In an interview broadcast Sunday evening on Radio Lisanga TV, a station close to the opposition, Etienne Tshisekedi stirred controversy and radicalized the tone of the election campaign.
I have transcribed and translated what I could hear of the interview in the below clip. Speaking from South Africa, where he has reportedly been since the beginning of the election campaign ten days ago, he denied that the Congolese government had refused his plane a landing permission, thereby contradicting his own party spokesman.
He went on to say that Kabila is all alone, that only his wife is still with him. Most controversially, he self-proclaimed himself president, saying that since the majority of the people was with him, from today on he was the president of the Congo.
In another part of the interview that I haven't heard, he allegedly said: "I call on supporters (combattants) everywhere in the country to go to the prisons, to break down the doors and to liberate my supporters." He continued: ""I'm giving a 48-hour deadline for all opposition prisoners to be released. Past that deadline, I will ask the population to attack prisons and free them, and as president, I'm ordering prison guards not to resist."
He was apparently referring to his supporters who had been arrested during recent demonstrations. This prompted the government to shut down the TV station, which belongs to the opposition MP and former rebel leader Roger Lumbala.
The UDPS has confirmed that the interview was authentic. Later, on the BBC Swahili service, I heard a UDPS representative explaining the interview, saying that, "It is normal for a candidate to boast like this."Roger Lumbala himself argued that Tshisekedi was referring to Kabila's slogan "With Rais [Kabila's nickname]...100% certain," saying that it we he and not Kabila who was sure to win.
This interview has already caused controversy on the internet and in the streets of Kinshasa.
Tshisekedi has been criticized for spending a third of the short election month abroad seeking funds and transport in South Africa, while his competitors campaign at home. It may be that this absence and the lack of funds prompted him to radicalize his message and to openly seek confrontation. Will his supporters take to the streets tomorrow? Will the government take further legal action against the UDPS or RLTV?
Here is the speech:
Translation:
"Those who say that Kabila prevented my plane from landing do not understand the situation. Kabila no longer represents anyone, but his wife. People like Boshab [president of the national assembly] and Mende [minister of information], who started elsewhere and talk with both sides of the mouth, say one thing during the day and another at night, have now abandoned him. He is alone with his wife, as you can see. So I say we need not wait for the elections. In a democracy, power rests with the popular majority. Since the majority of the Congolese people is with Tshisekedi and trusts Tshisekedi, from now on, I am the Head of State. Regarding the elections, my message is simple as I have said. Starting today, it’s the Congolese people who are the authority of the country. It’s Tshisekedi Etienne, no one else. If Mr. Ngoy Mulunda does not listen to what we are saying, he will be weeping in his native language come December 6 [the date election results are announced]."
Monday, November 7, 2011
Sunday, November 6, 2011
Some violence, but little stumping as the campaign begins
This post has been updated: The popular Hunde singer Fabrice was reportedly taken from his recording studio by intelligence agents on Friday evening, allegedly because he refused to sing for President Kabila's campaign. He was released in the early hours of Monday morning and is currently in hospital, receiving treatment. (h/t Kris)
The election campaign is into its second week now, with only modest campaigning by the main presidential contenders and some disturbing violence.
Even before the campaign official began, groups such as Human Rights Watch and the Congolese umbrella group Act for Peaceful and Transparent Elections (AETA), were warning of violence and hate speech. Human Rights Watch pointed to UNAFEC, a party with a strong following in Katanga, which was using hate speech against outsiders, in particular Kasaians. On April 31, Kyungu is reported to have said in a public speech: "There are too many mosquitoes in the living room. We have to spray some insecticide." This past week, at the beginning of the campaign, Kyungu conveyed again his belief that only "children of Katanga" should run for parliamentary seats there.
This hate speech has degenerated into violence on several occasions. In August, UNAFEC members attacked the UDPS office in Lubumbashi, damaging some cars and buildings (there were also allegations of UDPS provocations). Then, two days ago, UNAFEC reportedly clashed with UDPS supporters on their way to a Kyungu rally in Lubumbashi - it is not clear who provoked whom first, but apparently several UDPS supporters were beaten up.
Kyungu and his party are known for their militant youth wing and their hostile views toward Kasaians.
