Some news out of Goma, where President Kabila has been visiting for the past few days. The provincial minister of the interior named a deputy administrator of the territory of Masisi this week. Alexandre Gatembe is a CNDP official and his nomination is supposed to help bring an end to the parallel administration of the territory by the CNDP. Some road blocks have been dismantled, but many others remain and it is obvious that certain tax collectors and military units report to the CNDP leadership.
Tensions within the CNDP have persisted. As described by my anonymous guest blogger her a few days ago, Gad Ngabo's FPLC seems to be on collision course with his former ally (and alleged cousin) Bosco Taganda. A large number of troops under the command of Colonel Emmanuel (ex-CNDP deserter) were massing in the area around Matanda (Masisi territory), apparently intent on attacking the ex-CNDP troops in the area. Also, over 100km away, in northern Rutshuru, FPLC troops have attacked Congolese army positions twice in the past week around Nyakakoma.
These are not the only problems within the ex-CNDP. On June 2/3, a firefight broke out among ex-CNDP troops in Burungu (Masisi, close to Kitchanga). According to some local source, up to 20 soldier were killed. It isn't clear what the cause of the altercation was: some say there was an argument over divvying up "surplus salary payments," others say that ex-CNDP Colonel Innocent Kabundi was unwilling to hand over his arms cache.
A reader asked me in the comment section the other day how to understand this falling out between Gad and Bosco, as well as other CNDP internal divisions. I honestly don't have my ear close enough to the ground to fully understand. Suffice it to say that the post-Nkunda CNDP has become a mess of internal rivalries and divisions. Neither Kigali or Kinshasa (or even Kampala) seems to be too troubled by this for the moment.
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Roger Meece to Replace Alan Doss
Ban Ki-Moon announced yesterday that US diplomat Roger Meece would replace Alan Doss as the head of MONUC (soon to be MONUSCO). Meece was the US ambassador in Kinshasa between 2004-2007 and the Deputy Chief of Mission 1995-1998 (I if remember correctly he was the acting ambassador during the beginning of the 1998 war, when he organized the evacuation of embassy staff in Kinshasa). He was also US ambassador to Malawi from 2000-2003.
Meece is a graduate of Michigan State University and worked for many years in the peace corps (he did his own peace corps stint in Sierra Leone in the 1970s).
Meece has a different background than his three predecessors. Cameroonian Amos Namanga Ngongi was a top UN official who had a long career in World Food Program and other UN agencies before leading MONUC. William Swing was a US ambassador in South Africa, Liberia, Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Haiti and Kinshasa before leading the UN Mission in Western Sahara and then MONUC. Doss was a top UNDP official before helping to lead the UN missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast.
Ngongi was criticized for not being a savvy diplomat and manager, and for allowing the Kisangani massacre in 2002, but was lauded for helping to seal the peace deal in Sun City in 2002/3. Swing was hailed for shepherding through the transition and holding elections, but attacked for not being forceful enough with Kabila on security sector reform and human rights abuses, as well as backing down on the protection of civilians in Bukavu in 2004. Doss had the misfortune of being named just as MONUC lost a of its clout, and he was criticized for not forging a more coherent and aggressive vision for how MONUC could stabilize the Kivus and protect civilians.
Meece does not have the UN experience of any of his predecessors - this will be his first job for the organization - and has never been in charge of such a large organization. He was generally liked as ambassador in Kinshasa, but he is bound to be reminded that it was under his watch that the Phelps Dodge (now Freeport McMoran) contract for the huge Tenke Fungurume mine was signed, a deal that the US government allegedly helped to facilitate (he denied this).
His nomination came as a bit of a surprise to some - former French UN ambassador Jean Maurice Ripert had been cited several times, and the nomination of a senior US official straight from the US Foreign Service will without doubt raise some eyebrows.
We wish him good luck.
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
List of armed groups in the Kivus
Armed groups in the eastern Congo are like brooms in Disney's (Goethe) Sorcerer's Apprentice: They just seem to keep multiplying. This is my effort to come up with a decent list of armed groups in the Kivus.
