The sword thief: Reflections on Congolese independence

Congo: Happy 51st anniversary of independence. 


Instead of remembering Patrice Lumumba, Pierre Mulele or Simon Kimbangu, I'll choose Ambroise Boimbo this time. His claim to fame? Stealing King Baudouin' sword when the Belgian monarch arrived for independence celebrations in 1960. What was he thinking? Was he caught up in the delirium of independence, annoyed that he hadn't been able to fight his way to freedom? Was he egged on by friends? 

In my imaginary reconstruction of the event, I see Boimbo as a frustrated hero, a brave man posing a futile act of rebellion, who was robbed - like all Congolese - of a fair fight, who had to accept a fake independence on a silver platter. 


In a way, this lèse majesté symbolizes both the joy of being free, as well as the sad reality that the Congolese had neither proper preparation or a thorough decolonization. For how else can one explain the fact that the culmination of the struggle for independence was your previous colonizer parading down the main street in full military regalia? That even after Boimbo was caught, King Baudouin asked for him to be released, patronizing him?


The Belgians were letting the Congolese have their freedom, but - as the Congolese so often say - it was a poisoned chalice, as they had no one to rule their country, little national polity or political organization to speak of. There was only a handful of university graduates in the whole country, the highest ranking black officer in the army was a sergeant. Give me that sword, you who proclaim independence, when really that's just another kind of oppression you are handing me.


The sword thief was brave, a bit foolhardy. I wish more people today could stand up to their leaders like this. But at the same time, he symbolizes the lack of true rebellion and freedom that June 30, 1960 brought. 


Take ten minutes and look at this fascinating reconstruction of the event, Ambroise's life and his sad end in the Kintambo cemetery in Kinshasa.

Ambroise Boimbo : le voleur de l'épée du Roi by Franc_6

Mass rape reveals the fragility of rebel integration process

Over the past few days, information has come trickling in about yet another case of mass rape in the eastern Congo. According to Doctors Without Borders, local health centers, and the UN, anywhere between 121 and 170 women may have been raped on June 11 and 12 in Abala and Nyakiele, two villages in Fizi territory, South Kivu.

Why? In most reports on the incident, the essential context is missing. In this case, the context is the simultaneous integration of armed groups and the formation of new regiments out of existing brigades. This twin process - while probably necessary  - has been rushed and has produced a volatile and often violent situation, of which this mass rape may be a symptom.

So what happened in Fizi? This is what we know so far. 

The Congolese army is undergoing a process of troop consolidation, regrouping their brigades - which are often desperately understaffed, with only 400-800 soldiers - into regiments of 1,200 soldiers. So far, four regiments have been formed in South Kivu, and another five are on their way. Soldiers are being pulled together in training centers, where they are consolidated and placed under new command. 

On June 7, the commander of the 10th military region, General Patrick Masunzu, ordered all weapons in the Kananda training center to be stockpiled. This infuriated Colonel Kifaru Niragire, who had been commanding the 43rd sector. Col. Kifaru alleged that Gen. Masunzu was going to name Colonel Ruterera, a Munyamulenge officer from the FRF armed group, as the commander of the newly formed regiment. As Kifaru was the previously the overall commander of several brigades, he felt he was being passed over in favor of an officer from Masunzu's ethnic community.

A stand-off ensued in the training center, and Col. Kifaru deserted along with around 170 soldiers, climbing into the mountains of the High Plateau that rises up to the west of Lake Tanganyika. According to some sources, he was later joined by a small group of around 20 FDLR Rwandan rebels. Col. Kifaru is a Hutu from North Kivu and a former commander of PARECO, which had links to the mainly Hutu FDLR.

On the night of June 10, Col. Kifaru's group passed through Abala, a small village of around 300 people, mostly from the Bembe community. According to diplomatic sources who investigated the incident, Col. Kifaru's men ransacked the village for food and valuables. In the course of this pillage, his soldiers allegedly raped 15 women (some sources are higher).

The following day, the soldiers continued towards Nyakiele, a larger town 17 kilometers away, also mostly inhabited by Bembe. There, again according to diplomatic sources, Col. Kifaru's men supposedly asked for food from the population. They then proceeded to ransack the village before leaving the following day, June 12. After their departure, 31 women reported to the health center that they had been raped. When a team from Doctors Without Borders (MSF) arrived on June 22 and 23, a further 80 women came forward to state they had been raped. 

