Excerpts from the UN Group of Experts report

Here are some excerpts from the UN Group of Experts report that was leaked to the press today (and from the press, leaked to me).

Summary

This report concludes that military operations against the FDLR have failed to dismantle the organization’s political and military structures on the ground in eastern DRC. The increasing rate of FDLR combatant defections and the FDLR temporary removal from many of its bases are only a partial success considering that the armed group has regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and continues to recruit new fighters. This report shows that the FDLR continues to benefit from residual but significant support from top commanders of the FARDC, particularly those officers in the 10^th military region (South Kivu), and has sealed strategic alliances with other armed groups in both North and South Kivu. External support networks, both regional and international, have been used by FDLR in the field to counteract the effects of Kimia II, for instance networks in Burundi and Tanzania. [...]

The Group investigated the FDLR’s ongoing exploitation of natural resources in the Kivus, notably gold and cassiterite reserves which the Group calculates continue to deliver millions of dollars in direct financing into FDLR coffers. This report illustrates how FDLR gold networks are intertwined tightly with trading networks operating within Uganda and Burundi as well as the UAE. The Group also documents that a number of minerals exporting houses, some of whom were named in the Group’s previous report in 2008, continue to trade with the FDLR. This report shows that end buyers for this cassiterite include the Malaysia Smelting Corporation and the Thailand Smelting and Refining Company, held by Amalgamated Metals Corporation, a UK entity.

The report analyzes the integration of non-state armed groups into the FARDC through the rapid integration in January 2009; as well as prior and during the FARDC/RDF joint operation Umoja Wetu and Kimia II. In this context, the CNDP officer class, in particular General Bosco Ntaganda, has continued to retain heavy weapons acquired during its period of rebellion in spite of its official integration into the FARDC and still controls revenue generating activities and parallel local administrations. The Group also presents documentary evidence showing that Gen Ntaganda continues to act as Kimia II deputy operational commander.

CNDP military officers deployed as part of FARDC Kimia II operations have profited from their deployment in mineral rich areas, notably at the Bisie mine in Walikale, North Kivu, and in the territory of Kalehe, in South Kivu. In both these areas, the FARDC commanding officers on the ground are ex-CNDP officers. The Group includes evidence in the report showing direct involvement of CNDP military officials in the supply of minerals to a number of exporting houses in North and South Kivu, some of which also supply the same international companies mentioned above. [...]

FARDC-FDLR collaboration

24. The Group has obtained a report from a DRC security agency (Annex 4) and a case file from the intelligence officers (T2) of the 10^th military region (Annex 5) which describes the attempted diversion on 13 December 2008 of 14,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition (Kalashnikov type) from the official FARDC stockpile under the control of the commanders of the 10^th military region. These documents have been archived at the United Nations.

25. The Group separately interviewed two FARDC officers of the 10^th military region who were aware of the diversion of this military equipment. Both officers stated to the Group that the ammunition was destined to be delivered to the FRF, FNL and FDLR. The officers also informed the Group that there have been similar other episodes over the last year orchestrated by internal FARDC networks loyal to Colonel Baudouin Nakabaka, the deputy commander of the 10^th military region in charge of logistics and administration, and his direct superior General Pacifique Masunzu. [...]

26. The case file obtained by the Group shows Col Nakabaka’s direct complicity in the attempted diversion of ammunition on 13 December 2008. Testimonies by various FARDC officials in these documents show that the ammunition was loaded onto a specially rented private vehicle by certain FARDC officials, notably Sergeant Elie Awijeo Abutumange and Captain Ikamba, the latter who was at the time in charge of the FARDC depots where this material was stored. According to several testimonies of FARDC officials, Captain Ikamba and the driver of the vehicle stated to their fellow FARDC officers present at the storage site that the material was being moved with the authority of Col Nakabaka. Four FARDC witnesses reported that Colonel Nakabaka phoned FARDC officers in charge of securing the camp at that precise moment. FARDC witnesses also reported that the driver had attempted to call Col Nakabaka just before he was arrested. The documents show that Col Nakabaka’s phone number was found in the driver’s phone.

[...]

30. The Group, in collaboration with MONUC Pakistani military contingent, uncovered two arms caches in the town of Uvira, which the Group considers to be connected to non-state armed groups, notably the Mai Mai, FNL and FDLR. Acting on the Group’s information, MONUC’s Pakistani contingent seized a stock of 139 AK-47 rifles, 34 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition, 5 hand-grenades and 6 Uzi submachine-guns (Annex 6) between the night and early morning of 15 and 16 June 2009. [...]