Meanwhile, in Kinshasa last Wednesday armed men opened fire on a group of people who had reportedly just finished distributing UDPS posters, seriously injuring two people. And just this evening, two political parties faced off in Kinshasa, throwing stones at each other. Over the past weeks, the UDPS has faced off with both the police and PPRD supporters in Kinshasa, resulting in several deaths and many injured.
Finally, in Goma just this evening there has been unrest with reports of shooting in the Katindo neighborhood. It's not yet clear what the source of troubles is, but some reports suggest that a popular musician from the Hunde ethnic community has been enlisted to sing for the presidential campaign, which did not go down well among other members of the community, who protested in the streets and tore up posters of Joseph Kabila.
(I am leaving out unrest in Mbuji-Mayi and inflammatory speech by opposition radios in Equateur).
While there appears to be plenty of violence, there is little positive, issues-based campaigning. In fact, there is little campaigning at all by presidential candidates. Of the three main presidential contenders (Tshisekedi-Kabila-Kamerhe), only Kabila has been visible, launching his campaign in his mother's home province of Maniema. Kabila is also by far the most visible in terms of posters and advertisements - he has bought all of the front-lit billboards in Kinshasa, making him the only candidate visible at night in the capital.
Tshisekedi is not even in the country, claiming that his plane was refused a landing permit in Kisangani (the civil aviation authority denies this). Last I heard, he was still in South Africa. Kamerhe began his campaign in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo. But it seems that the opposition campaigns have suffered substantially from a lack of funds, as well as transport difficulties - only one airline (CAA) is still making domestic flights since a crash prompted Hewa Bora's license to be suspended.
The election campaign is into its second week now, with only modest campaigning by the main presidential contenders and some disturbing violence.
Even before the campaign official began, groups such as Human Rights Watch and the Congolese umbrella group Act for Peaceful and Transparent Elections (AETA), were warning of violence and hate speech. Human Rights Watch pointed to UNAFEC, a party with a strong following in Katanga, which was using hate speech against outsiders, in particular Kasaians. On April 31, Kyungu is reported to have said in a public speech: "There are too many mosquitoes in the living room. We have to spray some insecticide." This past week, at the beginning of the campaign, Kyungu conveyed again his belief that only "children of Katanga" should run for parliamentary seats there.
This hate speech has degenerated into violence on several occasions. In August, UNAFEC members attacked the UDPS office in Lubumbashi, damaging some cars and buildings (there were also allegations of UDPS provocations). Then, two days ago, UNAFEC reportedly clashed with UDPS supporters on their way to a Kyungu rally in Lubumbashi - it is not clear who provoked whom first, but apparently several UDPS supporters were beaten up.
Kyungu and his party are known for their militant youth wing and their hostile views toward Kasaians.
Meanwhile, in Kinshasa last Wednesday armed men opened fire on a group of people who had reportedly just finished distributing UDPS posters, seriously injuring two people. And just this evening, two political parties faced off in Kinshasa, throwing stones at each other. Over the past weeks, the UDPS has faced off with both the police and PPRD supporters in Kinshasa, resulting in several deaths and many injured.
Finally, in Goma just this evening there has been unrest with reports of shooting in the Katindo neighborhood. It's not yet clear what the source of troubles is, but some reports suggest that a popular musician from the Hunde ethnic community has been enlisted to sing for the presidential campaign, which did not go down well among other members of the community, who protested in the streets and tore up posters of Joseph Kabila.
(I am leaving out unrest in Mbuji-Mayi and inflammatory speech by opposition radios in Equateur).
While there appears to be plenty of violence, there is little positive, issues-based campaigning. In fact, there is little campaigning at all by presidential candidates. Of the three main presidential contenders (Tshisekedi-Kabila-Kamerhe), only Kabila has been visible, launching his campaign in his mother's home province of Maniema. Kabila is also by far the most visible in terms of posters and advertisements - he has bought all of the front-lit billboards in Kinshasa, making him the only candidate visible at night in the capital.
Tshisekedi is not even in the country, claiming that his plane was refused a landing permit in Kisangani (the civil aviation authority denies this). Last I heard, he was still in South Africa. Kamerhe began his campaign in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo. But it seems that the opposition campaigns have suffered substantially from a lack of funds, as well as transport difficulties - only one airline (CAA) is still making domestic flights since a crash prompted Hewa Bora's license to be suspended.
