?

Joseph Kabila: There has been little infrastructure development here over the past five years, many boat accidents and fighting in Dongo that displaced many tens of thousands. So Kabila will have a hard time standing on his record. He can, however, count on some votes due to his alliances - José Endundo, his environment minister, will get some votes in Mbandaka; other allies include Henri Lokondo and Mokolo wa Mpombo. Other former Mobutists may also provide support - on a recent trip to the province, Kabila's wife Olive stayed in houses provided by Seti Yale (former national security advisor) at every stop. Projection: 5%-25%.

Vital Kamerhe: To my knowledge, this is one part of the country where Vital has not spent much time, nor does he have many allies from here. The big exception is the secretary-general of Kamerhe's UNC party, Jean-Bertrand Ewanga, who is also the former governor of Equateur. Projection: 5%-15%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: For me, his popularity in Equateur is a question mark, given the nostalgia in some circles for Mobutu's days. Nonetheless, many will see him as the most reliable opposition candidate. His chief of staff Albert Moleka also has support here, as do his allies Ingele Ifoto and Lisanga Bonganga. Projection: 20-40%.

Others: This is a province where we can expect other presidential candidates to do well. Léon Kengo wa Dondo, Mobutu's former prime minister, may pick up a fair share of votes here (he has the endorsement of former governor José Makila), as will Nzanga Mobutu, the former Maréchal's son. I expect these dark horse candidates to win 20%-40% here. There are, however, rumors that Kengo could back Tshisekedi at the last minute, and Jean-Pierre Bemba might still throw his considerable weight behind someone.

Kasai-Occidental (2,6 million votes):

The Kasais are, of course, known as Tshisekedi's heartland. This is true to a large extent, and he will do well among the Luba (his father's community) and Lulua (his mother's community) populations. The Kasais, however, contain other communities that often have strained relations with the Luba due to historical differences and political favoritism. These communities have been arduously courted by Kabila - in Kasai-Occidental, they include the Tshokwe, Pende, and Kuba.

In 2006, Kabila ended up winning 23% of the vote here in the second round. We need to wary of these numbers, however, as voter turnout in 2006 was extremely low here (45% as compared with over 80% in most of the East) due to the UDPS boycott.

Joseph Kabila: The population has benefited from some modest infrastructure projects that have helped link parts of the province to Bandundu and Kinshasa. Kabila will use local allies to garner support, as well, in particular the speaker of the national assembly Evariste Boshab (from Mweka), minister of energy Gilbert Tshiongo (Dimbelenge) and head of migration service Francois Beya. Projection: 10%-25%.

Vital Kamerhe: Kamerhe spent some time in the Kasai provinces growing up, and speaks some Tshiluba, but many Luba still remember an unfortunate speech he gave when he was minister of information for Joseph Kabila - when asked why there were so few Luba in government, he reportedly answered: "The Luba - what importance do they have? ('Les Luba c'est quoi?')" I have not sourced this, but several Luba I have spoken with remember this. Nonetheless, Kamerhe has the support of the former governor of Kasai Occidental, Claudel Lubaya. Projection: 5%-15%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: Tshisekedi was born in Kananga, the capital of the province, and his mother his from the Lulua sub-tribe of the Luba that populates a large part of the province. In addition, he has the support of Delly Sesanga, a popular MP from Luiza. Projection: 65%-85%.

Kasai-Oriental (2,6 million votes):

Much of the same factors apply here as they do for Kasai-Occidental. Tshisekedi will be extremely popular among the Luba, but will probably fail to get the majority of votes in some other communities, including the Songye and Tetela groups in the north of the province. Kabila won 32% of the vote here in 2006, including over 80% in the territories of Lomela, Lodja and Katako-Kombe. However, the same caveat about turnout applies here: only 40% of registered voters showed up to vote here in 2006. This time, many enthusiastic first-time voters will turn out to vote, largely for Tshisekedi.

Joseph Kabila: Discontent against Kabila has been exacerbated by the decline of the state diamond company MIBA, which is based in the capital Mbuji-Mayi. There has also been a lack of infrastructure projects here, as well conflicts of land and local power. Kabila will try to gain the favor of the minoriy Tetela and Songye communities through his many prominent allies from the province: minister of information Lambert Mende (Lodja) , former minister of foreign affairs She Okitundu, popular MP Christophe Lutundula (Katako-Kombe), former head of MIBA Jonas Mukamba, minister of interior Adolphe Lumano (Kabinda), and minister of regional cooperation Raymond Tshibanda (Lomela). Projection: 10%-30%.

Vital Kamerhe: Again, he does not have many prominent allies here he can count on. Projection: 5%-10%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: His family is from Kabeya-Kamwanga, in the heart of the province, and he has a deeply loyal following here. His reputation is nothing less than that of a messiah among certain parts of the Luba community. He can also count on support from allies such as Roger Lumbala and Christian Badibangi. Projection: 65-85%.

Others: Several other presidential candidates are from the Kasais, including Oscar Kashala, who will will several percent at least here.

Province Orientale (3,8 million votes):

This province is difficult to predict, as it stretches from lowland rainforest to the highlands of Ituri and the savannahs of Haut-Uele. Kabila won big in 2006, with 70% in the first round and 79% in the second. The province is to a majority Swahili-phone, and almost half of the province's votes lie in the Ituri district. The sparsely-populated north has been the victim of LRA attacks over the past years, which will probably count against President Kabila. The electorate in the West of the province has a lot on common with Equateur (including the Lingala language), and voted for Bemba and Nzanga Mobutu in 2006.

There have been a few infrastructure projects that Kabila has taken credit for - repairs to the dirt road between Kisangani and Banalia, the urban road network in Kisangani, and the road from Beni to Kisangani. In addition, the security situation in Ituri, while still tenuous, is much better than during the war.

Joseph Kabila: He can count on the strong presence of his political party, as well as allies such as Monsignor Marini Bodho (Head of the Church of Christ in the Congo, from Ituri); John Tibasima (former head of Okimo mine, former RCD-K-ML rebel, Ituri); and Governor Médard Autsai. However, few of these people are actually very popular. Discontent with the pace of reform has been contagious, and this is one of the harder provinces to call - it has not suffered as much from conflict as the Kivus, but it has also not benefited much from development, and people want change. It may be more of a question of the strength of his candidates than the incumbent's prowess. Projection: 35%-60%.

Vital Kamerhe: Kamerhe has apparently been able to gain the endorsement of Thomas Lubanga's UPC party (why Lubanga himself is in prison in The Hague), although Tshisekedi contests this. Kamerhe is also seen as an easterner, which might help, but otherwise he is not well rooted in the province. Projection: 15%-30%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: The UDPS used to have a strong mobilization potential in Kisangani, but it is not clear to what extent they have maintained this over the years. They have not, in any case, been able to mobilize large numbers of people in the streets over the past months like in Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi and Kinshasa. He can count on the help of people like Matthieu Badjoko, the Dynamique Tshisekedi Président (DTP) campaign manager for Kisangani, and perhaps on Thomas Lubanga's UPC. Projection: 20%-40%.

Katanga (4,6 million votes):

This is Joseph Kabila's home province, and he won 93% of the votes here in the second round of 2006 elections. However, the province is far from homogenous - Kabila will stand to do well in the north, where he is from (or where his father is from, to be more precise, he has rarely been there). He will have a much harder time in the south, where tensions have been rising between the large immigrant Luba-Kasai population, which sympathizes with Tshisekedi and deeply distrusts firebrand Kabila loyalists like Kyungu wa Kumwanza. In addition, there are parts of the larger Lunda population along the border with Angola that feels marginalized - it is out of the population that a fringe has been advocating secession and rebellion.

Joseph Kabila: I can't name the many dozen stalwarts of the regime from the province. But Governor Moise Katumbi, perhaps the most popular politician in the province, has fully backed Kabila, as has Katumbi's bitter rival Jean-Claude Muyambo, who leads the Bemba community organization (he's a southerner). Defense minister Charles Mwando Simba and éminence grise of the regime Katumba Mwanke are also from the east of the province (Pweto and Moba) and will be influential in their constituencies. Projection: 55%-80%.

Vital Kamerhe: Unless I am mistaken, I don't think that Kamerhe stands much of a chance in the province outside of urban intellectuals looking for the third option (and those may also choose Kashala). Projection: 5%-15%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: There is a large Luba population in Lubumbashi, Kolwezi and Likasi. A full 25% of Lubumbashi votes for Jean-Pierre Bemba in 2006, for example. Projection: 10%-25%.

Maniema (0,9 million votes):

This sparsely populated province voted solidly for Kabila in 2006 and is likely to do so again this time around. Kabila's mother is from the province, and other parties - especially Vital Kamerhe's UNC - have had a hard time campaigning. Parts of the province have been hit by conflict, especially along the border with South Kivu in the southeast, but not as badly as the other Kivu provinces. Infrastructure projects have largely not materialized, other than a few bridges that have been built

Joseph Kabila: Should win big here, with the help of his mother and others from Maniema, including Alexis Thamwbe Mwamba (foreign minister), Kikaya bin Karubi (ambassador to United Kingdom) and General Gabriel Amisi, commander of land forces. The latter figure has been particularly influential, financing a popular soccer team in Kindu and getting involved in various businesses. Projection: 60%-80%.

Vital Kamerhe: Kamerhe is an easterner and aims at capitalizing on the lack of development in the province. He has a relatively active local party structure, but his activists have been frustrated by the security services. Projection: 15%-30%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: Tshisekedi does not have much presence here and is likely to win many votes. Projection: 5%-10%.

South Kivu (2 million votes):

This province has turned against Joseph Kabila since 2006, but the president still retains many powerful allies here. However, having won the last election on his reputation as a peacemaker and bulwark against Rwanda, the province has seen five years of continuous conflict and, more recently, a rise in prominence of Kinyarwandan-speakers in the army. The province has also not seen much in terms of infrastructure development, although the have finally finished a nice road from the airport to Bukavu, while the good dirt road (N4) from Bukavu to Kitutu is apparently still fairly good.

In any case, he will certainly not get the 98% of votes he got last time, but he does stand to hold his ground in some areas in the interior.

Joseph Kabila: This is probably the province where his effort to gain local allies has been most explicit - he has retained the support of the powerful customary chiefs of Ngweshe, Kalehe, Kabare, Luhwindja, Idjwi South/North, as well as some of the less powerful local chiefs from the lowlands areas of Shabunda, Uvira and Fizi. In a place like Luhwindja, where the Banro gold mining company has been employing people and improving infrastructure, he is likely to win a lot of votes, whereas cities like Bukavu and Uvira will be more difficult to win over. Soldiers in the army - of which there are many thousand deployed here - have also reportedly been campaigning for him. Projection: 30%-50%.

Vital Kamerhe: This is his home turf, but that may not be in his favor throughout the province. He stands to do well in his native Bukavu and Walungu, where his Shi community predominates. Tensions between the Rega and Shi population, however, will dent his success in Mwenga territory, where Kabila loyalists like Ambroise Bulambo are popular. Projection: 40%-60%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: The veteran opposition leader made an opportunistic alliance with Rwandan-backed RCD rebels during the peace deal negotiations. Many still remember that in the province and dislike him for this reason. South Kivu has never been very favorable to the UDPS, but Tshisekedi has been using people like Elias Mulungula (Mwenga) and Valentin Mubake (Bukavu/Shabunda) to campaign for him. There are also rumors that the locally popular Yakutumba rebels in Fizi territory are backing the UDPS. Projection: 5%-10%.