| SAMPLE OF MOST IMPORTANT ARMED GROUPS | ||||
CNDP | (split) Gen Bosco Taganda Gen Laurent Nkunda Philippe Gafishi Col Sultan Makenga | 3,000-4,000 integrated 1,000-2,000 unitegrated | Control the Masisi highlands between Ngungu and Mweso | Protect Tutsi community Protect interests of local elites (land, cows, businesses) |
| FDLR | Gen Sylvestre Mudacumura | 3,000-4,000 | Deployed in rural areas throughout rural South and North Kivu and Maniema. | Extract resources, maintain ideology overthrowing RPF but little hope |
| ACPLS | Gen Janvier Buingo Comd Innocent Balume Comd Innocent Dunga | 500-2,000 | Centered around Nyabiondo, western Masisi. | Protect local Hunde community, in particular against ex-CNDP troops. |
| Mai-Mai Cheka | Colonel Cheka | 50-200 | Based around Mubi and Njigala, Walikale | Benefit from taxation rackets and put pressure on mining companies workin in the Bisie mine. |
| PARECO | Gen Ntasibanga ? | 300-1,000 | Lubero/Masisi territory | |
| FPLC | “Gen.” Gadi Ngabo | 200-500 | In Rutshuru territory and Uganda | Galvanize former CNDP officers, obtain backing from Uganda. |
| UJPS | Tumai Byamungu, official in ministry of interior | 500-1,000 | No permanently located troops, mostly within FARDC | Mostly kadogo from the AFDL era, multi-ethnic |
| Mai-Mai Mongol | Bigembe Nturinkukiko Felicien Miganda Dieudonne Shobora | 500-1,500 | In southern Masisi | Composed of Hutu Partially integrated into FARDC |
| Mai-Mai Kifuafua | Colonel Delphin Mbaende Didier Bitaki Colonel Akilimali | 300-1,000 | In southern Masisi territory | Partially integrated into FARDC Mostly Hunde and Tembo |
| Mai-Mai Simba | Colonel Marhegane | 100-200 (?) | Around Miti, Kabare territory | A split off from the former Mudundu 40 group |
| FRF | Gen Venant Bisogo Gen Michel Rukunda | 100-300 | In Biabo forest, Fizi territory | |
| Mai Mai Yakutumba | Col Yakutumba | 150-250 | Around Baraka, Fizi territory | Strong anti-Tutsi ideology Collaboration with FDLR Mostly from Bembe community |
| Raia Mutomboki | Political representative: Gilbert Ngongo of South Kivu provincial assembly | 100-1,000 | Shabunda territory | A self-defense group with little capacity that lies dormant most of the time |
| Jeshi la Uma | | 100-300 | Shabunda territory | |
| Mai Mai Zabuloni | Colonel Zabuloni (now in Bukavu, leadership struggle) | 50-150 | Rusizi plains, moyen plateau of Uvira territory | Little coherent ideology Soldier mostly from Fuliro community |
| Mai Mai Kirikicho | Colonel Kirikicho | 50-200 (?) | In high plateau of Kalehe territory, Bunyakiri | Declared over 1,300 combatants but none entered integration process Poorly organized and disciplined |
| Mai Mai Nyakiriba | Colonel Nyakiriba | 100-200 | Around Kasika, Mwenga territory | Not very active |
| Mai Mai Kapopo | Colonel Kapopo | 200-400 | Around Miki, Mwenga territory | Not very active |
| Mai-Mai Kyatende | “General” Kyatende Dittman | 50-200 | Southern Shabunda | Kyatende was the manager of the Muungano soccer team in Bukavu and was married to a German women before he decided to start an armed rebellion in 2010. |
Aftershocks of Chebeya's death
Some news on the Chebeya assassination trial.
AFP and RFI are reporting that the Congolese government will allow Dutch medical experts to help with the autopsy, although the attorney general also told the press they will not allow for international participation in the investigation, so it appears as if they have their wires a bit crossed.
Sources from within diplomatic circles in Kinshasa suggest that the Belgian government was thinking about canceling the king's visit for the Congo's 50th anniversary celebrations later this month. That would have been a major blow to President Kabila, as the king is (somewhat bizarrely) the guest of honor, and the government has proudly trumpeted his visit in the press (it's even one of the main features on Kabila's website). However, the Congolese government's rapid reaction to Chebeya's death seems to have calmed Belgian spirits a bit.
Why this lightening reaction by Kinshasa? It stands in marked contrast to previous crises - in January 2007, a clamp down by security forces against the Bundu dia Kongo sect resulted in 100 deaths, which elicited donor protests but no major consequences. Similarly, clashes between the army and Bemba's bodyguards in March 2007 left hundred dead in the streets of Kinshasa. Nonetheless, the French minister of cooperation decided not to cancel her visit to Kinshasa just days afterwards. When several ambassadors protested to Kabila that their embassies had been looted by security forces, the president told them to leave the country if they didn't like it.
