Kash on the Congo

Kash Thembo is hands down the best Congolese caricaturist. He has just released a new book, which you can order here: kilawou75@yahoo.com.

The book has texts by Pascal Kambale, a veteran Congolese human rights activist and co-founder of AZADHO, and an introduction by Professor Yoka Lye, a prominent Congolese satirist.

To whet your appetite, here are a few recent Kash drawings.

A bar fight leads to pillage and rape in Fizi

New Year's Day in Fizi, South Kivu, brought bad news and gave an idea about how stupid and arrogant the violence in the Kivus has sometimes become.

A argument broke out in a bar between a Congolese army soldier and a civilian, reportedly over a woman.  The soldier shot the other man in the abdomen, which then prompted a mob to lynch the soldier. As retaliation, the local army battalion went on a rampage in town, raping and looting the village. Various reports suggest that between 10 and 29 women were raped and at least two people were killed. Much of the population fled to the surrounding areas. A delegation led by South Kivu Governor Marcellin Cisambo and MONUSCO arrived in Fizi on January 7th and the UN is deploying peacekeepers to the town. The population has asked for the army headquarters of the 43rd Sector to be relocated away from Fizi.

All this because of a bar fight?

Policy recommendations for an election year

I was in Washington this past week to participate in a brainstorming session on the Congo at the State Dept. I was asked to give a 5 minute presentation on what US policy should be - here it is, in an expanded version. Feedback is, as always welcome.

The overwhelming issue this year will be elections. This election will be in many ways more difficult and challenging than the 2006 election. Then, the incumbent was likely to win (and he did), the business and political establishment just wanted stability and the biggest rebel threat (RCD) had been marginalized.

This time, although there has been no reliable polling and grassroots proclivities are hard to intuit, Kabila would be likely to lose a free and fair vote, given that he is probably no more popular in the West and his popularity has frayed in the war-torn East. His main strategy has been to marginalize or suppress any viable alternative. It appears ever more likely that there is a popular alternative in the form of a Kamerhe-Tshisekedi-Bemba coalition, although there are substantial tensions among these figures. 

Even if Kabila succeeds in changing the constitution to a one-round plurality vote (which he may well do), he could lose even then. This will prompt him first to try to repress the opposition, leading to abuses, assassinations and silencing of the media. A indication of this was provided when Vital Kamerhe visited the Kivus a few weeks ago – the crowd that had come to welcome him was shot upon, killing one and injuring many others; his rallies were broken up. Flawed elections could lead to anything from a Nigerian 2007 situation – where rigging led largely to shoulder shrugging – to a Kenya 2007 or Ivory Coast 2010, with much more dire consequences. But I think we can all agree that rigging would be a bad thing.

It is imperative that the US strengthen its engagement during this election year. That means several things. First and foremost, we need to fund the elections. Only then will donors be able to have a say if abuses arise. At the moment, my understanding is that the US in particular has not contributed much to the electoral process – the Congolese have asked for $350 million, we have only offered around $5 million so far, in contrast to the EU's’ $70 million. We should remember that lack of funding is Kabila’s excuse to change the constitution in favor of a one-round election. In addition to funding, we need to make sure that everything is in place to ensure election transparency: a strong civil society monitoring group, a thorough review of the electoral roll, public counting of ballots at polling stations, a better media monitoring body, and so on. If we remember back to the 2006 elections, these safeguards were already being set up a year before the polls.

Secondly, we need a coordinated way of engaging with the Congolese government if problems arise, as they surely will. In 2006, the CIAT played an important role, with SRSG Bill Swing particularly actively before and after the elections in resolving disputes. We want to avoid calling anything CIAT this time around, as we are dealing with a sovereign, democratically elected government, but donors should create a formal or informal working group that is willing to engage with Kabila publicly on these issues as they arise. In addition, the African Union could be very valuable in the electoral process (cf. Ivory Coast) by already now appointing an envoy, a position that the US could help fund.

Now to the East. Things have been relatively calm in recent months, but looks should not deceive. While I do not think that there will be another crisis in the nest few months or possibly year (one never knows), the current daily levels of pillage, rape and extortion are unacceptable. Solving this will largely be a question of security sector reform, but there are also regional political imperatives.