Burundi

87. The Group obtained several testimonies that the FDLR maintain a relationship with General Adolphe Nshimirimana, Burundi’s head of intelligence, as well as with top Burundian police officers. This information has been corroborated by several active FDLR elements, regional security agencies, Burundian government officials and civil society members. The Group has also obtained phone records showing thirteen communications between Colonel Agricole Ntirampeba, the chief of staff of Gen Nshimirimana, and Major Mazuru of the FDLR during June 2009 to August 2009. In October 2009, an FDLR liaison officer also confirmed that the FDLR collaborates with Gen Nshimirimana and Col Ntirampeba, especially through the provision of logistical arrangements and medical assistance. [...]

FDLR Diaspora networks

93. To further corroborate the modus operandi of the FDLR chain of command, the Group worked in collaboration with an FDLR ex-combatant who in turn obtained information in the presence of the Group from a radio operator active in DRC. This conversation, which was heard and transcribed by the Group, related to military instructions issued in March 2009 by the FDLR high command to attack civilian populations and hospitals (see transcription made by the Group as the radio operator read them out in Annex 18). Four FDLR ex-combatants, two of whom were senior officers, reported that they had received similar orders to act against the civilian population following the end of Umoja Wetu. Dozens of FDLR ex-combatants have also stated to the Group that orders of this nature must be given by Gen Mudacumura, who in similar circumstances consults first with Mr Murwanashyaka.

94. The Group obtained testimonies from FDLR ex-combatants that Mr Murwanashyaka has been involved in coordinating the transfer of arms and ammunition to FDLR units and relaying specific instructions on their use (see paragraph 71 for one example). The Group also obtained evidence that Mr Murwanashyaka has been involved in managing large sums of money that have been raised through the illicit sale of natural resources derived from areas under the control of the FDLR. This money is used by the leadership to pay for operational needs such as the phone bills of satellite phones used by the FDLR military high command. [...]

95. The Group obtained evidence that Etablissement Muyeye, one of the biggest minerals trading houses in Bukavu, has organised the transfer of funds through Western Union to individuals in Germany who are helping Mr Murwanashyaka violate the terms of the assets freeze imposed upon him by the UN and German authorities (Etablissement Muyeye was cited in paragraphs 78-88 of the Group’s December 2008 report (S/2008/773), as well as paragraphs 164 to 172 of this report for purchasing minerals from FDLR areas). The Group was informed by an employee and a family member of Mr Muyeye Byaboshi, the owner of Etablissement Muyeye, that Mr Muyeye was transferring money to Germany on behalf of the FDLR. The employee of Mr Muyeye showed to the Group some receipts of such money transfers. They included payments of several thousand dollars, and the most recent had been made as late as April 2009. The transfers were all made in the name of Jean Marie Shamavu, an associate of Mr Muyeye in Bukavu, to Metete Nzita in Germany, who is an agent of Mr Murwanashyaka in Germany, according to several sources close to the FDLR.

[...]

112. One case relates to financial support provided to the FDLR through funding received by “Fundaciò S’Olivar” and Inshuti, both Spanish charitable organizations. On the basis of testimonies, original email correspondence, audio recordings of conversations, phone logs analysis and receipts of money transfers, as well as other documents, the Group established that the FDLR has received regular financial, logistical and political support from individuals belonging to the above charitable institutions which, in turn, were funded directly or indirectly from the government of Islas Baleares, a provincial authority in Spain.

Non-integration of the CNDP

180. In this regard, the Group would like to highlight its findings as reported in its interim report of May 2009 (S/2009/253), where it noted that according to government figures, roughly 6,000 CNDP soldiers were integrated into the FARDC but only 2,542 personal weapons were handed in by these elements. In terms of larger weapons, CNDP only handed in seven PKM machine guns, one MAG machine gun, seven RPG-7, four 60mm mortars, one 82mm mortar, six 75mm recoilless guns, two SPG-9 recoilless guns and four multiple rocket launchers according to the government’s technical commission on integration. The Group obtained multiple testimonies from demobilized CNDP elements, including child soldiers, FARDC and Congolese intelligence officials as well as MONUC that corroborate information of significant arms caches under the control of hardline ex-CNDP commanders integrated into the FARDC.[...]