Saturday, October 22, 2011
Guest blog: US should not repeat Ugandan failures against the LRA
This guest blog was written by Ledio Cakaj. He has worked almost exclusively on the LRA conflict for the last three years as a consultant with various organizations. Most recently he was part of an international group of experts looking into possible ways to deal with the LRA.
On 14 October 2011, President Obama announced in a letter to Congress his decision to deploy “a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces … to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield.”
Kony is the founder and leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group which for more than two decades waged civil conflict in Northern Uganda before moving to bases in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006. Since the end of 2008 the Ugandan army with significant US support, has hunted the highly mobile LRA in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. The aid from the US over the last three years includes logistics and intelligence to the Ugandans to the tune of about $40 million.
US troop deployment to central Africa is part of a larger US strategy to deal with the LRA that was unveiled on 24 November 2010. Obama’s recent announcement and the related media fanfare just shy of the strategy’s one-year anniversary are somewhat anachronistic, given that the current campaign against the LRA has largely stalled. Total numbers of armed LRA combatants today are virtually unchanged compared to last November – at about 350 – and the leadership of the rebel group remains intact.
In the meantime LRA groups have conducted numerous accounts in all three countries. Since December 2008, the LRA has purportedly killed over 3,000 people and caused the displacement of 440,000. The majority of killings and displacements have taken place in DRC.
Friction between the pursuing Ugandan troops and the regional armies, particularly the Congolese (FARDC), is one of many reasons for the shortcomings of the current efforts. Despite public pronouncements from Kampala and Kinshasa hailing the Ugandan-Congolese cooperation, the situation on the ground is dire. A recent Ugandan army internal report stated that FARDC troops have openly threatened to shoot Ugandan soldiers in DRC while a Congolese army officer told a journalist that the Ugandans were intent on looting Congolese resources. Ugandan officials accuse some FARDC commanders originating from the Kivus of being pro-Rwanda and anti-Uganda. The history of the Ugandan-Rwandese conflict played out in Congolese territory in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the abuses by both sides are firmly rooted at the heart of the current hostilities.
The willingness and ability of the Ugandans to capture Kony and his commanders is also a likely negative factor. Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni has repeatedly vowed to crush the LRA militarily – and systematically failed to do so – since the rebel group came to life in 1988. Reports from the last ten years have implicated Ugandans officers in engaging in illegal mineral extraction in DRC and logging in South Sudan. It is possible that a predilection on the part of Ugandan army officers to first look for possible business deals then focus on the LRA hunt has contributed to the conflict’s longevity.
US soldiers on the ground could help to provide some transparency in the LRA operations and perhaps a rapprochement between the Ugandans and the Congolese. Supplied with sophisticated communication technology US troops should be able to provide real time intelligence on the movements of LRA groups as well as the behavior of the Congolese and Ugandan soldiers. But claims that the US troops will help quickly finish the job the Ugandans started 23 years ago are most likely a serious exaggeration. Contrary to commonly held views of the LRA as a group of rag-tag bandits, Kony’s men are well-trained, disciplined and capable of enduring extreme hardships while covering large swathes of inhospitable territory.
While US engagement is welcome as it brings much needed attention to a largely neglected conflict, the current approach might need rethinking. In its existing form, the US has comprehensively adopted the unsuccessful Ugandan policy of all-out war without appearing to question its merits or fully appreciating potential repercussions. The risk of overemphasizing the military offensive at the expense of encouraging defections of LRA combatants or enhancing civilian protection strategies cannot be overstated.
History has shown that a focus on a military solution alone has done little to end the LRA war, while simultaneously increasing violence to civilians, a strategy preferred by LRA commanders when feeling cornered. Rather than focusing exclusively on advising Ugandan soldiers how to capture or kill Kony, the US troops should help devise and carry out better strategies to protect civilians and encourage LRA fighters to leave the ranks.
The US strategy seems also to have espoused the Ugandan modus operandi of military operations against the LRA with no particular time frame, contingency plans and end-game scenarios. For the strategy to have a high chance of success, US planners need to match the LRA’s adaptability and quick thinking. Peacefully engaging LRA commanders and resuming peace talks with the top leadership of the LRA are options that should be considered either as concurrent to or as alternatives to the military approach.
Kony might still refuse to sign a peace deal, but luring his commanders out can be more devastating to the LRA than direct military action. The LRA has been greatly damaged during peaceful negotiations in the past as we have been able to learn a great deal about the otherwise secretive rebel group. Peace talks have also directly led to the defection of a few high profile commanders.
