Massive recruitment, WikiLeaks and elections

A quick news roundup before I go offline for a few days.

• Guy de Boeck has an article on CongoForum asking some questions about preparations for the elections - among other things, he points out that the constitutional revision has been put on the agenda of the national assembly without following the necessary procedure;
• Some more Wikileaks documents have been put up concerning the Congo, including some suggesting that George Forrest's company was involved in smuggling uranium out of the Congo in 2006;
• The French minister for human rights finished a trip to the Congo a few days ago, concluding the the human rights situation was "a shipwreck;"
• Human Rights Watch put out a press statement a few days ago, drawing attention to the fact that since September there has been a wave of recruitment in the Kivus. According to HRW, both CNDP and FDLR have been responsible for a wave of forced recruitment, including of many children. Such recruitment is a bad sign - it often takes place shortly before an escalation of violence. 

The Congo and Hezbollah

Just when you thought the US didn't care about the Congo (see last post), the US Treasury has named a prominent Kinshasa company as part of a financial network channeling funds to Hezbollah. They have placed Congo Futur, a company involved in manufacturing, trade and real estate throughout the Congo, on a list of Special Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) for being a "cover company" for Hezbollah supporters. This should lead to the blocking of the company's assets in the United States and forbid American entities from doing business with them.

According to the Treasury Department press release, which has received quite a bit of coverage in Kinshasa, the owners of Congo Futur have been substantial financial backers of Hezbollah. Ali Tajideen and Husayn Tajideen, both of whom apparently reside in the Gambia, are the newly named alleged supporters of Hezbollah. Kassim Tajideen, their brother, is the one cited on the list as the owner of Congo Futur, based in downtown Kinshasa. He has been on the SDGT list since May 2009.

Congo Futur has responded denying that the Tajideen brothers are shareholders in their business and saying that they have never been involved in money laundering. Nonetheless, their website names their founder as Ahmed Tajideen.

Congo Futur has been in Kinshasa since 1997 (not 2007 as the Treasury Department statement says) and is one of the largest business conglomerates in the country. They have factories that make plastics, oxygen, biscuits and construction materials, as well as a sawmill and several large real estate holdings. They are currently building a fourteen story apartment building in downtown Kinshasa.

There have been persistent allegations over the years, albeit unsubstantiated, that Congo Futur is linked to Kabila's family and their rapid expansion into real estate and other ventures has benefited from this political cover. There have also been a bunch of allegations, made by think tanks and online newspapers, linking Congo Futur to the uranium trade and Iran. It makes for strange reading, especially as another close friend of the government is Dan Gertler, who has been linked with rightest parties and settlers in Israel.

An intimate look at US government policy toward the Congo - Interview with Tony Gambino

Congo Siasa spoke this week with Tony Gambino about US policy towards the Congo. Tony has been engaged on the Congo for 31 years, since he was a Peace Corps Volunteer in rural South Kivu and in Kisangani. He was the Mission Director of USAID to the DR Congo from 2001-2004 and authored an influential Council on Foreign Relations report on the country. He is now an independent consultant based in Washington, DC.

JS: To start off with, give us a historical perspective on US foreign policy towards the Congo. How has it changed over the years?

TG: During the Cold War, US foreign policy globally had clear priorities. Those priorities led the US to support the pro-West dictator, Mobutu. That clear lens, however, disappeared with the end of the Cold War in 1990. In the first phase after the Cold War’s end, US policymakers thought they didn’t need to care about or pay much attention to places like Zaire, Rwanda or Burundi. But the 1994 genocide in Rwanda dramatically changed that. Policymakers realized that they couldn’t ignore what was going on in Central Africa. But what did this renewed attention mean for Zaire, which at that time was going through a flawed democratization process and then, starting in 1996, an invasion from the east? Should the US prop up Mobutu one more time or sit back and watch? Eventually, the US and other Western states decided not to intervene and Mobutu fell.