185. The Group has obtained evidence and testimonies that Gen Ntaganda has centralized many of the ground-level taxation networks previously controlled by the CNDP in the territory of Masisi in North Kivu, including control of illegal checkpoints, charcoal markets and the timber trade, and has enforced parallel administrative structures particularly in his central fiefdom of the Mushake zone of Masisi territory. The Group has calculated that Gen Ntaganda’s network raises about 250,000 US dollars a month from these ground taxes (also see the Group’s interim report S/2009/253).

201. Since March 2009 the Bisie mine in Walikale, which provides approximately 70 percent of the output of cassiterite of North Kivu, has been under the control of units responding to former CNDP hardliners operating within the FARDC’s 1^st integrated brigade. The Group has confirmation from military officials, miners and traders in Bisie, mining officials and demobilized ex-CNDP elements that a part of government taxation revenues and part of the production from the mine have been controlled directly by Lt Col Hassan “Shimita” Bin Mashabi, an ex-CNDP officer working for the FARDC under the 1^st integrated brigade. This unit has been commanded by Lt Col Antoine Manzi until September 2009 and subsequently by Lt Col Yusuf Mboneza, both of whom are former CNDP officers. [...]

202. [...] The Group estimates that the local military commanders at Bisie can therefore earn up to 60,000 US dollars per annum from these taxes, based on industry estimates of an average of 500 tonnes a month of production from Bisie. [...]

205. The Group has also been informed by mining and military officials that the brother of Lt Col Bin Mahsabi, known as Faustin Ndahiriwe, has also been trading cassiterite produced on behalf of the ex-CNDP officers based at Walikale. [...]

206. The Group has established that Mr Ndahiriwe has directly supplied a number of businesses in Goma with cassiterite, and in particular three exporting houses, or comptoirs: Hill Side, SODEEM and Pan African Business Group (PABG). The Group obtained documentation from all these three companies showing they have purchased cassiterite from Mr Ndahiriwe in 2009 (Annex 70). Mr Ndahiriwe confirmed that he is prefinanced by some of the comptoirs in Goma although he did not specify which ones.

Leak: UN expert report

The UN Group of Experts report was leaked to the press today. The experts have spent the past 9 months investigating how various rebel groups in the Congo get financial and military support. Some of their main conclusions:

1. The operations against the FDLR have failed to dismantle the organization’s political and military structures on the ground in eastern DRC. The increasing rate of FDLR combatant defections and the FDLR temporary removal from many of its bases are only a partial success considering that the armed group has regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and continues to recruit new fighters.

2. The report goes a long way in showing how rebel groups in the eastern Congo take advantage of the lack of transparency and accountability in the minerals trade to make millions of dollars from gold, tin, timber and coltan. They carry out this racketeering in complicity with regional governments, as well as local and international businessmen. Some of the figures they cite are:

• General Adolphe Nshimirimana, the head of intelligence in Burundi
• Mutoka Ruganyira, one of the most important gold dealers in Burundi
• Muyeye Byaboshi, one of the biggest mineral dealers in Bukavu
  
• Rajendra Vaya and J.V. Lodhia, who headed two Ugandan gold trading companies called UCI and Machanga
• Colonel Baudouin Nakabaka, the deputy head of the South Kivu military region
• Two Spanish charities - the Fundació S'Olivar and Inshuti which are funded by the government of the Islas Baleares Province and linked to the Roman Catholic church (not for minerals trade but for financial support to the FDLR)
  

3. The report shows that the integration of the CNDP, which has been widely hailed as a success, has been extremely limited. CNDP officers maintain parallel command networks within the Congolese army, which have been responsible for a rash of abuses this year. Also, these units have been put in control of some of the most lucrative mining areas in the Kivus, including the Bisie mine (in Walikale territory, biggest tin mine in the Kivus) and mines in Kalehe territory. These commanders, in turn, help supply businessmen in Kigali and abroad with tin. In other words, instead of uniting rebel groups under one command, the integration process has merely displaced the patronage networks and created new factions within the Congolese army.

The Sorcerer's Apprentice

As in Goethe's fable of the sorcerer's apprentice, it seems like the rebel groups of North Kivu keep on splitting among themselves, creating new rebel groups that are ever harder to control. (Watch out for a Fantasia version of Kivutian politics, to be released soon).