North Kivu (3 million votes):

This province has many internal divisions, which will be reflected in the vote. Based the north of the territory, the Nande community make up almost half of the population here, and they are a very homogenous block. This time, however, their leaders are split, with Venant Tshipasa and Apollinaire Malu Malu backing Kabila and Mbusa Nyamwisi running for Tshisekedi (and himself?). But popularity for Kabila has faded in this part of the territory, as security has deteriorated in the towns of Beni and Butembo and the economy has suffered, as well.

In the south of the province, the CNDP political party and soldiers have been overtly campaigning for Kabila, especially in Masisi territory. Kabila is therefore likely to win votes in the Tutsi community (although perhaps not in urban areas), as well as in the Hutu community, where customary chiefs have backed him, as well. Other, less numerous communities like the Hunde, Nyanga and Tembo are less likely to vote for him.

2006 results: 78% first round, 96% second round for Kabila.

Joseph Kabila: In addition to the above, he has received the backing of Jean-Luc Mutokambali, Sekimonyo wa Magango, Eugene Serufuli, Mwene Songa and Mwami Ndeze (Hutu community); the Rwakabuba family, CNDP and Edouard Mwangachuchu (Tutsi community); the implicit support of Abbé Malu Malu and Archbishop Sikuli (Nande community). Like in South Kivu, soldiers in the national army have been campaigning for Kabila's re-election, as well. Projection: 30%-56%.

Vital Kamerhe: He is also an easterner, and during his trips to Goma he has been greeted by large crowds. The capital of the province has a large Shi population (up to a quarter of the town), which helps Kamerhe here. He does not have big-name allies in the province, however. Projection: 30%-40%.

Etienne Tshisekedi: He has made some inroads into the Nande with Mbusa Nyamwisi's support, but is otherwise not very well known here. Projection: 10%-25%.

If you take these projections and weight them by the population of the provinces, you can conclude that it will be a close race between Kabila and Tshisekedi. Turnout will be crucial, as will the extent to which disaffection with the current government will translate into votes for opposition candidates. A last-minute endorsement by Bemba and coalitions among opposition candidates could also sway the vote.

Kabila rallies popular musicians behind him

2011-11-13T00:43:00.000-08:00

In a country that is crazy about music, politicians have always courted the support of popular musicians. And musicians have often complied, preferring to take their money and avoid problems with those in power. This election season is no different - the criticisms of yesteryear have fallen away and even previously skeptical singers like Koffi Olomide and Papa Wemba are throwing their talents behind Joseph Kabila's campaign. In fact, of the most popular singers, I think only Fally Ipupa and Ferre Gola have not endorsed Kabila's campaign. As far as I can remember, Kabila has been able to rally more singers behind him this time than in 2006.

Here is a list of the singers who have thrown their weight behind Kabila: Koffi Olomide, Felix Wazekwa, JB Mpiana, Werrason, Papa Wemba, Karmapa, Tshala Muana, Reddy Amisi, Blaise Bula and Lutumba Simaron.

Tshisekedi in South Africa: What happened?

2011-11-12T05:09:00.000-08:00

Before arriving in Kisangani on Thursday evening, opposition candidate Etienne Tshisekedi spent much of the first two weeks of the election campaign in South Africa. What was he up to?

According to the man himself, he was seeking political and financial support from the ruling ANC and businessmen. He reportedly met at least once with Gwede Mantashe, the Secretary-General of the ANC, and by Thursday could boast that he had been able to rent a DC-3, a small passenger jet and a helicopter. These assets are key, given the dearth of commercial jets in the Congo (the UDPS says the government is hogging commercial air assets, others say there this is just due to the lack of aircraft since Hewa Bora's license was suspended in July this year, leaving only CAA flying domestically).

This has set off speculation in domestic and diplomatic circles that Tshisekedi has received support from President Jacob Zuma's government. Some also point to the fact that the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is fielding more election observers than the EU, the AU and Carter Center, and the head of this mission is Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, wife of Charles Nqakula, who is a close adviser to President Zuma and his envoy to Sudan and Zimbabwe (and previously Burundi).

But it's not so simple. After all, the same day Tshisekedi flew to Kisangani, South African authorities announced that a new deal would be signed today (November 12) on the Grand Inga hydroelectric dam between their national electricity provider Eskom and the Congolese electricity company, which could provide up to 40,000 MW of electricity, the largest such dam in the world. But this is merely an MoU, which may lead to a formal agreement in six months, and negotiations have been ongoing since 2004 on similar projects. Despite the tentative nature of the agreement, President Zuma will be in Lubumbashi today to officially sign the MoU.

Was it merely a coincidence that Tshisekedi was in South Africa just before the deal was signed with Kabila? If Zuma did provide support to the opposition, how can this be squared with a trip that will be interpreted as an endorsement of Kabila's candidacy?

Some analysts I spoke with suggested that the South Africans were using Tshisekedi as leverage to squeeze a deal out of the Congolese (even though the Congolese could always renege, as they have in the past). Others say that Tshisekedi was really in South Africa for medical treatment (speculation about his health never abates), and his aircraft were not provided by Pretoria after all.

Relations between Presidents Zuma and Kabila have been through many twists and turns. Some of the powerbrokers around Kabila, in particular Katumba Mwanke, were reportedly closer to the Thabo Mbeki wing of the ANC during his leadership struggle against Jacob Zuma in 2009, and were viewed with some suspicion when Zuma won this struggle.

Shortly afterwards, however, news broke that two hitherto unknown companies in the British Virgin Islands, Caprikat and Foxwhelp, had obtained oil blocks in the Congo previously held by Irish company Tullow. Who was listed as the representatives of the two companies? None other than Khulubuse Zuma, the president's nephew, and Michael Hulley, the president's lawyer (who was promoted this week to be his official legal counsel). Possibly also involved - albeit indirectly - was Tokyo Sekwale, a prominent ANC businessman and minister.

Were these oil blocks peace offerings by Kabila to the South Africans? It isn't clear, but one of the other companies that lost out in this deal was Divine Inspiration, which allegedly had links to the Mbeki-faction of the ANC.

South Africa is a key partner for the Congolese government. It is the largest economy in the region and the base for many of the mining companies operating in the Congo.

So who are they backing? I couldn't say, and obviously some of this is speculation. But it wouldn't be too bizarre if they were backing more than one horse. Angola (Pretoria biggest competitor in the region) allegedly made a similar move earlier this year, when they provided some support to Vital Kamerhe (or strategically leaked information in this regard). Shortly afterwards, the Congolese government announced that they would hold off on pursuing their claims to offshore oil blocks - that are currently being managed by Angola - until 2014.

Guest blog: Taking stock of the China deal

2011-11-10T03:42:00.000-08:00

This is a guest blog by Johanna Jansson, a PhD candidate in International Development Studies at the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark. Her PhD project explores the DRC’s relations with its emerging and traditional development partners.

The ‘China deal’, the minerals-for-infrastructure agreement struck in 2007 between the DRC and China, is one of the most well-known embodiments of the increasing Chinese presence on the African continent.

Most of you are familiar with the story. By means of a barter-type agreeement, the Sino-Congolese mining joint venture (JV), Sino–Congolais des Mines (Sicomines), was created and allocated mining titles in Katanga. In exchange for access to mining titles, Sicomines will construct transport and social infrastructure in the DRC, financed by loans from the Chinese state-owned bank China Export–Import (Exim) Bank. The loans are to be reimbursed by means of the profits from the mining venture. The mining titles allocated are the Mashamba West and Dikuluwe copper- and cobalt concessions.

The agreement was contested during 2008 and 2009 by a range of domestic and international actors. Among the concerns raised, the most salient pertained to a lack of transparency in the negotiation process, concerns for debt sustainability and a claim that the agreement was skewed in favour of the Chinese party. The Sicomines episode became known worldwide since it provoked the perhaps most conspicuous (geo) political controversy seen to date between an African country’s traditional (IMF) and emerging (China) external partners. The 2009 settlement was in favour of the IMF’s preferences: the loan towards infrastructure was capped at US$ 3 billion and the guarantee provided by the Congolese state for the reimbursement of the China Exim Bank loan to the commercial mining venture was removed.

The agreement is now under implementation (refer to the table below for an overview of the infrastructure projects implemented). The mining venture is slated to come into production in 2012-2013 and reach full capacity in 2016.

In a recent paper for the South African Institute of International Affairs, I take a close look at the agreement from its inception in 2007 to the state of implementation as of May 2011. The paper draws on field work in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi in September-October 2008, February-March and October 2009 and February-May 2011. I have conducted interviews with Congolese respondents from government departments, civil society and the private sector; Chinese respondents from state-owned and private enterprises and the Chinese Embassy; and representatives from international governmental and non-governmental organisations, the diplomatic community and observers. Around 50 of my 130 interviews concerned the Sicomines agreement specifically.

In the paper, I argue that the Sicomines episode reflects the contemporary changes in China’s role globally. The power configurations of the global political economy shifted significantly from 2007 when the agreement was first signed to 2009 when it was renegotiated. China’s ascension as a global leader was fast-tracked by the global economic downturn. Its position as an external actor to reckon with in the DRC is now consolidated, a development which in itself signifies change in the DRC’s international relations. Yet, the Sicomines agreement also represents continuity in that regard, since it was amended to the benefit of the policy preferences of the IMF. The revision came about for several reasons which I outline in the paper. The most important is that China, with its strong strategic interest in taking up an active role in the IMF, had to balance its goals in the DRC and in the IMF. The lobbying efforts of the traditional donors, also members of the IMF’s board, therefore had the desired effect of making China agree to a downsizing of the agreement.

Since the Sicomines agreement was revised in 2009, it has slipped down the agenda and is no longer subject of a great deal of Kinshasa’s attention. “It’s under implementation, and it’s going slower than the Congolese government would have wanted”, seems to be the assessment of most people, Congolese and expatriates, I’ve talked to this year. Yet, many questions around what the agreement actually meant and means for the DRC remain both undebated and unanswered.

A matter that I find deserves to be opened up is the perception that the downsizing of the agreement was primarily made for debt sustainability reasons. It was part of the considerations, rightly so, but there is more to that story. I show in the paper that despite the fact that the quantity of minerals contained by the mining concessions is uncertain, even IMF and World Bank staff has observed that the repayment margin for the loan to be contracted under the 2009 version of the agreement is important. A second tranche of lending towards infrastructure may thus have been within the reimbursement capacity of the Sicomines JV. In other words, a loan larger than US$ 3 billion could have been justified. The halving of the credit line to be extended by China Exim Bank towards infrastructure refurbishment therefore needs to be read as more than a result of debt sustainability concerns. It is also an expression of the IMF’s and the traditional donor community’s preferences in terms of how investments in the mining sector should be structured: that investments should be channelled through the Mining Code, the companies should pay taxes and public goods should be provided by the state. By means of the renegotiation of the Sicomines agreement, this model partly trumped the original developmental-state approach: a credit line extended by a state-owned bank providing up-front financing of turnkey infrastructure projects, and reimbursements on that loan replacing payment of profit taxes. Both approaches have their pros and cons in the Congolese context, and I discuss this further in the paper.

