Nick Kristof on the Congo

Nicholas Kristof just spent a week in the eastern Congo and has begun publishing a series of Op-Eds in The New York Times. This first one is here, and is less than illuminating. He talks about the how women raped and children are orphaned. He says that he has come to the Kivus, "where militias rape, mutilate and kill civilians with a savagery that is almost incomprehensible." Unfortunately, Kristof does not do much in his Op-Ed to make it any more comprehensible. Instead, he slips from one stock image to the next, without providing much explanation at all - in fact, that might be antithetical to the piece, as he states: "This is a pointless war — now a dozen years old — driven by warlords, greed for minerals, ethnic tensions and complete impunity." A pointless war. Perhaps. But does it defy reason? Is there any way to explain in simple terms what the war is about? Here are some suggestions to slip into the piece:

• The Congo war has many causes, but two on the main ones were the collapse of the Congolese state after 32 years of misrule by a western-backed dictator; and the genocide of 800,000 people in Rwanda in 1994, which drove a million people across the border into the Congo, where some of the commanders involved in the genocide still terrorize the Congolese population, along with many new non-genocidaire recruits.
• In 1996, a Rwandan-backed coalition invaded the Congo to topple the this dictator, Mobutu. After Laurent Kabila came to power on the back of this rebellion, he fell out with his Rwandan backers, who then launched a new rebellion. The war lasted until 2003, when all belligerents joined a transitional government. Elections were held in 2006 and Joseph Kabila was elected president. However, his presidency has been marred by corruption, abuse and state weakness. In the East, former Rwandan allies went back to war, driving an insurrection that morphed through various phases and continues until today.
• This violence is compounded by struggles over local political and economic resources that often take place along ethnic lines. Faced with a weak state, many ethnic-based militias have emerged. The motives of the fighters vary from self-defense to trying to make money to asserting manhood. [It would be very nice if journalists took more to interview perpetrators and not just victims, it helps to dispel the specter of African savagery.]

This is still hopelessly reductive; the point is, a journalist's job is to provide intelligent context and analysis, to illuminate, not stultify. Some say that it is better that Kristof is writing even these simple tidbits - it helps mobilize interest in the West and people like myself are lost in the stratosphere. I am certainly lost in the stratosphere, but I do think there is a way of writing an Op-Ed that better reflects the conflict's dimensions. After all, it's supposed to be an opinion piece. The only opinion I could find here was: "The Congo is messed up. Please help." Imagine writing a similar piece about America's school system or health care. It would never be published in the NYT.

I am not convinced that just making people care more will solve the problem. After all, caring could lead to bad policy. There is ample precedent for this. Or, people could just shake their head when confronted with such "pointless" violence and throw their hands up in the air.

Kristof also could have spoken about policy. There are currently two pieces of important legislation in Congress on helping to regulate the mining sector in the Congo. The US Defense Department is considering how to help reform the Congolese army through AFRICOM. Several organizations are considering how to intervene to help combat sexual violence through initiatives in the justice sector. This is what an opinion piece is supposed to do: influence opinion and policy. Not reinforce stereotypes.

Maybe I spoke to soon - after all, this is his first piece. Maybe he was just prepping us for cogent policy pieces to come. I certainly hope so.

War of the cows

A friend recently sent me information regarding the ownership of cattle in the area of Masisi occupied by former CNDP rebels. He said he had gathered information about 7,200 cows in Masisi belonging to high-ranking Rwandan officials.

I have no way of independently verifying this. However, in the UN panel report I helped write in 2008 we said: "The Group has seen official agricultural documents showing that CNDP officers own over 1,500 cows in a small area of their territory, worth between $450,000 and $750,000, and probably own far more than that in other areas they occupy. According to ranchers, there could be as many as 180,000 cows in North Kivu, many of them in territory under CNDP control."

There is no doubt that thousands of cows have crossed the border from Rwanda over the past year. Several reports of Tutsi refugees returning from Rwanda to Masisi indicate that groups often cross with herds of cattle. Several factors have played into this. Rwanda has limited the public grazing of cattle and recently introduced zero-grazing (keeping cattle indoors) to prevent soil erosion. En bref, there is limited room in Rwanda for cattle. In a country where cows have huge cultural significance, people are attached to the idea of buying cattle. Many ex-CNDP officers have also invested in large herds of cattle - I remember that when General Bosco received a cash windfall after being appointed the head of the CNDP a year ago, he spent quite a bit on buying more heads of cattle.