When a new war broke out in August 1998, the US faced a traditional international problem – how to deal with a multi-state international conflict. The main priority for the US at that point was stability in the region, so it did what it could to contain the war, build a peace process and help the Congolese move to a transition and elections. Overall, this US engagement was a success.

After the Congolese national elections in 2006, the US and other concerned states made a fundamental mistake. It is well known that countries coming out of civil war with a fragmented, fragile political system are at high risk to relapse into conflict. Therefore, increased, enhanced engagement is what is required. However, the US and other Western states decided that once elections had been held, now Congo was OK – it was, after all, a democracy now – and it was time to scale down. Ultimately, this decision was driven by nothing more than “Congo fatigue” in Washington and other Western capitals. “Congo fatigue” is an intellectually barren way of thinking about the Congo, and it led the US in 2007 and 2008 to do precisely the opposite of what it should have done. US policymakers still struggle with the consequences – an international community that keeps providing money, but remains intellectually and diplomatically disengaged. As a result of this international disengagement and extremely poor governance within the Congo, the country began to drift. Conflicts broke out again in the East, and there was a lack of progress in consolidating state institutions to provide a basic minimum of security, justice and other basic state services. This is the situation in the Congo today.

JS: What do you say to the argument that this drift in attention has coincided with much greater economic investment, including by American companies?

TG: Greater economic investments should lead to more engagement by the US government, not less. No, it really was nothing more than “Congo fatigue”: US policymakers put the country onto a distant back burner with hardly any flame and that triggered the inappropriate US diplomatic disengagement. The main manifestation of this was the focus of the US government in 2007 and 2008 to draw down MONUC – the main representative of the international community in the Congo – as rapidly as possible.

Some US companies, including one very large one, Freeport McMoran, have invested heavily in the Congo. This is a good thing, and should have focused US policymakers much more towards promoting democratic stability. The scale of investments that Freeport is making takes decades of mining to justify. When companies are thinking about staying in a country for that long, they want a functioning rule of law and secure property rights. This is a good thing and should be encouraged.

JS: The other allegation we often hear is that the US was complicit in the violence due to its support for Rwanda. What do you make of this argument?

TG: Let us look at different periods. Early during the 1998 war, some US policymakers initially looked favorably on Rwanda’s invasion of the Congo, in part because US policymakers at the time listened carefully, even deferentially, to Rwandan President Kagame, and were disenchanted with Laurent Kabila’s ineffectual rule in the Congo. But as that war drew in states from around Africa and turned into a bloody stalemate, the US and other Western states realized that it made no sense to take sides. The US then turned to peacemaking and support for a successful Congolese transition process, which was the right approach to take.

Once the war ended and until early 2009, much of the violence came about because of actions by the FDLR, the Rwandan rebel group. The FDLR remained a serious force because it received support from Congolese political figures, from those based in eastern Congo linked back to political and military figures in Kinshasa. When that support finally was cut off, as part of a deal between Presidents Kabila and Kagame in late 2008, the FDLR’s ability to project power began to wane. It has been on the decline ever since.

Recent violence in the Congo is really about competition within the Congo over land, minerals, and, ultimately, power and wealth. While Rwandan and other neighboring economic interests have benefited from the messy, violent struggles in eastern Congo, they are not its present cause.

JS: Does this administration have a coherent, comprehensive strategy for the Congo, similar to the strategies their have developed for other countries in Africa?

TG: The US is still struggling with a strategy for Central Africa. The US thinks the Congo requires some heightened attention, but hasn’t yet figured out what that means. This administration came in wanting to do something regarding the Congo. This could be seen most clearly in the Secretary of State’s 2009 visit to Kinshasa and Goma. Secretary Clinton was genuinely surprised and moved by the scale and brutality of the violence. I believe her commitment for the US to do more to solve this problem is genuine and deeply felt.