The CNDP integration has been a human right failure but a relative political success. While they maintain parallel chains of command throughout the Kivus and in particular in the Masisi highlands, these chains of command are confused and often linked to immediate financial gain; there is no overall commander of the troops, even within the pro-Nkunda faction. There was a real chance of escalation in October/November, when CNDP officers were upset about their lack of official ranks within the Congolese army and in particular about the possibility that they would be asked to leave the Kivus, possibly by the Rwandan army. There was a spate of serious recruitment of over 1,200 soldiers, including of many children. However, since then the CNDP has officially joined the AMP ruling coalition, the threat of removing them from the Kivus has been benched, and the ranks of some (not many) officers were confirmed this week. Almost as important, the Rwandan government is afraid enough of an alliance between RPF dissidents and the FDLR in the Kivus that they will do their best to prevent the CNDP from starting a new rebellion that they couldn’t control.

As for the FDLR – they are weakened and increasingly seeking coalitions with Mai-Mai and other militia. They have lost many of their officers, as well as their international spokesmen and some reports put their strength as low as 3,000. They have sought out a coalition with the FNL, which is reconstituting itself in the Rukoko plain on the Burundi/Congo border. Some reports – although we need to treat these with great caution, as Kigali may be trying to discredits its rivals – suggest that Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa has contacted various armed groups in the East. This is very worrying – I doubt they would plan to launch a conventional attack on Rwanda, but they could try to destabilize the country in order to further fragment the RPF regime and promote a palace coup. As I have said many times before, much more can be done in terms of brokering individual deals with FDLR commanders to return to Rwanda. MONUSCO has recently begun this kind of work, but the Rwandan government is the key party in this, as they can provide security assurances, ranks in their army and other incentives for commanders to leave the bush. And, with their fear that Gen. Kayumba is reaching out to the FDLR (whether this is true or not), Kigali may be more receptive to a more proactive stance on bringing the FDLR home.

Overall, the humanitarian situation in the Kivus remains precarious. IDP levels rose sharply in South Kivu in 2010, although falling slightly in North Kivu. There were more attacks against NGOs and UN staff in the last year than in either of the preceding ones.  There are still over 1,3 million people displaced in these two provinces. Reports of pillage and rape continue on a daily basis for anyone reading MONUSCO reports.

This state of affairs will only change by getting rid of non-governmental militia and reforming the security sector, including the judiciary. This is a long, political process. On the one hand the government will be more interested than ever in beginning these reforms now, as Kabila wants to improve his stature before the elections. But there will also be opposition – he will not want to create any more enemies – especially in his military and police, or in Kigali – in the run-up to a volatile period.

Little has happened on SSR in the past years, despite consistent promises by donors that this will be a priority. Donors have acted bilaterally, training individual battalions that then often disintegrate once they are deployed. The US has provided welcome training to one battalion and to military justice staff. But the problem is not just a lack of training – although that is a problem – but above all a problem of political will and institutional capacity. We should remember that Mobutu’s officers were trained at Saint Cyr (France), Fort Bragg (USA), Sandhurst (UK) and Nanjing (China).

For meaningful reform, we need a comprehensive plan for SSR rather than donors working in a piecemeal approach as they currently are. Donors need to sit together with the government and legislature to draft a major SSR plan that will build barracks and training schools, computerize their record keeping and inventory, support parliamentary oversight and a functional auditing system and create a strong and professional military justice system. While this may seem unrealistic in an era of fiscal crunch – we are talking about hundreds of millions of dollars over the next decade – this is the only way of really tackling impunity and the grinding abuse that affects millions of Congolese.

If you decide that such central and rooted reform is impossible, the next best option is to work on reforming the army in the Kivus. Such an approach would also require a large investment and a comprehensive plan with the government, but would focus on short term capacity building projects in military justice reform, barrack building and a streamlining of the very confused and corrupt chain of command in North and South Kivu. This is political, as it would deprive many units of their corrupt cash flows – in particular the ex-CNDP units – and would need serious political engagement with the governments of both Kigali and Kinshasa.

Any approach would have to put a premium on tackling impunity. First and foremost, we should work with the Congolese government to arrest some of the major abusers – Gen. Bosco, Col. Zimurinda, Col. Gwigwi to name just a few. One could draw on the profiling work currently being done by MONUSCO for a more thorough-going, yet improvised vetting operation in the Kivus. Such arrests – or, in some cases, just administrative sanctions and suspension – would require serious engagement with Kigali and Kinshasa, as Kigali in particular as a vested stake in the Bosco wing in particular, a stake that has increased since they have become more fearful of Gen. Kayumba’s influence in the East. But it must be done.

The other action that can have an immediate impact on improving the lives of civilians is cantoning soldiers. We have upwards of 40,000 soldiers in the Kivus, many of whom live off the backs of the local population. While both STAREC and ISSS were trying to build barracks, these projects have faltered due both to lack of donor engagement and government inertia. We need to jumpstart this – especially with the polls coming up, we don’t need tens of thousands of soldiers intimidating voters.