It's hard to guess how much these cows are worth. Frisian and Brown Swiss - good milk cows - can run as high as $1,000/head, but the Ugandan Longhorn can be much cheaper, as little as $200-300/head. In any case, 7,000 cows could be anywhere between $1,4 and $7 million.

Don't laugh, but cattle play an important role in the conflict. Agriculturalists - mostly Hutu and Hunde - are sometimes pushed off their land to make way for cattle. The conquest of land often goes hand in hand with securing land for cattle grazing. Raids by the Mai-Mai or Congolese army against the CNDP in North Kivu and against the Banyamulenge in South Kivu have sometimes gone hand in hand with cattle raiding worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. In Goma for a while they had introduced a new phrase into the lexicon of natural resource wars: Blood cheese.

MONUC - aiding and abetting?

Life is complex. In response to harsh criticism for supporting abusive Congolese army units last year, the UN peacekeeping mission was told by the UN Security Council in December that it had to condition its support on the behavior of these units. Specifically, the Council told them that any support is:

"Strictly conditioned on FARDC’s compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and on an effective joint planning of these operations, decides that MONUC military leadership shall confirm, prior to providing any support to such operations that sufficient joint planning has been undertaken, especially regarding the protection of the civilian population, calls upon MONUC to intercede with the FARDC command if elements of a FARDC unit receiving MONUC’s support are suspected of having committed grave violations of such laws, and if the situation persists, calls upon MONUC to withdraw support from these FARDC units."

In clear terms, MONUC is not supposed to support any Congolese battalions led by officers listed in UN reports as being responsible for violations of international law. If there are reports of new violations being committed by troops supported by MONUC, they will be given a 3 week period to start judicial proceedings against the alleged perpetrators. If no action is taken, support will be removed for that battalion. In addition, if the operations in general are seen to be systematically violating international law, MONUC is supposed to bring all support to a halt. It isn't very clear, however, what exactly "systematic" means here - is one attack on an aid convoy enough? One massacre? Of 10 people or 20 people?

The Congolese army is currently deploying 8 "strike battalions" in North Kivu in the Amani Leo operations. Last week, they gave MONUC the list of these battalions that MONUC will be supporting. All other battalions are supposed to be in holding positions or in barracks. MONUC is currently in the process of vetting this list to see if any of its commanders are on their blacklists. Two of the battalions are in the 23rd sector, currently commanded by Colonel Innocent Zimurinda, who has been found by the UN and Human Rights Watch to be involved in the Shalio massacre of last year, as well as the recruitment of child soldiers. Will MONUC protest and ask to have Zimurinda, a close associate of General Bosco Ntaganda, removed or will it consider that since they are providing support to the battalions and not the sector, it's kosher?

Several weeks ago, the Congolese foreign minister told a top MONUC official that "if MONUC suspends support to one more Congolese battalion, we will ask MONUC to leave the country." If this is true, it's some pretty fierce posturing by the Congolese government. MONUC officials say they are trapped between a rock and a hard place - they want to have an impact and support the Congolese troops, but they don't want to be complicit in abuses.

In Swahili, there is a saying: "Usiingie kwenye mashua yenye inatoboka" - don't get into a sinking ship. Might be better to patch those holes before embarking.

A proposal: Making mining in the Kivus more accountable

The Center on International Cooperation at New York University just published a concept paper I wrote with Steve Hege on mining in the Kivus. It's a proposal for how to instill some accountability in the Kivus, inspired by work done by the UN Group of Experts. You can find the paper here, it's pretty short and to the point.

Here's the basic idea:

Recently, numerous initiatives have focused attention on the linkage between conflict and the mineral trade in the Congo. NGOs such as Global Witness and ENOUGH have led campaigns urging governments and companies to take action. The United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC has released several reports documenting in detail how businesses, armed actors and government actors are involved in the mineral trade.

These initiatives have focused on three avenues of dealing with the problem: due diligence, certification and reinforcing local institutions. Due diligence, as suggested by Global Witness and ENOUGH, advocates making companies responsible for determining the conditions under which minerals are mined and brought to market. Companies would have to carry out rigorous internal audits to document their entire supply chain, and an independent international monitoring mechanism would be set up to verify their compliance. While companies could begin conducting such audits immediately, absolute certainty could only come through comprehensive certification of minerals at the source. Bags of cassiterite, coltan or wolframite would have to be sealed at the mine and labeled as conflict-free, so that traders, auditors and international mining companies would be able to distinguish between legal and illegal product.