So the administration wanted a new strategic approach to the country, but they weren’t able to get the intended results from a Special Envoy who could spearhead the process, so they went about it piecemeal, sending out a multitude of various teams to the Congo to draft reports with literally hundreds of recommendations – ultimately more than a thousand recommendations were made. This only ended up creating confusion; it certainly did not lead to a new, focused approach. Instead of tolerating multiple, loosely coordinated activities that often are only tangentially linked, the US needs to focus all parts of our government on achieving clear results in two crucial areas. The US should focus on two central priorities in the Congo: the first priority should be to bring greater stability to and reduce civilian suffering in eastern Congo. The second priority needs to be ensuring that next year’s national elections take place and are free and fair.

JS: Why is there this apparent disjointed approach to the Congo? Does it have to do with bureaucratic or organizational challenges?

TG: The Secretary of State has a lot on her plate, so she obviously will not have time to deal with the Congo on a regular basis. Below her, the key policymaker is Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa - but look at what is already on his plate: the referendum in Sudan, instability in Somalia, problems in Kenya, concern for the two African powerhouses of South Africa and Nigeria, and now a stand-off in the Ivory Coast.

The present governmental organization on the Congo is rather dysfunctional. An unintended consequence of Secretary Clinton’s trip was that everybody in the US Government wanted to jump in afterwards and do something. There were three or four entities just within the Defense Department trying to get involved, then various actors in USAID, as well as two Under Secretaries of State. Unfortunately, these actors have not been pulled together into a coherent approach. The old adage about “too many cooks in the kitchen” describes part of the problem.

There are a number of ways to streamline and focus this process. The important thing is the political will, which needs to come from the Secretary herself. When the administration decides an issue is important enough, it finds a way to get the job done. For example, in Sudan as the January referendum has approached, not only has money been provided as the Special Envoy’s office and others in the US government have worked harder and harder, but people like Ambassador Princeton Lyman have been brought in to do very substantive work. Another example is Kenya, where there are a series of complex issues important to the US. It is clear that the Assistant Secretary of State himself – who is a former ambassador to Kenya – gives the country a lot of attention, which also has brought about effective engagement and focus.

The problem with Congo is that the decision hasn’t yet been made that the country needs that kind of action and attention. We are now at the end of 2010, over a year after Secretary Clinton’s visit, and the Congo is no better off in terms of overall violence in general and sexual violence in particular. The Congo is less than a year away from crucial elections. No serious observer thinks these elections can succeed without serious engagement by the international community, with Washington necessarily playing a leading role. But I have not yet seen the political will at a senior level in the US Government that these issues are so important that the US needs to put its shoulder seriously to the wheel, like it has in Sudan.

JS: Do you think that naming a Special Envoy, something several non-profits are pushing for, would help?

TG: A Special Envoy could make a difference. But the decision for deeper, more focused engagement must come from the most senior levels of the Administration. Only that will give the necessary support to those who are pushing for the US to more effectively engage on the Congo. The fundamental issue is will there be a decision to put our shoulder to the wheel or not? Appointing a Special Envoy alone isn’t enough.

I’ll give you an example of how bad things are today. In a public presentation a few weeks ago, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Carson said that last year the US gave $900 million in assistance to the Congo. But the US is slated to spend only $4 million for the elections, compared to an estimated need from international donors of around $300 million. A 20% contribution from the US – about $60 million – would be considered pretty serious. But the US contribution presently is at less than one percent of estimated needs. That shows a lack of seriousness. The US planning process around this issue clearly has failed. The timing of this important election has been known for years. Of what use is a Special Envoy if the level of funding for and commitment to free and fair elections remains as low as it is today?