Lastly and importantly, I find that there is a strange discrepancy between the enormous attention devoted by the international community to the issue prior to October 2009 and today’s relative silence. After all, the amendments made in 2009 only encompassed a cap on the infrastructure loans. US$ 3 billion of loans are still to be contracted by the DRC, and the real story in terms of the DRC getting value for ‘money’ (mining titles) will in this case be determined by the implementation of the infrastructure projects. As my paper shows, and as indicated by the table below, one project is completed, eight are under implementation and six projects are under negotiation. For the remainder of projects, the disbursement pace will be determined by the profitability of the mine. The selection of specific projects and the terms of these (most notably the price) are determined in negotiations between the Chinese parties in Kinshasa and Beijing on the one hand, and the Bureau for Coordination and Monitoring of the Sino-Congolese Programme (Bureau de Coordination et de Suivi du Programme Sino-Congolais) and the Congolese Agency for Public Works (Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux) on the other. Anyone interested in whether or not the Sicomines agreement is a ‘good deal’ for the DRC – this is where to take a closer look over the years to come.

State of implementation of the infrastructure projects financed through the Sicomines agreement

This table is reproduced from Jansson, J. (2011). “The Sicomines agreement: change and continuity in the DRC’s international relations”. Occasional paper, October. Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs.

Project	Measure	Contractor	Status as of June 2011	Cost ($ million)
The road between Beni and Niania, North Kivu	Refurbishment	Sinohydro	Completed and evaluated	57
Boulevard Triomphale, Kinshasa		CREC	Underway, about to be completed	N/A
Boulevard Sendwe, Kinshasa		CREC	Underway, about to be completed	N/A
Central hospital (Hôpital du Cinquantenaire), Kinshasa	Construction	Sinohydro	Underway, estimated inauguration October 2011	200
Part 1 of the Boulevard du 30 juin, Kinshasa	Refurbishment	CREC	Underway, about to be completed	N/A
Part 2 of the Boulevard du 30 juin, Kinshasa			Underway	N/A
Tourism Avenue, Kinshasa				24.4
Lutendele Road, Kinshasa				21
The road between Lubumbashi and Kasomeno, Katanga province				138
15 km of road in Butembo, North Kivu province		Sinohydro	Not yet started	30
Part 1 of the esplanade in front of the People’s Palace, Kinshasa				19
Part 2 of the esplanade in front of the People’s Palace, Kinshasa				Not negotiated at the time of the 2011 field research
Avenue de la Paix, Kinshasa
Avenue Ndjoku, Kinshasa
The road between Bukavu and Kamaniola

Source: Johanna Jansson’s personal interviews in Kinshasa with ACGT representatives, 15 February 2011 and 3 February 2009; a representative for one of the Chinese companies within Sicomines, 3 May 2011; and with BCPSC representatives, 23 February 2009 and 3 March 2009.

North Kivu Simmering on Eve of Elections

2011-11-09T10:47:00.000-08:00

I have said previously on this blog that North Kivu would probably not be as marred by electoral violence as the hotbeds of opposition in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi and Kananga. I was wrong.

The electoral divide in the East, which has pitted Kabila loyalists against Vital Kamerhe, has dangerously overlapped with pre-existing ethnic and political rifts. In particular, rwandophone candidates from the Hutu and Tutsi community have been resorting to divisive rhetoric. Human Rights Watch reported that Sylvain Seninga, who is campaigning for re-election as a national MP, said in a public speech on March 25 that Rwandophones should "free themselves from this domination, this slavery," that had been imposed on them "by a little people that does not even know the origins of its ancestors."

In September, another local Hutu leader, Nyunga Munyamariba, told a crowd in Masisi that "whoever does not vote for the Rwandophone candidates must be eliminated." In October, army officer Colonel Mudahunga told a crowd that had gathered for the opening of a new army center that if Vital Kamerhe is found voting in Rutshuru and Masisi territories "he will be shot."

Many of these people are linked to either former Governor Eugene Serufuli or to the ex-CNDP, and locally people are speaking of the rebirth of the "rwandophonie," a coalition of Hutu and Tutsi populations that was stitched together under the diligent watch of Serufuli and his Rwandan allies during RCD rule in the province (1998-2006). Many of them are now closely allied to President Kabila - the CNDP political party, for example, has endorsed Kabila, and ex-CNDP officers have been informally campaigning for him, in particular in Masisi and Rutshuru, where many of them are from. They point to the UDPS' anti-Rwandan statements and Vital Kamerhe's notorious opposition to the joint Congolese-Rwandan military operations in 2009 that integrated the CNDP into the army.

This campaigning has infuriated other segments of the population, in particular the Hunde community, which has felt under occupation by the CNDP in Masisi for some years (this is the main lament of the APCLS armed group of Col. Janvier). They claim that the CNDP is further encroaching on their land - indeed, the more radical Hunde suggest that none of the Hutu and Tutsi of Masisi, who are largely descendents of immigrants from Rwanda between 1930-1960, have customary rights to land there.

These tensions erupted into violence during the last week, when the popular Hunde singer Fabrice Mumpfiritsa was kidnapped by armed men from his recording studio in Goma. He had previously supported Joseph Kabila, but recently switched sides and began singing in praise of the opposition. After his disappearance, members of the Hunde community in Goma, but also in Masisi, set up road blocks and began protesting. A web petition was set up, titled "Give us Back our Poet." Police and soldiers cleared the streets by shooting in the air, and the UN injured one demonstrator by shooting him in the leg.

By Monday morning, Fabrice had been found, battered and bruised, in a suburb of Goma. According to some sources, a government delegation, aware of the outrage his kidnapping had caused, was in Goma today to help take him to South Africa for medical treatment.

Where Tshisekedi is Coming From

2011-11-09T01:04:00.000-08:00

I should add that some of the incidents of abuse reported below have not been confirmed and, according to reliable sources, may have been less serious than described below. However, a report released by the UN today documents many more abuses linked to the electoral process that have taken place over the past year.

Like myself, many Congolese and foreign observers were taken aback by Etienne Tshisekedi's interview, broadcast on local TV last Sunday, in which he called on his supporters to "mobilize everywhere and set free the supporters...and break all the prisons." He also said "we don’t need to wait for the elections. In a democracy, whoever has the power is the majority of the people. Therefore, from this day on I am the Head of State of the DRC."

Could this really be the same Tshisekedi who had suffered torture, persecution and internal exile under Mobutu and Laurent-Désiré Kabila? Who had insisted on non-violent resistance when everybody else was forming armed groups? As critical as many have been about Tshisekedi's tactics in the past (his Cap-Martin reconciliation with Mobutu, his alliance with Rwanda/RCD-G in 2002, his boycott of the 2006 elections), this interview came as a shock.

But should it really have? For the past months, the UDPS has faced obstacle after obstacle in its preparations for elections. Demanding transparency in the voter register and better access to the election commission, UDPS supporters have demonstrated in Kinshasa every Thursday for the past six weeks, with little reaction from either the UN or the government. The demonstrations often deteriorated into street battles with the police and thugs - at least three of their supporters died and several dozen are in prison. None of these arrests have been carried out according to due process, but the minister of justice and public prosecutor have not responded to repeated UDPS letters.

UDPS posters have been torn down in public places, especially in Place Victoire, and on one occasion men in plain clothes open fire on people who had just distributed posters and flyers of Tshisekedi at Rond Point Ngaba.

The government has booked many of the country's few planes (there is only one commercial airliner still flying), making it difficult for opposition parties to fly their members around the country - this was one of the purposes of Tshisekedi's visit to South Africa, where has was able to secure the lease of a DC-3, a small jet and a helicopter.

Violent repression has also taken place in the provinces. On October 28, a UDPS demonstration was reportedly broken up by the bodyguards of Governor Kasanji, resulting in the deaths of two minors and the arrests of several supporters. On November 4, the seat of the UDPS in Kisantu (Bas-Congo) was set on fire by unidentified assailants. On November 5/6, UDPS and UNAFEC parties traded insults in Lubumbashi, resulting in the sacking of the UNAFEC office and an attack on UDPS installations - one UDPS supporter died.

Given this backdrop, Tshisekedi's statement is rendered more understandable, albeit not any more forgivable. His party is under pressure from the authorities, suffering from a lack of funds (the home page of his campaign features a video of Tshisekedi asking for contributions) and behind schedule in its campaign. He may well think that he needs to radicalize his message and step up his confrontation with the government, sending a signal to his supporters that he will stand firm. Two analysts sympathetic to Tshisekedi have written to me, both suggesting that his interview amounted to "psy-ops."

What, however, is the endgame? Is it merely to motivate his followers and project an image of strength as they go into the last round? (Ali taunting Foreman, "Is that all you got, George? My Grandma punches harder than you...") Or will the UDPS actively seek out violence to create a political crisis and pressure the government?

We shall see. I hope it's not the latter.

Transcript of Tshisekedi interview

2011-11-08T13:30:00.000-08:00

CANDIDATE ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI WA MULUMBA PHONE INTERVIEW ON RLTV PROGRAM “SET 7” SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 6 2011.

Original language: Lingala. This is an unofficial English transcript.

Reporter: The echoes are raging in Kinshasa that you are still in South Africa to establish contacts with the ANC, the party with which you plan to collaborate in managing Congo tomorrow,and, in addition, in Kinshasa, Kisangani, the people are growing impatient and would like to know when you will be back home because it’s already been more than a week since the campaign has begun, there are many problems in Congo, the problems of planes…He will present his schedule, the program of Kisangani, Lubumbashi and we will give his telephone number to the public, the Congolese are impatient to know when you will return to Congo !

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: By mid-week I will be in Kisangani, so there is no problem. But those who say that Kabila would stop my aircraft from landing in Congo, they know nothing about the real situation, Kabila does not represent anything anymore. There is only him and his wife left, because he is not even the minority leader any longer. For this same minority has sold him out! Guys like Boshab, Mende currently have a double standard talk, in the morning they talk one way and another at night. Finally, they let him go. Therefore he can’t prevent the majority leader’s aircraft from landing, because in a democracy, it is the majority who leads and I'm the head of the majority. So, I'm the President of the DRC, I am the actual Head of State.

Reporter: “Son of the country“ E. Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, here we are swarmed by Congolese people who came to listen to you live. They ask you to repeat your last statements.

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: As I said, we don’t need to wait for the elections. In a democracy, whoever has the power is the majority of the people. And the people of Congo, in its majority have chosen and trust Tshisekedi. Therefore, from this day on I am the Head of State of the DRC.

Reporter: “Son of the country“ E. Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, since we have put up your campaign ads where you say “People come first“, people answer Tshisekedi comes first, it has become a form of greeting in Kinshasa. But yesterday, did you get the news from Katanga? Where supporters of a party have gone to bother and fight the opposition’s supporters, what do you say to that?

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: First, you must know that this problem doesn’t come from another party, these incidents are to be blamed on Unafec, a party whose president is a foreigner, a Portuguese named Doliveira. He calls himself NKIUNGU to pretend make believe he is Congolese, he isn’t Congolese, he’s Portuguese.

Second, I just said that I am the Head of the Congo because I have the majority. The Congolese, or rather the compatriots who are in Lubumbashi and in all of Katanga, know well that the majority, well, that’s them! And in a democracy, power is in the hands of the majority and not the minority. Thus, they shouldn’t have left a small handful of people led by a "lunatic, a foreigner" who’s making up the laws over there. They had to teach them a lesson and follow them to their retrenchment because the majority cannot always complain.