Eventually, due diligence and certification will be pivotal in reforming the Congolese mining sector. However, comprehensive certification would require reliable agents to be deployed at thousands of pits, mines and streams throughout the eastern DRC, requiring considerable time and resources to set up. Due diligence, on the other hand, remains mostly focused on international trade. In the short run, as long as armed actors control mines and mineral traffic routes, they will find ways to benefit and to get the product onto the international market.

This is why we propose a Third Party Oversight Mechanism, an independently-funded entity that investigates the links between armed actors and the mineral trade. It would provide concrete incentives to the Congolese government to prevent armed groups and military units from benefiting from the mineral trade. The oversight mechanism would function much like the UN Group of Experts has, with several key differences.

Its mandate in a nutshell:

• It would be set up with an official mandate from the Congolese government to monitor the mineral trade. The close collaboration with the Congolese government is crucial, as this will help encourage support from local and national institutions and will help the mechanism to be sustainable.
• The mechanism would establish a norm together with the Congolese government that would provide a definition of illegal trade in minerals. Options could include: “Buying minerals from mines controlled by armed actors is illegal,” “buying minerals that you know come from areas controlled by armed actors is illegal,” “buying minerals in direct collusion with armed actors is illegal,” or any other definition established with the government.
• The investigators would ascertain which traders are violating this norm. It would rely on documentary evidence and eyewitness testimony based on clear evidentiary guidelines spelled out in the mechanism’s mandate.
• The Congolese government would designate an institution that would be charged with sanctioning individuals who violate this norm, including government officials and army commanders. Ideally, sanctions would be administrative, such as a fine or the suspension of mining or export license, as this would lower the burden of proof and expedite investigations.
• In order to provide clear guidance to traders about which mining sites are considered to be off-limits, the mechanism would include a mapping cell. This cell would establish public maps of mining sites in the three Kivus provinces. Regularly update versions of these maps would be readily available on the internet.
• The mechanism would be funded by international donors. Ideally, its members would be appointed by the United Nations Secretariat in consultation with the Congolese government. If a UN mandate is not forthcoming, it could be set up through the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and funded by outside donors, such as the European Union. However, it would be crucial to preserve the financial and substantive independence of the mechanism.
• It would be led by approximately fifteen international and Congolese thematic experts with extensive experience in complex and sensitive field investigations. The mapping cell would comprise an additional twelve staff members, most of whom would be hired locally from the Kivus.

Benefits

• Provide incentives and sanctions in view of formalizing trade An oversight mechanism would have a direct impact on the mineral trade. By sanctioning spoilers and promoting transparency in concrete ways in the eastern Congo, the mechanisms would provide tangible incentives to traders to stop purchasing from areas controlled by armed actors.

• Make information available Most of the mineral trade in the eastern Congo is underground, making it easier for armed actors to profit and depriving the government of vital revenues. The mechanism would provide detailed information about mineral supply chains and their links to local and regional actors. Regular briefings would be provided to provincial and national Congolese authorities, as well as to donors. Mineral traders could draw on this information in order to know which areas would be off-limits. This information alone, however, would not suffice as due diligence.

• Capacity to respond to dynamic trade networks The economic networks of the Kivus are highly malleable. Attempts to regulate the mineral trade by prohibiting purchases from certain mining zones could have the adverse effect of driving the trade of those minerals into the informal sector and undermine efforts for greater transparency. However, a third party oversight mechanism with geographic mapping tools would be able to anticipate these changes in supply chains.

• Facilitate the strengthening of Congolese institutions Close collaboration between Congolese authorities deployed at Mineral Trading Centers, and this mechanism could also generate confidence amongst donors to increase their financial and in-kind support for Congolese mining institutions with a view towards facilitating the progressive handover of the responsibilities mandated for this independent oversight. Congolese members of the mechanism would also eventually play a key leadership role in this process.

Lubumbashi madness

Lubumbashi has always been a world unto itself, a weird microcosm of Congolese politics. The city is one of the wealthiest in the country, due to its proximity to the largest mining ventures in the country (although Mbuji-Mayi, the diamond capital, is one big slum). Politics here are often extremely contentious and explosive, partly due to the conversion of the two main fault lines in Katangan politics:

First, the north-south rift, which has been pronounced since independence, when the north sided with the Lumumbists and the south tried to secede under Moise Tshombe, backed by western mining interests - the two sides fought a brief but bitter war (Laurent D Kabila cut his teeth fighting with the northern militia). This rift also coincides with ethnic and socio-economic cleavages, as the north is predominantly Lubakat and the south a mixture of Lunda/Bemba/others. In addition, the north is seen as "Katanga inutile," as its economy is now mostly based on subsistence agriculture, while the south is rich in copper and cobalt mines. This particular fault line might become very explosive if the plans to split Katanga into four provinces (2 northern & poor, 2 southern & rich) ever go through.