These events happened just after the 2006 elections; donors were eager not to jeopardize the peace process that they had bankrolled. They decided to give Kabila another chance.
When Congolese army troops and ex-CNDP cadres carried out widespread abuses in the Kivus in 2009 during operations against the FDLR, the international community again protested, but did not seriously reconsider any of their aid to the government, which amounts to almost 50% of its budget (much of which is in terms of projects, no grants to the government). In fact, the IMF has more or less promised to wipe clean billions in Congolese debts this year, as the government reaches HIPC completion point.
Again, the political context explains some of this: Donors were generally enthusiastic about Rwanda-Congo peace deal that ended years of CNDP-FARDC fighting in the Kivus. They didn't want to rock the boat by having MONUC arrest Bosco Taganda or pressing Kabila too hard on human rights abuses.
So has this changed with Chebeya's murder? It's too early to tell, but it does come at a very sensitive time, just weeks before the anniversary celebrations and just before the IMF decision on Congolese debt. Also, it may open up a rift within Kabila's inner circle if John Numbi, the head of the police, is prosecuted for the murder.
AFP and RFI are reporting that the Congolese government will allow Dutch medical experts to help with the autopsy, although the attorney general also told the press they will not allow for international participation in the investigation, so it appears as if they have their wires a bit crossed.
Sources from within diplomatic circles in Kinshasa suggest that the Belgian government was thinking about canceling the king's visit for the Congo's 50th anniversary celebrations later this month. That would have been a major blow to President Kabila, as the king is (somewhat bizarrely) the guest of honor, and the government has proudly trumpeted his visit in the press (it's even one of the main features on Kabila's website). However, the Congolese government's rapid reaction to Chebeya's death seems to have calmed Belgian spirits a bit.
Why this lightening reaction by Kinshasa? It stands in marked contrast to previous crises - in January 2007, a clamp down by security forces against the Bundu dia Kongo sect resulted in 100 deaths, which elicited donor protests but no major consequences. Similarly, clashes between the army and Bemba's bodyguards in March 2007 left hundred dead in the streets of Kinshasa. Nonetheless, the French minister of cooperation decided not to cancel her visit to Kinshasa just days afterwards. When several ambassadors protested to Kabila that their embassies had been looted by security forces, the president told them to leave the country if they didn't like it.
These events happened just after the 2006 elections; donors were eager not to jeopardize the peace process that they had bankrolled. They decided to give Kabila another chance.
When Congolese army troops and ex-CNDP cadres carried out widespread abuses in the Kivus in 2009 during operations against the FDLR, the international community again protested, but did not seriously reconsider any of their aid to the government, which amounts to almost 50% of its budget (much of which is in terms of projects, no grants to the government). In fact, the IMF has more or less promised to wipe clean billions in Congolese debts this year, as the government reaches HIPC completion point.
Again, the political context explains some of this: Donors were generally enthusiastic about Rwanda-Congo peace deal that ended years of CNDP-FARDC fighting in the Kivus. They didn't want to rock the boat by having MONUC arrest Bosco Taganda or pressing Kabila too hard on human rights abuses.
So has this changed with Chebeya's murder? It's too early to tell, but it does come at a very sensitive time, just weeks before the anniversary celebrations and just before the IMF decision on Congolese debt. Also, it may open up a rift within Kabila's inner circle if John Numbi, the head of the police, is prosecuted for the murder.
Monday, June 7, 2010
The love triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC
A new militia reared its head this year in North Kivu called the FPLC, led by a Congolese Tutsi called Gad Ngabo. I have pasted below extracts from an assessment of the FPLC that I got from diplomatic sources in the region.
The Front Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo makes its first appearance in January 2010, in an interview with Voice of America, in which General Gadi Ngabo stated that he would liberate the DRC and continue the struggle of Nkunda. Rumors about the presence of Gad first surfaced a couple of months earlier, in September when a number of looting incidents along the Rutshuru-Ishasha road were attributed to his group.
Gad's group, working closely with the FDLR and with Nkundist elements of CNDP, was first thought to be connected to General Bosco Ntaganda. Gad is a Tutsi from Ngungu and thus Mugogwe [clan affiliation], as it Bosco. He had also broken away from the RCD-Goma to join the RCD-KML in Kisangani in 1999 and later joined, as did Bosco, the Ugandan backed UPC of Thomas Lubanga. After Lubanga's arrest in 2003, he fled to Uganda, where he was often spotted with senior army intelligence officers. The reason for his "exile", as former RCD-sources suggest, is that he had stolen a vehicle of WFP in South Kivu, and ran off with it to Uganda. Although political and military supporters of Nkunda's wing of CNDP deny any links with Gad, it is more and more obvious that the latter receives support and recruits from their side of the house, rather than Bosco's. In addition to this, Rwandan intelligence sources are convinced, that Gad's movement is a creation of Kampala, where Nkunda-supporters have fled and are being prepared to form a new front in eastern DRC but also in Rwanda. They also attribute the recent grenade attacks in Kigali to this group.
