Tshisekedi in South Africa: What happened?

Before arriving in Kisangani on Thursday evening, opposition candidate Etienne Tshisekedi spent much of the first two weeks of the election campaign in South Africa. What was he up to?

According to the man himself, he was seeking political and financial support from the ruling ANC and businessmen. He reportedly met at least once with Gwede Mantashe, the Secretary-General of the ANC, and by Thursday could boast that he had been able to rent a DC-3, a small passenger jet and a helicopter. These assets are key, given the dearth of commercial jets in the Congo (the UDPS says the government is hogging commercial air assets, others say there this is just due to the lack of aircraft since Hewa Bora's license was suspended in July this year, leaving only CAA flying domestically).

This has set off speculation in domestic and diplomatic circles that Tshisekedi has received support from President Jacob Zuma's government. Some also point to the fact that the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is fielding more election observers than the EU, the AU and Carter Center, and the head of this mission is Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, wife of Charles Nqakula, who is a close adviser to President Zuma and his envoy to Sudan and Zimbabwe (and previously Burundi).

But it's not so simple. After all, the same day Tshisekedi flew to Kisangani, South African authorities announced that a new deal would be signed today (November 12) on the Grand Inga hydroelectric dam between their national electricity provider Eskom and the Congolese electricity company, which could provide up to 40,000 MW of electricity, the largest such dam in the world. But this is merely an MoU, which may lead to a formal agreement in six months, and negotiations have been ongoing since 2004 on similar projects. Despite the tentative nature of the agreement, President Zuma will be in Lubumbashi today to officially sign the MoU.

Was it merely a coincidence that Tshisekedi was in South Africa just before the deal was signed with Kabila? If Zuma did provide support to the opposition, how can this be squared with a trip that will  be interpreted as an endorsement of Kabila's candidacy?

Some analysts I spoke with suggested that the South Africans were using Tshisekedi as leverage to squeeze a deal out of the Congolese (even though the Congolese could always renege, as they have in the past). Others say that Tshisekedi was really in South Africa for medical treatment (speculation about his health never abates), and his aircraft were not provided by Pretoria after all.

Relations between Presidents Zuma and Kabila have been through many twists and turns. Some of the powerbrokers around Kabila, in particular Katumba Mwanke, were reportedly closer to the Thabo Mbeki wing of the ANC during his leadership struggle against Jacob Zuma in 2009, and were viewed with some suspicion when Zuma won this struggle.

Shortly afterwards, however, news broke that two hitherto unknown companies in the British Virgin Islands, Caprikat and Foxwhelp, had obtained oil blocks in the Congo previously held by Irish company Tullow. Who was listed as the representatives of the two companies? None other than Khulubuse Zuma, the president's nephew, and Michael Hulley, the president's lawyer (who was promoted this week to be his official legal counsel). Possibly also involved - albeit indirectly - was Tokyo Sekwale, a prominent ANC businessman and minister.

Were these oil blocks peace offerings by Kabila to the South Africans? It isn't clear, but one of the other companies that lost out in this deal was Divine Inspiration, which allegedly had links to the Mbeki-faction of the ANC.

South Africa is a key partner for the Congolese government. It is the largest economy in the region and the base for many of the mining companies operating in the Congo.

So who are they backing? I couldn't say, and obviously some of this is speculation. But it wouldn't be too bizarre if they were backing more than one horse. Angola (Pretoria biggest competitor in the region) allegedly made a similar move earlier this year, when they provided some support to Vital Kamerhe (or strategically leaked information in this regard). Shortly afterwards, the Congolese government announced that they would hold off on pursuing their claims to offshore oil blocks - that are currently being managed by Angola - until 2014.

Guest blog: Taking stock of the China deal

This is a guest blog by Johanna Jansson, a PhD candidate in International Development Studies at the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark. Her PhD project explores the DRC’s relations with its emerging and traditional development partners. 

