Jean Kenge: Aucun prix ne serait trop fort…

Après multiples rebondissements, le sénat a enfin adopté, la semaine dernière, le projet de loi portant répartition des sièges par circonscription pour les élections locales et municipales. Non sans déchirements additionnels au sein de la classe politique congolaise.

Entre les dispositions de la constitution en matière des sessions extraordinaires et le règlement intérieur de la chambre haute, la pression a été telle que Léon Kengo wa Dondo a dû lâcher, afin d’éviter au sénat la réputation qui lui était faite «d’empêcheur de glisser en rond», et à lui-même l’accusation infamante de celui par lequel le scandale risquait d’arriver !

Il reste qu’en faveur d’un fonctionnement sain de la démocratie, la Cour Constitutionnelle aurait dû être sollicitée afin d’interpréter les textes controversés. Le message de la majorité, en l’occurrence, s’est voulu plutôt belliqueux en direction d’autres forces politiques et sociales du pays : se coucher ou ne pas exister.  Une posture d’autant plus paradoxale que si elle permet, certes,  de rêver à la tenue d’élections locales dans un horizon encore incertain, elle n’offre toujours pas, au même moment,  la capacité d’avoir à la fois la maîtrise du temps, des moyens financiers et du fichier électoral. Le glissement se trouvait ainsi inscrit dans l’ADN d’une démarche qui reste, pour beaucoup de Congolais et leurs partenaires, contestable dans son principe.

L’empressement de la majorité pose en effet, au stade actuel, deux questions majeures à la classe politique congolaise ainsi qu’aux partenaires dans le processus électoral. La première relève de la problématique constitutionnelle : que deviennent, dans cette course, les nouveaux majeurs, dont le sort avait récemment «ému» même le chef de l’Etat, au point de l’amener, dans son adresse du 30 juin, à souhaiter que le dialogue permette, entre autres, de trancher en faveur de leur enrôlement. Aucun texte n’autorise, en effet, qu’une institution, un individu ou groupe d’individus, empêche des citoyens à part entière d’exercer leur devoir civique.

La deuxième question est d’ordre politique. Le découpage des provinces a en effet redistribué les circonscriptions électorales sur l’ensemble du territoire national. Mais au-delà de ce redéploiement, il restera encore et toujours l’épineuse question de la redistribution du corps électoral – la fameuse cartographie - face au phénomène du nombre élevé des bureaux de vote dans certains territoires à faible démographie, comparativement à leur nombre relativement bas dans les territoires à plus forte densité démographique.

Pour qu’elle ne soit pas évacuée juste comme un simple détail, rappelons que cette question avait empoisonné le débat au lendemain des élections de 2011. Avec, d’un côté, des bureaux de vote ayant connu un taux de participation de plus de 100%, sans aucune explication cohérente et, de l’autre, un taux de participation différent d’un scrutin à l’autre entre la présidentielle et les législatives dans un même bureau et pour des élections couplées. Plus généralement, les Missions d’Observation Electorales s’étaient montrées très dubitatives, sinon critiques, sur des taux de participation extrêmement élevés dans les zones favorables à la majorité et très bas dans celles où c’est l’opposition qui avait les faveurs.

Autant dire que l’empressement à aller coûte que coûte aux élections locales sans avoir enrôlé les nouveaux majeurs, sans un audit fiable du fichier électoral et sans un redéploiement conséquent de la cartographie des bureaux de vote plus conforme aux réalités démographiques, s’il ne cache pas une intention malicieuse, prépare à tout le moins le lit de la contestation.

Voilà pourquoi, à la limite,  le dialogue n’aurait de sens que s’il devait permettre à chaque groupe de Congolais de développer son cahier de charges face à la gouvernance générale du pays et, en particulier, à une gouvernance électorale contestable. Des cahiers de charges qu’une instance d’arbitrage harmoniserait dans un rapport d’équidistance avec toutes les tendances politiques et sociales s’exprimant dans le pays.

