ECI paper released

A bunch of Congo-focused events took place in Washington, D.C. on Tuesday, centered around the release of the Eastern Congo Initiative (ECI) white paper. You can download the paper here. It has a useful summary of current initiatives on the eastern Congo and gets into a lot of the nitty-gritty of technical assistance (not surprising, as its author Spyros Demetriou was the team leader for MONUC's stabilization strategy in the Kivus).

Some of the recommendations are good, especially the emphasis on obtaining buy-in from the Congolese government and conditioning aid on political reforms . In fact, I wish more emphasis and analysis had been placed on conditionality, as it is key for everything that follows: if donors do not have a coherent conditionality for ALL of their funds (not just the humanitarian stuff, but budgetary aid and infrastructure projects), then the rest of the recommendations will fall on deaf ears in Kinshasa - but how do construct such conditionality with push-back from the World Bank and IMF, and the risk of jeopardizing development projects? When do we pull the plug on investments and projects? It seems like a whole paper could be written on just this.

I also like the idea of garrisoning troops in barracks in the East to prevent them from living off the land - an idea already including in the current stabilization strategy - as well as the details on support to police and justice sectors.

Other recommendations, such as how to deal with the FDLR and how to demobilize Congolese armed groups, consist largely of improving the technical capacity of demobilization programs - useful, for sure, but it seems we've seen this all before. For example, they leave untouched (except for a tantalizing quote by a Congolese partner in the margins) the possibility of a more diplomatic approach to the FDLR problem. Also, while there should certainly be more support to the electoral and decentralization processes, the paper doesn't really produce much detail about what exactly this support should entail other than technical assistance.

I'm also not sure I buy the notion that the US should be doing this out of its own national interests. They mention our investments, but then quote the amount of money we have spent on humanitarian issues in the country - this argument amounts to spending more money because we have already spent money. I'm not sure that will impress Congress that much. Then they say that the US has national security interests in the Congo - the only concrete instance we can point to is the possible, very tenuous connection between the Ugandan ADF rebels and the Kampala bombings this year, an incident that may have linked the Congo to terrorists cells in East Africa. I have yet to see any concrete evidence for this link (although Kampala keeps pushing it), and I understand the FBI - who had 60 investigators on the ground - didn't find much evidence for this, either.

That is all just to say that I think we shouldn't try too hard - the moral imperatives are strong enough, I think we should stick to them.

The paper is worth reading. It is particularly good to have a second report in as many months (see the Oxfam report on SSR from last month) explicitly targeting US policy. It is also impressive - although  a bit bewildering - to see such a huge turnout: two senators (John Kerry and John Boozeman), the Assistant Secretary of State Johnny Carson and pretty much anybody who is anybody in Washington working on the Congo was present. ICG, HRW and other groups have never had this kind of turnout. Ben Affleck's celebrity and the organizational skills of ECI certainly helped.

However, if I am not mistaken, the report was written by two consultants, and - outside of Goma, where ECI has a dedicated staff working on humanitarian issues - they does not have much in-house policy expertise on the Congo. This kind of policy work is complex and it is vital to have intimate knowledge of local and regional politics. ECI is a new organization and has started with an admirable focus on promoting local voices and organizations, but it is also trying to become a prominent voice in the policy community, an arena where organizations have dozens of full-time staff working on these very issues.

Politique ya Congo eza makasi - Congolese politics is tough. Mujikaze bandugu, kila la heri.

News roundup: Vital Lula, UN sanctions and Tshisekedi

• The UN has added four people to its sanctions list for violation of its sanctions regime - Col. Innocent Zimurinda, an ex-CNDP commander, and three high-ranking FDLR commanders, including its new president Gen. Iyamuremye (aka Rumuli Michel). We shouldn't expect too much, however - the sanctions are only asset freezes and travel bans. None of the people sanctioned have known bank accounts or travel much across international borders. The same goes for over 90% of the other people on the sanctions list.
• Etienne Tshisekedi, the veteran opposition leader, has delayed his return to Kinshasa from Brussels for logistical reasons - apparently they need to confirm their authorization for the rallies to be held when he arrives at the airport. In any case, his UDPS party has said that he will be back in time for their national congress on December 10th.
• Below is an interview with the other big opposition candidate: Vital Kamerhe in Rome, where he was attending the consecration of the Congo' new cardinal, Laurent Monsengwo. Vital waxes lyrical (and a bit demagogic), avoiding questions about his presidential ambitions ("there is a time for everything, the Bible says that.") He calls himself "a church in the middle of the village," alluding to his talents for bridging social divides and and one point suggesting that the Congo is very much like Brazil ("there is only a tectonic plate dividing us, we have a big river and a big jungle, too) and that it needs a Lula. (Vital Lula?) The two main policy positions he takes is denouncing JP Bemba's arrest and pushing for negotiations between Rwanda and the FDLR.