The ‘China deal’, the minerals-for-infrastructure agreement struck in 2007 between the DRC and China, is one of the most well-known embodiments of the increasing Chinese presence on the African continent. 

Most of you are familiar with the story. By means of a barter-type agreeement, the Sino-Congolese mining joint venture (JV), Sino–Congolais des Mines (Sicomines), was created and allocated mining titles in Katanga. In exchange for access to mining titles, Sicomines will construct transport and social infrastructure in the DRC, financed by loans from the Chinese state-owned bank China Export–Import (Exim) Bank. The loans are to be reimbursed by means of the profits from the mining venture. The mining titles allocated are the Mashamba West and Dikuluwe copper- and cobalt concessions.  

The agreement was contested during 2008 and 2009 by a range of domestic and international actors. Among the concerns raised, the most salient pertained to a lack of transparency in the negotiation process, concerns for debt sustainability and a claim that the agreement was skewed in favour of the Chinese party. The Sicomines episode became known worldwide since it provoked the perhaps most conspicuous (geo) political controversy seen to date between an African country’s traditional (IMF) and emerging (China) external partners. The 2009 settlement was in favour of the IMF’s preferences: the loan towards infrastructure was capped at US$ 3 billion and the guarantee provided by the Congolese state for the reimbursement of the China Exim Bank loan to the commercial mining venture was removed. 

The agreement is now under implementation (refer to the table below for an overview of the infrastructure projects implemented). The mining venture is slated to come into production in 2012-2013 and reach full capacity in 2016.

In a recent paper for the South African Institute of International Affairs, I take a close look at the agreement from its inception in 2007 to the state of implementation as of May 2011. The paper draws on field work in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi in September-October 2008, February-March and October 2009 and February-May 2011. I have conducted interviews with Congolese respondents from government departments, civil society and the private sector; Chinese respondents from state-owned and private enterprises and the Chinese Embassy; and representatives from international governmental and non-governmental organisations, the diplomatic community and observers. Around 50 of my 130 interviews concerned the Sicomines agreement specifically.

In the paper, I argue that the Sicomines episode reflects the contemporary changes in China’s role globally. The power configurations of the global political economy shifted significantly from 2007 when the agreement was first signed to 2009 when it was renegotiated. China’s ascension as a global leader was fast-tracked by the global economic downturn. Its position as an external actor to reckon with in the DRC is now consolidated, a development which in itself signifies change in the DRC’s international relations. Yet, the Sicomines agreement also represents continuity in that regard, since it was amended to the benefit of the policy preferences of the IMF. The revision came about for several reasons which I outline in the paper. The most important is that China, with its strong strategic interest in taking up an active role in the IMF, had to balance its goals in the DRC and in the IMF. The lobbying efforts of the traditional donors, also members of the IMF’s board, therefore had the desired effect of making China agree to a downsizing of the agreement.

Since the Sicomines agreement was revised in 2009, it has slipped down the agenda and is no longer subject of a great deal of Kinshasa’s attention. “It’s under implementation, and it’s going slower than the Congolese government would have wanted”, seems to be the assessment of most people, Congolese and expatriates, I’ve talked to this year. Yet, many questions around what the agreement actually meant and means for the DRC remain both undebated and unanswered.

A matter that I find deserves to be opened up is the perception that the downsizing of the agreement was primarily made for debt sustainability reasons. It was part of the considerations, rightly so, but there is more to that story. I show in the paper that despite the fact that the quantity of minerals contained by the mining concessions is uncertain, even IMF and World Bank staff has observed that the repayment margin for the loan to be contracted under the 2009 version of the agreement is important. A second tranche of lending towards infrastructure may thus have been within the reimbursement capacity of the Sicomines JV. In other words, a loan larger than US$ 3 billion could have been justified. The halving of the credit line to be extended by China Exim Bank towards infrastructure refurbishment therefore needs to be read as more than a result of debt sustainability concerns. It is also an expression of the IMF’s and the traditional donor community’s preferences in terms of how investments in the mining sector should be structured: that investments should be channelled through the Mining Code, the companies should pay taxes and public goods should be provided by the state. By means of the renegotiation of the Sicomines agreement, this model partly trumped the original developmental-state approach: a credit line extended by a state-owned bank providing up-front financing of turnkey infrastructure projects, and reimbursements on that loan replacing payment of profit taxes. Both approaches have their pros and cons in the Congolese context, and I discuss this further in the paper.