This is probably the right point to mention conditionality. Sustainable solutions will only come from the Congolese people and their leaders, but the international community, which has at times been part of the problem, should provide support for these solutions. For this, the US government and other donors need leverage. And yet, we have been reluctant to use our financial power as leverage. Donors contribute to roughly half of the Congo’s $6,5 billion budget; around 1/3 of that is from the Chinese now, but 2/3 is still mostly from the IMF, World Bank and bilateral donors. Around $700 million of that is budgetary aid. There was a good attempt to create such conditionality through the governance compact in 2006, but even though that was adopted by the national assembly, there was almost no follow up. Since then, we have squandered much of our leverage by giving away debt relief and providing billions in funding without conditionality that goes beyond narrow fiscal responsibility. If we are serious about political reform, about combating sexual violence, about promoting a stable and equitable society, then we should use our financial leverage in both the Congo and neighboring countries to do this.

Lastly, a brief mention of conflict minerals, as this is an area where the US has taken the lead and deserves praise. Despite my admiration for these efforts, however, I doubt that the due diligence efforts of the OECD, the US administration or the ICGLR will have much impact if there is not better information coming from the field. In other words, if the entire due diligence system is premised on knowing which minerals are linked to human rights abuses, if we do not have this information in the field, all efforts will be in vain. Auditors from Price Waterhouse Coopers or other companies will go to Goma and Bukavu, only to be utterly confused by the complexity and opacity of the minerals trade there. And it is very difficult to know exactly which companies are buying from where, and a lot of vested interests in keeping that information secret. The US government can perform a very valuable function by investing in an oversight mechanism that would work with the Congolese government to provide information that can be used by prosecutors, auditors and companies. 

Controversy in Kinshasa as Kabila Tries to Change the Constitution

Talk of changing the constitution and electoral law in the Congo is now mounting, with the national assembly debating the issue and parties tallying their members' votes to see whether they can win the vote. Yesterday, Congo's Catholic Cardinal Monsengwo came out in opposition to one of the more controversial reforms, which would make the presidential race into a single-round plurality vote. But it looks like President Kabila might have the votes to push through the reform anyway.  

What is at stake exactly? President Kabila has long said that he wanted to change the way representatives are elected. In particular, he and his associates have complained that it is difficult to push through the necessary reforms with 70 different  political parties in the national assembly alone, which has resulted in endless horse-trading and bribery. The ruling AMP coalition therefore has proposed to changing the electoral law to what they are calling a majoritarian system - this means that MPs will be elected based on lists determined by their political party and not as individuals.

Let's take an example - the Lukunga electoral district of Kinshasa currently has 14 seats in the national assembly. In 2006, voters elected their MPs individually, with several parties obtaining seats in Lukunga. If the proposed change goes through, the district would still have 14 votes, but voters would elect the MLC or PPRD or ARC list instead of individuals. If the MLC wins 50% of the vote, then they get all 14 seats. If they have less than that, under the proposed law, they would split the seats proportionally - they might get 4, PPRD 4 and ARC 6, for example. 

This proposal might not get through, as many current MPs, who would have to vote on these changes, fear that this list-based system would give too much power to the party leadership. Especially the smaller parties could suffer, as the PPRD is aiming at using its muscle and cash to dominate the upcoming elections, thereby eliminating many of the smaller parties that would only get through if they made an official alliance with another party (in which case they would have to cede some of their power and autonomy) or if no one in the district got the necessary 50% of the vote. 

This, however, is not the controversial reform. President Kabila has made waves by asking for the presidential election to be held as a one-round, plurality vote. This means that the candidate with the most votes in the first round gets elected, even if he only has 15% of the vote. This is what Cardinal Monsengwo has denounced a undemocratic. It is a smart move - Kabila would probably lose a fair two-round election in which his opponents would form an alliance and present one candidate in the run-off. This happened in the Ivory Coast, for example, an election that has struck fear in the heart of the ruling Congolese coalition. It would also save the government a lot of money, which has been their main selling point - they argue that up to half of the costs could be saved. 