Sans évidemment présager de la suite des événements, c’est l’exercice tenté, tant bien que mal, par le Congo-Brazzaville. Du moins, c’est le message qu’on a cherché à faire passer dans l’opinion et auprès des partenaires. Les voisins de la RD Congo n’ont pas seulement eu la sagesse – ou la malice -d’accepter le principe de deux dialogues, ils se sont en plus employés à éviter à leur chef de l’Etat la position critiquable de quelqu’un qui aurait d’emblée pris position pour une partie du pays contre une autre.

A Brazzaville en effet, on semble penser que la précipitation est l’ennemi de la perfection, et que la frustration fait toujours le lit de la confrontation. Par ailleurs, préserver la paix et la stabilité durant les festivités du 55^ème anniversaire de l’indépendance, mais aussi tout au long des jeux africains, n’a pas été considéré comme une simple option parmi d’autres mais bien un impératif stratégique. Enfin, on prête aux autorités brazzavilloises, après avoir écouté tous les sons de cloche à l’intérieur,  l’intention de vouloir calmer le jeu, mais aussi d’élargir le champs de leurs consultations à la faveur du prochain sommet de Paris sur le climat, afin que la nouvelle vision qui se dessine pour le Congo-Brazzaville soit soutenue et partagée dans un monde de plus en plus globalisé au lieu de devenir la cause d’un dangereux isolement diplomatique et d’un déchirement additionnel pour le pays.

Rien, au stade actuel, n’indique évidemment que ce pari sera tenu,  qu’une malice de trop ne viendra pas bloquer la machine et replonger le pays dans l’incertitude. En attendant, la seule leçon à tirer est qu’aucun prix ne serait trop fort lorsqu’il s’agit d’éviter à son pays la triste expérience des guerres civiles à répétition.

Congolese leaders vie for influence in Washington through lobbyists

Last week, Aaron Ross had an insightful piece for Reuters about Moise Katumbi's upcoming run for the presidency in the Congo. In the article, he mentioned that Katumbi––or a company now managed by his wife, to be more precise––had employed a lobbying firm in Washington in what appears to be an effort to help with his campaign.

A closer look at lobbying disclosure forms shows that Katumbi is far from alone in these efforts to curry favor in Washington. Two lobbying companies are currently working for the Congolese government, and US government officials report that at least one other group has been lobbying them about the Congo.

Katumbi

Mining Company of Katanga (MCK), a company founded by Moise Katumbi and now managed by his wife Karyn, initially employed Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld in 2013 to help secure the opening of a US consulate in Lubumbashi and to press for USAID to send corn to Katanga. This disclosure form details the nature of this arrangement and suggests that Katumbi paid $350,000 to retain the firm for the period of one year.

It does not appear, however, that the lobbyists did much traditional lobbying. According to the Foreign Agents Registration Act archives, which compiles visits by lobbyists to government employees for foreign entities, the company only had one meeting for MCK in the second half of 2014. That was with Congressman Ed Royce, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives. While that meeting was about the consulate and corn supplies, the next meetings, which took place six months later, were not. Starting in April 2014, and still within the initial contract period (which was supposed to only concern the consulate and corn), the lobbyists had eleven meetings in a period of several months about "the DRC presidential electoral process."

Apparently, Katumbi has had his eye on the presidency for some time.

This year, that activity intensified. The contract with Akin and Gump was apparently renewed, and lobbyists had 240 meetings, emails, and phone calls with various officials about the presidential elections. Here's the list; most of the meetings and correspondance was with legislative aides and staff, although there have also been exchanges with State Deptartment officials and NGOs. As the Reuters article indicates, and as US officials have confirmed to me, it is clear that MCK is pushing for US action to guarantee Kabila's exit in 2016. In private meetings, Katumbi has also obliquely, but clearly, sought to secure US support for his own bid.

But not just Katumbi...