Not too long ago, my colleague Philip Lancaster argued in this forum that a serious analysis of the LRA had not been conducted by any of the militaries involved. Hopefully, the US military advisers can fill that gap and in the process help provide a flexible roadmap for ending this long and bloody conflict for good.
Wednesday, October 19, 2011
Despite assurances, election date in doubt
Over the past weeks, Congolese officials have repeatedly insisted that they would be able to hold elections on November 28, as planned. Most recently, President Kabila himself, in a rare press conference yesterday in his office, explicitly confirmed the date.
Nonetheless, behind the scenes diplomats are expressing serious doubts, which two reports released this past week reinforce. (Also see this Reuters report)
The Congolese umbrella group Agir pour des élections libres et transparentes (AETA) concluded in a recent report that "we are worried by disturbing signs regarding the capacity of the electoral commission to master the logistical, technical, political and security challenges in order to be able to respect the election date of 28 November 2011." The Atlanta-based Carter Center released a similar conclusion two days ago, saying that "scheduling and logistical tasks pose a serious threat to the election date."
There are various reasons for the delay. The voter registration process took two months longer than expected, ending on July 15. There was then a delay in the ordering and printing of ballots, in part due to the suppliers in China and Germany; in part due to the huge number of candidates (18,386 for the legislative elections). While the electoral kits are being deployed throughout the country at the moment, the 120,000 ballot boxes still have not been delivered from China, and the ballots are only now being printed in South Africa.
According to diplomats, UN logistical officers have been saying for weeks that it will be almost impossible to deploy all the materials in time (other UN officials, however, insist that there is still enough time), while new litmuses keep on being set; the last one suggested that if the ballot boxes had not arrived by the beginning of this week, there should be a delay in the elections.
These delays are pushing the electoral calendar into dangerous territory. According to the electoral law, the voter roll has to be published one month ahead of the election campaign, i.e. by September 28. This has only happened over the past few days on the electoral commission's new website. But a much more dangerous line will be crossed if elections themselves cannot be held by November 28, as the opposition is already saying it will not recognize the president anymore after December 6, when his constitutional term runs out.
Both reports press the electoral commission to begin thinking about a Plan B - what should be done if the current schedule cannot be met. The AETA report already calls for a national debate on possible delays. Several months ago already, the International Crisis Group already called for the main political parties to agree on a transitional period that would allow for a delay, a call echoed by one of the main Congolese human rights groups, ASADHO. At least one presidential candidate agrees, Oscar Kashala, as does the leader of the RCD, Azarias Ruberwa.
Nonetheless, President Kabila and the election commission Mulunda Ngoy still insist on November 28. For the moment, no diplomat seems to disagree with them, at least not in public.
Nonetheless, behind the scenes diplomats are expressing serious doubts, which two reports released this past week reinforce. (Also see this Reuters report)
The Congolese umbrella group Agir pour des élections libres et transparentes (AETA) concluded in a recent report that "we are worried by disturbing signs regarding the capacity of the electoral commission to master the logistical, technical, political and security challenges in order to be able to respect the election date of 28 November 2011." The Atlanta-based Carter Center released a similar conclusion two days ago, saying that "scheduling and logistical tasks pose a serious threat to the election date."
There are various reasons for the delay. The voter registration process took two months longer than expected, ending on July 15. There was then a delay in the ordering and printing of ballots, in part due to the suppliers in China and Germany; in part due to the huge number of candidates (18,386 for the legislative elections). While the electoral kits are being deployed throughout the country at the moment, the 120,000 ballot boxes still have not been delivered from China, and the ballots are only now being printed in South Africa.
According to diplomats, UN logistical officers have been saying for weeks that it will be almost impossible to deploy all the materials in time (other UN officials, however, insist that there is still enough time), while new litmuses keep on being set; the last one suggested that if the ballot boxes had not arrived by the beginning of this week, there should be a delay in the elections.
These delays are pushing the electoral calendar into dangerous territory. According to the electoral law, the voter roll has to be published one month ahead of the election campaign, i.e. by September 28. This has only happened over the past few days on the electoral commission's new website. But a much more dangerous line will be crossed if elections themselves cannot be held by November 28, as the opposition is already saying it will not recognize the president anymore after December 6, when his constitutional term runs out.
