The Best of the Best: Congo News

Some of the zaniest stories that have come out of the Congo in the past years. Thanks to Michael for some of these recommendations; please write in if you have your own favorite Congo story.

1. The Congo space program: A must see. I'm so glad the Congolese government is investing money in sending rats into outer space. It makes the war in the East tolerable to know that Congolese rodents are in orbit. http://current.com/items/90729107_congolese-space-program-a-great-success.htm

2. The Great Congo Penis Theft - Former Reuters correspondent Joe Bavier wrote this gem up. I think it was one of his most widely seen stories (this in the middle of a war in the eastern Congo), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2290323220080422

3. The Zidane interview - I don't know where this guy came from, but he manages to steal the show from Zinedine Zidane. http://www.eteignezvotreordinateur.com/interview-tres-exotique-de-zidane-au-congo/

4. Row over rat claims two lives

Apr 04 2008 04:05:58:497PM

A violent row over a giant rat has led to the killing of two militiamen in the DRC's Nord-Kivu province, a radio station has reported.

Kinshasa - A violent row over a giant rat led to the killing of two Mai Mai militia members in the Democratic Republic of Congo's Nord-Kivu province, Radio Okapi reported on Friday.

One of the militiamen caught the huge rat, valued for its tender flesh, in a field when a fellow patrolman shot and killed him to get the animal, the UN-sponsored radio station reported.

The head of the group of Resistant Congolese Patriots (Pareco) then "gave orders that the murderer be tortured" and the man "died as a result of his injuries", according to the news report.

The radio identified the disputed beast as a giant Gambia rat, an African animal that measures up to 75 centimetres long and is bred for food in some countries.

The Gambia rat also has such a fine sense of smell that it has proved a useful ally in detecting anti-personnel mines.

Initial work in using rodents for mine clearance was backed by the Belgian Directorate for International Co-operation and a non-commercial agency, APOPO, works jointly with Tanzania's Sokoine University of Agriculture on the project.

5. Finally, the rumors are making the rounds in Kinshasa that Kabila's chief of staff Adolphe Lumanu tried to lay the moves on the Canadian ambassador outside the president's office and that the Canadian government is demanding an apology. Lumanu allegedly accused the ambassador of making the first move. If this is true, it might make the top ten list.

The art of Mai-Mai negotiating

If you can't beat 'em...give em a ton of cash and see what happens. That seems to be the status of the negotiations with the various armed groups who have not joined the Congolese army. We always talk about the CNDP and forget that there were some twenty other groups who participated in the peace process - some have integrated most of their troops, such as the PARECO-Mugabo wing, while others are still holding out.

Some examples:

• 400 Mai-Mai Kifuafua made their way this past week to assembly sites in Walikale territory (mostly south of Walikale town), from where they are supposed to integrate the national army. This is not the first time we've seen this kind of movement by the Kifuafua ("those who go into battle chest first) boys. The population is happy they are leaving, but worried that the FDLR will take their place.
• General Kakule Lafontaine, former PARECO commander based in Lubero territory, has once again said this week that he is ready to talk with MONUC. He usually follows Mao's dictum of "talk/fight, talk/fight" as the best strategy.
• Another PARECO commander has written to protest the non-integration of 2051 PARECO policemen - why have the CNDP and other group integrated their police, but not PARECO, he asked. I must say, I've been to PARECO territory numerous times and have never seen many "policemen." 2051? Hmmm....
• General James Matabishi, the leader of the Mai-Mai Ruwenzori, also protested this past week that his police force had not been integrated. I remember once seeing a census of Ruwenzori soldiers that barely reached 50 - he has apparently recruited a bunch of new soldiers on the promise that they would benefit from the demobilization program.
  
• Finally, a Hutu militia that did not take part in the peace process, PANADEF, has also written to the Congolese army to say they want to integrate their troops. They operate in Rutshuru territory, but nobody knows how many they are, although they are allegedly collaborating with Tutsi commander Ngabo Gadi, who is close to former CNDP officers.
  

And that's just for North Kivu.

Academics interested in inter-state bargaining have suggested that the main problem with such negotiations are (1) commitment problems, i.e. how can we be sure that you will do what you promised, that after we demobilize our boys you don't just arrest us? and (2) information asymmetries, i.e. we don't really know enough about the other side, so let's hold out.