MCK is not the only Congolese entity lobbying the US government. Two other lobbying contracts have been registered:

• KRL International is working with the Congolese president's special envoy on child recruitment and sexual violence, Jeannine Mabunda. Part of that contract is reportedly a PR effort to improve the Congo's reputation in dealing with sexual violence. The contract is for three months between April and September 2015 and costs Congolese tax payers $40,000 per month. Interestingly, this is not the first time Mabunda has been involved in the contracting of a US lobbying company––in 2009, when she was minister of state-run companies, she hired Crescent Consultants for a year, paying them $290,000;
• The Glover Park Group is working for a Congolese company called LN Communications, which is in turn working for the Congolese government. The contract stipulates that Glover Park will help the Congolese government with its commercial relations with the US government for one year, starting April 1, 2015, in return for $540,000. 

Other Congolese have also hired DC-based lobbyists in the past. This includes three other past presidential hopefuls: Jean-Paul Moka, Nzanga Mobutu, and Oscar Kashala. It also includes numerous other lobbying contracts for the Congolese government––this one for Washington World Group, for example, apparently saw the Congolese government pay $500,000 annually between 1999 and 2003 for services. Here is the list:

In addition, US government officials have told me that private companies, including a group belonging to Dan Gertler, have also retained lobbyists in DC.

Will this sort of lobbying make a difference? The United States government will not endorse Katumbi, and even without MCK's prodding it was pushing pretty hard for Kabila to stand down in 2016. As for the Congolese government, the lobbying efforts in Washington, DC were not as effective as the persistent diplomacy like the kind carried out by the Rwandan government during the war (1998-2003). And it doesn't appear that the US government, especially during this period, was particularly favorable to the authorities in Kinshasa.

One can also wonder about the cost. For comparison, in 2013 (the last year where I can find data on the execution of the budget), the operating budget for the police of North and South Kivu was around $158,000, for the Hôpital Général de Kinshasa around $196,000, for Congolese veterans around $153,000.

Nonetheless, history has been a potent teacher for Congolese. The US government was for many years a big player in Mobutu's Zaire, and even more recently antipathy against Etienne Tshisekedi among foreign officials––including in MONUSCO and the US––contributed to the international response after the rigged 2011 elections.

A sudden senate reversal puts Congo electoral calendar in jeopardy

Léon Kengo wa Dondo, President of the Senate (Radio Okapi)

On August 11 the Congolese senate passed a law apportioning seats for the upcoming local elections. It was a technical law, ascribing seats for local councils (conseil municipaux, conseil de communes, conseil de chefferie/secteur) based on the population. There were a bunch of important, technical controversies linked to the lack of reliable demographic data. In addition, the opposition protested that the senate could not hold two extraordinary sessions on the same issue––the same law had been rejected two weeks earlier due to a lack of quorum.

But the real controversy is not that. The forcing through of the law shows the Congolese government’s determination to hold local elections, currently scheduled for 25 October 2015, before the presidential and national parliamentary elections. This will almost inevitably delay the electoral process, as the local elections are more complicated than any other before, and the logistics and finances are simply not in place. As a result, President Kabila will remain as president past his constitutional limit of December 2016, potentially triggering a political crisis.

Although this calendar has been in place since February 2015, things could have turned out differently. For the past several months, Kabila has been holding discussions with a wide variety of actors––opposition parties, religious and customary leaders, and members of his own ruling majority. These discussions, which have flagged off over the past month, were supposed to prepare the ground for a national dialogue. Time and again, the president’s interlocutors said that the result of that dialogue should be the postponing of local elections until 2017, so that the president and national assembly can be elected on time. That was the message given by the Catholic Church, a variety of opposition parties, and even a dissident wing––the so-called Group of 7 (here and here)––of his presidential majority. 

But the senate vote makes it fairly clear that the president has chosen otherwise. The first time the law came up for a vote in the senate––it had been passed by the national assembly––the chamber failed to muster a quorum, with only 47 of the 108 senators supporting the bill and only 49 voting. Only XXX later, the exact same bill was put forward and there was a unanimous vote: all 77 senators present voted in favor.

It is reasonable to assume that the difference between first and the second vote––between 49 and 77 senators––was the result of extensive pressure and possibly vote-buying, and that is what some senators are now reporting in private. Even members of the dissident G7 faction are rumored to have voted in favor of the law. It is unlikely that the presidency would have deployed such efforts if it had not decided to double down on local elections.