Also, I take this opportunity to tell the so-called leaders of Congo who are listening to me that I have learned our brothers in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi, Lubumbashi are imprisoned. Therefore, I give them 48 hours, next Tuesday at noon I would like to receive the news that no opponent remains in prison. If it is not so, Tuesday at noon, I will ask my base wherever they are, in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi, Kananga and Lubumbashi to mobilize everywhere and set free the supporters and other opponents and break all the prisons.

And if unfortunately, police officers and other soldiers come to bother them, then they should be taught a lesson. And if they flee to the camps they should be hunted all the way out there and followed to their camp where they will receive a good punishment even in front of their family!

Reporter: So you're saying if by Tuesday, supporters and opponents are not freed, you will give the order to the Congolese who are your base to take responsibility! Therefore to go free them by force and that no one is to interfere with them. But the big question remains in Congo when will you return to Congo?

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: Isn’t Kisangani in Congolese territory?

Reporter: But which day will you land in Kisangani?

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: I said earlier in the middle of the week that is now starting, since then I will have finished my errands. Once this is done, I will give precision 48 hours ahead because I will come with my own plane, so there is no problem.

Reporter: So what do you say to the Congolese regarding the elections?

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: For the elections, the message is simple as I said earlier the Head of the country remains the Congolese people, so Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba we ensure the electoral process in our country.

Mr NGOY MULUNDA, if he does not pay attention to everything we tell him he will cry in his mother tongue on December 6.

Therefore rest assured, as it is you who have the election in your hands, it is you that are going to choose, no more worrying about having insomnia, do not worry and sleep like babies! Now talk to my advisor BONA who will give you my number to be in contact with you and therefore receive all election-related concerns generated either by the PPRD, the CSAC and others.

Advisor BONA: 0027790893872.

Tshisekedi delivers firebrand interview, provokes controversy

2011-11-07T13:52:00.000-08:00

In an interview broadcast Sunday evening on Radio Lisanga TV, a station close to the opposition, Etienne Tshisekedi stirred controversy and radicalized the tone of the election campaign.

I have transcribed and translated what I could hear of the interview in the below clip. Speaking from South Africa, where he has reportedly been since the beginning of the election campaign ten days ago, he denied that the Congolese government had refused his plane a landing permission, thereby contradicting his own party spokesman.

He went on to say that Kabila is all alone, that only his wife is still with him. Most controversially, he self-proclaimed himself president, saying that since the majority of the people was with him, from today on he was the president of the Congo.

In another part of the interview that I haven't heard, he allegedly said: "I call on supporters (combattants) everywhere in the country to go to the prisons, to break down the doors and to liberate my supporters." He continued: ""I'm giving a 48-hour deadline for all opposition prisoners to be released. Past that deadline, I will ask the population to attack prisons and free them, and as president, I'm ordering prison guards not to resist."

He was apparently referring to his supporters who had been arrested during recent demonstrations. This prompted the government to shut down the TV station, which belongs to the opposition MP and former rebel leader Roger Lumbala.

The UDPS has confirmed that the interview was authentic. Later, on the BBC Swahili service, I heard a UDPS representative explaining the interview, saying that, "It is normal for a candidate to boast like this."Roger Lumbala himself argued that Tshisekedi was referring to Kabila's slogan "With Rais [Kabila's nickname]...100% certain," saying that it we he and not Kabila who was sure to win.

This interview has already caused controversy on the internet and in the streets of Kinshasa.

Tshisekedi has been criticized for spending a third of the short election month abroad seeking funds and transport in South Africa, while his competitors campaign at home. It may be that this absence and the lack of funds prompted him to radicalize his message and to openly seek confrontation. Will his supporters take to the streets tomorrow? Will the government take further legal action against the UDPS or RLTV?

Here is the speech:

Translation:

"Those who say that Kabila prevented my plane from landing do not understand the situation. Kabila no longer represents anyone, but his wife. People like Boshab [president of the national assembly] and Mende [minister of information], who started elsewhere and talk with both sides of the mouth, say one thing during the day and another at night, have now abandoned him. He is alone with his wife, as you can see. So I say we need not wait for the elections. In a democracy, power rests with the popular majority. Since the majority of the Congolese people is with Tshisekedi and trusts Tshisekedi, from now on, I am the Head of State. Regarding the elections, my message is simple as I have said. Starting today, it’s the Congolese people who are the authority of the country. It’s Tshisekedi Etienne, no one else. If Mr. Ngoy Mulunda does not listen to what we are saying, he will be weeping in his native language come December 6 [the date election results are announced]."

Some violence, but little stumping as the campaign begins

2011-11-06T13:16:00.000-08:00

This post has been updated: The popular Hunde singer Fabrice was reportedly taken from his recording studio by intelligence agents on Friday evening, allegedly because he refused to sing for President Kabila's campaign. He was released in the early hours of Monday morning and is currently in hospital, receiving treatment. (h/t Kris)

The election campaign is into its second week now, with only modest campaigning by the main presidential contenders and some disturbing violence.

Even before the campaign official began, groups such as Human Rights Watch and the Congolese umbrella group Act for Peaceful and Transparent Elections (AETA), were warning of violence and hate speech. Human Rights Watch pointed to UNAFEC, a party with a strong following in Katanga, which was using hate speech against outsiders, in particular Kasaians. On April 31, Kyungu is reported to have said in a public speech: "There are too many mosquitoes in the living room. We have to spray some insecticide." This past week, at the beginning of the campaign, Kyungu conveyed again his belief that only "children of Katanga" should run for parliamentary seats there.

This hate speech has degenerated into violence on several occasions. In August, UNAFEC members attacked the UDPS office in Lubumbashi, damaging some cars and buildings (there were also allegations of UDPS provocations). Then, two days ago, UNAFEC reportedly clashed with UDPS supporters on their way to a Kyungu rally in Lubumbashi - it is not clear who provoked whom first, but apparently several UDPS supporters were beaten up.

Kyungu and his party are known for their militant youth wing and their hostile views toward Kasaians.

Meanwhile, in Kinshasa last Wednesday armed men opened fire on a group of people who had reportedly just finished distributing UDPS posters, seriously injuring two people. And just this evening, two political parties faced off in Kinshasa, throwing stones at each other. Over the past weeks, the UDPS has faced off with both the police and PPRD supporters in Kinshasa, resulting in several deaths and many injured.

Finally, in Goma just this evening there has been unrest with reports of shooting in the Katindo neighborhood. It's not yet clear what the source of troubles is, but some reports suggest that a popular musician from the Hunde ethnic community has been enlisted to sing for the presidential campaign, which did not go down well among other members of the community, who protested in the streets and tore up posters of Joseph Kabila.

(I am leaving out unrest in Mbuji-Mayi and inflammatory speech by opposition radios in Equateur).

While there appears to be plenty of violence, there is little positive, issues-based campaigning. In fact, there is little campaigning at all by presidential candidates. Of the three main presidential contenders (Tshisekedi-Kabila-Kamerhe), only Kabila has been visible, launching his campaign in his mother's home province of Maniema. Kabila is also by far the most visible in terms of posters and advertisements - he has bought all of the front-lit billboards in Kinshasa, making him the only candidate visible at night in the capital.

Tshisekedi is not even in the country, claiming that his plane was refused a landing permit in Kisangani (the civil aviation authority denies this). Last I heard, he was still in South Africa. Kamerhe began his campaign in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo. But it seems that the opposition campaigns have suffered substantially from a lack of funds, as well as transport difficulties - only one airline (CAA) is still making domestic flights since a crash prompted Hewa Bora's license to be suspended.

Guest blog: US should not repeat Ugandan failures against the LRA

2011-10-22T00:25:00.000-07:00

This guest blog was written by Ledio Cakaj. He has worked almost exclusively on the LRA conflict for the last three years as a consultant with various organizations. Most recently he was part of an international group of experts looking into possible ways to deal with the LRA.

On 14 October 2011, President Obama announced in a letter to Congress his decision to deploy “a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces … to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield.”

Kony is the founder and leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group which for more than two decades waged civil conflict in Northern Uganda before moving to bases in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006. Since the end of 2008 the Ugandan army with significant US support, has hunted the highly mobile LRA in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. The aid from the US over the last three years includes logistics and intelligence to the Ugandans to the tune of about $40 million.

US troop deployment to central Africa is part of a larger US strategy to deal with the LRA that was unveiled on 24 November 2010. Obama’s recent announcement and the related media fanfare just shy of the strategy’s one-year anniversary are somewhat anachronistic, given that the current campaign against the LRA has largely stalled. Total numbers of armed LRA combatants today are virtually unchanged compared to last November – at about 350 – and the leadership of the rebel group remains intact.

In the meantime LRA groups have conducted numerous accounts in all three countries. Since December 2008, the LRA has purportedly killed over 3,000 people and caused the displacement of 440,000. The majority of killings and displacements have taken place in DRC.

Friction between the pursuing Ugandan troops and the regional armies, particularly the Congolese (FARDC), is one of many reasons for the shortcomings of the current efforts. Despite public pronouncements from Kampala and Kinshasa hailing the Ugandan-Congolese cooperation, the situation on the ground is dire. A recent Ugandan army internal report stated that FARDC troops have openly threatened to shoot Ugandan soldiers in DRC while a Congolese army officer told a journalist that the Ugandans were intent on looting Congolese resources. Ugandan officials accuse some FARDC commanders originating from the Kivus of being pro-Rwanda and anti-Uganda. The history of the Ugandan-Rwandese conflict played out in Congolese territory in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the abuses by both sides are firmly rooted at the heart of the current hostilities.

The willingness and ability of the Ugandans to capture Kony and his commanders is also a likely negative factor. Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni has repeatedly vowed to crush the LRA militarily – and systematically failed to do so – since the rebel group came to life in 1988. Reports from the last ten years have implicated Ugandans officers in engaging in illegal mineral extraction in DRC and logging in South Sudan. It is possible that a predilection on the part of Ugandan army officers to first look for possible business deals then focus on the LRA hunt has contributed to the conflict’s longevity.

US soldiers on the ground could help to provide some transparency in the LRA operations and perhaps a rapprochement between the Ugandans and the Congolese. Supplied with sophisticated communication technology US troops should be able to provide real time intelligence on the movements of LRA groups as well as the behavior of the Congolese and Ugandan soldiers. But claims that the US troops will help quickly finish the job the Ugandans started 23 years ago are most likely a serious exaggeration. Contrary to commonly held views of the LRA as a group of rag-tag bandits, Kony’s men are well-trained, disciplined and capable of enduring extreme hardships while covering large swathes of inhospitable territory.

While US engagement is welcome as it brings much needed attention to a largely neglected conflict, the current approach might need rethinking. In its existing form, the US has comprehensively adopted the unsuccessful Ugandan policy of all-out war without appearing to question its merits or fully appreciating potential repercussions. The risk of overemphasizing the military offensive at the expense of encouraging defections of LRA combatants or enhancing civilian protection strategies cannot be overstated.

History has shown that a focus on a military solution alone has done little to end the LRA war, while simultaneously increasing violence to civilians, a strategy preferred by LRA commanders when feeling cornered. Rather than focusing exclusively on advising Ugandan soldiers how to capture or kill Kony, the US troops should help devise and carry out better strategies to protect civilians and encourage LRA fighters to leave the ranks.

The US strategy seems also to have espoused the Ugandan modus operandi of military operations against the LRA with no particular time frame, contingency plans and end-game scenarios. For the strategy to have a high chance of success, US planners need to match the LRA’s adaptability and quick thinking. Peacefully engaging LRA commanders and resuming peace talks with the top leadership of the LRA are options that should be considered either as concurrent to or as alternatives to the military approach.