Second, the "autochtone" vs. "outsider" cleavage. Hundreds of thousands of outsiders immigrated to Lubumbashi and other mining cities, especially Likasi and Kolwezi, during the colonial period. Most of these outsiders were ethnic Lubas from Kasai, who were often well educated and endowed with the technical expertise needed for the mining operations. Not surprisingly, this created tensions. During the early 1990s, when Mobutu was trying to deflect from opposition against him, he embarked on a policy of ethnic divisionism in the Kivus and Katanga. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Kasaians had to flee southern Katanga. Many, however, remain or have since returned, and tensions in Lubumbashi remain high between the bakuyakuya (those who come from outside) and the "indigenous" population.

To make matter more complex, Joseph Kabila is theoretically from Katanga - his father was from Ankoro, in northern Katanga, although his grandmother was a southerner (Lunda) and his mother is from Maniema (Bangubangu). He is not really considered Katangan but most there, as he never spent much time there and grew up in mostly in Tanzania. In any case, many of the power brokers around the president are from Katanga (north and south) and their patronage networks are often deeply ethnic.

All this is a long-winded way of introducing two bizarre incidents.

First, a curious round-up of students and teachers in Lubumbashi a few days ago. A small criminology institute had set up shop in a Methodist church in one of the central neighborhoods. a teacher had taken upon himself to give the students a lesson in coup d'etats, an event that is relevant for many Congolese. He was lecturing them in how coup d'etats are planned and carried out when a bunch of police and intelligence agents burst in the door and arrested everybody. They are currently being held in a prison in Lubumbashi for plotting to overthrow the head of state (Kabila happened to be in Lubumbashi at the time). Ah, the Congo, what a car wreck, it hurts to watch, it hurts to look away.

Secondly, an incident at the provincial assembly a few days ago. According to Radio Okapi, four provincial MPs had submitted a motion to impeach the "questeur" of the assembly, the parliamentary administrator, for mismanagement. The president of the assembly, Kyungu wa Kumwanza (who was partly responsible for the anti-Luba ethnic attacks of the early 1990s), basically snubbed them and they walked out of the assembly. Outside, to their surprise, a gang of youths was waiting for them, accusing them of "offending the president of the assembly" and proceeded to beat them. One of them suffered some pretty nasty wounds that can be seen on the Radio Okapi website. He walked back into the assembly, blood dripping onto his shirt. The other MPs were so outraged by what had happened that Kyungu had to stop the proceedings. Pretty ominous, but militias and youth groups are a fundamental part of Lubumbashi politics, more so than anywhere else in the country.

Political and security developments in North Kivu

There was quite a bit of commotion in the Kivus this past week. Abbe Malu Malu arrived in Goma to chair a Comite national de suivi (follow-up committee for the peace deal) with the armed groups. Here were some of the developments he announced:

• Kabila has authorized the appointment of 6 CNDP delegates as territorial administrators, without saying where they would be based (most likely not just in the Kivus);
• funds had already been released for the CNDP war wounded - this had been the pretext for CNDP's maintenance of parallel administration and taxation in Masisi and Rutshuru;
• the various armed groups in the peace process will be officially recognized as political parties within the next three weeks;
• a new president of the Comite de suivi will shortly be named and its mandate extended for another three months.

This breathed some much-needed life into the peace process. However, most of the important negotiations and developments have always taken place outside of these formal talks - giving the CNDP and PARECO lead positions in the Kimia II operations, and even the appointment of politicians from their ranks to administrative positions. So it remains to be seen how relevant the process is, other than providing per diems to its members. Also, I am not sure the CNDP will be happy with just 6 administrators - they had been gunning for ministerial positions in the national and provincial governments (they already have two such positions in North Kivu, there had been rumors of similar nominations in South Kivu). There should be a ministerial shuffle in Kinshasa in the next weeks that will be important in this regard.

The military developments on the ground have also been important. MONUC and the Congolese army have been discussing the new deployments of the Amani Leo operations (successor to Kimia II). Interestingly, MONUC chief Alan Doss has used the insurgency in Equateur province (unrelated to the Kivus) to get leverage on the Congolese army - they have provided extensive transport, fuel and medical evacuation for Congolese troops deployed there upon the condition that the Congolese army allow for closer MONUC involvement in operational planning in Amani Leo - they had been pretty much excluded from meaningful planning in Kimia II, and they have seized upon this as an opportunity.