It is becoming clearer and clearer that the some former CNDP stalwarts are forming a new organization. Several meetings were held in Goma and Masisi last week, led by General Bosco Ntaganda (ex-CNDP chief of staff, Tutsi from Masisi) and Francois Gachaba (ex-RCD leader, provincial MP, Hutu from Masisi). They announced the creation of the Front for the Liberation and Emancipation of the Congo (FLEC). As reported in previous blogs, this movement is supported by the discontents of the March 23 agreement - the politicians who have yet to get new appointments, marginalized CNDP officers and Bosco himself, who has an ICC indictment hanging over his head.

At a public meeting in Bihambwe last week, Bosco apparently announced that the Hutu ex-PARECO commander Colonel Balomi would become one of FLEC's leaders. They also decided that they would more aggressively try to recruit Congolese army deserters to beef up the movement, an activity that has already started, being led by Colonel Baudouin Ngaruye and Francois Gachaba (you might remember Gachaba from his prison break in June this year; he has been sentenced for rape and other abuses during his time as bourgomestre. Bosco sprang him free).

A few interesting things: First, the movement is based explicitly on a Masisi Hutu-Tutsi alliance, including some previously very hard line "Mongol" Hutu from Masisi who are known for their anti-Tutsi views. This is in line with previous strategies of political-military movements in North Kivu, most notably that of Eugene Serufuli although previously the Tutsi faction was represented mostly by upper class Tutsi from Goma and Jomba, while this time they seem to be mostly from the lower class Bagogwe clan from Masisi.

Secondly, it is not clear whether this will be an insurrectional movement or more of a political platform with some military ties. There has not been any fighting so far, but Bosco has made several public statement accusing Colonel Sultani Makenga - who has taken over the pro-Nkunda faction of the CNDP - of wanting to kill him. Lastly, it is worrisome that the person whom Rwanda helped installed as the head of the CNDP earlier this year is now publicly making signs of defecting from the Congolese army.

Much is still in the land of rumor. It seems likely that FLEC has ambitions to control large parts of Masisi. In one of their meetings, they spoke of creating new administrative divisions for Ngungu, Mushaki and Kitchanga and that they will be creating new taxes that they will use to pay their officials and commanders. Much has also been made about movements of cows and Tutsi refugees back to Masisi; FLEC is apparently interested in protecting these movements and using their military power to obtain more land, either through purchase or force.

Also, chroniclers of the Congo will remember that this is not the first the a rebel movement called FLEC has made waves. We first heard of FLEC in 2003/4, when rumors of a new Rwanda-backed rebellion were making the rounds. It was supposed to unite all the anti-Kabila forces in the East, including Ituri armed groups, Mai-Mai dissidents and former RCD members.

The CNDP commanders reportedly linked to this movement include:

Colonel Innocent Kabundi
Colonel Baudouin Ngaruye (Mugogwe from Masisi)
Colonel Eric Ruohimbere (Munyamulenge from South Kivu)
Colonel Wilson Nsengiyumva (Mugogwe from Masisi)
Colonel Innocent Zimurinda
Colonel Ngabo
Colonel Innocent Gahizi (the manager of Tribert Rujugiro's ranch)

US Congress tackles conflict minerals

Yesterday, the US congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA) unveiled legislation he will introduce in the U.S. House of Representatives today to help stop trade in conflict minerals in the Congo. His initiative was applauded by many advocacy groups, including the Enough Campaign, Human Rights' Watch and Global Witness.

This is good news indeed. Now we have three initiatives in the US government aimed at quelling the trade in conflict minerals in the Congo. In addition to this initiative, there is the Congo Minerals Act that Senators Brownback (R-KS), Duck Durbin (D-IL) and Russ Feingold (D-WI) introduced to the upper house in April 2009, as well as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act signed into law in October 2009 requiring the State and Defense Departments to work together to create a map of mining areas and zones occupied by armed groups in the eastern Congo.

This is unprecedented. Previously, the furthest the US Congress has gone is to issue resolutions condemning violence, supporting peace processes and holding hearings. The European Union is watching closely, and advocates in France are considering following suit with pressure on the French parliament. It's nice to see the US taking the lead on this.