Both reports press the electoral commission to begin thinking about a Plan B - what should be done if the current schedule cannot be met. The AETA report already calls for a national debate on possible delays. Several months ago already, the International Crisis Group already called for the main political parties to agree on a transitional period that would allow for a delay, a call echoed by one of the main Congolese human rights groups, ASADHO. At least one presidential candidate agrees, Oscar Kashala, as does the leader of the RCD, Azarias Ruberwa.
Nonetheless, President Kabila and the election commission Mulunda Ngoy still insist on November 28. For the moment, no diplomat seems to disagree with them, at least not in public.
Thursday, October 13, 2011
Elections Update
I have been posting irregularly over the past few weeks. Here are some stories you may have missed over the last week that relate to elections.
1. Attack on Lukolela: Compared to many incidents in the East, this attack seemed minor, but has a strongn symbolic value. According to Kinshasa, on October 6 an armed group attacked the fishing village of Lukolela, along the border with The Republic of Congo (ROC) around 500 km from the capital Kinshasa. Five of the attackers were arrested, allegedly carrying residency permits from the ROC and signed orders from General Faustin Munene, a dissident DR Congolese officer.
Immediately, the ROC government dismissed the claims as a set-up by the DRC government, saying "if those who are organizing the elections are not ready, they should say so, but they need to leave others out of this." Its minister of interior scoffed at the idea that the attackers had signed orders from General Munene, wondering how Munene could sign orders if he is in prison in their capital Brazzaville.
In response, Kinshasa sent a large delegation of 21 officials to Brazzaville to show them proof of the attack.
This back-and-forth comes to the backdrop of tense relations between the two countries. DRC officials have suggested that the armed men who attacked the presidential residence in February came from across the river, and Brazzaville has still not responded to an extradition request for DRC's two main western rebel leaders: General Munene and Udjani Mangbama. ROC President Sassou Nguesso visited Kinshasa in April to discuss these security issues with his counterpart, but no concrete steps have been taken to ameliorate relations.
2. Gizenga finally makes his move: Just days after his 86th birthday, Antoine Gizenga, former prime minister and the head of the PALU political party, declared his support for Joseph Kabila's candidacy. A declaration had been long awaited, as PALU had previously just said they would support the "party of the left." Gizenga made clear that Kabila had won that label, and that he was the only "Lumumbist" candidate in the running. None of these labels mean much to most Congolese, or they think they are window-dressing for political expediency.
The alliance is important, as Gizenga helped Kabila will over 60% of the vote in Bandundu province, where he is revered almost as a saint by many, in 2006. This time around, however, it may well be different, as PALU has held the prime ministry for the past five (first Gizenga, then Adolphe Muzito) and has not delivered much. Some doubt whether Gizenga has much appeal outside the elders of his Pende community.
3. Ethnic tensions rise in Fizi, South Kivu: On October 5, the jeep of the NGO Ebenezer was stopped by armed men close to Fizi. According to several sources, the soldiers seperated the passengers by ethnicity, putting the Banyamulenge to one side and shooting them, but sparing the others. Twelve Banyamulenge were reportedly killed in the incident. The attackers were allegedly members of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, together with members of the Burundian FNL rebels. It was the FNL that claimed responsibility for the 2004 massacre of 152 Banyamulenge in the Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi.
Yakutumba has gleaned a certain popularity in the Fizi area for his opposition to the deployment of rwandophone officers (ex-CNDP and ex-PARECO) in the region. He is rumored to be preparing an endorsement of Etienne Tshisekedi.
1. Attack on Lukolela: Compared to many incidents in the East, this attack seemed minor, but has a strongn symbolic value. According to Kinshasa, on October 6 an armed group attacked the fishing village of Lukolela, along the border with The Republic of Congo (ROC) around 500 km from the capital Kinshasa. Five of the attackers were arrested, allegedly carrying residency permits from the ROC and signed orders from General Faustin Munene, a dissident DR Congolese officer.
Immediately, the ROC government dismissed the claims as a set-up by the DRC government, saying "if those who are organizing the elections are not ready, they should say so, but they need to leave others out of this." Its minister of interior scoffed at the idea that the attackers had signed orders from General Munene, wondering how Munene could sign orders if he is in prison in their capital Brazzaville.
In response, Kinshasa sent a large delegation of 21 officials to Brazzaville to show them proof of the attack.