Since leaving the training camp, Col. Kifaru has been in touch with the Congolese regional commander, Gen. Masunzu regarding reintegration. Masunzu reportedly acknowledged that Col. Kifaru was right in asking to be a regimental commander, and the deserters were ready to came to the Luberizi training center when news broke out about the abuses in Nyakiele and Abala. Col. Kifaru has maintained his innocence, suggesting that the local Bembe population has manufactured these reports for political reasons. A local Mai-Mai commander from the Bembe community, "General" Yakutumba, had listed Col. Kifaru as one of his principle enemies in a document he published in February this year. Congolese army spokespeople have also dismissed the allegations of abuse. 

A joint team composed of officials from the UN peacekeeping mission, the governor's office and the Congolese army went to Nyakiele this week to investigate the rape charges and is due to report back soon. Congolese officers are worried that a rape scandal will make it more difficult to reintegrate Col. Kifaru's men into the army, as they will be pressured to arrest him, which could lead to another stand-off.

This episode reveals the fragility of the integration and regimentation exercise. Col. Kifaru is not the first commander to desert - other, smaller groups have been defecting in North Kivu, as well. This has several causes: Units are asked to consolidate, which inevitably results in some commanders being demoted while others are relegated to tedious, ill-paid jobs at headquarters. To make matters worse, the integration of groups like the FRF and Mai-Mai Kapopo has stirred up ethnic resentment and created even more rank-inflation to fulfill rebels' demands. 

Finally, impunity, once again, risks becoming the (somewhat brittle) glue of the ramshackle army. The integration process is all carrot and no stick. Commanders are rarely vetted for past abuses and - as this example shows - the government has often been reduced to kow-towing to rebel demands.

As for the motives of the rapes - initial reports are inconclusive. Some officials I have spoken with cast doubts on the scale of the rapes, pointing to the suspiciously similar and forthcoming testimonies of the women in Nyakiele, along with the increase in rape claims when MSF arrived.

But everyone seems to agree that a large number of rapes did take place. The hypotheses vary between ethnic tensions between the Bembe and Hutu communities and the theory that a large number of deserters needs to be fed, and the looting operations often provoke a frenzy of brutality that then results in rape.

More info on food prices

It turns out the internet is a fascinating place for people looking for information on food prices. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has some great price tracking tools here that allow you to make your own charts out of different commodities.

I have pasted several different charts below to give you an idea of food price developments in the Congo and their possible political importance. In the first chart, I compare cassava flour - probably the most important, cheapest staple in much of the country - in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Bunia and Lubumbashi. Two observations: Kinshasa is much more susceptible to fluctuations in the food markets, even the local one (all cassava flour is sourced locally), due to its reliance on the hinterlands for food. So an increase in fuel prices and bottlenecks in supply will affect this behemoth of a city much more than places like Bunia, where there is plentiful local production.

My second observation on this chart is that, while cassava prices have risen gradually, increasing by 15-35%, they are still below their crazy peak in 2008-2009 during the financial crisis. (We also need to be a bit careful about this price index, as it is expressed in Congolese francs, which have seen 10-20% inflation over the past two years - some of the economy is still dollarized, which provides a bit of a buffer to inflation in local francs).

On the second chart I compare different commodities in the capital Kinshasa - the reason for this focus is that, if there is going to be serious urban unrest, Kinshasa - the third largest city on the continent - is a likely candidate. Wheat - which is all imported - is obviously more susceptible to fluctuations in international markets, but otherwise most commodities seem to be more or less tracking levels of inflation in the country (I'd have to do a more rigorous analysis of the prices to be sure of this) and (possibly) fuel prices.

The last chart is a comparison of two African countries that have seen urban unrest linked to high food prices recently: Uganda and Burkina Faso. Here, the prices of imports (not the locally produced sorghum in the case of BF) has risen much more steeply than in the Congo, by 60-150% over the past year (I'm eyeballing it).

Food and fuel prices in the Congo

The IMF has warned that rising food prices will be a major challenge for the Congo this year; rising food and fuel prices are alleged to have contributed to civil unrest in Burkina Faso, Tunisia and Uganda this year, and Global food prices have risen 30% since last year, says the World Bank. So it is worthwhile looking at their impact on the tense situation in the Congo before elections. According to Minister of Information (aka the Congolese vuvuzela) Lambert Mende, taxes on food have been cut to help consumers.

Here are the price for the past year, courtesy of the Food Security Portal.

Commodity Prices ($US/Kg)
                            Dec 10 Jan 11 Feb 11 Mar 11 Apr 11 May 11
Maize Prices           0.41     0.42     0.40      0.42     0.43      0.50
Rice Prices             0.63     0.60      0.59      0.63     0.69     0.72


This is in line with central bank stats that record inflation in the year to date at 12%, which would come out to 17% year-on-year. That is not good, but we should also recall that the country saw inflation of over 50% in 2009. Here is another metric, provided by FAO, but only updated to March this year.