Lastly and importantly, I find that there is a strange discrepancy between the enormous attention devoted by the international community to the issue prior to October 2009 and today’s relative silence. After all, the amendments made in 2009 only encompassed a cap on the infrastructure loans. US$ 3 billion of loans are still to be contracted by the DRC, and the real story in terms of the DRC getting value for ‘money’ (mining titles) will in this case be determined by the implementation of the infrastructure projects. As my paper shows, and as indicated by the table below, one project is completed, eight are under implementation and six projects are under negotiation. For the remainder of projects, the disbursement pace will be determined by the profitability of the mine. The selection of specific projects and the terms of these (most notably the price) are determined in negotiations between the Chinese parties in Kinshasa and Beijing on the one hand, and the Bureau for Coordination and Monitoring of the Sino-Congolese Programme (Bureau de Coordination et de Suivi du Programme Sino-Congolais) and the Congolese Agency for Public Works (Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux) on the other. Anyone interested in whether or not the Sicomines agreement is a ‘good deal’ for the DRC – this is where to take a closer look over the years to come.

State of implementation of the infrastructure projects financed through the Sicomines agreement

This table is reproduced from Jansson, J. (2011). “The Sicomines agreement: change and continuity in the DRC’s international relations”. Occasional paper, October. Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs.

Project	Measure	Contractor	Status as of June 2011	Cost ($ million)
The road between Beni and Niania, North Kivu	Refurbishment	Sinohydro	Completed and evaluated	57
Boulevard Triomphale, Kinshasa		CREC	Underway, about to be completed	N/A
Boulevard Sendwe, Kinshasa
Central hospital (Hôpital du Cinquantenaire), Kinshasa	Construction	Sinohydro	Underway, estimated inauguration October 2011	200
Part 1 of the Boulevard du 30 juin, Kinshasa	Refurbishment	CREC	Underway, about to be completed	N/A
Part 2 of the Boulevard du 30 juin, Kinshasa			Underway	N/A
Tourism Avenue, Kinshasa				24.4
Lutendele Road, Kinshasa				21
The road between Lubumbashi and Kasomeno, Katanga province				138
15 km of road in Butembo, North Kivu province		Sinohydro	Not yet started	30
Part 1 of the esplanade in front of the People’s Palace, Kinshasa				19
Part 2 of the esplanade in front of the People’s Palace, Kinshasa				Not negotiated at the time of the 2011 field research
Avenue de la Paix, Kinshasa
Avenue Ndjoku, Kinshasa
The road between Bukavu and Kamaniola

Source: Johanna Jansson’s personal interviews in Kinshasa with ACGT representatives, 15 February 2011 and 3 February 2009; a representative for one of the Chinese companies within Sicomines, 3 May 2011; and with BCPSC representatives, 23 February 2009 and 3 March 2009.

North Kivu Simmering on Eve of Elections

I have said previously on this blog that North Kivu would probably not be as marred by electoral violence as the hotbeds of opposition in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi and Kananga. I was wrong.

The electoral divide in the East, which has pitted Kabila loyalists against Vital Kamerhe, has dangerously overlapped with pre-existing ethnic and political rifts. In particular, rwandophone candidates from the Hutu and Tutsi community have been resorting to divisive rhetoric. Human Rights Watch reported that Sylvain Seninga, who is campaigning for re-election as a national MP, said in a public speech on March 25 that Rwandophones should "free themselves from this domination, this slavery," that had been imposed on them "by a little people that does not even know the origins of its ancestors."