For once, such academic arguments can actually be applied to the Congo. Given that your promotion through the ranks in the Congolese army depends on your support network, ethnic affiliations and ability to work the system, it is very difficult for the often illiterate militia leaders to obtain good positions in the army - often they are promised high posts and are soon afterward demoted. Plus, once you demobilize your troops, you have no leverage to resort to if you are sidelined. As for information asymmetries, militia leaders often have no idea what awaits them in the Congolese army - many operate in areas close to their ancestral home, where they know the terrain and language. What can a Nande Mai-Mai commander do in Equateur with no formal training, no French and basic knowledge of military etiquette?

A few examples of this: the most successful RCD officer to have integrated the Congolese army is General Gabriel Amisi, better known as "Tango Four," and even better known for his role in several large massacres, including of 160 people in Kisangani in May 2002. Amisi joined the army along with the rest of the RCD in July 2003, was named regional commander in Goma, where he excelled by currying favor with Kabila while protecting Nkunda's fledgling military organization. In order to get him out, Kabila promoted him to become commander of the land forces in Kinshasa in 2004. Amisi is from the Bangubangu ethnic community from Maniema, just like Kabila's mother Mama Sifa Mahanya, and he was able to position himself in Kinshasa as reliable and a good business partner - he provided protection to the 83rd brigade that controlled the lucrative Bisie mine in Walikale for many years, and in return he and his associates got rich off kickbacks from that and from his airplane company, Maniema Aviation. He also sponsored a very successful soccer team in Kindu (a great way to political success, as Governors Moise Katumbi and Andre Kimbuta have found out in Katanga and Kinshasa, respectively). Now that's success.

In contrast to Amisi, who was an educated former Mobutu officer, the Mai-Mai have fared terribly. Aside from General Padiri Bulenda, the biggest Mai-Mai leader (although not in size) who is now regional commander in Lubumbashi, it's hard to find a single high-profile militia leader from the East in the army hierarchy, outside the few who have top positions in the Kimia II/Amani Leo operations.

Faced with a weak state that cannot enforce law and order, institutions that cannot keep their promises (how many ministerial shuffles have there been in the past 3 years?) and plenty of local resources, the option of continued insurgency with sporadic peace talks at the fine hotels in Goma is probably the best bet.

Whistling Child Soldiers?

I'll put this in the category of weird humanitarian initiatives. I saw this belatedly - the great blog Wronging Rights carried this story about an NGO that sells whistles to raise money to help former child soldiers. (Website here) The connection? Well, they say that, "Captured by Nkunda’s rebel army, the boys not big enough to hold a gun are given merely a whistle and put on the front lines of battle." According to them, thousands of child soldiers are sent to the front line with only these whistles. Celebrities like Selma Hayek, John Stewart, will.i.am and other apparently support "the whistle-blowers."

I must confess, in my trips to Nkunda's troops I have never heard of this whistle story - it is possible for several dozen, but thousands? Plus, I've never met a militia in the Congo that could find a child who was too small to hold a gun. Nkunda never had much trouble getting enough guns for his troops, it was the Mai-Mai who were less well-equipped.

Plus, the website is full of statements like these: "Nkunda's rebels had gone mad with drugs. He told us it didn't matter who guarded us, the sight of our white skin would enrage them and they would fire." Um....I'm not a big fan of Nkunda's troops, but this is bullshit.

Can anybody in Goma reading this tell me if I'm missing something here? Whistle kids, really? (According to the comments from Goma on Wronging Rights site, it is nonsense and the NGOs founders were deported by Congolese authorities for not having the right paperwork). Apparently, they have raised $80,000 by selling 2,000 whistles and are helping 270 Congolese kids.

Sizing up the Congolese legislative apparatus

There has been a lot of noise in Katanga over the past few weeks, as members of the provincial assembly have asked for the resignation of several members of the provincial assembly, leading to acrimonious debate and an attack by a band of youths against one of the members of the assembly. At the same time, members of the provincial assembly in North Kivu have also continued to push for the resignation of Governor Julien Paluku, who has continued to hang on by the hair of his chinny chin.