This back-and-forth comes to the backdrop of tense relations between the two countries. DRC officials have suggested that the armed men who attacked the presidential residence in February came from across the river, and Brazzaville has still not responded to an extradition request for DRC's two main western rebel leaders: General Munene and Udjani Mangbama. ROC President Sassou Nguesso visited Kinshasa in April to discuss these security issues with his counterpart, but no concrete steps have been taken to ameliorate relations.
2. Gizenga finally makes his move: Just days after his 86th birthday, Antoine Gizenga, former prime minister and the head of the PALU political party, declared his support for Joseph Kabila's candidacy. A declaration had been long awaited, as PALU had previously just said they would support the "party of the left." Gizenga made clear that Kabila had won that label, and that he was the only "Lumumbist" candidate in the running. None of these labels mean much to most Congolese, or they think they are window-dressing for political expediency.
The alliance is important, as Gizenga helped Kabila will over 60% of the vote in Bandundu province, where he is revered almost as a saint by many, in 2006. This time around, however, it may well be different, as PALU has held the prime ministry for the past five (first Gizenga, then Adolphe Muzito) and has not delivered much. Some doubt whether Gizenga has much appeal outside the elders of his Pende community.
3. Ethnic tensions rise in Fizi, South Kivu: On October 5, the jeep of the NGO Ebenezer was stopped by armed men close to Fizi. According to several sources, the soldiers seperated the passengers by ethnicity, putting the Banyamulenge to one side and shooting them, but sparing the others. Twelve Banyamulenge were reportedly killed in the incident. The attackers were allegedly members of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, together with members of the Burundian FNL rebels. It was the FNL that claimed responsibility for the 2004 massacre of 152 Banyamulenge in the Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi.
Yakutumba has gleaned a certain popularity in the Fizi area for his opposition to the deployment of rwandophone officers (ex-CNDP and ex-PARECO) in the region. He is rumored to be preparing an endorsement of Etienne Tshisekedi.
Saturday, October 8, 2011
The electoral commission publishes the (partial) list of voters
The Congolese electoral commission has now put up a partial list of voters on its website here. For those of you with some free time, you can go through the tens of thousands of pages of voters who registered to vote. The commission has not put up the whole list, just three provinces (Bas-Congo, Kasai Occidental and Maniema).
Does this solve the controversy over an audit of the voter register? Maybe, but it the format of the document probably does not lend itself to identification of double or triple registrations (the famous "doublons") through computer programs. And if political parties want to make sure the no foreigners, ghost voters or children registered, they will have to decentralize the audit to their local offices in the provinces, where party officials would have to check the names registered in an area with the local population - an almost impossible task (the CENI list breaks it down to the level of neighborhood/groupement - still a very large area).
Does this solve the controversy over an audit of the voter register? Maybe, but it the format of the document probably does not lend itself to identification of double or triple registrations (the famous "doublons") through computer programs. And if political parties want to make sure the no foreigners, ghost voters or children registered, they will have to decentralize the audit to their local offices in the provinces, where party officials would have to check the names registered in an area with the local population - an almost impossible task (the CENI list breaks it down to the level of neighborhood/groupement - still a very large area).
The peregrinations of Congo's politicians
For the past two weeks, the fate of the Congolese opposition has been played out abroad.
First, there was the trip to Addis Ababa, where the African Union asked Congolese political parties to agree on a code of conduct for elections and to campaign peacefully. This came just days after UDPS and PPRD followers clashed in Kinshasa. The meeting in Addis did not produce any visible outcomes - the UDPS is still the only major opposition party to refuse to sign the code of conduct, while UDPS followers continue to clash with the police in Kinshasa. Le Potentiel, Kinshasa's biggest daily, dismissed the initiative as "a distraction."
Then, Tshisekedi - the Sphinx of Limete, as he is called - traveled to Brussels, first to meet with Jean-Pierre Bemba at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. According to the Congolese press, as well as MLC members, Bemba refrained from backing the UDPS leader, preferring to just say that he would "back the joint candidate of the opposition," and urging the various opposition parties to find such a man.
Then, Tshisekedi went to meet with Kengo wa Dondo - who has just announced his own coalition that is backing him as "their joint candidate for the presidency." According to people close to Kengo, Tshisekedi gave him a document outlining his main policy plans, then urged him to sign up. Kengo is allegedly not happy with this way of proceeding. "You don't just hand someone your plan and tell him sign up - that's no way of negotiating," one of his associate told Congo Siasa.