In September, another local Hutu leader, Nyunga Munyamariba, told a crowd in Masisi that "whoever does not vote for the Rwandophone candidates must be eliminated." In October, army officer Colonel Mudahunga told a crowd that had gathered for the opening of a new army center that if Vital Kamerhe is found voting in Rutshuru and Masisi territories "he will be shot."

Many of these people are linked to either former Governor Eugene Serufuli or to the ex-CNDP, and locally people are speaking of the rebirth of the "rwandophonie," a coalition of Hutu and Tutsi populations that was stitched together under the diligent watch of Serufuli and his Rwandan allies during RCD rule in the province (1998-2006). Many of them are now closely allied to President Kabila - the CNDP political party, for example, has endorsed Kabila, and ex-CNDP officers have been informally campaigning for him, in particular in Masisi and Rutshuru, where many of them are from. They point to the UDPS' anti-Rwandan statements and Vital Kamerhe's notorious opposition to the joint Congolese-Rwandan military operations in 2009 that integrated the CNDP into the army.

This campaigning has infuriated other segments of the population, in particular the Hunde community, which has felt under occupation by the CNDP in Masisi for some years (this is the main lament of the APCLS armed group of Col. Janvier). They claim that the CNDP is further encroaching on their land - indeed, the more radical Hunde suggest that none of the Hutu and Tutsi of Masisi, who are largely descendents of immigrants from Rwanda between 1930-1960, have customary rights to land there.

These tensions erupted into violence during the last week, when the popular Hunde singer Fabrice Mumpfiritsa was kidnapped by armed men from his recording studio in Goma. He had previously supported Joseph Kabila, but recently switched sides and began singing in praise of the opposition. After his disappearance, members of the Hunde community in Goma, but also in Masisi, set up road blocks and began protesting. A web petition was set up, titled "Give us Back our Poet." Police and soldiers cleared the streets by shooting in the air, and the UN injured one demonstrator by shooting him in the leg.

By Monday morning, Fabrice had been found, battered and bruised, in a suburb of Goma. According to some sources, a government delegation, aware of the outrage his kidnapping had caused, was in Goma today to help take him to South Africa for medical treatment.

Where Tshisekedi is Coming From

 I should add that some of the incidents of abuse reported below have not been confirmed and, according to reliable sources, may have been less serious than described below. However, a report released by the UN today documents many more abuses linked to the electoral process that have taken place over the past year.

Like myself, many Congolese and foreign observers were taken aback by Etienne Tshisekedi's interview, broadcast on local TV last Sunday, in which he called on his supporters to "mobilize everywhere and set free the supporters...and break all the prisons." He also said "we don’t need to wait for the elections. In a democracy, whoever has the power is the majority of the people. Therefore, from this day on I am the Head of State of the DRC."

Could this really be the same Tshisekedi who had suffered torture, persecution and internal exile under Mobutu and Laurent-Désiré Kabila? Who had insisted on non-violent resistance when everybody else was forming armed groups? As critical as many have been about Tshisekedi's tactics in the past (his Cap-Martin reconciliation with Mobutu, his alliance with Rwanda/RCD-G in 2002, his boycott of the 2006 elections), this interview came as a shock.

But should it really have? For the past months, the UDPS has faced obstacle after obstacle in its preparations for elections. Demanding transparency in the voter register and better access to the election commission, UDPS supporters have demonstrated in Kinshasa every Thursday for the past six weeks, with little reaction from either the UN or the government. The demonstrations often deteriorated into street battles with the police and thugs - at least three of their supporters died and several dozen are in prison. None of these arrests have been carried out according to due process, but the minister of justice and public prosecutor have not responded to repeated UDPS letters.

UDPS posters have been torn down in public places, especially in Place Victoire, and on one occasion men in plain clothes open fire on people who had just distributed posters and flyers of Tshisekedi at Rond Point Ngaba.