New UN Group of Experts Report is Out

Congo Siasa is back, just in time for the new UN Group of Experts' report.

It's a great report, chock full of useful information on the situation in the Kivus, and I'll have an exclusive interview with members of the Group here in a few days. For now, some of the highlights of the 190 page document:

• Even though the Group's mandate is to focus on non-governmental armed groups - in the past the CNDP and FDLR have been centerstage - a main concern in the this report is the Congolese army itself. The Group argues that the Congolese army has pushed many rebels out of mining areas, but has then itself become complicit in "criminal networks" that often collaborate with rebel groups in running violent protection rackets. The Group points out that President Kabila himself denounces "this kind of mafia." Dozens of cases of these criminal networks are documented in the report.
• While military operations have whittled away at the FDLR, reducing them from 5,800 to 3,500 in three years, the Group says that the rebels' "command and control structure remains largely intact."Only a few leading FDLR officers have been demobilized, and the Group is now busy crafting alliances with many smaller Congolese groups, such as Mai-Mai Cheka, APCLS and FRF. In response to the military pressure, FDLR have dispersed into smaller formations and many have been pushed out of mining areas. This has boosted demobilization stats from 50 per month in 2008 to 134 per month in 2010 and prompted FDLR to increasingly recruit Congolese. 
• According to the Group, the Burundian FNL leader Agathon Rwasa fled to the Congo following election in mid-2010. He benefited from the complicity of Congolese army commanders, Burundian businessmen and other opposition parties, and has been able to recruit 700 soldiers based in South Kivu province. 
• The report provides detailed information on CNDP integration - or lack thereof - into the national army. They document three well-armed battalions in Masisi territory that have not been integrated, although they point out that CNDP taxes in the territory have significantly decreased since an agreement between the CNDP and the government was reached in July. The CNDP also tightened its control over mining areas in Walikale during the presidential ban on mineral exports - the Group suggests that Gen. Bosco Ntaganda controls three quarters of all command posts in Walikale, leading some non-CNDP troops to flee the area. The Group also documents serious internal tensions within the CNDP that have led to a spate of killings, often linked to Gen Bosco Ntaganda. Controversially, the Group suggests that exiled Rwandan Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa may have been in touch with CNDP (and perhaps even the FDLR) in the Kivus.
• Perhaps most significantly, the Group has proposed a rigorous due diligence process for international companies involved in the minerals trade. The Security Council had asked the Group to develop standards, and the five person group (aided by a consultant, Greg Mthembu-Salter) came up with a long list of requirements that dovetails nicely with what the OECD is coming up with. Go to page 83 to find the requirements - the Group has proposed two standards, one just targeting rebel groups, the other including "criminal networks" that include the Congolese army. The Group reportedly told the Security Council that they strongly prefer the latter standard, and the Council has reacted positively to this. 

Anyway, I strongly recommend reading the report in its entirety - it gives the best idea of what is going on in the Kivus of any report I have read this year.

Congo Siasa On Vacation

Congo Siasa will be offline for the next ten days.

Row over debt cancellation

Several days ago, the Paris Club of lenders announced that it would cancel all of the debts the Congolese government owed them - $7,35 billion. This follows the cancellation of $12 billion in debts by the IMF in July. Altogether, these cancellations have freed up around $520 million in the Congolese annual budget that had been used for debt servicing, almost ten per cent of the current budget.

Debt cancellation is a thorny issue. It's incredibly difficult to oppose the cancellation of the odious debt that had mostly been accumulated under Mobutu - why should the current government pay for the sins of a past dictator? It shouldn't.

On the other hand, if there is leverage to be had on the Congolese government, it is probably to be found here. The World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank account for a large majority of the financial support provided to the Congolese government, which makes up for half of the country's budget. There is a deep ingrained reluctance within the bureaucracies of these organizations to use grants and loans to leverage security sector reforms, decentralization or to tackle impunity. There was some pressure, especially from the Canadian government, earlier this year to use the $12 billion IMF debt relief package to push for governance reforms, although this was somewhat cynically tied to the squabble over First Quantum (a Canadian mining company) mining rights (was this really this most shocking issue to be confronting Kinshasa over?) In the end, however, donors decided that the the criteria had been met under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and that debt relief should be granted. Critics complained that the HIPC criteria were very narrow and looked mostly at financial matters - inflation rates, reforms in the financial regulations and procedures, fiscal performance, etc. - to the exclusion of political and human rights concerns.

Which it why it wasn't surprising to have some heavyweights again balk over granting the $7 billion Paris Club debt relief. Charles Michel, the Belgian minister for development, had said that debt relief should be postponed until next year due to poor economic governance. In the end, however, apparently, other considerations won over and relief was granted.

Which leaves two questions:

Why don't donors, who constantly wring their hands and complain about their lack of leverage to push for reforms in Kinshasa, use their financial weight in the World Bank and IMF as leverage? Perhaps debt relief is not the right forum, but what about all the other loans?