Next stop: Washington, DC, where Vital Kamerhe, Mbusa Nyamwisi and Etienne Tshisekedi were all supposed to converge over the past several days. However, Tshisekedi missed meeting with Kamerhe due to a trip to Raleigh, North Carolina, where he met with the large Congolese community. He did, however, reportedly send the same policy document to Kamerhe and urge him to sign up, as well. Kamerhe, predictably, demurred.
Of course, all of these meetings abroad have fueled speculation in Kinshasa about Belgian and American positioning during the elections.
Despite these tensions within the opposition, something does seem to be afoot. For some time now, the main parties have been converging on Tshisekedi as the main candidate. However, the main stumbling block was his's reluctance to dole out specific positions before the elections - he told the other parties that the main spoils - prime minister, speaker of parliament, president of the senate - would depend on how each party fared in the polls. The other parties - UNC (Kamerhe), UFC (Kengo) and the MLC - insisted on knowing what they would get out of such an alliance.
Now, however, a plan is emerging that might solve that broker a compromise. While details are still fluid - and nothing is certain - under the terms of the deal, Kengo and the MLC would back Tshisekedi for the presidency if he promises that the UDPS would not claim the prime ministry or speaker of the national assembly. Instead, those positions would go to the other two largest opposition constituencies in parliament. That, of course, assumes that the opposition gains a majority in the national assembly.
It is not clear if Kamerhe, who has the most sway in the East of all the opposition parties, is involved in these negotiations. But it would be difficult for him to hold out alone if both Kengo and the MLC join forces with the UDPS.
First, there was the trip to Addis Ababa, where the African Union asked Congolese political parties to agree on a code of conduct for elections and to campaign peacefully. This came just days after UDPS and PPRD followers clashed in Kinshasa. The meeting in Addis did not produce any visible outcomes - the UDPS is still the only major opposition party to refuse to sign the code of conduct, while UDPS followers continue to clash with the police in Kinshasa. Le Potentiel, Kinshasa's biggest daily, dismissed the initiative as "a distraction."
Then, Tshisekedi - the Sphinx of Limete, as he is called - traveled to Brussels, first to meet with Jean-Pierre Bemba at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. According to the Congolese press, as well as MLC members, Bemba refrained from backing the UDPS leader, preferring to just say that he would "back the joint candidate of the opposition," and urging the various opposition parties to find such a man.
Then, Tshisekedi went to meet with Kengo wa Dondo - who has just announced his own coalition that is backing him as "their joint candidate for the presidency." According to people close to Kengo, Tshisekedi gave him a document outlining his main policy plans, then urged him to sign up. Kengo is allegedly not happy with this way of proceeding. "You don't just hand someone your plan and tell him sign up - that's no way of negotiating," one of his associate told Congo Siasa.
Next stop: Washington, DC, where Vital Kamerhe, Mbusa Nyamwisi and Etienne Tshisekedi were all supposed to converge over the past several days. However, Tshisekedi missed meeting with Kamerhe due to a trip to Raleigh, North Carolina, where he met with the large Congolese community. He did, however, reportedly send the same policy document to Kamerhe and urge him to sign up, as well. Kamerhe, predictably, demurred.
Of course, all of these meetings abroad have fueled speculation in Kinshasa about Belgian and American positioning during the elections.
Despite these tensions within the opposition, something does seem to be afoot. For some time now, the main parties have been converging on Tshisekedi as the main candidate. However, the main stumbling block was his's reluctance to dole out specific positions before the elections - he told the other parties that the main spoils - prime minister, speaker of parliament, president of the senate - would depend on how each party fared in the polls. The other parties - UNC (Kamerhe), UFC (Kengo) and the MLC - insisted on knowing what they would get out of such an alliance.
Now, however, a plan is emerging that might solve that broker a compromise. While details are still fluid - and nothing is certain - under the terms of the deal, Kengo and the MLC would back Tshisekedi for the presidency if he promises that the UDPS would not claim the prime ministry or speaker of the national assembly. Instead, those positions would go to the other two largest opposition constituencies in parliament. That, of course, assumes that the opposition gains a majority in the national assembly.
It is not clear if Kamerhe, who has the most sway in the East of all the opposition parties, is involved in these negotiations. But it would be difficult for him to hold out alone if both Kengo and the MLC join forces with the UDPS.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