The government has booked many of the country's few planes (there is only one commercial airliner still flying), making it difficult for opposition parties to fly their members around the country - this was one of the purposes of Tshisekedi's visit to South Africa, where has was able to secure the lease of a DC-3, a small jet and a helicopter.

Violent repression has also taken place in the provinces. On October 28, a UDPS demonstration was reportedly broken up by the bodyguards of Governor Kasanji, resulting in the deaths of two minors and the arrests of several supporters. On November 4, the seat of the UDPS in Kisantu (Bas-Congo) was set on fire by unidentified assailants. On November 5/6, UDPS and UNAFEC parties traded insults in Lubumbashi, resulting in the sacking of the UNAFEC office and an attack on UDPS installations - one UDPS supporter died.

Given this backdrop, Tshisekedi's statement is rendered more understandable, albeit not any more forgivable. His party is under pressure from the authorities, suffering from a lack of funds (the home page of his campaign features a video of Tshisekedi asking for contributions) and behind schedule in its campaign. He may well think that he needs to radicalize his message and step up his confrontation with the government, sending a signal to his supporters that he will stand firm. Two analysts sympathetic to Tshisekedi have written to me, both suggesting that his interview amounted to "psy-ops."

What, however, is the endgame? Is it merely to motivate his followers and project an image of strength as they go into the last round? (Ali taunting Foreman, "Is that all you got, George? My Grandma punches harder than you...") Or will the UDPS actively seek out violence to create a political crisis and pressure the government?

We shall see. I hope it's not the latter.

Transcript of Tshisekedi interview

CANDIDATE ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI WA MULUMBA PHONE INTERVIEW ON RLTV PROGRAM “SET 7” SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 6 2011.

Original language: Lingala.  This is an unofficial English transcript.

Reporter: The echoes are raging in Kinshasa that you are still in South Africa to establish contacts with the ANC, the party with which you plan to collaborate in managing Congo tomorrow,and, in addition, in Kinshasa, Kisangani, the people are growing impatient and would like to know when you will be back home because it’s already been more than a week since the campaign has begun, there are many problems in Congo, the problems of planes…He will present his schedule, the program of Kisangani, Lubumbashi and we will give his telephone number to the public, the Congolese are impatient to know when you will return to Congo !

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: By mid-week I will be in Kisangani, so there is no problem. But those who say that Kabila would stop my aircraft from landing in Congo, they know nothing about the real situation, Kabila does not represent anything anymore. There is only him and his wife left, because he is not even the minority leader any longer. For this same minority has sold him out! Guys like Boshab, Mende currently have a double standard talk, in the morning they talk one way and another at night. Finally, they let him go. Therefore he can’t prevent the majority leader’s aircraft from landing, because in a democracy, it is the majority who leads and I'm the head of the majority. So, I'm the President of the DRC,  I am the actual Head of State.

Reporter: “Son of the country“ E. Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, here  we are swarmed by Congolese people who came to listen to you live. They ask you to repeat your last statements.

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: As I said, we don’t need to wait for the elections. In a democracy, whoever has the power is the majority of the people. And the people of Congo, in its majority have chosen and trust Tshisekedi. Therefore, from this day on I am the Head of State of the DRC.

Reporter: “Son of the country“ E. Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, since we have put up your campaign ads where you say “People come first“, people answer Tshisekedi comes first, it has become a form of greeting in Kinshasa. But yesterday, did you get the news from Katanga? Where supporters of a party have gone to bother and fight the opposition’s supporters, what do you say to that?

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: First, you must know that this problem doesn’t come from another party, these incidents are to be blamed on Unafec, a party whose president is a foreigner, a Portuguese named Doliveira. He calls himself NKIUNGU to pretend make believe he is Congolese, he isn’t Congolese, he’s Portuguese.