But what do these acts actually call for? Here are the most important items in the House bill:

• definition by commerce secretary of what constitutes a conflict mineral good, the tasking of regular audits of mineral processing facilities in the US
• create a conflict minerals map
• support for further investigations by the UN Group of Experts;
• mapping of which armed groups control key mines in eastern Congo;
• inclusion of information on the negative impact of mineral exploitation and trade on human rights in Congo in the annual human rights reports;
• GAO review to evaluate adherence and effectiveness of policies

The Senate bill is similar, requiring amongst other things that "companies that are involved in commercial activities involving three minerals (coltan, cassiterite, and wolframite) to disclose the country of origin of the minerals to the Securities and Exchange Commission. If the minerals are from DRC or neighboring countries, companies would have to also disclose the mine of origin."

The main flaw in this legislation, as I have argued before, (I tend to be repetitious) is that it relies on being able to discern what a conflict mineral is. Otherwise the mining companies in the US will just throw their hands up and claim not to know where the minerals are from. This is currently what mining traders in Goma and Bukavu do - they just say: "All we know is that it comes from the interior, we have no idea where it is from." They are often lying, but it is sometimes difficult to prove them wrong - with the UN Group of Experts, we had to retrace the supply chain, sifting through stacks of Congolese documents (which are sometimes unreliable) and get testimony from mining industry insiders.

One idea is to start this kind of certification in several pilot projects and then trying to spread out from there. There is currently an effort being launched by MONUC, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Canadian government to establish "centres de negoce" (trading centers) in five places in North and South Kivu (Mubi, Rubaya, Hombo, Baraka and Kamituga) where international officials would support the Congolese government and police to begin inspecting shipments and certifying their origin. Congolese revenue agents would also be present to levy taxes.

Even here, though, none of the centers would be established at the mines themselves. In the case of Mubi, potentially the biggest center, miners would have to shlep minerals 50 kilometers from the Bisie mine, the biggest tin mine in North Kivu. On the way, minerals from areas controlled by armed groups could be infiltrated into the supply chain; by the time the certifying agents in Mubi look at the bags full of tin, they will have a hard time knowing if it is conflict minerals or not.

We could try certifying at the mines themselves, starting with a dozen or so of the biggest mines. This would require sending reliable agents and people to protect them to these sites, not an easy task as some of the biggest mines are over a day walk from the closest road or airstrip (like Bisie, a 16 hour slog through the jungle from mine to airstrip). This would also face stiff opposition from traders, as it would reduce tin exports by significant amounts, as even "legitimate" mining sites (i.e. those occupied by the Congolese army) would be barred. But this could be a start and something for donors to commission studies to see which sites would be most appropriate.

In the meantime, a quick way of of imposing some accountability in the sector is to take the approach that Global Witness and the UN Group of Experts already have: by investigating the traders and finding out who is knowingly dealing in minerals from rebel-controlled areas. I call this the policing option and recommend setting it up as an official third-party monitor, recognized by the Congolese government with a clear agreement on what illegal activity means, what prerogatives they have under Congolese law and what the sanctions would be violations.

Hence, I think the US legislators' initiatives are laudable, but have a somewhat backwards approach - we should first try to institute mechanisms of accountability at the local level, then at the international level. Of course, the two approaches reinforce each other, and I understand some US-based electronics companies may even be willing to fund such local institutions in the Congo.

Ignace in handcuffs

The German police finally arrested Ignace Murwanashyaka, the president of the FDLR, on charges of being involved in a terrorist organization. This is very good news. Ignace had been living in Germany since the 1980s when he came to the country to study. He got a PhD in economics, married a German woman, and obtained political asylum. In 2001, he became the head of the FDLR's political wing in effort of rebranding the organization by the military commanders - Ignace had no record of being involved in the 1994 genocide.

It was clear that Ignace was in charge of the FDLR - he himself proudly said so, and there are almost daily phone calls between him and General Mudacumura, the commander of the FDLR in the Congo, to prove it. If you talk to the FDLR on the ground, they all know Ignace and identify him as their leader. Former FDLR officers have described how Ignace use to call Mudacumura and other commanders and give them orders, as during the Kimia II offensive, when Ignace called to urge them to use all of their ammunition, as more would soon be forthcoming. The last two UN Group of Experts reports (another will be out in a few weeks) and the BBC have documented this.

The Germans had been slow in acting for two reasons. First, they didn't seem to see this with any urgency. When UN officials approached German prosecutors to take action, they said they either did not have enough evidence showing that Ignace had real control over the FDLR, they didn't have enough information on FDLR abuses in the Congo, or there were no laws against such activity on the books in Germany. This last point was probably the most important one - in many countries there are limited laws against being member of a foreign rebel group, especially one that does not impinge on the host state's interests. When I was with the UN and we approached the USA, France and other countries about FDLR operatives, they all said that they respected free speech and that these people had themselves not done anything illegal (although they admitted their organizations may have). There is therefore a legal problem, one which the German's solved by trying Ignace on charges of terrorism.