Kony might still refuse to sign a peace deal, but luring his commanders out can be more devastating to the LRA than direct military action. The LRA has been greatly damaged during peaceful negotiations in the past as we have been able to learn a great deal about the otherwise secretive rebel group. Peace talks have also directly led to the defection of a few high profile commanders.

Not too long ago, my colleague Philip Lancaster argued in this forum that a serious analysis of the LRA had not been conducted by any of the militaries involved. Hopefully, the US military advisers can fill that gap and in the process help provide a flexible roadmap for ending this long and bloody conflict for good.

Despite assurances, election date in doubt

2011-10-19T13:55:00.000-07:00

Over the past weeks, Congolese officials have repeatedly insisted that they would be able to hold elections on November 28, as planned. Most recently, President Kabila himself, in a rare press conference yesterday in his office, explicitly confirmed the date.

Nonetheless, behind the scenes diplomats are expressing serious doubts, which two reports released this past week reinforce. (Also see this Reuters report)

The Congolese umbrella group Agir pour des élections libres et transparentes (AETA) concluded in a recent report that "we are worried by disturbing signs regarding the capacity of the electoral commission to master the logistical, technical, political and security challenges in order to be able to respect the election date of 28 November 2011." The Atlanta-based Carter Center released a similar conclusion two days ago, saying that "scheduling and logistical tasks pose a serious threat to the election date."

There are various reasons for the delay. The voter registration process took two months longer than expected, ending on July 15. There was then a delay in the ordering and printing of ballots, in part due to the suppliers in China and Germany; in part due to the huge number of candidates (18,386 for the legislative elections). While the electoral kits are being deployed throughout the country at the moment, the 120,000 ballot boxes still have not been delivered from China, and the ballots are only now being printed in South Africa.

According to diplomats, UN logistical officers have been saying for weeks that it will be almost impossible to deploy all the materials in time (other UN officials, however, insist that there is still enough time), while new litmuses keep on being set; the last one suggested that if the ballot boxes had not arrived by the beginning of this week, there should be a delay in the elections.

These delays are pushing the electoral calendar into dangerous territory. According to the electoral law, the voter roll has to be published one month ahead of the election campaign, i.e. by September 28. This has only happened over the past few days on the electoral commission's new website. But a much more dangerous line will be crossed if elections themselves cannot be held by November 28, as the opposition is already saying it will not recognize the president anymore after December 6, when his constitutional term runs out.

Both reports press the electoral commission to begin thinking about a Plan B - what should be done if the current schedule cannot be met. The AETA report already calls for a national debate on possible delays. Several months ago already, the International Crisis Group already called for the main political parties to agree on a transitional period that would allow for a delay, a call echoed by one of the main Congolese human rights groups, ASADHO. At least one presidential candidate agrees, Oscar Kashala, as does the leader of the RCD, Azarias Ruberwa.

Nonetheless, President Kabila and the election commission Mulunda Ngoy still insist on November 28. For the moment, no diplomat seems to disagree with them, at least not in public.

Elections Update

2011-10-13T23:17:00.000-07:00

I have been posting irregularly over the past few weeks. Here are some stories you may have missed over the last week that relate to elections.

1. Attack on Lukolela: Compared to many incidents in the East, this attack seemed minor, but has a strongn symbolic value. According to Kinshasa, on October 6 an armed group attacked the fishing village of Lukolela, along the border with The Republic of Congo (ROC) around 500 km from the capital Kinshasa. Five of the attackers were arrested, allegedly carrying residency permits from the ROC and signed orders from General Faustin Munene, a dissident DR Congolese officer.

Immediately, the ROC government dismissed the claims as a set-up by the DRC government, saying "if those who are organizing the elections are not ready, they should say so, but they need to leave others out of this." Its minister of interior scoffed at the idea that the attackers had signed orders from General Munene, wondering how Munene could sign orders if he is in prison in their capital Brazzaville.

In response, Kinshasa sent a large delegation of 21 officials to Brazzaville to show them proof of the attack.

This back-and-forth comes to the backdrop of tense relations between the two countries. DRC officials have suggested that the armed men who attacked the presidential residence in February came from across the river, and Brazzaville has still not responded to an extradition request for DRC's two main western rebel leaders: General Munene and Udjani Mangbama. ROC President Sassou Nguesso visited Kinshasa in April to discuss these security issues with his counterpart, but no concrete steps have been taken to ameliorate relations.

2. Gizenga finally makes his move: Just days after his 86th birthday, Antoine Gizenga, former prime minister and the head of the PALU political party, declared his support for Joseph Kabila's candidacy. A declaration had been long awaited, as PALU had previously just said they would support the "party of the left." Gizenga made clear that Kabila had won that label, and that he was the only "Lumumbist" candidate in the running. None of these labels mean much to most Congolese, or they think they are window-dressing for political expediency.

The alliance is important, as Gizenga helped Kabila will over 60% of the vote in Bandundu province, where he is revered almost as a saint by many, in 2006. This time around, however, it may well be different, as PALU has held the prime ministry for the past five (first Gizenga, then Adolphe Muzito) and has not delivered much. Some doubt whether Gizenga has much appeal outside the elders of his Pende community.

3. Ethnic tensions rise in Fizi, South Kivu: On October 5, the jeep of the NGO Ebenezer was stopped by armed men close to Fizi. According to several sources, the soldiers seperated the passengers by ethnicity, putting the Banyamulenge to one side and shooting them, but sparing the others. Twelve Banyamulenge were reportedly killed in the incident. The attackers were allegedly members of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, together with members of the Burundian FNL rebels. It was the FNL that claimed responsibility for the 2004 massacre of 152 Banyamulenge in the Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi.

Yakutumba has gleaned a certain popularity in the Fizi area for his opposition to the deployment of rwandophone officers (ex-CNDP and ex-PARECO) in the region. He is rumored to be preparing an endorsement of Etienne Tshisekedi.

The electoral commission publishes the (partial) list of voters

2011-10-08T13:12:00.000-07:00

The Congolese electoral commission has now put up a partial list of voters on its website here. For those of you with some free time, you can go through the tens of thousands of pages of voters who registered to vote. The commission has not put up the whole list, just three provinces (Bas-Congo, Kasai Occidental and Maniema).

Does this solve the controversy over an audit of the voter register? Maybe, but it the format of the document probably does not lend itself to identification of double or triple registrations (the famous "doublons") through computer programs. And if political parties want to make sure the no foreigners, ghost voters or children registered, they will have to decentralize the audit to their local offices in the provinces, where party officials would have to check the names registered in an area with the local population - an almost impossible task (the CENI list breaks it down to the level of neighborhood/groupement - still a very large area).

The peregrinations of Congo's politicians

2011-10-08T12:50:00.000-07:00

For the past two weeks, the fate of the Congolese opposition has been played out abroad.

First, there was the trip to Addis Ababa, where the African Union asked Congolese political parties to agree on a code of conduct for elections and to campaign peacefully. This came just days after UDPS and PPRD followers clashed in Kinshasa. The meeting in Addis did not produce any visible outcomes - the UDPS is still the only major opposition party to refuse to sign the code of conduct, while UDPS followers continue to clash with the police in Kinshasa. Le Potentiel, Kinshasa's biggest daily, dismissed the initiative as "a distraction."

Then, Tshisekedi - the Sphinx of Limete, as he is called - traveled to Brussels, first to meet with Jean-Pierre Bemba at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. According to the Congolese press, as well as MLC members, Bemba refrained from backing the UDPS leader, preferring to just say that he would "back the joint candidate of the opposition," and urging the various opposition parties to find such a man.

Then, Tshisekedi went to meet with Kengo wa Dondo - who has just announced his own coalition that is backing him as "their joint candidate for the presidency." According to people close to Kengo, Tshisekedi gave him a document outlining his main policy plans, then urged him to sign up. Kengo is allegedly not happy with this way of proceeding. "You don't just hand someone your plan and tell him sign up - that's no way of negotiating," one of his associate told Congo Siasa.

Next stop: Washington, DC, where Vital Kamerhe, Mbusa Nyamwisi and Etienne Tshisekedi were all supposed to converge over the past several days. However, Tshisekedi missed meeting with Kamerhe due to a trip to Raleigh, North Carolina, where he met with the large Congolese community. He did, however, reportedly send the same policy document to Kamerhe and urge him to sign up, as well. Kamerhe, predictably, demurred.

Of course, all of these meetings abroad have fueled speculation in Kinshasa about Belgian and American positioning during the elections.

Despite these tensions within the opposition, something does seem to be afoot. For some time now, the main parties have been converging on Tshisekedi as the main candidate. However, the main stumbling block was his's reluctance to dole out specific positions before the elections - he told the other parties that the main spoils - prime minister, speaker of parliament, president of the senate - would depend on how each party fared in the polls. The other parties - UNC (Kamerhe), UFC (Kengo) and the MLC - insisted on knowing what they would get out of such an alliance.

Now, however, a plan is emerging that might solve that broker a compromise. While details are still fluid - and nothing is certain - under the terms of the deal, Kengo and the MLC would back Tshisekedi for the presidency if he promises that the UDPS would not claim the prime ministry or speaker of the national assembly. Instead, those positions would go to the other two largest opposition constituencies in parliament. That, of course, assumes that the opposition gains a majority in the national assembly.

It is not clear if Kamerhe, who has the most sway in the East of all the opposition parties, is involved in these negotiations. But it would be difficult for him to hold out alone if both Kengo and the MLC join forces with the UDPS.

Response by Zetes to allegations of fraud

2011-10-04T23:17:00.000-07:00

In response to an earlier blog posting on possible fraud in the voter register, the company contracted for the issuing of registration cards has written a rebuttal. I will post some comments on this letter later. A French version of this letter can also be found here.

In response to the blog “Document may suggest fraud in voter register” by Jason Stearns

We would like to address here to some of the preoccupation addressed in this blog which was subsequently mentioned in the local press in Kinshasa (mostly in “Le Potentiel” 5343 and “Le Phare” 4176 on the 30 of September), for our company’s name, Zetes, has been referred to in reference to the some of the work performed by our AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) on the electoral enrollment data.

First of all, the title of the blog, even if in the conditional (“may suggest fraud”), has been transformed in the press in Kinshasa where fraud is now supposedly a fact, this without enquiry nor respect for the work being done.

As a partner of the CENI, Zetes participates in a joint effort with the objective of providing the best information possible to the CENI so that all in DRC can participate in the coming election.

In this perspective, we, as well as other partners, provide information so that the CENI can analyze, compile, compare and clean data gathered on the field as to obtain the most reliable collection of records with a minimized margin of error, errors that are inevitably encountered in such complex operations. There is no contradictory report to the official report of the CENI, sole depositary of the official and final information.

We take this opportunity to remind everyone that this kind of large-scale and complex operation always brings its share of problems we are here to help solving. We put our reputation at stake as our credibility and transparency in such operations we undertake and do not wish to see this work being used for political purposes by feeding rumors that do not have reason to exist at this stage. Any given number can be made to speak different kinds of truth. We strongly regret having been exploited and cited in the local press without having had the opportunity to comment but we hope this message can bring some reassurance to readers and will prevent the incorrect use of preliminary and outdated information in the future.

Having a long experience on the subject in hand, here is a statement, as bold as it may seem, that all involved in electoral processes should very well be aware of: fraud is impossible to organize at the level of centralization systems / databases.