In addition, fuel prices - which affect the transport of all of these commodities - have gone up in the past few weeks due to international fuel prices and tax changes in the Congo. Fuel prices in Kinshasa have gone from $1,2 to $1,3 per liter.

Doesn't look good. But perhaps not as combustible as elsewhere?

Kamerhe unfurls new alliance

It says something about the fragmentation of Congolese politics that each candidates has to stitch together alliances of dozens of parties and political leaders. Kabila has the "Majorité Presidentielle," Tshisekedi has the "Dynamique Tshisekedi Président" as well as Roger Lumbala's "Soutien a Etienne Tshisekedi". Today Vital Kamerhe announced his own alliance: "Alternance Vital Kamerhe."

For those who had been expecting defections from Kabila's camp, none were forthcoming. Nonetheless, Vital has been able to garner some important allies, most promimently: Ne Muanda Nsemi, the popular leader of the outlawed Bundu dia Kongo and Bundu dia Mayala groups; Charles Bofassa Njema, a popular opposition MP from Mbandaka; and Raphael Katebe Katato, a former leader of the RCD, brother of the governor of Katanga and rich businessman from Lubumbashi. These men bring with them either popularity (Nsemi, Bofassa) or money (Katebe).

Then there are people who bring with them their own individual weight, as well as symbolism that will rancor Kamerhe's opponents. Mwenze Kongolo, who served as minister from both Joseph and Laurent Kabila; and Gaston Dindo and Mulumba Katshi, two former high-ranking leaders of Tshiskedi's party. These individuals, however, bring little money or popular base with them to the alliance.

The presence of his two former allies is not the only thing that will irk Tshisekedi - Kamerhe also taunted him, referring to his reputation as eternal opponent: "I want to be clear. I do not want to dispute the leadership of the opposition with anybody. I will give the opposition to he who wants to keep it forever. My ambition is to become president of the Republic." The gloves, apparently, have come off after months during which Kamerhe did not react to Tshisekedi's cold-shouldering of his candidacy.

Finally, for those who were hoping for "Mopepe ya Sika" - new air, Kamerhe's slogan - they were also liable to be disappointed. Kamerhe has now linked up with numerous figures tainted by corruption or other abuse of office. Katebe Katoto has been linked by the UN to the financing of several armed groups in the Kivus; Kongolo has also been named in UN reports, linked to extra-legal use of Congolese resources together with the Zimbabwean government. This is in addition to Kamerhe's repeated calls for Jean-Pierre Bemba to be released from jail, and his coalition with the former UPC party of another ICC-indictee, Thomas Lubanga.

Congo's Opposition Faces Internal Discord

Last month, a number of opposition leaders were invited to dinner at an ambassador's residence in Kinshasa. According to one of the people present, Etienne Tshisekedi, the veteran opposition leader, was asked by a diplomat what his party's position would be if the president stayed in office after December 6, 2011, when his constitutional mandate expires. This has been an important question of late, as several NGOs - including the International Crisis Group and ASADHO - have pushed for the election date to be pushed back to allow for a better organization of elections. The main opposition parties have stuck to their guns, insisting that the constitution be respected.

According to the witness, Tshisekedi answered the diplomat brazenly: If Kabila's term runs out, there will have to be a government of national unity. He implied that the opposition would have to be represented in equal measure as the current regime.

Tshisekedi has since denied having said this, but opposition has been ratcheting up the pressure on Kabila, insisting on November 28, 2011 as the election date.

Etienne Tshisekedi

This obstinacy is just one example of the poor tactics displayed by the opposition in recent months. It is true that the opposition face serious harassment and a lack of funds, and the incumbent is using his access to state media and security services to campaign. But in a country where Kabila is probably significantly less popular than in 2006, when he won 58% of the vote, the opposition will also have themselves to blame if, as is expected, Kabila is voted in for another five years in office.

Tshisekedi's notorious stubbornness is one reason for this. President Kabila's party changed the constitution earlier this year to get rid of the run-off election for the presidency. This reform was intended to divide the opposition, making it easier for Kabila to win re-election, even if with only 20% or 25% of the vote. In this context, Tshisekedi's insistence that he is the unique opposition candidate has been unproductive. Almost since he returned triumphantly to Kinshasa last December, the veteran opposition leader has been proclaiming that he will run for the presidency regardless of what the other opposition candidates think. More recently, he has also proclaimed himself as the undisputed leader of the opposition. In this interview with Colette Braeckman, when asked if he is the unique opposition candidate, he answered:

But yes, of course, that is obvious. I count on being the only candidate and even now there are more than ten opposition candidates who have signed up to my candidacy through the coalition Dynamique Tshisekedi President. We are really on the right path. 