Which prompts me to ask: how successful have these assemblies been in holding the provincial leaders accountable?

It's a mixed bag. You often hear political analysts saying that the provincial institutions contain probably the most pro-active and scrupulous bunch of politicians in the country, possible because they are so close to their voters. Perhaps. But it was also these jokers who allowed themselves to be bribed to the gills to elect senators and governors and senators in 2007 (those elections are indirect by the provincial assemblies) who had little popularity in the province - thus the MLC, which had majorities in 2/3 provinces was only able to elect one governor, and South Kivu elected two RCD senators (well, one RCD plus the daughter of the RCD's main arms dealer).

Anyway, here's a brief summary of the tug-o-war in the various provincial assemblies. I think it says more about the lack of stability and discipline within the various political parties than necessarily the efficiency of the checks and balances:

• South Kivu: Governor Chibalonza was impeached in 2008, then put back in by the Supreme Court, then removed by his PPRD party (Kabila's main party). Since then, Leonce Mudherwa has been the head of the province, but now some MPs are asking for him to resign due to mismanagement. Also, Chibalonza and several of his ministers were accused of stealing $441,000 in "severance pay" when they were impeached. Some of them admitted, claiming they didn't know they couldn't get severance pay, and paid it back.
  
• North Kivu: Provincial MPs have tried to impeach Governor Julien Paluku three times, the first time in 2007 for embezzling $372,000 in road taxes, the second time for alleged embezzlement/misallocation of over $8 million of the provincial budget (that was based on an audit they had conducted). Sound arguments, but Paluku has held on.
  
• Maniema: In October 2009, provincial MP impeached the vice-governor Pierre Masudi for financial mismanagement and violation of parliamentary rules.
• Province Orientale: In October 2009, the provincial assembly accused vice-governor Joseph Bangakya of embezzling funds through fraudulent procurement of road building machines. He resigned several days later.
  
• Kasai-Oriental: The provincial assembly accused its leadership (three members of the PA's office) of embezzling around $300,000. The president of the PA Francois Kabala resigned but has never been tried in a court of law.
  
• Kasai-Occidental: The provincial assembly impeached Governor Tresor Kapuku in July 2007, but he was soon reinstated by the Supreme Court (which is seen by many to utterly lack independence).
  
• Equateur: The provincial assembly impeached Governor Jose Makila for financial mismanagement in January 2009 (they later found that he wasn't guilty after all); the current governor Jean-Claude Baende has faced serious allegations of embezzlement, as well.
• Kinshasa: The Governor Andre Kimbuta was accused by several witnesses of ordering the assassination of a provincial MP from the opposition, but the witnesses later retracted their statements (some allege under duress). Kimbuta was also accused by members of his own government to have been involved in the embezzlement of $15 million for road repairs.
• Katanga: While Governor Moise Katumbi has a firm grip on the province, his provincial assembly has recently been the scene of various conflagrations (see recent blog posting), with MPs accusing firebrand PA president Kyungu wa Kumwanza of disrespect of parliamentary procedures and several members of his office of embezzlement.
  

In sum: the resignation or impeachment of three governors (one came back), two vice-governors, one PA president, and several provincial ministers. And all of this in just three years. Bandundu appears to be the only province to have avoided these problems.

All of this is definitely a sign that MPs will rabble-rouse when possible. I would refrain, however, from saying this is sign of democratic checks and balances at work - it is, but we have also seen many cases where cases have been brought and then MPs have been bought off - in fact, such accusations are often used as "fond de commerce," bargaining chips in order to get a piece of the pie. Also, to my knowledge none of the officials who have been impeached have been prosecuted or sentenced for their abuses.

Who Killed Laurent Kabila?

A couple of weeks ago was the 9th anniversary of Laurent Kabila's assassination. The hulking "liberator" of Zaire was assassinated in his office on January 16, 2001 by one of his bodyguards as he met with one of his advisers. In a shambolic trial several months later, the presidential military adviser Edy Kapend, the commander of Kinshasa General Yav Nawej and dozens of bodyguards were all found guilty and sentenced to death.