Second, I just said that I am the Head of the Congo because I have the majority. The Congolese, or rather the compatriots who are in Lubumbashi and in all of Katanga, know well that the majority, well, that’s them! And in a democracy, power is in the hands of the majority and not the minority. Thus, they shouldn’t have left a small handful of people led by a "lunatic, a foreigner" who’s making up the laws over there. They had to teach them a lesson and follow them to their retrenchment because the majority cannot always complain.

Also, I take this opportunity to tell the so-called leaders of Congo who are listening to me that I have learned our brothers in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi, Lubumbashi are imprisoned. Therefore, I give them 48 hours, next Tuesday at noon I would like to receive the news that no opponent remains in prison. If it is not so, Tuesday at noon, I will ask my base wherever they are, in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi, Kananga and Lubumbashi to mobilize everywhere and set free the supporters and other opponents and break all the prisons.

And if unfortunately, police officers and other soldiers come to bother them, then they should be taught a lesson. And if they flee to the camps they should be hunted all the way out there and followed to their camp where they will receive a good punishment even in front of their family!

Reporter: So you're saying if by Tuesday, supporters and opponents are not freed, you will give the order to the Congolese who are your base to take responsibility! Therefore to go free them by force and that no one is to interfere with them. But the big question remains in Congo when will you return to Congo?

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: Isn’t Kisangani in Congolese territory?

Reporter: But which day will you land in Kisangani?

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: I said earlier in the middle of the week that is now starting, since then I will have finished my errands. Once this is done, I will give precision 48 hours ahead because I will come with my own plane, so there is no problem.

Reporter: So what do you say to the Congolese regarding the elections?

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba: For the elections, the message is simple as I said earlier the Head of the country remains the Congolese people, so Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba we ensure the electoral process in our country.

Mr NGOY MULUNDA, if he does not pay attention to everything we tell him he will cry in his mother tongue on December 6.

Therefore rest assured, as it is you who have the election in your hands, it is you that are going to choose, no more worrying about having insomnia, do not worry and sleep like babies! Now talk to my advisor BONA who will give you my number to be in contact with you and therefore receive all election-related concerns generated either by the PPRD, the CSAC and others.

Advisor BONA: 0027790893872.

Tshisekedi delivers firebrand interview, provokes controversy

In an interview broadcast Sunday evening on Radio Lisanga TV, a station close to the opposition, Etienne Tshisekedi stirred controversy and radicalized the tone of the election campaign.

I have transcribed and translated what I could hear of the interview in the below clip. Speaking from South Africa, where he has reportedly been since the beginning of the election campaign ten days ago, he denied that the Congolese government had refused his plane a landing permission, thereby contradicting his own party spokesman.

He went on to say that Kabila is all alone, that only his wife is still with him. Most controversially, he self-proclaimed himself president, saying that since the majority of the people was with him, from today on he was the president of the Congo.

In another part of the interview that I haven't heard, he allegedly said: "I call on supporters (combattants) everywhere in the country to go to the prisons, to break down the doors and to liberate my supporters." He continued: ""I'm giving a 48-hour deadline for all opposition prisoners to be released. Past that deadline, I will ask the population to attack prisons and free them, and as president, I'm ordering prison guards not to resist."

He was apparently referring to his supporters who had been arrested during recent demonstrations. This prompted the government to shut down the TV station, which belongs to the opposition MP and former rebel leader Roger Lumbala.

The UDPS has confirmed that the interview was authentic. Later, on the BBC Swahili service, I heard a UDPS representative explaining the interview, saying that, "It is normal for a candidate to boast like this."Roger Lumbala himself argued that Tshisekedi was referring to Kabila's slogan "With Rais [Kabila's nickname]...100% certain," saying that it we he and not Kabila who was sure to win.

This interview has already caused controversy on the internet and in the streets of Kinshasa.

Tshisekedi has been criticized for spending a third of the short election month abroad seeking funds and transport in South Africa, while his competitors campaign at home. It may be that this absence and the lack of funds prompted him to radicalize his message and to openly seek confrontation. Will his supporters take to the streets tomorrow? Will the government take further legal action against the UDPS or RLTV?