When leverage is considered, why is it almost only over "economic governance," in other words when Kinshasa begins canceling mining contracts and refused to improve the investment climate?

Oxfam Report on SSR in the Congo

Oxfam has just released a report on US efforts towards security sector reform in the Congo. It's a nice summary of the initiatives the US government is pursuing in the Congo. Bottom line: neither the foreign donors not the Congolese government seem very serious about success. The Congolese are reluctant to take the necessary steps to reform the security services, preferring a weak, fragmented army. Foreign donors have not coordinated their efforts or devised a coherent, comprehensive strategy, in part due to bilateral interests, in part due to lack of funds.

The report also provides a list of detailed policy recommendations for the US goverment.

What Motivates Congo's Politicians: Good Question

A new report on the Congo has come out by the International Crisis Group that concludes that the peace deal between Rwanda and the Congo has failed to bring about peace in the eastern DRC. It points to the violence over the past year, the failed integration process of the armed groups and the predation on natural resources by all belligerents.

Absolutely. And it’s a good report. But why do I have this nagging feeling of déjà vu?

Because we’ve seen it before. I probably wrote a report similar to this one for ICG five years ago. A myriad of NGOs publish reports calling on the Congolese and Rwandan governments to respect human rights, promote good governance and settle their differences peacefully every year. This is, of course, useful, especially if they can dredge up good evidence of their wrongdoing – it can serve as a necessary check on abuses.

But relatively few reports ask why the governments are carrying out so many abuses, why the CNDP does not want to integrate. Instead, the reports catalog the events, denounce the abuses and propose solutions. There is usually little analysis of the deeper Congolese and regional political motives. If there were, we could avoid nasty stereotyping and perhaps get a bit closer to constructive solutions.

Let’s take an example – the disarmament and/or integration of CNDP troops into the Congolese army. This is something that dozens of reports, including this ICG one, have called for, worried that renewed clashes between the Congolese government and the CNDP could break out. So why aren’t they integrated? There are a few theories. One is that it is Kigali pulling the strings, preventing CNDP redeployment because they need them to protect their interests. There has certainly been some truth to this – although also a lot of disagreement about what exactly Kigali’s interests are in the Kivus – but it is too simple a story, one proved insufficient recently when it was Kigali that reportedly pushed for some CNDP units to be removed from the Kivus for fear of their collaboration with RPF defectors.

Another theory is that it is the CNDP army commanders themselves who are the main obstacle to integration – they have gotten used to their autonomy and the various rackets they run and don’t want to be sent to Bandundu, where there are no mines, they will loose their power, and they will be unable to protect their communities.

Yet another view is that it is the Goma elites, the owners of mineral trading houses and leaders of the Tutsi political class who are blocking the integration/redeployment of CNDP troops. Or perhaps the local communities, who provide the footsoldiers and want the CNDP to stay back to protect them.

The point is that, depending on your analysis of the situation, the solution will look drastically different. Should we be putting pressure on Kigali, focusing on ensuring contractual security for local businessmen, working on co-opting or arresting CNDP commanders or solving local land conflicts?

Similarly goes it with the infamous security sector reform. If I had an AK-47 for every time I heard someone say: “Security sector reform has to be the number one priority,” I would be rivaling Viktor Bout (before his days in the clink, that is). So why is it that Kabila doesn’t arrest the army commanders who periodically embezzle funds, deal in minerals and preside over abusive units? Here again there are many theories. One suggests that the president is too weak, that if he were to clamp down on his commanders there could be a violent backlash and he could end up like his father. Another thesis – that doesn’t necessarily contradict the first – is that Kabila does not want to reform his security services, that this kind of fragmentation of control prevents other centers of power from arising and allows him to dole out favors and patronage at his own discretion. Yet another theory argues that the Rais does want to reform the army, but that he does not have the means or the technical know-how to do so.

The current scattershot approach to security sector reform is mostly based on the last analysis – the problem is a lack of technical training and infrastructures, which is why most of what we are doing is training soldiers and building barracks. As the millions of dollars provided to Mobutu’s army proved, however, throwing good money after bad will not solve anything.

So this is a plea for “deep diagnosis,” going beyond just denouncing abuses and describing trends and trying to understand the underlying political logic. One of the side effects of the “Oh My God The Congo Is a Mess” approach is that it reduces the actors there to a bunch of ruthless warlords and African bigwigs, catering to all the noxious stereotypes of the continent. Actors may be ruthless but they have all kinds of good reasons for what they are doing.

“Deep diagnosis” of this kind is difficult, as many actors have vested interests in concealing their motives, and it requires an enormous amount of patience and local knowledge. It is not the kind of analysis that can be done from London, Johannesburg or even just Kinshasa.

I am not criticizing ICG – they often do wonderful work that goes far beyond the "OMG Congo approach." But we need to go beyond this to truly understand how actors think, what they want and who is pulling the strings.