Here are different reasons why:

It is impossible the create/delete persons in a database without anyone being aware of it, and there are many actors of different origin involved, when following centralization processes that lasts months.
All transactions in the databases from the field and in the central system are logged and linked to the operator who performed the actions so we are capable of tracing everything that has been done from beginning to end.
In terms of logistics, it is impossible to organize a fraud from an electronic file in proportion that cannot be detected or are of nature to have a significant impact. Try creating 100,000 fake voter within a database of more than 30 million by duplication. You would then need more than 2,000 buses (45 seater) or more than 400 planes (230-seater) to move them to other polling stations or manage to instruct 100,000 people without anybody else noticing. Having done all that, you would not even impact 0.3% of the electoral population.
We always find in the end the same amount of “real doubles or duplicates” here and in many different countries; call it law of numbers. A large number of real duplicates for example is 0.5% based on the total electoral population of which in 90% of the cases are people getting another card because their name was misspelled or didn’t like their picture or just wanted to have two card in case they loose one.
The nature of a duplicate is complex. The proven frauds (that can only be determined after human verification) are a small subset of the real duplicates, themselves a subset of the raw duplicates. Even in the eventuality that all of these where fraud attempts we are talking about way less than half a percent of the number of persons concerned (a double being a pair of at least 2 persons).

Computerized solution have the advantage of bringing credibility at this stage of the process by being able to cut down the error margin to bellow the percent which is seldom the case even in “mature” democracies but remains necessary in the absence of a computerized national registry to prevent fraud.

Errors on electoral lists in G20 countries are often greater than that even with electronic voting. With the experience of many projects, people should now be better aware, where fraud is possible or not, and it is not at the level of centralization systems that they can occur simply because it doesn’t make any sense.

As a result, we have transmitted information several time in the course of the process to the CENI and have continued working in order for the CENI to be able corroborate this with other information available from other sources and partners. The very presence of many players guarantees a degree of transparency through the exchange and ongoing consultation, which reveals that no alteration is possible. These information help improve the overall viability and confirmed that even though there were technical glitches, as you mention in you blog, we have early on stated that there where no major problems to foresee as we have sufficient means to address them.

The numbers indicated in the blog are of different nature. Raw data is compared here with cleaned data, already deprived of technical errors. The comparison is therefore not possible.

In the hope that this, if not addressing the use of incomplete statistics will be reassurance enough to not concede to panic and invite those preoccupied to ask questions before relaying concerns expressed in this blog as facts.

We invite all who have used the information in this blog to read it again carefully, it expresses concerns that are not facts and it is irresponsible to use sparse elements in the press without further inquiry to obtain tangible information that would have inevitably lifted any doubts.

Kinshasa, October 3, 2011

Fabien MARIE

Program Manager

Zetes PASS

www.zetes.com

The short list

2011-10-04T00:33:00.000-07:00

I realize that most of you do not have the time to read all of the news sources I listed in the previous post. If you don't, but still want to stay abreast of important events, the following is a short list.

Read Radio Okapi for daily news, and sign up for Google Alerts in English and French for "congo" or something similar. Read the daily news roundups by Congo Forum to get a feel for the Kinshasa press (or check out Africatime's DRC website).

Read the regular reports posted by OCHA on the humanitarian situation, as well as reports by the International Crisis Group, HRW, the UN Group of Experts and MONUSCO's Secretary-General reports. Don't forget to follow the country's political economy through Africa Mining Intelligence and Economist Intelligence Unit reports.

Sources for news on the Congo

2011-10-04T00:10:00.000-07:00

(Apologies for formatting problems)

Here's my selective list. I have not included all sources, but the ones I feel are the most critical. It is heavily biased toward political reporting and neglects some excellent blogs on social and environmental issues. Feel free to recommend your own favorites.

Notice that this list is for internet sources - some Congolese newspapers still do not have good websites, whereas some diaspora websites are extremely active but have poorer access to information from the ground.

Also, I know that this is an English site, but it is impossible to get an accurate picture of developments in the Congo without reading the francophone press and bloggers. I encourage you to install the Google translate bar (or an equivalent) on your browser if you don't read French.

Print Media

It is important to hail the courage of many Congolese journalists working - half a dozen have been killed or arrested in the past several years - but also to point out that few newspaper have a circulation of over 3,000 copies (each goes for between $1 and $3), and there are frequent allegations that papers are paid to publish articles favorable to businessmen or politicians. In addition, most newspapers have a known slant or are close to prominent politicians.

Le Potentiel (http://www.lepotentiel.com/) is reportedly the daily with the widest circulation (who keeps track?). Although historically linked to the UDPS opposition, its founding editor Modeste Mutinga is now affiliated to the government. Nonetheless, it has the largest staff and some of the most critical reporting, and its managing editor/director general Freddy Kabuayi remains a staunch critic of the government.

Le Phare (www.lephareonline.net) is sympathetic towards the UDPS opposition. Founded and still run by Polydor Muboyayi, one of the newspaper's journalists was assassinated in 2006, allegedly for having written an article about diamond trafficking in Kasai province.

L'Avenir (http://www.groupelavenir.cd/) was founded by Pius Mwabilu in 1997. The paper quickly became close to Laurent Kabila, allegedly by way of Yerodia Ndombasi, who is now a senator. The paper is unabashedly favorable toward Joseph Kabila, as are the other parts of the Avenir empire: RTGA radio and TV stations.

L'Observateur (http://www.lobservateur.cd/), run by Makenda Voka, is one of the newspapers that tries not to be pinned to a political tendency or party.

L'Agence Congolaise de Presse (http://www.acpcongo.com/) is the national, state-run news agency that has become quite a bit more professional over the past several years.

For foreign press, you can sign up for a Google alert in both French and English. The foreign press with correspondents based in Congo are Bloomberg, Reuters, AFP, AP, BBC and Xinhua (some have local stringers). La Libre Belgique, Le Soir, RFI and VoA also have frequent articles on the Congo.

It is worth to figure out how to get access to several subscription-only services: Africa Confidential, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Africa Mining Intelligence and Africa Energy Intelligence have critical reports, especially on business and politics.

Radio and TV

You can listen to several TV and radio stations online, including Top Congo FM, Congo Planet and Congo Mikili. The quality and reliability, unfortunately, are not always ideal.

I would recommend going straight to Radio Okapi, a radio station and website run jointly by the UN peacekeeping mission and Lausanne-based Fondation Hirondelle. With dozens of journalists and relay stations around the country, and a budget of over $4 million, the station is the best source of news from around the country. Their website is a good first stop for Congolese news, and some of their shows - in particular Dialogue Entre Congolais - are good sources for analysis.

Websites and news aggregators

Several websites aggregate Congolese news. One of the best sources of daily summaries of Congolese news is on CongoForum, which has a "Revue de la Presse Congolaise" that comes out every weekday, and has an aggregation site in French, Dutch and English. Congo Planet has similar sites in English and French and also provides original news. Both Africatime.com and AllAfrica aggregate local and international news on the Congo, although neither translate the local media into English.

Digitalcongo.net aggregates local media on their website, which also provides original content. The Digitalcongo family, which has includes a TV and radio station, is known to be favorable toward Kabila.

I also recommend Congo Independent, which is edited by Baudouin Amba Wetshi in Brussels but provides good, if strongly critical, analysis on Congolese politics. Kaka Luigi is run by a Catholic priest in Bukavu and mostly re-posts other articles from the web.

In addition to these media that focus on the entire country, with a distinct bias toward Kinshasa (except for Okapi), there are also provincial media. Beni-Lubero Online provides local news from the northern part of North Kivu; Nyota Radio Television is broadcast from Lubumbashi but has a website with mostly national news; Congo Blog (last time I looked, managed by Cédric Kalonji) has a network of correspondents providing slice-of-life stories, full of color, from around the country, including cartoons and pictures; Mutaani is a Goma-based website in English, Swahili and French, with over ten journalists in Goma, Kinshasa, Bukavu, Kisangani and Lubumbashi, and with live streaming radio programs; Bukavu Online is managed by Olivier Katoto and posts articles regarding local and national politics; Uhaki News is a network of Congolese women journalists reporting on local and national issues, helped out by the Institute for War and Peace reporting; for those with a particular interest in South Kivu's high plateau, check out Journal Mulenge.

There are a number of websites with more of a regional nature, but crucial for understanding politics, especially in the eastern DRC. Grand Lacs Info is a website featuring original content as well as aggregating news on the whole region; Syfia Grands Lacs is a news agency with several original articles each week on the region; The New Times is Rwanda's government-run newspaper; The New Vision and The Daily Monitor are the top dailies in Uganda, with Andrew Mwenda's The Independent providing competition in the weekly news market; Iwacu is probably the best Bujumbura-based site for Burundian news, run by Antoine Kaburahe. (I'm obviously leaving out a lot of regional sites here).

Listservs

There are three listservs that I can strongly recommend to get Congolese news and analysis provided straight to your inbox (I leave it up to you to find out how to get on them). The European Network for Central Africa (Eurac), through its director Kris Berwouts, sends out a host of much-needed information on the region if you can get on his email list; and Jean-Claude Willame of the Catholic University of Louvain has an excellent weekly summary of regional news in French that he sends out.

Not to leave out either is Denis Tougas, who works for a Canadian NGO, L'Entreaide Missionaire, and runs a listserv on Congolese mining.

In addition, Yahoo! has a number of listservs that you can search for ask to subscribe to (Hinterland, for example) that will put you in touch with hundreds of Congolese and Congo-watchers.

Blogs and other websites

Blogs on the Congo are proliferating, especially those in English. Some of the more important ones are:

Mvemba's Eye on Africa - This is run by Mvemba Dizolele, a Congolese journalist based in Washington DC and the author of a forthcoming biography on Mobutu.Friends of the Congo runs a blog based out of the US, blogging on all things Congo. Jina Moore is a bit less active on her blog these days, but still often provides good articles on the region through her blog on other outlets.

Laura Seay's Texas in Africa blog is one of the best known blogs on the region. Laura is a professor of political science at Morehouse College and wrote her PhD on the Congo. Congo Resources is a blog written by David Aronson, an longstanding Congo hand, who is particularly interested in natural resources. Alex Engwete has a fabulous blog that talks about Congolese politics with much gusto and wit, as well as many other things.

Colette Braeckman is probably the best-known Belgian journalist writing on the Congo and she has a blog based out of her Le Soir newspaper. While one may not always agree with her, her articles are often well-informed and always worth reading. Congo Masquerade is a new book by Theodore Tréfon, the director of contemporary history at the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Belgium; it is also the name of his new blog, well worth reading.

The Enough Project has a blog, including many postings on the Congo.

Other websites

Must read, in-depth reports on the Congo are written regularly by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Global Witness, Refugees International, Enough and the International Crisis Group.

I must give a particular shout-out to the reports by the UN Group of Experts (where I previously worked), which carries out investigations on armed groups in Congo under a UN mandate.

Pole Institute is a Goma-based think tank and research institute working on conflict, natural resources and governance. They often post interesting articles on their website. Gouvernance pour Tous is a site run by CENADEP, a Congolese NGO working on governance. They have a database of national laws, as well as news and analysis. ASADHO is one of the oldest Congolese human rights NGOs, based in Kinshasa and with a relatively new and well-managed website.

ACIDH is a Lubumbashi-based human rights organization that does investigations of human rights abuses, with a particular focus on mining. Héritiers de la Justice is a Bukavu-based human rights NGO with a newly refurbished website. Congolese civil society runs a website with reports of many different local NGOs, as well as their contact information.