Here is the speech:



Translation:

"Those who say that Kabila prevented my plane from landing do not understand the situation. Kabila no longer represents anyone, but his wife. People like Boshab [president of the national assembly] and Mende [minister of information], who started elsewhere and talk with both sides of the mouth, say one thing during the day and another at night, have now abandoned him. He is alone with his wife, as you can see. So I say we need not wait for the elections. In a democracy, power rests with the popular majority. Since the majority of the Congolese people is with Tshisekedi and trusts Tshisekedi, from now on, I am the Head of State. Regarding the elections, my message is simple as I have said. Starting today, it’s the Congolese people who are the authority of the country. It’s Tshisekedi Etienne, no one else. If Mr. Ngoy Mulunda does not listen to what we are saying, he will be weeping in his native language come December 6 [the date election results are announced]."

Some violence, but little stumping as the campaign begins

This post has been updated: The popular Hunde singer Fabrice was reportedly taken from his recording studio by intelligence agents on Friday evening, allegedly because he refused to sing for President Kabila's campaign. He was released in the early hours of Monday morning and is currently in hospital, receiving treatment. (h/t Kris)

 The election campaign is into its second week now, with only modest campaigning by the main presidential contenders and some disturbing violence.

Even before the campaign official began, groups such as Human Rights Watch and the Congolese umbrella group Act for Peaceful and Transparent Elections (AETA), were warning of violence and hate speech. Human Rights Watch pointed to UNAFEC, a party with a strong following in Katanga, which was using hate speech against outsiders, in particular Kasaians. On April 31, Kyungu is reported to have said in a public speech: "There are too many mosquitoes in the living room. We have to spray some insecticide." This past week, at the beginning of the campaign, Kyungu conveyed again his belief that only "children of Katanga" should run for parliamentary seats there.

This hate speech has degenerated into violence on several occasions. In August, UNAFEC members attacked the UDPS office in Lubumbashi, damaging some cars and buildings (there were also allegations of UDPS provocations). Then, two days ago, UNAFEC reportedly clashed with UDPS supporters on their way to a Kyungu rally in Lubumbashi - it is not clear who provoked whom first, but apparently several UDPS supporters were beaten up.

Kyungu and his party are known for their militant youth wing and their hostile views toward Kasaians.

Meanwhile, in Kinshasa last Wednesday armed men opened fire on a group of people who had reportedly just finished distributing UDPS posters, seriously injuring two people. And just this evening, two political parties faced off in Kinshasa, throwing stones at each other. Over the past weeks, the UDPS has faced off with both the police and PPRD supporters in Kinshasa, resulting in several deaths and many injured.

Finally, in Goma just this evening there has been unrest with reports of shooting in the Katindo neighborhood. It's not yet clear what the source of troubles is, but some reports suggest that a popular musician from the Hunde ethnic community has been enlisted to sing for the presidential campaign, which did not go down well among other members of the community, who protested in the streets and tore up posters of Joseph Kabila.

(I am leaving out unrest in Mbuji-Mayi and inflammatory speech by opposition radios in Equateur).

While there appears to be plenty of violence, there is little positive, issues-based campaigning. In fact, there is little campaigning at all by presidential candidates. Of the three main presidential contenders (Tshisekedi-Kabila-Kamerhe), only Kabila has been visible, launching his campaign in his mother's home province of Maniema. Kabila is also by far the most visible in terms of posters and advertisements - he has bought all of the front-lit billboards in Kinshasa, making him the only candidate visible at night in the capital.

Tshisekedi is not even in the country, claiming that his plane was refused a landing permit in Kisangani (the civil aviation authority denies this). Last I heard, he was still in South Africa. Kamerhe began his campaign in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo. But it seems that the opposition campaigns have suffered substantially from a lack of funds, as well as transport difficulties - only one airline (CAA) is still making domestic flights since a crash prompted Hewa Bora's license to be suspended.