This begs the question as to why Uganda would be supporting such a group that consists of FLDR and CNDP elements.
Kampala and Kigali have, following their withdrawal in 2002 and 2003, kept their options open in DRC, through varying degrees of support to the militia in Ituri and the armed groups in the Kivus. The UPC of Lubanga started as a Ugandan backed group but in late 2002, Lubanga, Bosco and a number of others were approached by an official of the Rwandan Embassy in Kampala and traveled to Goma and Kigali. A couple of weeks later, in January 2003, the UPC switched sides and publically announced a new alliance with the RCD-Goma. Soon thereafter, the UPDF and the UPC were fighting an open war in Bunia. These wars by proxy between Uganda and Rwanda have continued in the DRC, be it with periodic intervals of escalation and de-escalation.
n 2001, Kampala accused Kigali of financial support to President Museveni's main opponent, Kizza Besigiye and Rwanda was also said to be supporting the People's Redemption Army, a Ugandan dissident group (of little or no consequence) in the DRC. In 2005 and 2006 Kigali accused Kampala of harboring and facilitating the passage of senior officers of the FDLR, who were given Ugandan passports to travel back and forth between Europe and the FDLR-FOCA command in Masisi. So, one might expect that at a time of realignments in relations between Rwanda and the DRC, MONUC drawdown, and in a period of domestic electoral tension, the rivalry between Kigali and Kampala increases.
When Nkunda overplayed his hand and Kigali took him out of the equation, some of his supporters turned to Kampala. Having held an area in Rutshuru for a decade, the CNDP had established business links with Ugandan businessmen along the border posts, from Ishasha to Bunagana, where timber, other merchandise and the proceeds from looting campaigns are traded. Furthermore, many ex-ANC officers started their rebel career as part of Museveni's NRA and had received training in Uganda in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Gad's FPLC seems to be a new attempt of Kampala to sow the seeds of a new rebellion in the DRC, to disrupt the rapprochement between Kinshasa and Kigali.
Kigali has had to intervene several times when internal CNDP-rivalry risked derailing. While Kinshasa is trying to ease tension with the typical envelopes of money, the real guarantor behind CNDP's integration in the FARDC remains Rwanda. But even Kigali doesn't control all the parameters and while internal opposition against Kagame may have been simmering for years, the arrest of Nkunda was obviously a move that didn’t go down well with some players amongst the Tutsi establishment on both sides of the border.
Indeed, those who were sidelined during the recent reshuffle of the army top brass in Kigali were all inner-circle, many of whom were involved in the subsequent Rwandan invasions in the DRC and no doubt, in the Rwandan support and supply lines to the ANC and the CNDP. Bosco, whose political and military wing of CNDP continues to receive backing from Kigali, is not at all appreciated by these officers, who haven't forgotten the Kisangani wars when Bosco was standing on the wrong (Ugandan) side of the fence.
Many of them also have relatives and commercial interests in DRC, cattle ranches, interest in the petrol trade, land, etc ... and these interests may now be at stake or change hands from one wing of the CNDP-support networks to another. While recent research has already documented how CNDP officers are expropriating non-Rwandophones in Masisi or taking over mining sites in Walikale and in South Kivu at the expense of local communities, the rise of Bosco's wing of CNDP is also affecting former Nkunda-loyalists, who are losing privileges and are now even suspected of anti-Rwandan activities. Lately, a number of Nkunda-supporters have been arrested in Gisenyi, while several others in Goma start to reach out to diplomats or MONUC officials, seeking "protection against Kigali". An attempt to start a new CNDP-Courant Renovateur was very short-lived. A day after they issued their founding manifest on 4 May, the person who signed it – Patrice Habarurema – was already arrested in Gisenyi. It is unclear, at this point, what faction of CNDP he represents, but Kigali is clearly not ready to allow its proxy any independent political moves.