This will hopefully set a precedent for how other states can act. The other most active member of the FDLR in the Diaspora, Callixte Mbarushimana, is based in France, from where he publishes press statements and talks to the media. The French government has repeatedly said they are not aware of anything illegal he has done, and they respect free speech. In the US, two leaders of a splinter faction of the FDLR, the RUD-URUNANA, which controls around 200-300 troops in North Kivu, are being watched by Homeland Security, but there, as well, the authorities have seen little grounds to act. They say that the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Statute, which allows US courts to try foreigners, would be difficult to apply because the RUD leaders (Felicien Kanyamibwa and Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro) were not directly involved in crimes, they are just member of armed groups. It still may be possible to get them for material support to a terrorist organization (FDLR's predecessor ALiR was on a terrorist watchlist in the US) or for having committed fraud on their immigration documents. At the moment, nobody seems to be trying.

We also need to understand the limits of prosecuting the Diaspora. Ignace and Callixte are important symbolically and in terms of the troops morale - they represent the hope the the FDLR will one day engage in political negotiations with the Rwandan government, that they are a legitimate armed group. But they are not very important in terms of the financing and arming of the rebels - the FDLR get the vast majority of their funds from local taxation rackets. So the arrest of Ignace will not have a Savimbi-like effect, for example.

For more information on FDLR Diaspora leaders, see my October blog post here.

Refugee return: Reasons to worry

There are increasing worries about the return of the Congolese Tutsi refugees in Rwanda. UNHCR officials have indicated off the record that they are alarmed by "the complete lack of transparency in the return of refugees." They confirm that some 12,000 may have returned to the Congo in the past months, although few appear to have come from the refugee camps that they manage. This means that the refugees are either Congolese Tutsi who were living amidst the civilian population, of whom there are quite a few, or Rwandan citizens. Congolese officials who have tried to interview returnees have been rebuffed by ex-CNDP units.

Many of the refugees come across the border in Kibumba, where it is easy to cross the Rwandan border on market day (most have Congolese voter ID, which are valid national IDs). A friend who was recently there said there are around 100 people who cross twice a week these days. From Kibumba, minibuses take them to the Masisi highlands. It isn't clear whether this operation is all organized by higher powers, or just the individual initiative of the refugees who are tired of living in camps in Rwanda.


These refugees are apparently returning mostly to the areas around Kilolirwe and Kitchanga, in the Masisi highlands. But some are also some going to "frontline" areas, places with heavy CNDP deployments along the frontlines with FDLR or other rebels. It is in particular these groups who have sparked accusations that the CNDP are engaged in demographic engineering in North Kivu, stretching the boundaries of the territory where the Tutsi traditionally lived. It is difficult to confirm these allegation for now - but what is clear is that thousands of cows have also crossed the border in recent months and that some of these refugees are busy herding and protecting these cattle.

This return has sparked wild rumors and allegations from other communities, who think the Tutsi are engaged in expansionism. The Hunde, whose chiefs traditionally ruled over most of Masisi territory, are particularly angry, which has led some to sympathize with Colonel Janvier, a "son of the soil." Some of these rumors are very wild indeed - there is no indication that more than several hundred Tutsi would come back to Walikale territory, for instance, where traditional chiefs have banged on about 40,000 arriving. But there is definitely some movement going on - another friend was in Rubaya (in south-central Masisi) last week and saw many young Tutsi in military fatigues in the local population. This was a place completely deserted of Tutsi this time last year (it was on the frontline between PARECO, FARDC and CNDP). Interestingly, Bosco Ntaganda was also in Rubaya a few days ago, chaired a meeting on how Hutu and Tutsi should share the land there, obviously an issue that would come up if there are a lot of new arrivals.

The main problem is that we don't know who these refugees really are, where they are going, and what kinds of claims they have to the land on which they settle. A UN team will be going out soon to investigate; let's hope they come back with some good research.

CNDP & the logic of disorder

What is going on within the CNDP, only last year the strongest rebel group in the region?