And yet, there has been little reaction from the usual quarters. As mentioned, opposition leaders voiced procedural complaints, saying that it is unconstitutional to convoke two extraordinary sessions on the same issue. Others have called for international mediation of a national dialogue. But there have been no street protests and little explicit international condemnation. Compare that with January, when another delaying tactic was put before parliament: the holding of a national census before the presidential elections. That law was amended following bloody street protests and the mobilization of members of the ruling coalition and opposition against the bill. This time there is little sign of that sort of protest.

One difference has been the attitude of senate president Kengo wa Dondo, who played a key role in January but this time was in favor of the law. The international community has also been relatively quiet recently, due to the absence of a US Special Envoy for several months and the attention of many countries on the crisis in Burundi.

Of course, it is not too late for local elections to be postponed. And even if they are maintained––and even if the creation of new provinces goes forward as planned––President Kabila may only gain an additional year or two in power. But at the moment, it does not seem that anyone is operating based on a longer time frame than that. Checkers, not chess.

Guest blog - Trouble in Virunga: the challenges of conservation amidst conflict, violence and poverty

The following is a guest blog by Esther Marijnen, Blaise Muhire and Judith Verweijen, PhD Candidates/Researchers at the Insitute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), Bayreuth University and Nordic Africa Institute, respectively.

Recently, the movie Virunga, and concerted efforts by numerous NGOs have focused attention to one of the main threats to the Virunga National Park: the prospect of oil exploitation within and near its borders. Yet, there are two other, inter-related threats to the park that have received comparatively less attention, but that must be addressed for ensuring its survival nonetheless: first, populations trespassing on its territory, often as part of wider contestations of its limits; and second, the presence of a multitude of state and non-state armed actors who are commonly involved in unauthorized resources exploitation. In this contribution, we present a brief analysis of these phenomena, drawing on fieldwork conducted periodically between 2010 and 2015 in and around the park.

It is important to outline that these recent ‘threats’ need to be seen in relation to the history of the park and violent conflict in the east of the DR Congo. In 1925, the then King of Belgium, Albert, founded the National Park first named in his honor, and today known as Virunga National Park. As documented by several scholars, including Paul Vikanza and Joseph Nzabandora, the creation of the park was characterized by contestations, which partly resulted from the displacement of populations without compensation, and several extensions of the park without much consultation of local stakeholders. Furthermore, the park is located in the epicenter of ongoing conflict since 1993-4, and is strongly affected by cross-border dynamics with both Rwanda and Uganda. These regional dynamics are entangled in complex ways with more national and locally grounded dynamics of conflict, having turned the park into a hideout for numerous foreign and domestic armed groups. 

Ties between civilians and armed groups

Currently there are many peasants residing illegally in the park, having been driven there by a lack economic opportunity, land scarcity and a belief in ‘ancestral’ claims on the land. Others sporadically enter the park to carry out illegal activities, such as cultivation, logging, fishing, the production of makala (charcoal) and poaching. This is often made possible by the presence of armed actors, who do not only engage in such activities themselves, but also allow civilians to do so in exchange for protection fees. This means that a substantial part of the population living in or around the park currently collaborates with armed forces for ensuring a livelihood.

Armed groups and populations are also linked through multiple other economic ties, such as pre-financing arrangements and money lending. For example, many small-scale shops and taxi-motos in Kiwanja operate with armed group money. There is also collaboration in crime. The chefferie (chiefdom) of Bwisha (in Rutshuru territory) is plagued by rampant banditry, like armed robbery and kidnappings. A part of this crime is not directly committed by armed groups, but by local gangs. However, these often operate under the protection of armed groups or the security services, to whom they give part of the proceeds of their activities. These practices demonstrate that armed groups do not only live off natural resources exploitation, but have multiple sources of income, including banditry, road-block taxation and income via civilian intermediaries.