So, it is likely that a Ugandan backed alternative such as Gad's FPLC, would attract Nkundist politicians and military officers and that their grievances are now turned against Kigali, as well as Kinshasa. Gad's movement seems open to all: CNDP, FDLR-Rud, FDLR-FOCA, disgruntled FARDC officers who haven't seen their salaries for months or the various Mayi Mayi whose parochial demands can never be accommodated by Kinshasa. When meeting with a Gad delegation in early May however, it was obvious - as during the Nkunda-days - that the majority of his rebel force is Tutsi and that the tactics used, ambushes and hit-an-run attacks against FARDC units and the spreading of rumors, have the same modus operandi as the CNDP.
As a consequence, we may soon see a Rwandan operation in Rutshuru territory, where Gad’s main bases are. This will be the first test for the RPA after the recent purge and it will be interesting to see if they, the RPA officers’ corps, are ready to go after potential Nkundist backers of Gad within the CNDP. Kinshasa, having no or very little leverage with the CNDP-officers, is obviously banking on this but even if Rwanda intervenes to take out the immediate threat of a new rebellion, the integration process will be seriously put to the test. The big question mark is what, other than more chaos and uncertainty in the Kivus, we need to expect of the relations between Rwanda and Uganda. For this, we probably have to wait until after the Rwandan elections in August, although war by proxy can already start before that on the Congolese side of the border. An unconfirmed but reliable report has it, that the RPF recently – in mid May - crossed into Uganda, to neutralize a group of FDLR operating from within Uganda, in an area straddling the three borders.
The Front Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo makes its first appearance in January 2010, in an interview with Voice of America, in which General Gadi Ngabo stated that he would liberate the DRC and continue the struggle of Nkunda. Rumors about the presence of Gad first surfaced a couple of months earlier, in September when a number of looting incidents along the Rutshuru-Ishasha road were attributed to his group.
Gad's group, working closely with the FDLR and with Nkundist elements of CNDP, was first thought to be connected to General Bosco Ntaganda. Gad is a Tutsi from Ngungu and thus Mugogwe [clan affiliation], as it Bosco. He had also broken away from the RCD-Goma to join the RCD-KML in Kisangani in 1999 and later joined, as did Bosco, the Ugandan backed UPC of Thomas Lubanga. After Lubanga's arrest in 2003, he fled to Uganda, where he was often spotted with senior army intelligence officers. The reason for his "exile", as former RCD-sources suggest, is that he had stolen a vehicle of WFP in South Kivu, and ran off with it to Uganda. Although political and military supporters of Nkunda's wing of CNDP deny any links with Gad, it is more and more obvious that the latter receives support and recruits from their side of the house, rather than Bosco's. In addition to this, Rwandan intelligence sources are convinced, that Gad's movement is a creation of Kampala, where Nkunda-supporters have fled and are being prepared to form a new front in eastern DRC but also in Rwanda. They also attribute the recent grenade attacks in Kigali to this group.
This begs the question as to why Uganda would be supporting such a group that consists of FLDR and CNDP elements.
Kampala and Kigali have, following their withdrawal in 2002 and 2003, kept their options open in DRC, through varying degrees of support to the militia in Ituri and the armed groups in the Kivus. The UPC of Lubanga started as a Ugandan backed group but in late 2002, Lubanga, Bosco and a number of others were approached by an official of the Rwandan Embassy in Kampala and traveled to Goma and Kigali. A couple of weeks later, in January 2003, the UPC switched sides and publically announced a new alliance with the RCD-Goma. Soon thereafter, the UPDF and the UPC were fighting an open war in Bunia. These wars by proxy between Uganda and Rwanda have continued in the DRC, be it with periodic intervals of escalation and de-escalation.
n 2001, Kampala accused Kigali of financial support to President Museveni's main opponent, Kizza Besigiye and Rwanda was also said to be supporting the People's Redemption Army, a Ugandan dissident group (of little or no consequence) in the DRC. In 2005 and 2006 Kigali accused Kampala of harboring and facilitating the passage of senior officers of the FDLR, who were given Ugandan passports to travel back and forth between Europe and the FDLR-FOCA command in Masisi. So, one might expect that at a time of realignments in relations between Rwanda and the DRC, MONUC drawdown, and in a period of domestic electoral tension, the rivalry between Kigali and Kampala increases.
When Nkunda overplayed his hand and Kigali took him out of the equation, some of his supporters turned to Kampala. Having held an area in Rutshuru for a decade, the CNDP had established business links with Ugandan businessmen along the border posts, from Ishasha to Bunagana, where timber, other merchandise and the proceeds from looting campaigns are traded. Furthermore, many ex-ANC officers started their rebel career as part of Museveni's NRA and had received training in Uganda in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Gad's FPLC seems to be a new attempt of Kampala to sow the seeds of a new rebellion in the DRC, to disrupt the rapprochement between Kinshasa and Kigali.