What exactly this means is yet to be seen. The Congolese are supported to deploy eight "strike battalions" in North Kivu against the FDLR, which will be supported by MONUC. The areas that MONUC has targeted for increased civilian protection (and I assume where these battalions will be active) are: southern Lubero, north-central Rutshuru and southern Masisi territories. This means that the Congolese are supposed to deploy military police with their units to prevent abuses, and that regular police forces are supposed to move in to take care of law and order problems. Money will be provided to refurbish police buildings and prisons, and community reconciliation programs will be launched (not clear by whom and what this means).

This is a much more holistic approach than under Kimia II and will much fewer troops. As pointed out here before, however, it isn't clear where the remaining soldiers will be going, as the barracks have not yet been built or renovated for them, so they may still be preying on the local population, especially as they will no longer be receiving the extra funds from their government for operational logistics and fuel/supplies from MONUC. Previous experience in the Kivus shows that troops who are deployed in operations loot; those deployed in holding positions predate through taxation.

In the meantime, the FDLR have not changed their behavior much. Here are some quotes from MONUC's reports on the security situations in North Kivu for last week:

"Various reports have highlighted concerns that FDLR elements are causing insecurity for the local population in parts of NE Rutshuru, NW Masisi and E Walikale. North Kivu Brigade received reports from local sources that 6-7 FDLR elements looted the village of Karambi (12 km N of Tongo, Rutshuru Territory) on the night of 16 January, killing one individual. In Masisi Territory, North Kivu Brigade in Kashebere (33 km NW of Masisi) received reports from local sources that civilians in the area were apprehensive of FDLR looting around Mahanga (10 km W of Masisi). In E Walikale Territory, a MILOBs patrol to Kailenge (5 m SW of Pinga) received reports from local sources that Rhungoma (8 km S of Kailenge) was attacked by FDLR in the evening of 16 January. The attackers apparently beat local inhabitants, demanding ration cards provided to the population by ICRC. Inputs from NK Brigade suggested that this looting extended to Binyungunyungu (9 km SE of Pinga) and Kaghuli (7 km SE of Pinga). Meanwhile, local inhabitants in Ngora village (14 km NE of Walikale) reported to MILOBs that FDLR elements were based along the Mera-Ntoto axis (70-80 km E of Walikale) where they were reportedly committing exactions on the local population, including looting and rape."

A new FDLR leadership?

It appears that the FDLR are beginning to re-organize after the end of Kimia II operations. For several days now, meeting have been held in southern Masisi territory to determine how they should restructure their leadership after the arrest of Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni, their president and vice-president, in Germany last year. It appears that General Gaston Iyamuremye (aka Rumuli Michel) may temporarily take the helm. Until recently, Rumuli was the main representative of the civilian leadership in the field and a quasi minister of defense. He led an office that was staffed by civilian advisers and tasked with developing military and political strategy. He is known to be a relative hardliner, although he has previously engaged in talks with MONUC on behalf of the FDLR, notably in 2008, when he met with MONUC representatives in Nyabiondo (Masisi) and promised to send a battalion of FDLR troops into demobilization as a goodwill gesture. Nothing ever came of this, and some speculated that the military commander, General Mudacumura, had countermanded his order.

Rumuli Michel is around 60 years old and is from the northern province of Ruhengeri. He was trained in Rwanda and Belgium and was leading a battalion that was in charge of logistics and military equipment in Kigali at the time of the genocide; his involvement in the massacres has not been established, but some members of the Rwandan security service have suggested that they view him as complicit.

His nomination may only be temporary as they look for someone more suitable. However, if it does become permanent, it will represent a serious shift of their public image from Ignace Murwanashyaka - who was a civilian based in Germany and was not present in Rwanda at the time of the genocide - to a military commander in the field. In that sense, it could represent a radicalization of their approach (although it seems difficult to become more radical than they are already) and a closing of the ranks. Callixte Mbarushimana, the executive secretary of the FDLR based in Paris, has apparently backed this temporary nomination and is still signing press releases from Paris. A president based in the field may also take the pressure off him, as both the BBC and the Associated Press have recently run long stories on his involvement in the FDLR and the 1994 genocide.

In the meantime, local press reports that the FDLR have retaken some of the positions they were forced out of during Kimia II operations.