IPIS is a Belgian NGO that works a lot on natural resources and conflict. It has a website with a mapping tool that allows you to see where mines and armed groups are located.

The UN humanitarian coordination agency OCHA has a website, featuring maps and weekly/monthly reports on the humanitarian situation in the country. It's extremely useful for a broad picture of the humanitarian situation.

CENI, the Congolese election commission, has a website that is not frequently updated, but still has important information such as the list of electoral candidates and various election laws.

The Ministry of Budget has a website, where it posts the country's budget; the Ministry of Mines also has a website, where it is supposed to post all of the country's mining contracts (it doesn't always live up to this). The presidency has a website, featuring the President Kabila's official press statements and speeches, but also important laws and decrees.

The UN peacekeeping mission has a website, which mostly just reports on its activities (see Radio Okapi for national news), but it also has important resources, including maps and its regular reports to the Secretary-General, which are very useful summaries of political developments in the country.

For economic statistics on the country, you can also see the IMF's statistical appendixes from its reports; the OECD and the World Bank are also valuable sources of information in this regard.

Finally, The King Effect is a blog written by Amy Ernst, who is a rape counselor based in the eastern Congo. She provides detailed and nuanced descriptions of her interactions with soldiers, rape survivors and other Congolese.

Document may suggest fraud in the voter register

2011-09-27T14:18:00.000-07:00

A report has surfaced in Kinshasa suggesting that hundreds of thousands of voters in the official register may be fake. While many of these records may just be technical glitches, diplomats who have seen the document and follow the electoral process closely suggest this may be a sign of fraud.

For several weeks now, accusations have been flung back and forth between the election commission and the opposition about the voter register, a database of around 32 million voters that identifies those eligible to vote in the November elections. The stakes are potentially huge, as if the register is rigged, it will be difficult for observers at the polling stations to identify fraud.

The report is a confidential document written in early August by Zetes, a Belgian company contracted by the Congolese government to issue biometric voters cards. They conducted preliminary samples of the voter register to see how many doublons - voters who show up twice in the system - there may be in the database. According to two separate diplomats who had seen the document, Zetes found the following number of doublons:

Bandundu - 278,039, or 13.68% of all voters

Equateur - 201, 543, or 12.69%

Orientale - 198,881, or 5.47%

Kinshasa - 22,466, or 0.87%

These levels are far higher that those announced by the election commission Daniel Mulunda Ngoy, who said that 119,000 double registrations had been identified.

The Zetes report, which was issued in early August, says that there are different types of doublons. The most damning type, which they suggested based on their sampling was not negligible, are the doublons binaires and vrai doublons, which would constitute fraud. Zetes concluded itself that the presence of these voters in the register is evidence of manipulation. It is, however, not clear how many of these fake voter IDs were issued.

It is also important to note that removing these doublons would not eliminate other types of fraud, such as the registration of children or foreigners.

Even if all of these fake voters are technical glitches, at the very least it appears that the voter registration process has resulted in the gerrymandering of electoral districts, as Kinshasa has far fewer doublons than other provinces. This is confirmed by the fact that only 92% of expected voters were registered in Kinshasa, as compared with 110% in Equateur and 109% in Katanga. Because the voter register was not audited before the amendment to the electoral law - that determines how many parliamentary seats there are per district - was passed, this would imply that the population of Kinshasa will be underrepresented in the national assembly.

According to the same Zetes document, it would take them until October to audit out all of the doublons. That would have caused for a serious delay in the electoral process, as the electoral amendment had to be passed in early August in order for elections to take place on November 28.

Regardless of how skewed the parliamentary distribution of seats is, it remains crucial to audit the voter register. This past week, there was conflicting messages coming out of the electoral commission with regards to an audit. First, the election commissioner announced that five members of the political opposition would be allowed to access their database. (According to some observers, none of those put forward by the opposition, however, have the necessary technical expertise to carry out such an audit). Then, just a day later, he said that both sides of the political spectrum - the governing coalition and the opposition - would have to agree on an audit. Kabila's majority prompted said that they didn't think an audit was necessary, thereby preventing the opposition from gaining access to the database.

When contacted by diplomats and journalists, Zetes and UN electoral officials dismissed the report, saying that the glitches were technical and not a major problem.

A preliminary analysis of the legislative race

2011-09-25T08:02:00.000-07:00

The electoral commission has published the list of candidates for the legislative elections, which are scheduled to be held on November 28th along with the presidential election. The legislative election is particularly important in the Congo, as the prime minister is named by the largest coalition in parliament, and then forms a cabinet to deal with the day-to-day business of governing. (That's the theory, at least - in this government, the presidency has wielded far greater power).

There are 19,000 candidates for the 500 seats in the national assembly. This means the legislative battle will be more competitive than in 2006, when there were considerably fewer candidates. In some districts, like Tshangu in Kinshasa, there are a hundred candidates for every seat.

I have done a very superficial analysis of five of the major parties contending elections: MLC, PPRD, UFC, UNC and UDPS. I admit that other parties are also extremely important - MSR and PALU, for example - but I will leave those for another day. If I did not miscount, here is a list of how many candidates each party registered for the 500 seats:

MLC (Bemba): 237
PPRD (Kabila): 545
UDPS (Tshisekedi): 377
UFC (Kengo): 334
UNC (Kamerhe): 450

I should emphasize that these numbers don't mean much - if a party is unpopular, then even by multiplying the number of candidates they won't get more seats. Nonetheless, there are several observations we can make.

First, the PPRD has the largest pool of candidates. This is probably a sign of their deep pockets, but they are also the only party of these five (other than the MLC, which has been weakened by infighting) that contended the last elections and has been present in the field since then, if only by virtue of the fact that the are in power. However, in some areas they have submitted over double the number of candidates as there seats in the district - this could be a sign of poor organization, as the party will be wasting resources by overloading candidates.

Secondly, it is very probable that we will see a change in the lead opposition party. Even if Kabila's coalition wins again, the MLC appears to have been deeply weakened by Bemba's absence and the splintering of the party over the past several years. They were only able to table one candidate for every two seats, an indication of a lack of funds and organization - one of their officials told me that they had even had trouble raising the funds necessary for registering their legislative candidates (I think something like $60,000).

The new opposition parties have been mobilizing very effectively. In particular, the UNC, which was launched less than a year ago, has been able to put forward candidates for over 85 percent of the seats in the national assembly, an impressive feat that also indicates that they have been able to raise significant funds. The UDPS is strong, but lacks candidates in many areas in the East. Again, none of this is an indication of how many seats they will win, and some of suggested that the UNC has expanded too fast, allowing to many opportunists into the party, while the UDPS has been more selective in its candidates.

Here is a breakdown by province:

	Bas-Congo	Bandundu	Equateur	Kasai-Oc	Kasai-Or	Katanga	Kinshasa	Maniema	Prov Orientale	N Kivu	S Kivu
MLC	15	41	51	7	4	6	49	9	22	22	11
PPRD	23	51	54	41	42	86	55	14	102	45	32
UDPS	21	34	36	41	41	46	51	7	31	37	32
UFC	21	43	41	32	30	36	47	3	44	27	10
UNC	22	50	45	40	35	64	50	14	55	43	32

The not-so-prodigal son returns?

2011-09-19T23:25:00.000-07:00

Most observers would have never thought it possible: Laurent Nkunda coming back to the Congo? Yes, this is indeed the rumor that has been making the rounds in Goma, Kigali and elsewhere over the past few months. Moreover, this mooted return would not be one in handcuffs to the closest prison, but in style and honor to an official military position.

It seems impossible, given that Nkunda is one of the most divisive figures in the country - seen by many Congolese as symbol of Rwandan aggression or Tutsi chauvinism, upheld by some in his own community as a hero. Could President Kabila really accept this? Some CNDP officials are saying yes. Accentuating these rumors, in past weeks, Nkunda has reportedly been seen traveling more freely inside Rwanda, allegedly even coming to a funeral in Gisenyi.

It has been two and half years since Nkunda was arrested by the Rwandan government and put under house arrest in Kigali pending a trial that has never happened. Now, Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo suggests, "We are talking to the Congolese authorities with regard to his extradition," (they have said this for a while, also maintaining that this extradition is difficult), and I have seen emails suggesting that he could be named as the military commander of Maniema.

One possible reason for this return could be to reconcile the two factions within the CNDP, in order to solidify the group before the elections and to prevent any alliance with Rwandan opponents like Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa. Or this could just be a rumor to keep people on their toes - after all, the Congolese have maintained they would court martial him if he ever returns.

If it does happen, in handcuffs or not, it is unlikely to take place before the elections.

Donors and elections in the Congo

2011-09-19T23:05:00.000-07:00

With elections approaching in the Congo, it is worthwhile reflecting on the role of the international community in the process. Since the beginning, it has been clear that foreign partners would play a more marginal role than in the 2006 polls. Then, as the country was coming out of a war, donors financed 90 percent of the elections budget - this time, the Congolese government is shouldering 60 percent of the burden. MONUSCO, the guarantor of the peace process, is now dealing with a sovereign, democratically elected government.

This, however, hasn't stopped many analysts - myself included - from pushing for greater involvement and pressure. Following the rushed constitutional reform that radically altered the electoral process - from a two-round majority-win to a one-round plurality-win poll for the president - there was little protest from diplomats, who suggested that these were internal matters of a sovereignly-elected government. I have some sympathy for this, for as much as the constitutional change was opportunistic and rammed through parliament in a hurry, on the face of it, the revision passed (more or less) legally.

Where I am less sympathetic is regarding the voter registration. What little observation has been carried out suggests that there may have been significant flaws in this process - children, foreigners and "ghosts" (fictitious voters) registered, and we know from election officials that there are people who have registered numerous times in different offices (one observer mentioned one man registering eleven times). The problem is, because the political opposition (and to a certain degree, civil society) was not really present to monitor the process, we don't know how widespread this abuse was. Could it compromise the presidential election? What about the legislative elections? Difficult to say.

At the very least, there should be a mechanical audit to get rid of "doublons," people who have registered more than once. Since registration was biometric, this should be relatively easy to complete in several days in Kinshasa. Getting rid of other abusers - children, foreigners, etc. - would probably have to be done in a decentralized fashion, by publishing the voting list locally and then allowing each community to verify the identities of those registered. This would be difficult and would take time, although the electoral law did require each registration office to publish the lists of those who registered there (they sometimes didn't).

The election commissioner said he would agree to two delegates from the opposition to have access to the voter register for an audit - the opposition put forward two such experts two weeks ago (Valentin Mubake from the UDPS and Jean-Lucien Busa from the MLC), but now the commissioner is questioning their qualifications. In the meantime, the electoral countdown clock is ticking. (Just after I published this posting, Radio Okapi announced that an agreement had been found for the audit - see here).

Here, the donor community could have weighed in; after all, they are providing a large amount of the funding and logistics for the election. Not only did they not push for this audit, the mission - along with several embassies - called for the swift adoption of the amendment to the electoral law that de facto confirmed the registration figures: it determined how many parliamentarians would be elected per district based on the number of voters there.

MONUSCO has been reluctant to criticize the preparation of elections. In part, as I have written here before, this fits in with the mission's aim of re-establishing good relations with the Congolese government. To an extent, they are right: Little can be achieved by the mission without cordial relations with their counterparts, and this relationship slipped badly during the latter year of Alan Doss' term. When Roger Meece arrived as the new head of the peacekeeping mission last year, he took it upon himself to re-dynamize that relationship, and has in large part succeeded.