Kigali has had to intervene several times when internal CNDP-rivalry risked derailing. While Kinshasa is trying to ease tension with the typical envelopes of money, the real guarantor behind CNDP's integration in the FARDC remains Rwanda. But even Kigali doesn't control all the parameters and while internal opposition against Kagame may have been simmering for years, the arrest of Nkunda was obviously a move that didn’t go down well with some players amongst the Tutsi establishment on both sides of the border.
Indeed, those who were sidelined during the recent reshuffle of the army top brass in Kigali were all inner-circle, many of whom were involved in the subsequent Rwandan invasions in the DRC and no doubt, in the Rwandan support and supply lines to the ANC and the CNDP. Bosco, whose political and military wing of CNDP continues to receive backing from Kigali, is not at all appreciated by these officers, who haven't forgotten the Kisangani wars when Bosco was standing on the wrong (Ugandan) side of the fence.
Many of them also have relatives and commercial interests in DRC, cattle ranches, interest in the petrol trade, land, etc ... and these interests may now be at stake or change hands from one wing of the CNDP-support networks to another. While recent research has already documented how CNDP officers are expropriating non-Rwandophones in Masisi or taking over mining sites in Walikale and in South Kivu at the expense of local communities, the rise of Bosco's wing of CNDP is also affecting former Nkunda-loyalists, who are losing privileges and are now even suspected of anti-Rwandan activities. Lately, a number of Nkunda-supporters have been arrested in Gisenyi, while several others in Goma start to reach out to diplomats or MONUC officials, seeking "protection against Kigali". An attempt to start a new CNDP-Courant Renovateur was very short-lived. A day after they issued their founding manifest on 4 May, the person who signed it – Patrice Habarurema – was already arrested in Gisenyi. It is unclear, at this point, what faction of CNDP he represents, but Kigali is clearly not ready to allow its proxy any independent political moves.
So, it is likely that a Ugandan backed alternative such as Gad's FPLC, would attract Nkundist politicians and military officers and that their grievances are now turned against Kigali, as well as Kinshasa. Gad's movement seems open to all: CNDP, FDLR-Rud, FDLR-FOCA, disgruntled FARDC officers who haven't seen their salaries for months or the various Mayi Mayi whose parochial demands can never be accommodated by Kinshasa. When meeting with a Gad delegation in early May however, it was obvious - as during the Nkunda-days - that the majority of his rebel force is Tutsi and that the tactics used, ambushes and hit-an-run attacks against FARDC units and the spreading of rumors, have the same modus operandi as the CNDP.
As a consequence, we may soon see a Rwandan operation in Rutshuru territory, where Gad’s main bases are. This will be the first test for the RPA after the recent purge and it will be interesting to see if they, the RPA officers’ corps, are ready to go after potential Nkundist backers of Gad within the CNDP. Kinshasa, having no or very little leverage with the CNDP-officers, is obviously banking on this but even if Rwanda intervenes to take out the immediate threat of a new rebellion, the integration process will be seriously put to the test. The big question mark is what, other than more chaos and uncertainty in the Kivus, we need to expect of the relations between Rwanda and Uganda. For this, we probably have to wait until after the Rwandan elections in August, although war by proxy can already start before that on the Congolese side of the border. An unconfirmed but reliable report has it, that the RPF recently – in mid May - crossed into Uganda, to neutralize a group of FDLR operating from within Uganda, in an area straddling the three borders.
Trouble in Kabila's coalition?
The news of Floribert Chebeya's presumed murder comes at a bad time for the president's coalition. On May 25th, several of his main AMP coalition partners decided to create a new "courant renovateur" called the Liberal and Patriotic Center (CLP). It includes some heavyweights: the parties of Mbusa Nyamwisi, Olivier Kamitatu and Jose Endundo all signed up.
Their statement was bizarre. They claimed to be utterly loyal to President Kabila; they just didn't like the way the government was being managed. In other words, this was an implicit snub towards Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito, was is in theory in charge of the government. Of course, what makes it somewhat bizarre is that everyone knows that Muzito is not really in charge of much - most important policy decisions are made by the president's office.
The rest of the statement was a series of platitudes: the confirm their loyalty to Kabila, their desire to encourage dialogue within the AMP, and to build a strong Congo. The only slightly revealing part is: they want "a fair distribution of responsibilities amongst [the AMP's] members."