The ties between armed actors and civilians are further strengthened by political elites, who seize upon and inflate existing antipathies towards the park. It should be emphasized that civilians in the region have ambivalent feelings about the park. While the idea of nature conservation is generally supported, and people are proud of the park, seeing the wildlife as their heritage, many feel that the park has expropriated their ancestral lands. Furthermore, many people feel unjustly deprived from the means of earning a livelihood in the face of severe poverty. Customary chiefs and politicians often take advantage of these sentiments as a means of reinforcing their popularity and power. Especially in times of elections, politicians try to gain votes by promising to revise the limits of the park. A number of these same politicians have been documented (e.g. by the UN Group of Experts) to finance armed groups operating in the park.

Politicians and allied armed groups have also been instrumental in perpetuating inter-community conflicts that have a long lineage. Each round of violence seems to revive and reinforce these conflicts. Most recently, the M23 rebellion ratcheted up tensions in Bwisha between (but also among) Nande, Hutu and Tutsi, which have continued after the rebellion’s departure. This is partly a result of the fact that most armed groups are tied to one community or competing network or another, which creates local security dilemmas.

Land conflicts can further fuel tensions between communities. For instance, there is a long-standing conflict between on the one hand, the Banande-led Syndicat Alliance Paysanne (SAP), which mobilized farmers to cultivate around Kahunga, in the hunting reserve of the Domaine de Chasse de Rutshuru (DCR) and on the other hand, the Hutu mwami (customary chief) of Bwisha, who blames SAP of bringing Banande from Lubero to cultivate in his chefferie. Recently, the park retroceded a part of the DCR to the population, which reinforced the existing conflict between SAP and the mwami. While SAP fought for years to gain access to the land, the mwami redistributed it mainly to his own constituency of (mostly Hutu) politicians, associations and businesspersons. Many of the Nande but also a few Hunde and Hutu peasants that formerly cultivated illegally in the area feel ‘trapped’, as they are now forced now to work for large-scale land-owners under exploitative agreements. Furthermore, in part because of the hydro-electric plant that is currently being built in the area by the Virunga Alliance, the value of land in Bwisha is increasing. This intensifies competition, which in the current power constellation often benefits the rich.  

The pitfalls of ICCN–FARDC cooperation

The national armed forces are an integral part of the complex violent political economy in and around the park. Not only are certain units, like the naval forces on Lake Edward, heavily implicated in the protection business and other illegal revenue-generation activities, they often collude with armed groups. Furthermore, there has been fierce competition between different units and networks within the armed forces, pitting for instance the navy against the infantry. These conflicts were not resolved when the infantry started to collaborate more closely with the ICCN in mixed units in certain parts of the park––which further drew the ICCN into the mess of Congolese army politics. Yet, in the face of rampant insecurity, and the tendency of the Congolese army to get involved in resources exploitation when left unchecked, there seem to be few alternatives to this collaboration.

One of the problems is that the parts of the army not included in the collaboration are envious of the much better service conditions enjoyed by ICCN agents and the soldiers in the mixed units. While part of the ICCN, the Virunga National Park is formally managed under a public-private partnership, and its daily management is largely in the hands of the NGO the Virunga Foundation. The latter tops up the meager official wages of the guards with extra fees, and provides them with three meals a day and proper health care, while also ensuring they have sufficient equipment and transport. Most of this is financed by development aid from the European Commission.

Another problem with the FARDC is that the operations that it conducts against armed groups in and around the park often exacerbate tensions. For instance, the Kimia II/Amani Leo operations in 2009-2010 led to an upsurge in instability in Bwisha, in part because they did not manage to cut the ties between armed groups and populations. Moreover, the FARDC sometimes took over protection rackets ran by armed groups. The recent operations against the FDLR launched in the park seem to have a similar fate. While the operations initially halted makala production, the trade has slowly resumed, but now under the protection of the FARDC.  