In a one-round election, however, Kabila's opponents would split the anti-Kabila vote among themselves and the incumbent could still muddle his way to victory, as he knows that it is unlikely that Kamerhe and Tshisekedi, the strongest candidates for the opposition at the moment, would run on a joint ticket in the first round. If Congolese elections were issue-based elections, this system may not be so bad. But in the Congo, the vote is often based on approval or rejection of the incumbent alone - in this context, the proposed system would favor the incumbent Kabila, as the main policy issue in the election is whether you approve of the incumbent or not, and the anti-incumbent vote would be split in two, giving Kabila a much better chance at winning. This means that 60% of the population could vote against Kabila (30% Kamerhe, 30% Tshisekedi), but he would still win. Even worse, Kamerhe could win 20% in the Kivus, Tshisekedi 20% in the Kasais and Kinshasa, a gaggle of other candidates 30% in the rest of the country and Kabila could get elected with 21%, purely Katangan votes. 

These changes would not be unconstitutional - although some might argue that they go against the spirit of the constitution. Congo's constitution is relatively easy to amend - you only need 60% of the votes in parliament, and the AMP thinks it can rally these easily. Also, other countries in the world have a similar system, in particular countries in Latin America - Mexico, Nicaragua (although I believe you need at least 35% of the vote there), Paraguay - but also the Philippines and Seychelles. So the revision of the constitution and electoral law would be legal, but it could very well end up producing an unrepresentative vote. 

2011: Election year in the Congo

Elections will trump everything else in Congolese politics in 2011. Joseph Kabila will have to fight for his survival. He is vulnerable in much of the country, even in his Kivutian heartland. The fight will be all the more difficult if his main challengers - Tshisekedi, Bemba (or whoever he endorses) and Kamerhe - are able to forge an alliance, as they appear to be trying to do.

Two things happened in the first days of 2011 that will have an impact on this dynamic. First and foremost, the parliament has begin to discuss a possible change to the electoral code that would get rid of the a presidential run-off election. This means that whoever wins a plurality of the vote in the first round would win, meaning that Kabila would not have to face a Tshisekedi-Bemba-Kamerhe alliance, but would merely have to get more votes than each of them alone. He could possibly - depending on the wording of the law - win with 30% of the vote, for example.

The second development has been the promotion of 14,280 officers and NCOs in the Congolese army - a huge number of promotions for an army of around 160,000 soldiers. Pundits in Kinshasa are linking this to the elections, of course, suggesting that the president wants to maintain the loyalty of his officer corps at this critical juncture.

In particular, analysts point to the integration of CNDP troops in the Kivus - CNDP officers have long grumbled about the fact that their ranks (there had been serious rank inflation under the CNDP regime) had not been confirmed, as they had demanded during the peace negotiations. According to one high-ranking Congolese army source, 8 CNDP officers have been promoted/confirmed to be full colonels, including Innocent Gahizi, Innocent Kabundi, Claude Mucho, Sultani Makenga, Faustin Muhindo and Baudouin Ngaruye. This is, however, fewer than the 18 that had been agreed upon during negotiations with Kinshasa high command six months ago.

Why is this important? The CNDP has wide-ranging influence in the Kivus due to their deployment for Kimia II and Amani Leo operations, and they can stir up trouble, intimidate political parties and secure economic interests. In short, they are a force to be reckoned with. Already, there were rumors that Vital Kamerhe benefited from CNDP protection during a visit to Goma a few weeks ago (they say that they are being smeared by Kabila's security services).  

Some thoughts about the SEC draft regulations for conflict minerals

As required by last year's Dodd-Frank bill, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has come out with proposed regulations for US companies trading in minerals from Congo and surrounding countries. 

I have not read the whole bill - the 113 pages did not fit into my packed Christmas schedule - but a few things do spring to mind.

First and foremost, this a bill that is intended not so much to have the government regulate the mineral trade, but to provide the tools and information for concerned citizens and the press to do so. The SEC does not specify what exactly a company must do to determine whether it is sourcing its minerals from the Congo ("a reasonable country of origin inquiry") or what steps it should take to make sure the minerals coming from the Congo are not fueling conflict. It simply requires companies to say what that have done to find out from where there minerals are sourced. It would then be up to the court of public opinion to punish those companies who do trade in conflict minerals.

The SEC, however, does reserve the right to review companies' due diligence process and to judge them insufficient or unreliable. They suggest that companies could use standards such as those developed by the OECD. 

In any case, the burden is on companies to prove that their minerals do not come from the Congo. If they are unable to prove this, they will have to submit a "Conflict Minerals Report" to the SEC and will have to pay an independent auditor to review its report and make the report and the audit public on its website. 