These are not the only murmurings of discontent. Just several weeks ago, a group of opposition MPs tried to impeach the prime minister, but backed down when it appeared they didn't have enough support. Muzito has often been alleged to be involved in very large embezzlement schemes.
The president's reaction to the creation of the CLP is said to have been harsh. According to RFI (whose correspondent Ghislaine du Pont has to report from Paris, as she's been banned from the country for several years now), Kabila invited members of his AMP coalition to his Kingakati ranch last Saturday, where he proceeded to berate the CLP ministers, accusing them of attempting to oust him from power, saying that "if this were an army, you would be executed." This version of events has not been confirmed by anyone else.
Their statement was bizarre. They claimed to be utterly loyal to President Kabila; they just didn't like the way the government was being managed. In other words, this was an implicit snub towards Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito, was is in theory in charge of the government. Of course, what makes it somewhat bizarre is that everyone knows that Muzito is not really in charge of much - most important policy decisions are made by the president's office.
The rest of the statement was a series of platitudes: the confirm their loyalty to Kabila, their desire to encourage dialogue within the AMP, and to build a strong Congo. The only slightly revealing part is: they want "a fair distribution of responsibilities amongst [the AMP's] members."
These are not the only murmurings of discontent. Just several weeks ago, a group of opposition MPs tried to impeach the prime minister, but backed down when it appeared they didn't have enough support. Muzito has often been alleged to be involved in very large embezzlement schemes.
The president's reaction to the creation of the CLP is said to have been harsh. According to RFI (whose correspondent Ghislaine du Pont has to report from Paris, as she's been banned from the country for several years now), Kabila invited members of his AMP coalition to his Kingakati ranch last Saturday, where he proceeded to berate the CLP ministers, accusing them of attempting to oust him from power, saying that "if this were an army, you would be executed." This version of events has not been confirmed by anyone else.
Death of Chebeya & Suspension of Numbi
I have been traveling - apologies for the feeble Congo Siasa presence of late.
And there has been a lot of news. Last Wednesday, one of Congo's leading human rights advocates, Floribert Chebeya, was found dead in his car on the outskirts of town. The cause of his death is unknown, but was last known to be on his way to a meeting with General John Numbi, the Inspector General of the police. According to some sources, later in the evening he texted his wife, saying that he hadn't been able to meet with Numbi. His wife tried calling him numerous times after 9pm, but his phone was off. He was found dead the next morning. His family has been allowed to see the corpse, but no autopsy has yet been performed.
To add insult to injury, the Kinshasa police chief issued a statement suggesting that the body had been found "without any visible sign of violence, whose pants fly zipper was open and beside whom were two condoms already used and one unused tree-condom pack; a box of the [Indian-made erectile] stimulant Davigra containing a bubble pack of two tablets already used; two artificial nails and a few women’s artificial hair extensions.”
The Congolese government's reaction was surprisingly swift. Investigators arrested Daniel Mukalay, the head of the notorious special services of the police, who apparently immediately implicated his boss, General Numbi. Numbi has been suspended from his position, although he remains a free man.
There are many bizarre aspects of the case: Why did he go alone to see Numbi and not accompanied by his colleagues, as he was used to? With such high stakes, why did Mukalay confess so easily? And above all, what was the motive: if this was indeed Numbi, then he would surely know that by killing one human rights defender he was not going to make any of his problems go away, quite to contrary?
Let's take look at the accused. John Numbi is by all accounts one of the most powerful men in the country. Originally from Katanga, he was trained as an electrical technician before he took a leadership role in the JUFERI youth militia that conducted anti-Luba witchhunts in Katanga in 1991/1992. When Laurent Kabila's AFDL arrived in Lubumbahsi, Numbi was quickly contacted to help other youths in the province. He later became army commander of Katanga (although he has little military training) and, after Joseph Kabila came to power, commander of the air force.
But there have been tensions between Kabila and Numbi in the past. When a rogue presidential guard commander attempted a botched coup in 2004, Congolese security services suggested that Numbi might have been behind it (the coup leader Eric Lenge was friend of Numbi and the air force blew the attempts to arrest him). Numbi commands a lot of respect within the presidential guard and is seen as a threat by some in the presidency. Could this have been a set-up to frame Numbi? Possible, although of late Numbi had been a crucial player in negotiating the various peace deals with Rwanda.
Was this an attempt by Kabila's inner circle to intimidate its critics before next year's elections? Maybe. But the timing is bizarre. We are less than four weeks away from the country's 50th anniversary celebration, an event Kabila has been preparing for and wants to use to highlight his achievements. Chebeya's assassination throws a dark pall over the festivities. We are also quite a long way from next year's elections.
