This is a guest blog by Judith Verweijen, a PhD candidate at the Center for Conflict Studies at Utrecht University. She has spent several years living among and studying armed groups in the eastern Congo, especially in the Uvira-Fizi area.
In his recent post on the possible spread of the M23 rebellion into South Kivu, Jason mentioned the attack on the military base of Luberizi in the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira territory. This attack was at first ascribed to one of the two parties of an ongoing conflict around the chefferie (customary chiefdom), of the Ruzizi Plain, pitting Barundi (perceived as belonging to the “rwandophone” camp) against Bafuliiru (self-styled “autochthones”).
In his recent post on the possible spread of the M23 rebellion into South Kivu, Jason mentioned the attack on the military base of Luberizi in the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira territory. This attack was at first ascribed to one of the two parties of an ongoing conflict around the chefferie (customary chiefdom), of the Ruzizi Plain, pitting Barundi (perceived as belonging to the “rwandophone” camp) against Bafuliiru (self-styled “autochthones”).
The intensification of this conflict – which is decades old – dates back
to April this year, when the mwami
(traditional paramount chief) Floribert Nsabimana Ndabagoye of the Barundi was
killed, leading to protests and violent incidents. When the Luberizi army camp,
which lies at the heart of this chefferiewas
attacked this month, it was immediately assumed that it was related to this conflict.
It was only later established that the events
were the work of armed groups related to M23.
However, one of the two groups cited as responsible for the attack, that
of Mufuliiru Major Bede Rusagara, is believed to be also implicated in the
conflicts surrounding the killing of the mwami.
Born in Mutarule, at a stone’s throw
from Luberizi, Bede started his military career in the Mai-Mai of Col. Baudouin
Nyakabaka. He was subsequently co-opted
by the RCD, then briefly served in the CNDP, and eventually integrated into the
FARDC. At the start of 2011,he deserted
in order to form his own armed group in the hills near Kahanda, close to his
home village. Given this past, it is not surprising that he is described by
local sources as un aventurier (an
opportunist, a brigand).
Bede is the cousin of Bike Rusagara, who was acting Chief of the Ruzizi
Plain at the moment the murder occurred. That this post was assumed by a
Mufuliiru is related to the turbulent history of the chefferie. In 2004, when
Ndabagoye was in Kinshasa, where he served as Member of the Transitional
Parliament for the RCD, a Mufuliiru was installed as mwami (allegedly with the help of Col. Nyakabaka, current Deputy
Commander of the 10th Military Region). Since then, repeated
attempts of the Barundi chief to resume power have failed.
What then, is at the root of this conflict? And what is the relevance of
taking a closer look at these seemingly never-ending quarrels between ethnic
groups? Firstly, the story of the chefferie
of the Ruzizi Plain shows how much conflicts around local administration and
access to land continue to be defined in ethnic terms, often along the “
autochthone/rwandophone” divide. Secondly, it illustrates how easily more
localized conflicts become linked to larger conflicts that play out at the provincial,
national or sub-regional levels. Thirdly, the conflict around the chefferie of the Ruzizi Plain elucidates
the ease with which power conflicts between civilian actors become militarized,
in the face of the omnipresence of armed factions. This sounds, I am sure, very
abstract, so let me explain.
As the name indicates, the Barundi are a people whose origins can be
traced back to Burundi. They moved into what is now the Congo in the course of
the 19th century. At that time, there were no international
boundaries, population movements were ongoing, and not all territories were
permanently inhabited or controlled by local chiefs. In general, the organization of power was not always
rigidly delineated in a territorial sense, as it was mostly tied to control
over people. When the colonial authorities arrived, they started to drastically
reorganize the local administration in Uvira, regrouping various chiefs and
their clans into bigger groups, delineating administrative boundaries, and
eventually creating a system of chefferies
headed by paramount chiefs. The Barundi
too were granted their own chefferie-secteur.
However, in the immediate post-independence era of the 1960s, when the Mulele rebellion rocked
the area of Uvira, the Bafuliiru started to claim control over the chefferie of the Barundi. They said it had been unjustly awarded by the
colonial authorities, as the Barundi were “foreigners”, who had immigrated to a
piece of land of which the Bafuliiru claimed to be the original inhabitants.
However, if one reads the history of the Ruzizi Plain, as documented for
example by professor Bosco Muchukiwa, it becomes clear
that these claims are based on a rather selective reading of history.
What makes these conflicts so explosive is that, at various times in
history, they have become linked to events at the national or sub-regional
level, often reinforcing the autochton/foreigner fault lines. This was for example the case in the era of
the RCD rebellion (1998-2003), when the mwami
of the Barundi, under siege by the Bafuliiru Mai-Mai, allied himself to the RCD. More recently, the reorganization of the armed
opposition in Burundi and the M23 rebellion have kindled similar dynamics. Just
after the assassination of the mwami,
the Barundi were first accused of seeking reinforcements from Burundian armed
groups and mercenaries across the border. This is not strange, given that
fighters thought to be linked to the FNL, but also to other Burundian armed
opposition groups that operate on a near-permanent basis in Uvira territory. For their part, it was thought that the
Bafuliiru had sought reinforcement from Bede’s group, whereas some also cited
the implication of a local defense militia created by mwami Ndare Simba of the Bafuliiru. (Interestingly, the latter
recently lost the elections, in which he ran as an independent candidate, and is
said to try to use the current upheaval to restore some of his eroded
popularity).
The M23 rebellion has given a new twist to this conflict. As said, Bede is believed to be associated
with this group, which is not strange given his ex-CNDP background. However,
whereas the M23 are uniquely associated with rwandophones, Bede is believed to
defend the autochthone (Fuliiru) side in the conflict in the Ruzizi Plain. This
shows the complexity of the political and military dynamics of the Kivus, and
that we can not assume divides to mechanistically follow identity-based lines.
This is also illustrated by the fact that the Banyamulenge, an ethnic Tutsi
group, have thus far overwhelming resisted any overtures from the Tutsi-led M23
(except the small fringe of Nkingi Muhima, mentioned in Jason’s blogpost). Similarly seemingly unnaturalcoalitions have
emerged in Masisi, where Hutu have allied with the government, while some Tembo
groups – who traditionally label themselves anti-Rwanda – have established
shaky alliances with the M23.
Hence, conflicts in the Kivus continue to be the product of multiple
socio-economic, political, and military developments, of which (ethnic)
identities are but one dimension.
Whereas this makes things immensely volatile, given the resulting constantly
changing alliances, the good news is perhaps that it demonstrates that
self-styled autochthones and rwandophones are by no means automatically opposed
to each other (although some would call cross-ethnic alliances mostly
opportunistic). Rather, identity-based alliances, and to a lesser extent
identities, continue to be relatively flexible.
Although perhaps in a distant future, this could eventually serve as a basis
for a society where identities are less polarized and ethnicity plays a less
pronounced role in social interactions.