Jean-Pierre Bemba

But none of the ten candidates he mentioned have much weight (nor are they all registered presidential candidates). The best known among them are Diomi Ndongala, Roger Lumbala and Frank Diongo - none of whom have much popular support. (Diomi got 0,51% of the vote in 2006 and Lumbala 0,45%).

More importantly, neither of the other main opposition parties, Vital Kamehre's UNC or Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC, has endorsed Tshisekedi for president. In fact, Tshiskedi has been dismissive of Kamerhe - in a recent interview on RFI, he suggested that he wasn't sure if Kamerhe was really a member of the opposition, saying that even in his native South Kivu Kamerhe was associated with Kabila. Kamerhe, for his part, is said to have been furious when he visited Tshiskedi at his house and was made to wait for an hour in the waiting room.

Vital Kamerhe

But the two other parties have troubles of their own. Jean-Pierre Bemba, who won 42% of the vote in 2006, is still languishing in an ICC jail cell in the The Hague. Nonetheless, he has insisted that he will be coming home and standing for elections. This seems highly unlikely given how long it takes for the ICC to reach a verdict (Lubanga's trial is over two years old now, Bemba's trial is only seven months old). In the meantime, his party is being riven by internal dissent. Several months ago, the acting head of the party Francois Mwamba led an internal faction that seemed to be trying to shake free Bemba's control over the party, either to name a different candidate for elections or to make an alliance with Kabila's party.

Mwamba was quickly ousted by Thomas Luhaka, who has now been named by the founding members of the party (backed by Bemba) as Secretary-General. Mwamba, however, has sued for justice in court, and the ruling in now scheduled for August. In the meantime, the party - which has also seen the prominent defections of Delly Sesanga (who has endorsed Tshisekedi) and José Makila (who is courting the government) - has done little in terms of preparing the grassroots for elections. D-Day for the MLC will come soon, as Bemba has to register to vote before the Kinshasa registration comes to an end in just a few weeks (the MLC is pushing for the registration centers to stay open until August). If he does not register to vote, he cannot run for the presidency.

Vital Kamerhe has probably faced the most repression of all the opposition candidates. One of the leaders of the women's wing of the party was assassinated in South Kivu; the culprit and motive of the murder are still unknown. Several of his party leaders in Maniema and South Kivu have been detained or harassed, and when he showed up to campaign in Goma and Bukavu, the local security forces prevented him from holding his speeches as planned. Although Kamerhe has national stature and made many friends across party and ethnic lines during his tenure as president of the national assembly, he has done little popular mobilization outside of the Kivus since he first announced his candidacy. He has been most adamant in getting the opposition to unite and is reported to be ready to endorse another candidate under the right circumstances (e.g. that he would get the nod for prime minister if their coalition wins sufficient seats in parliament).

In sum, harassment is certainly a problem for the opposition. But the stubbornness of figures like Tshisekedi and Bemba and their reluctance to build a genuine opposition coalition could prove to be just as formidable. We will have to wait and see whether they are able to overcome their egos and join up. We also need to see what the political figures who do have an electoral base decide to do - figures such as Ne Muanda Nsemi (Bas Congo), Mbusa Nyamwisi (North Kivu) and Nzanga Mobutu (Equateur) have not to my knowledge made official endorsements.

Tidbits from travels

I have been traveling over the past few weeks in London, Brussels and Nairobi. In the course of these travels I have been speaking with some interesting people. Here are some tidbits from these conversations, some of which I still have to confirm (readers welcome to chip in):

• The Congolese government has postponed arbitration over key oil blocks in the Atlantic with the Angolan government until 2013. This follows heightened tensions over Blocks 14 & 15 that prompted speculation that Angola may be considering supporting an opponent to Kabila during the upcoming elections. By putting off arbitration the Congolese government has managed to firm up relations with their southern neighbor.
• Butembo, the North Kivu town long known for its booming trade and business sector, has been losing its edge in the import-export business that brought it prosperity. This may be linked to two factors: first, traders from elsewhere in the Congo have begun to establish networks in Dubai and Guangzhou, so Butembo-based traders no longer have an advantage; secondly, the business arrangement between the Butembo business elite and local politicians has frayed - during the war, this relationship (with Mbusa Nyamwisi at the time) allowed businessmen to avoid the exobitant customs and taxes traders had to deal with elsewhere.
• Several independent analysts from Kinshasa give Kabila good chances at winning the upcoming elections. The constitutional revision, coupled with the significant resources the government is already pouring into campaigning, as well as the fractured opposition, lead them to believe Kabila could win, even if he only gets 25% of the total vote.