I want to call your attention to something Senator John Kerry said; this is the way I think about the Congo, too:

"We’re putting $106 billion a year into Afghanistan; more than a trillion went into Iraq.  [The needs in Congo are] so small in terms of the monetary requirement and what would make a difference, so stunningly small but so huge in terms of the dramatic impact it would have on the lives of fellow human beings and frankly, it would do America so much good to be able to say to the world that it’s not just the war on terror and other kinds of things we care about but it’s this kind of humanitarian challenge that motivates us and excites us and challenges us and brings a whole generation into a new level of engagement that can transform, in the end, a whole continent.”

JS: What would you do differently?

TG: My list of three priorities for the US: Help secure the eastern Congo, see that elections are free and fair and get serious about governance as a whole. This list is not different from the list you would hear from US officials. But while the US says it cares about these, it has not organized its engagement to make a serious difference in any of these areas. It’s the level of engagement and commitment that needs to change.

JS: Should the US use its financial leverage to reach these goals?

TG: Certainly the US should put money behind those things it believes in, such as providing adequate support for the elections.

Beyond that, though, people talk about conditionality and aid cutoffs much too loosely. Today, the US gives quite a bit of money for the Congo, but almost all of it flows through non-governmental structures. Much of that assistance is for humanitarian projects – it would be both immoral and counterproductive to cut off such funding.

What is more appropriate is to look at flows that go directly into the Congolese government’s budget. Here the main actors are the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF has been extremely reluctant to undertake simple pro-governance conditionality.

To gauge a country’s commitment to key sectors, you can look across those sectors in a country’s budget like justice, health and education. A very simple exercise would be to ask what do countries that are about the same level of development as the Congo spend in these areas? Take justice – normally it is 2-6% in comparable countries, but for Congo it is .2% [figures from this year’s or last year’s budget]. The fact is that the Congolese budget for these sectors is at ludicrously low levels. For anyone who knows how collapsed the justice sector is in the Congo, this level of commitment to justice is absurd. The IMF and World Bank, with the support of the US, should have a very intensive dialogue with the government to raise that figure. Let us remember that over a third of the government’s budget in the Congo comes from the IMF and World Bank.

The IMF has not been willing to engage on this. The World Bank is thinking hard about how it can be more helpful. The US should be playing a lead role in its engagement with the IMF and World Bank. What I am thinking about is an approach like the “Governance Compact.” [An initiative of the World Bank and UNDP in 2006 and 2007 to link aid to concrete political and economic reforms.]

JS: How useful do you think the lens of sexual violence and conflict minerals has been as an advocacy tool in the United States?

TG: I salute activists on the Congo: I think they have really done their job. Because of tremendous efforts around issues of sexual violence and conflict minerals there are high school and college students and others around the country making noise about the Congo and writing their Senators and Representatives, which produces legislation. This is all very, very good. The problem is that it has not yet been translated into a clear decision at senior levels in the Executive Branch that the US will focus and concentrate its efforts to make a serious difference in the Congo now.

Congo club on the brink of world fame

Tomorrow is a hugely momentous day for the Congo. TP Mazembe, a soccer team from Lubumbashi, will face off with Inter Milan in Abu Dhabi for the title of best soccer club in the world. It is hard to understate the importance of this event, not just because this is the first time any African team has been in the Club World Finals. After years of repression by their own and foreign governments, the Congolese finally have a chance to be proud of a homegrown, talented and successful institution. Congrats to the guys for getting this far.

From a political point of view, this will be important, as well. TP Mazembe's chairman is Moise Katumbi, the governor of Katanga and reportedly one of the wealthiest men in the Congo. Katumbi is a controversial figure - he is hailed by many Congolese (and the movie "Katanga Business" as one of the few leaders who has been efficient and responsible), but he also is alleged to have been involved in corrupt dealings in Zambia, whose government at one point wanted to arrest him (they later dropped the charges). According to an article in the Financial Times (by Katrina Manson, who just moved to the FT from Reuters/Kinshasa), he offers up to $10,000 in bonuses to his players and helps the club have a $10 million budget.