A few days ago, the head of the CNDP, Desire Kamanzi, resigned, leaving a leadership vacuum at the head of the movement/party/ex-rebel group. But the vacuum was to a large degree there already. Kamanzi's sidekick and spokesperson for the party, Jean Munyampenda, had quit several months before, and it has been obvious pretty much since Nkunda's arrest that the party has been riven with internal conflicts and political dissent.

Let's revisit the group's recent history. When Nkunda was arrested in January 2009, he was replaced by Bosco Ntaganda as the military leader of the CNDP. According to several CNDP officers, General James Kabarebe, the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army, invited their officer corps across the border to Gisenyi to give them a choice: follow Bosco Ntaganda and integrate into the Congolese army or we will consider you as our enemies.

Bosco was not popular amongst many in the officer corps for various reasons. Many did not appreciate Rwanda's domineering attitude, imposing their will on them and dictating the terms. Bosco was not charismatic or an intellectual, and he is from the Gogwe Tutsi clan from Masisi, whereas Nkunda is Jomba from Rutshuru territory. He is also a latecomer to the CNDP rebellion, having joined them from Ituri long after the CNDP was created. So the officers toed the line grudgingly, but with little enthusiasm. They continued to talk to Nkunda, who was under a loose house arrest in Gisenyi and then in Kigali, and they paid little heed to Bosco. Colonel Sultani Makenga became the figurative leader of these pro-Nkunda CNDP commanders, and only a few major commanders (Colonel Baudouin, Colonel Wilson Nsengiyumva) remained in the Bosco camp. In order to bolster his marginal position, Bosco affiliated himself with former Hutu governor Eugene Serufuli, which only further alienated him from the Nkunda faction. Tensions reached a breaking point in June 2009, when a scuffle broke out in Goma over disputed revenues from the timber trade.

On both sides, the ex-CNDP commanders have fared relatively well - Bosco has solidified his control of the administrative apparatus in parts of Masisi territory, which provides him hundreds of thousands of dollars in tax revenues a month from the charcoal, timber and other trade. Makenga and other officers have, on their part, been able to establish over other lucrative rackets, often in collaboration with their former foes in the Congolese army. According to numerous reports, CNDP officers have brought thousands of cows across the border from Rwanda to the lush highlands around Mushaki, Ngungu, Kitchanga and Kilolirwe (all in Masisi), where they graze under the watchful eyes of CNDP soldiers.

But, despite the fact that most CNDP officers are making more money than ever before off the various taxation rackets, parts of their movements are not happy. The politicians, on one side, have not reaped any benefits from the peace process other than the nomination of two minor ministers to the provincial government. In addition, many in the Tutsi community - their main constituency - feel that they core demands of refugee repatriation and protection of the Tutsi community have not been addressed (although around 12,000 "refugees" have returned from Rwanda this year.) The Amani process, the political negotiations through which all the rebel groups were pushing their demands, ended earlier this year. There is no formal framework through which the CNDP can now pursue its political ambitions.

On the other side is Bosco himself, who has a an ICC warrant on his head and has few loyal friends left. Integration into the Congolese army seems to be a recipe for getting himself arrested eventually.

In between all these various factions is the Rwandan government, which played a key role in the early months of the year only to take a step back and let the CNDP bicker amongst each other. It is instructive that Kigali, initially so forceful and controlling in January 2009, has not intervened to prevent officers from rejecting Bosco's authority. It seems that they are happy seeing a weak, factionalized CNDP.

Now, in the past few weeks, Bosco has tried to reconcile himself with the Nkunda faction. There have been several meetings between Bosco and pro-Nkunda CNDP leaders to try to hammer out an agreement over the way forward. At the same time, there have been persistent reports regarding new recruitment being organized by Bosco with relatives in Kampala (a certain Ngabo Gad), although it seems that, if anything, Bosco wants to protect his own neck and not launch a new rebellion - the risks are too high. Just this week, the non-CNDP factions within the Congolese army have stepped up operations along the Ugandan border where Bosco was allegedly mobilizing troops. The CNDP negotiations appear to have broken down this week, as heavyweight CNDP commanders like Colonel Makenga refused to be part of any new rebellion.

So the status quo of petty squabbles, internecine plotting and leadership conflicts will continue within the CNDP. It appears to appeal to the strongest parties - Kigali, the main CNDP commanders, and the Congolese government. The other parties - Bosco, the ex-CNDP politicians - have been cut out but have little recourse for the moment. It is a sort of willed disorder, what Congolese sometimes term as la politique de la pagaille. Sometimes everybody is best served by a mess.