One problem raised by this laissez-faire attitude is that companies would simply submit a report saying that they sent people into the field, but were unable to find any evidence that companies they buy from are trading in conflict minerals. Given the opacity of the minerals trade in the Kivus, they could even carry out fairly rigorous due diligence without finding any wrong-doing. Auditors flown in from Nairobi or Washington would be hard-pressed to figure out much in the muddle of Kivu politics. This just highlights the importance of independent body doing in-depth investigations into companies and armed groups in the Kivus - something like the UN Group of Experts, but with much more manpower (the UN panel only has one person working on conflict minerals) and access to company information. Bottom line: without good knowledge of local criminal networks, the best due diligence will not produce much. 

Another possible problem with the proposed regulations is that they, as the Dodd-Frank bill, say that they will define "armed group" in accordance with the State Department's human rights reports. While the Congressmen who drafted the legislation have said that by armed group they definitely meant the Congolese army, as well, some lobbyist are now apparently contesting that. The latest UN Group of Experts report highlights the importance of the Congolese army in the criminalization of the minerals trade; it would be a huge disappointment if companies felt they could buy minerals taxed and controlled by Congolese army units, who now control many of the Kivu's most lucrative mines. 

The footnotes in the proposed regulations also tell an interesting story: A lot of lobby groups have written to the SEC to express their support or skepticism about due diligence, many more of these groups, actually, than NGOs. 

Finally, there are some funny calculations in the draft about how much due diligence could cost. They suggest that up to 20% of the world's tantalum comes from the DRC, so therefore 20% of minerals-consuming companies in the US would be concerned: a total of 1,199 companies. But what if all companies in the US used tantalum from the Congo to the tune of 20% of their supply? In any case, they only use this figure to speculate about how much due diligence might cost the industry - they use the mean of a figure provided by NGOs ($25 million) and by the industry ($8 million) and come up with $16.5 million. They then add to that the amount a private sector audit of the Conflict Minerals Report would cost - only $25,000 per company, a very low figure that suggest that auditors would not have to go into the field - and  multiply by 1,199 companies: $29,975,000. Together with the due diligence, that totals $46,475,000 for the whole industry. Pretty funny math, if you ask me, even if it's just to get a ballpark figure. 

Anyway, this is just a draft. The SEC welcomes comments until the end of January. You can email them at: rule-comments@sec.gov.

News for the New Year: An unjust budget, Kabila's speech and Chinese prostitutes

Congo Siasa is back after the Christmas vacation. There was not much action in the Congo during the holidays - as opposed to previous years, when there had been LRA massacres and CNDP offensives. The short-staffed UN mission (many officials go away on vacation at this time of year) breathed a sigh of relief.

A few stories of interest, nonetheless:

•  Veteran Congolese human rights activist Pascal Kambale had a good column in Le Potentiel newspaper that analyzed the Congolese budget. How can Kabila, he asks, say that there will be "Zero Tolerance" for impunity in the country and then allocate a measly 0,1% of the budget, a mere $6,7 million, to the justice sector? The state prosecutor's office has just over $1 million to hunt down and arrest criminals, less than the budget of the somewhat redundant ministry of parliamentary relations. The anti-corruption cell has a budget ($141,621) that is fifteen times smaller than the Bureau of Personal Services for the President. Kambale also highlights some of the more ridiculous budgetary lines: over $1,2 million for the upkeep of the prime minister's residence, $60,000 for "clothing" for the ministry of culture and arts, and $60,000 for the same ministry's food and drink budget (whereas the ministry of justice only got $5,000 for the same budget line). 

• The president gave a New Year speech to the nation that was broadcast via radio and television. You can find it here. It was pretty vague and pollyannish (he said that never had the country's prospects been as good as in 2010), which annoyed some Congolese - see an opinion piece here from Congoindependant. Alex Engwete had a some thoughts here, as well as this report of an incident at parliament: 

Earlier on during the day, at a Senate hearing--and I commend senators and MPs for working on New Year's Eve--the Minister of Primary and Secondary Education was confronted by senators over the "achievement" being claimed by the government of "free primary education for all children!" It did however transpire from the hearing that the claim of free primary education is at best a pipe-dream or at worst a practical joke at the expense of Congolese citizen. Many parents, fleeced by schools, have already given up on educating their kids--in a country with 96% unemployment rate! 

•  Finally, on a lighter note, the Chinese government carried out a sting operation together with the Congolese police on a karaoke bar in Kinshasa. Apparently 11 Chinese prostitutes had been trafficked there and were working for the establishment. However, they ladies of the night refused the offer to return to Chinese - the $100 they got per customer (half went to the bar) was apparently better than they could get back home.