Katumbi has been widely mentioned as an eventual rival to Joseph Kabila. He has waved aside these rumors, saying that he will retire in 2011 and return to business. Nonetheless, in a country where most of the chairmen of the top clubs have been involved in politics, a victory by TP Mazembe would boost his reputation even more.

As a reminder, the governor of Kinshasa, André Kimbuta, was the head of AS Vita Club, a Kinshasa rival of TP Mazembe, as was a 2006 presidential hopeful, Diomi Ndongala. General Gabriel Amisi, the embattled head of the army now accused of corrupt dealings in gold, built up Maniema Union from scratch, making it into one of the best clubs in the country. Claude Nyamugabo, the current Sports Minister, used to run OC Bukavu Dawa.

Kamerhe arrives in the East, conflict minerals guidelines and murder of bishop's wife

Some stories to watch:

• Vital Kamerhe left for a tour of the East of the country immediately after launching his UNC political party on Tuesday. On Wednesday, he was in Goma, where a melee broke out between police, his supporters and people who turned out to stone his convoy. Given the commotion, Kamerhe was unable to hold his public rally. Kamerhe claims that he was blocked from speaking officially to his supporters; government officials say that the election campaign hasn't started yet, so he can't be carrying out such events. Yesterday he arrived in Bukavu, where a large crowd of supporters turned out to greet him.
• The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has published their proposed guidelines for conflict minerals legislation, you can download them here. The SEC was required by the conflict minerals legislation passed last year in Congress to propose a set of regulations to implement the bill. Also, the UN has published a more accessible version of their own, very similar guidelines. In the meantime, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), meeting in Lusaka on Wednesday, signed an agreement on making the minerals trade more transparent.
• Bishop Levy Mbala, the head of the Church of Christ in the Congo - one of the largest protestant church groups in the country - was wounded and his wife killed in an attack on their house in Goma on Monday. The cause of the attack is not yet known; the attackers wore balaclavas to conceal their faces.

Kamerhe's party flyer

You saw it first on Congo Siasa - here's his party flyer,  distributed today at the press conference he gave in Kinshasa.

As suspected, his slogan is "Mopepe ya sika" - Fresh air.

CNDP, Tshisekedi and mining in the Kivus

News round-up:

• The CNDP officially announced that it was joining the AMP ruling coalition. Critics suggest that this is a way for the AMP to secure votes in the territory occupied by CNDP troops - anywhere between 300,000 to a million people live in and around CNDP-controlled areas in the Kivus. Nonetheless, it seems strange to forge an alliance with an armed group that is so unpopular.
• The Rwandan government is looking forward to an increase in mineral  exports due to the ban on exports from the Kivus, according to the mining minister. Hmmm...I wonder how that works? Perhaps because minerals from the Congo are smuggled into Rwanda and then exported? The minister hinted at that: "But we know that investors can get the minerals they were getting from Congo here in Rwanda." Minerals make up 30% of exports from Rwanda; while the country has its own tantalum and tin mines, a fair share of the exports are suspected to be from the Kivus.
• Tshisekedi said that dissidents from his party, including former leaders such as Maitre Mukendi wa Mulumba and Francoi-Xavier Beltchika, can join the party again - but they have to do it from the bottom up, through participation in local UDPS cells. This was seen as another way of telling them they are free to leave the party. 
• Vital Kamerhe just finished his much-anticipated announcement at the GB complex in Kinshasa - instead of announcing the members of his party, he just made official his resignation from the PPRD.
• Rwandan dissidents Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa and Col. Patrick Karegeya, along with Theogene Rudasingwa and Gerald Gahima, launched the Rwandan National Congress, an umbrella group under which they hope to organize against the ruling RPF party. Some critics suggest that they have failed to rally more heavyweights to their cause, as the names of some signatories on the document are not well known. You can read it here.
• Nzanga Mobutu announced that he would be running for the presidency in 2011. He was 4th in the 2006 elections with only a few percent of the national vote.