Furthermore, the operations of the mixed units, which often target populations living and working in the park, have at times reinforced the ties between rebels and civilians. Last year, the park decided to destroy a number of farms located within the area of Kibirizi (in the park), sending a mixed unit of around 30 FARDC soldiers and 9 park guards to patrol the vacated area. The population found itself in difficulty as many depend on cultivating in the park for their livelihood. In reaction, a part entered even further into the park, in a zone controlled by the FDLR, which ‘rents out’ small plots of land to civilians. The reinforced ties with the FDLR resulting from this arrangement later hampered FARDC operations in the area. However, the army did manage to disperse the rebels, which has contributed to increased insecurity for civilians along the Kibirizi – Rwindi road. As a consequence, the population has developed negative feelings towards the mixed FARDC-ICCN unit located there, believing it only chases farmers out of the park, but does little to protect civilians.

Beyond hoping for change

In the light of ongoing armed group activity and violence in the Virunga park, it is somewhat ironic that it occasionally presents itself as an “island of stability”. Unfortunately, neither the Congolese government nor its international partners have developed a coherent policy for dealing with the armed groups present in the park and the conflict dynamics that feed them. This also appears to apply to the park management. In its public communications, the park commonly portrays armed group activity as resulting primarily from the illegal exploitation of natural resources. From this perspective, pushing them out of the park through military operations would seem an adequate solution. Yet, the causes for armed group activity in the Virunga park are much more complex, and are also fed by factors such as communal conflicts, unscrupulous behavior by politicians and local authorities feeding off animosities towards the park, the militarization of politics, a malfunctioning security apparatus, regional interference and long-standing social ties between populations and armed groups. Addressing these various factors is urgent for ensuring that stability becomes more than just a vain hope.

The park’s current approach to conservation and development projects around appears to have done little to mitigate conflict dynamics. For example, while the park has toughened its approach to the illegal exploitation of natural resources ––whether by civilians or armed actors––it has been much slower in the creation of livelihoods for civilians. Certainly, the park promises to create many jobs through the projects of the Virunga Alliance, although most of these have not yet materialized. Not only do these initiatives take time to come off the ground, they seem to be hampered by the current situation of rampant insecurity in and around the park.

Even when jobs providing alternatives to unauthorized resources exploitation will materialize, they might not directly sever the links between populations and armed groups, nor de-escalate conflict dynamics. In fact, depending on how it is managed, the availability of jobs may actually reinforce conflicts between and within communities and elites, as it raises their stakes. Where recruitment is believed to benefit only certain ethnic groups, factions or networks, those perceiving to be marginalized will protest. For example, in September 2014, youngsters from Rutshuru demonstrated in front of the headquarters of the park in Rumangabo, as they found that too many people from the ‘outside’ were working in high positions for the Virunga Foundation. The manifestation was handled in a heavy-handed manner by park guards, which created further antagonisms. In the current climate of militarization, such discontent is dangerous, as it may draw in the armed actors to which politicians and local authorities are often linked, a risk that is especially elevated in the context of elections and the ongoing decentralization process.

It would be therefore seem important for the park to adopt a more conflict sensitive approach to conservation, which would also require a more participatory orientation. This would demand an increased effort by the park to improve its local communication, which has been lagging behind on its internationally oriented publicity, although a number of recent initiatives point to improvement in this domain. However, it is also important to realize that there is only so much the management of the park can do to end the interlocking cycle of conflicts and violence. Many of the solutions for Virunga’s problems are in the hands of politicians and institutions located far away from the park’s boundaries. It is the primary responsibility of these actors to find integrated solutions for the different rebel groups residing in the park. Similar to other parts of the Congo, the current emphasis on stand-alone military operations has proven little effective up till now.

Jean Kenge: Quand la CENI se fait hara-kiri

Ce n’était pas le scénario rêvé pour la Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI). Mardi 28 juillet, la centrale électorale congolaise a annoncé le report de la date de l’élection des gouverneurs des nouvelles provinces issues du récent découpage territorial en République Démocratique du Congo. Soit, au total, 21 gouverneurs et leurs adjoints. Les partis politiques tout comme les indépendants soucieux de présenter leurs candidats ont désormais jusqu’au 21 août pour préparer et présenter leurs dossiers. Annoncées par le rapporteur général de la CENI, les dates clés de cette séquence sont les suivantes :