However, this has meant that the mission has at time shied away from criticism, particularly with regards to the electoral process. MONUSCO officials have been insisting in public and private that they need to be " a neutral and supportive body and to avoid a formal judgmental role," as one official put it.

This last bit refers to the fact that MONUSCO wants to avoid being an accreditor of the elections, like the UN mission did in the Ivory Coast. I agree with that, as that would have been a step to far and the government would have most likely rejected that option. But has the UN been vocal enough "to encourage open and peaceful conditions," as they are mandated to do? In May this year, the mission wrote in a public report that they had evidence of 200 human rights abuses related to the electoral process. However, they have never made public any of this evidence or condemned any of those responsible.

Neither MONUSCO or foreign diplomats are to blame for all of the flaws in the electoral process - the political opposition has been consumed by in-fighting, and the primary responsibility for electoral abuse is of course to be placed on the abusers themselves. But one is left wondering whether MONUSCO has confused neutrality for impartiality - the UN should not take sides, but surely it should denounce abuse where it sees it, especially if it is in violation of the principles the organization stands for.

Elections: Can the opposition still unite?

2011-09-16T00:16:00.000-07:00

Correction: There are only 11 presidential candidates. Ismael Kitenge did not register.

As most readers will know by now, there are twelve candidates for the presidential elections in the Congo. This is many fewer than in 2006, when 33 Congolese vied for the position, but for many in the opposition, this is still far too many.

As I have argued here before, the presidential vote will, first and foremost, be a referendum on Kabila's popularity. If the president, for example, knows that he can garner 35% of the popular vote, then he needs to focus on making sure the remaining 65% is divided among enough candidates that no single one can beat him. That was the importance of the constitutional revision earlier this year, that changed the presidential poll from a two-round, majority-wins election to a one-round, plurality-wins affair.

This means that the main challenge for the opposition will be to unite behind a single candidate in order to increase their chances of beating Kabila. This endeavor, however, has butted up against the considerable egos of those involved, as well as deep mistrust within the opposition.

The opposition has now split into two major wings - the Fatima wing, led by Tshisekedi. He has been able to muster the support of 80 political parties other than his own UDPS, although none of these parties, to my knowledge, has much of an electoral base. Talks appear to have more or less come to an end between Tshisekedi and the other major opposition candidates. "The negotiations are finished," the veteran opposition leader said when he submitted his candidacy. His spokesperson added: "I am sure that our friends will join us."

Those friends, however, have formed their own wing, an informal coalition dubbed Sultani, and led by Léon Kengo wa Dondo and Vital Kamerhe. In private, members of those parties are not optimistic about uniting behind Tshisekedi, who they claim has been leading with his chin by boldly refusing any negotiations. And even within this coalition, there are troubles - Kengo has been telling his colleagues that Kamerhe may rally behind him in exchange for the prime minister's position. Kamerhe says this is not true, and indeed it is not clear why Kengo, who has been a sly political player but has little mass following, should take the lead.

Other, smaller players, may yet further divide the opposition. Adam Bombole, a rich businessman and former head of the MLC's Kinshasa section, has thrown his name in the hat. According to MLC sources, Bombole spoke with Jean-Pierre Bemba and received his provisional approval to run, but then didn't take the care to consult with other MLC leaders (not in prison) before announcing his candidacy. The result: He has been expelled from the party. Nonetheless, Bombole has relatively deep pockets and is popular in Kinshasa, where he could get votes.

The only other two of the twelve candidates who could get more than one or two percent of the vote are Mbusa Nyamwisi and Oscar Kashala. Mbusa, who decided to run as an independent instead of for his RCD-K-ML party, still has something of a base in North Kivu among his Nande community, although many have jumped ship there, as well. Kashala came in 5th in the 2006 elections, with 3,4% of the total vote. However, the US-based doctor benefited then from Tshisekedi's boycott, allowing him to claim many votes in the Luba community and in Kinshasa.

With this proliferation of candidates, it is no surprise that allegations have emerged that some are fake opposition members, running in order to divide their ranks and allow Kabila to win. Kamerhe and Kengo have been accused of this, and now Bombole and Mbusa have earned this dubious distinction, as well. I even heard a Kengo supporter suggesting that Tshisekedi's advisors have been bought off and have steered him in the wrong direction.

Of course, it is still theoretically possible that (a) the opposition will unite, at least a little; and (b) that even divided, one of them could beat Kabila single-handedly. The president, however, has formidable resources: deep pockets, state media and the security services. Already, opposition members are complaining that they barely had the funds to pay for the registration of all of their legislative candidates, and there are reports that some of the main opposition parties have only been able to field candidates in a fraction of the 169 electoral districts.

The next weeks will be interesting. Two things to watch: Will there be any further consolidation of the presidential field? My guess is that this would happen before the official campaigning begins in October, when candidates start spending much more money. Secondly, who are the different parties' legislative candidates? This last question will be important for any negotiations within the opposition, as it will have a bearing on who is projected to control parliament and thus be able to nominate the prime minister.

New armed groups appear in South Kivu

2011-09-15T04:32:00.000-07:00

(Please read the comments section, as well, for informative corrections and additions by Judith.)

Yesterday, in a speech to the nation, President Joseph Kabila announced, "There is no more fire in the East, just some embers." While it is true that fighting has ebbed this year - largely due to a decrease in operations by the Congolese army - new armed groups have been popping up in South Kivu.

In the run-up to elections, we reported on efforts by the Congolese army to co-opt and repress various remaining armed groups in the eastern Congo - groups that are commonly euphemized as "residuals" by the government. The government struck deals with the FRF (Fizi/Uvira), Mai-Mai Kapopo (Mwenga), Mai-Mai Kifuafua (Kalehe) and has launched an offensive against the Mai-Mai Yakutumba (Fizi). (The army said it would no longer broker deals with groups after last June)

These efforts had been built on relatively shaky grounds - most of the deals involved cash buyouts and promises of positions in the new regiments. At the same time, the Congolese army had to reassure the previously integrated armed groups - especially PARECO and CNDP - and the national army that their power would not be diluted.

Over the past few weeks, we have seen these efforts crumble. First, some existing deals have fallen apart, while at the same time new groups have emerged. One MONUSCO official in South Kivu spoke of "the mushrooming of new groups" there, in particular in the highlands of Uvira territory.

One new group called Mai-Mai Kashorogosi belongs to a deserter from the police, Col. Nyerere Bunana, who defected in June and has rallied around 30 soldiers around him. His defection was prompted by allegations from the Congolese army that he was involved in a criminal network. Two other defectors have reportedly also established new groups in the same general area: Col. Bede Rusagara and Lt Col Baleke Sumahili, both of whom deserted from the Congolese army. Neither of them probably has more than several combatants under his command.

The Fuliro community, which lives in the mountains to the west of Uvira, has apparently become a hotbed for such armed group activity. All of the three above groups come from this community. In addition to those, there is the Mai-Mai Aochi, which has been active for several months now in the high plateau around Minembwe. There is also the Mai-Mai Mulumba group, also from the Fuliro community, active in the same area. Finally, a splinter group of the FRF, with its roots in the Banyamulenge community, has also re-emerged under the command of Col. Richard Tawimbi, also in the same broad area.

What is the reason behind the proliferation of these groups this year? No one really seems to know for sure. In part, this is probably due to conflicts emerging around the integration of armed groups and the regimentation process, which has launched a competition for positions in the new army structure. In particular, the prominence of Hutu and Tutsi in these new structures has angered other communities, and the Fuliro have also been very outspoken in their opposition to the CNDP and PARECO. (In this regard, more on the recent rumors of a mutiny in Bukavu in a later post)

Others have suggested that the new armed groups are being manipulated by politicians, although I have not seen concrete proof of this yet.

The main problems, however, are still structural: a weak army and a large country. The army is not yet strong and professional enough to deter new groups from emerging, and by buying them off the army is providing incentives for other groups to form. Once rebels join the army, they soon despair at poor pay and living conditions. It is also difficult for commanders who are often illiterate and used to an easy life in their local community to rub shoulders with educated officers who have formal training, and to move far away from home.

Finally, the area where these groups are located is notoriously mountainous, rich in natural resources, and difficult to control, making it easy for guerrilla fighters to persist.

These groups do not pose a serious threat to state power, but they do form a symbolic threat at a time when the government is trying to show that they have re-established peace in the East.

Thoughts on ICG's report

2011-09-07T07:16:00.000-07:00

The International Crisis Group released a new report on the Congo this week called "The electoral process seen from the East." The report touches on several key points that are worth mentioning here.

First, they cite revealing figures concerning the voter registration process in the East. The registration figures for North Kivu, South Kivu and Province Orientale are roughly similar, with each province meeting its goals almost exactly. This means that the population in each of these provinces grew around 20 percent between 2006 and 2011. Across the Congo, over one million voters registered more than expected by the election commission, a figure that ICG says should raise questions.

Nord-Kivu	3 003 246	101%
Province Orientale	3 886 524	99%
Sud-Kivu	2 022 960	101%

However, these figures mask the numerous flaws in the registration process - the report provides a summary of fake voters, children and foreigners registering, as well as cases of voters registering multiple times (one diplomat I recently spoke to said they had seen one case of a voter registering eleven times). ICG also documents suspicious variations in registration levels within the provinces - why did 161 percent of expected voters register in Goma and 216 percent in Nyiragongo territory, while only 88 percent of those expected registered in Uvira territory?

Unfortunately, all ICG can do is ask questions. The truth is, we don't know how many eligible voters live where, as the last physical census was carried out in 1984. The election commission simply took the 2006 registration figures and extrapolated based on population growth - but not taking into account internal migration and variations in mortality and birth rates within the country.

In addition, as the report suggests, there was very weak monitoring of the registration process. In North Kivu, not a single official party official registered to observe the registration process, in part because the election commission only gave parties two days to register their witnesses (the electoral law requires seven days to registration). In general, political parties are poorly organized, and civil society did the bulk of what little monitoring there was. But as the election commission has not released the official voter register (they are required to do so 30 days before the election) and did not always post voter lists on the respective registration offices (they are required to do so by law), we have no idea how many fake voters there are in the East.

Given this extremely useful summary of election preparations, I find it strange that ICG did not call for an urgent audit of the voter register, as the opposition is now doing.

There are several other minor disagreements I have with the report - it claims that the political class in the eastern Congo thinks the presidential election is a fait accompli and that Kabila will win, given his superior financing, access to media and the security services. This was not my reading of the situation during my recent visit; the predominant mood was rather one of uncertainty, as many people in urban areas opposed Kabila but were worried of rigging. As I have written before, as there has been no rigorous polling, nobody has much to go on. The UNC and UDPS officials I spoke with certainly disagreed with this sentiment, and there have been several defections from Kabila's coalition in the Kivus that would confirm this uncertainty.

Secondly, I am not sure that people will vote for a candidate simply because a senior leader from their community tells them to. ICG suggests that Mwenga (South Kivu), for example, may vote for Kabila because a minister in his government comes from that territory. But Mwenga has also been one of the areas most riven by violence in the past years, with large parts occupied by the FDLR and various Mai-Mai groups. While Chinese engineers have built parts of the National Highway #4 through Mwenga, I am not sure that this will be enough to sway them. This question - to what degree a relatively uneducated population will vote for their leaders - is key, and to mind is still up in the air.