What about Chebeya himself, did he have any particular problems with Numbi or the government? Yes, of course, they were legion. He had accused both Numbi as well as several other high ranking government officials of complicity in the Bas-Congo massacres of 2007. He had recently released a report on the killing of civilians by the Congolese army in Mbandaka and was demanding for those convicted for the assassination of Laurent Kabila to be released based on lack of evidence. The list goes on and on. Other Congolese human rights defenders had said similar things, as well. But yes, it is entirely possible that this was revenge for past reports.
The diplomatic community, together with local and international NGOs, have all demanded an independent investigation. I can only encourage this. But if the assassinations of Serge Maheshe (Radio Okapi), Didace Namujimbo (Radio Okapi), Pascal Kabungulu (Heritiers de la Justice), Frank Ngyke (La Reference Plus) are anything to go by, the investigation will be disappointing.
And there has been a lot of news. Last Wednesday, one of Congo's leading human rights advocates, Floribert Chebeya, was found dead in his car on the outskirts of town. The cause of his death is unknown, but was last known to be on his way to a meeting with General John Numbi, the Inspector General of the police. According to some sources, later in the evening he texted his wife, saying that he hadn't been able to meet with Numbi. His wife tried calling him numerous times after 9pm, but his phone was off. He was found dead the next morning. His family has been allowed to see the corpse, but no autopsy has yet been performed.
To add insult to injury, the Kinshasa police chief issued a statement suggesting that the body had been found "without any visible sign of violence, whose pants fly zipper was open and beside whom were two condoms already used and one unused tree-condom pack; a box of the [Indian-made erectile] stimulant Davigra containing a bubble pack of two tablets already used; two artificial nails and a few women’s artificial hair extensions.”
The Congolese government's reaction was surprisingly swift. Investigators arrested Daniel Mukalay, the head of the notorious special services of the police, who apparently immediately implicated his boss, General Numbi. Numbi has been suspended from his position, although he remains a free man.
There are many bizarre aspects of the case: Why did he go alone to see Numbi and not accompanied by his colleagues, as he was used to? With such high stakes, why did Mukalay confess so easily? And above all, what was the motive: if this was indeed Numbi, then he would surely know that by killing one human rights defender he was not going to make any of his problems go away, quite to contrary?
Let's take look at the accused. John Numbi is by all accounts one of the most powerful men in the country. Originally from Katanga, he was trained as an electrical technician before he took a leadership role in the JUFERI youth militia that conducted anti-Luba witchhunts in Katanga in 1991/1992. When Laurent Kabila's AFDL arrived in Lubumbahsi, Numbi was quickly contacted to help other youths in the province. He later became army commander of Katanga (although he has little military training) and, after Joseph Kabila came to power, commander of the air force.
But there have been tensions between Kabila and Numbi in the past. When a rogue presidential guard commander attempted a botched coup in 2004, Congolese security services suggested that Numbi might have been behind it (the coup leader Eric Lenge was friend of Numbi and the air force blew the attempts to arrest him). Numbi commands a lot of respect within the presidential guard and is seen as a threat by some in the presidency. Could this have been a set-up to frame Numbi? Possible, although of late Numbi had been a crucial player in negotiating the various peace deals with Rwanda.
Was this an attempt by Kabila's inner circle to intimidate its critics before next year's elections? Maybe. But the timing is bizarre. We are less than four weeks away from the country's 50th anniversary celebration, an event Kabila has been preparing for and wants to use to highlight his achievements. Chebeya's assassination throws a dark pall over the festivities. We are also quite a long way from next year's elections.
What about Chebeya himself, did he have any particular problems with Numbi or the government? Yes, of course, they were legion. He had accused both Numbi as well as several other high ranking government officials of complicity in the Bas-Congo massacres of 2007. He had recently released a report on the killing of civilians by the Congolese army in Mbandaka and was demanding for those convicted for the assassination of Laurent Kabila to be released based on lack of evidence. The list goes on and on. Other Congolese human rights defenders had said similar things, as well. But yes, it is entirely possible that this was revenge for past reports.
The diplomatic community, together with local and international NGOs, have all demanded an independent investigation. I can only encourage this. But if the assassinations of Serge Maheshe (Radio Okapi), Didace Namujimbo (Radio Okapi), Pascal Kabungulu (Heritiers de la Justice), Frank Ngyke (La Reference Plus) are anything to go by, the investigation will be disappointing.
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