• Du 24 juillet au 21 août : dépôt des candidatures auprès de la représentation provinciale de la CENI.
• Du 22 août au 26 août 2015 : retrait, ajout ou substitution des candidatures.
• Du 27 août au 10 septembre 2015 : transmission des dossiers physiques des candidats au bureau de la CENI et délibération.
• Le 11 septembre 2015 : publication de la liste des candidatures recevables et non recevables par la CENI.
• Du 12 septembre au 14 septembre 2015 : dépôt des recours en contestation des listes des candidatures à la Cour d’appel.
• Du 15 septembre au 21 septembre 2015 : traitement des contentieux des candidatures par la Cour d’appel.
• Le 22 septembre 2015 : publication de la liste définitive des candidats par la CENI.
• Du 22 septembre au 1er octobre 2015 : accréditation des témoins, des observateurs et des journalistes aux secrétariats exécutifs provinciaux de la CENI de chaque nouvelle province.
• Du 2 octobre au 4 octobre 2015 : campagne électorale.
• Le 6 octobre 2015 : élection des gouverneurs et vice-gouverneurs par les députés provinciaux et publication des résultats provisoires par la CENI.
• Du 7 octobre au 14 octobre 2015 : dépôt des recours en contestation des résultats devant la Cour d’appel.
• Du 15 octobre au 21 octobre 2015 : traitement des contentieux des résultats par la Cour d’appel.
• Le 22 octobre 2015 : publication des résultats définitifs par la Cour d’appel.

Pour beaucoup de commentateurs à Kinshasa, l’annonce faite par la CENI a fini par entamer le peu de crédibilité qui restait encore à la centrale électorale congolaise.  Celle-ci a en effet assisté, sans aucune réaction, à l’activisme écrasant du ministère de l’intérieur tout au long du mois de juillet, au cours duquel le découpage territorial a été effectivement mis en place par les commissions constituées à cet effet. Le ministère de l’intérieur est allé jusqu’à annoncer «ses» dates pour l’élection des gouverneurs, entre fin juillet et début août. Une prérogative qui revient pourtant à la CENI en sa qualité de pouvoir organisateur des élections en République Démocratique du Congo.

Le coup de grâce, s’il faut ainsi s’exprimer, est venu de l’annonce, mardi 28 juillet par la CENI, du report de la date de l’élection des gouverneurs. Une annonce qui intervient au moment où des fuites avaient déjà prévenu que cette option était celle du bureau politique de la majorité, qui s’était réuni à ce propos lundi 27 juillet au Palais du Peuple. La majorité aurait souhaité se donner un peu plus de temps pour évaluer la nouvelle situation, compter ses forces avant d’aller à l’assaut des nouvelles provinces ou de conclure des «deals» avec des partis politiques de la majorité ou de l’opposition soutenant l’option du dialogue.

Le mauvais «timing» de l’annonce de la CENI a ainsi, malheureusement, confirmé les critiques de ceux qui ridiculisent une «CENI aux ordres de la majorité». La deuxième conséquence fâcheuse est la confirmation de l’analyse selon laquelle le calendrier électoral de la CENI n’est plus qu’un chiffon. Et que la concentration des élections locales, municipales, urbaines et provinciales, dans la meilleure des hypothèses fin 2015 et, au pire, courant 2016, repousserait ipso facto la présidentielle et les législatives nationales, à la fois faute d’argent et de temps.

Une sorte de démonstration par l’absurde. D’autant que la CENI se sera elle-même fait hara-kiri. On peut, déjà, en faire le constat avec l’important retard accumulé, au stade actuel, sur certaines étapes du calendrier électoral : dépôt des candidatures aux élections communales et locales du 26 mai au 28 juillet 2015 ; publication des listes définitives des candidats députés provinciaux le 9 juin 2015; contentieux des candidatures des candidats conseillers des communes et des secteurs-chefferies du 13 au 23 juillet 2015; publication des listes définitives des candidats conseillers des communes et des secteurs-chefferies le 28 juillet 2015.

Lentement mais sûrement, la boucle est en train d’être bouclée en faveur du glissement.