The assassination remains one of the great mysteries of recent Congolese history. In the past year, several prominent officials have come forward calling for either those convicted to be set free or for a new trial to be held. Mwenze Kongolo, one of Laurent Kabila's closest associates, published a book last year, saying that Edy Kapend was innocent and should be freed. Kongolo was minister of justice at the time of the trial, so he might know what he's talking about (he's also become an often critic of Joseph Kabila). A few days ago, the Archbishop of Kinshasa Laurent Monsengwo also called for the trial to be finished, saying that the proceedings had never been concluded and that there had been many flaws. Here is a nice story on the debate by France 24 correspondent Arnaud Zajtman (ex-BBC Kinshasa) - I love the part when he asks Joseph Kabila about the trial and Kabila just shakes his head and basically says: "Why does Arnaud Zajtman also bug me about this?"

That there had been many flaws is obvious. A New York Times article provides a nice description of the surreal scene at the trial. At one point, the prosecutor accused Edy Kapend of practicing polygamy, and the judge had the sole witness to the murder, Emile Mota, arrested for no reason after he took the stand.

"One prisoner, who said he was an architect held for a crime he did not commit, had painted a mural in front of which sat the judges, the prosecutor and the suspects. It depicts a bucolic scene of a picnic next to a pond, replete with grapes, mangos, bananas, bottles of wine and brandy, a violin and a bouquet of red roses.

During the proceedings, some of the women prisoners suckle their infants. The audience cheers or jeers at witnesses. During the noon breaks, prisoners, soldiers, lawyers and family and friends mix freely against the backdrop of the picnic. Sometimes cheerful Congolese music comes from the loudspeakers."

The basic facts are not contested. Kabila was speaking with Emile Mota, his health adviser, when his bodyguard Rashidi Kasereka asked for permission to enter. Acting like he wanted to whisper something into his boss' ear, Rashidi pulled his pistol and fired several shots into Kabila. He then fled the room and was shot outside the office by - here the testimonies diverge - either Edy Kapend or another bodyguard. We thereby lost the main witness to the murder. However, subsequent investigations by both journalists as well as the Congolese authorities did establish a few basic facts. The plot was probably executed by a bunch of former kadogo, or child soldiers from the Kivus, who were notoriously underpaid. But they had probably just carried out the plot - who was behind it? The problem was that by the time of this death, Kabila had made too many enemies - plenty of people apparently were gunning for him. Here are some of the main theories:

• Some French journalists from Le Monde suggested that it was the child soldiers acting on their own. A few months before the assassination, Kabila had ordered Anselme Masasu, the symbolic leader of the kadogo to be executed, as he was suspected of conspiring with Rwanda. Masasu was hugely popular among the child soldiers, and after his execution in November 2000, Kabila had rounded up a bunch of other kadogo and killed them, as well, or had them arrested.
  
• Angola. In 2000, the Angolan army had gotten close to crushing UNITA, its rebel adversary of twenty-five years. Nonetheless, according to UN investigators, UNITA continued to rake in revenues of $200 million a year through diamond deals and it appeared that Kabila, in a desperate bid for cash, had begun to allow UNITA to deal through Lebanese gem traders in Kinshasa. According to French and British insider periodicals, by the end of 2000 UNITA operatives were once again active in Kinshasa. President Dos Santos, who had supported the initial rebellion against Mobutu precisely to root out UNITA bases in Zaire, was livid. This hypothesis is supported by the curious behavior of General Yav Nawej, the commander of Kinshasa who had close ties to Angola, along with Edy Kapend, the president’s military advisor. The day before the assassination, General Yav ordered the disarmament of select northern Katangan units in Kinshasa’s garrison, who were the most loyal to Kabila. Then, within hours of the assassination, General Yav ordered the execution of eleven Lebanese, including six minors, belonging to a diamond trading family. In the meantime, Kapend had gone on the radio and ordered the commanders of the army, navy and air force to maintain discipline and calm, rankling these officers, who thought such commands to be far above his pay grade. According to this scenario, the Angolans did not instigate the assassination, but found out about it ahead of time and then told their men in Kinshasa – Yav and Kapend – not to intervene. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the kadogo acting on behest of Angola, as they had few links to Luanda and were much closer to Rwanda. It is, however, equally difficult to believe that only the pro-Angolan officers within the presidency would have discovered the coup plot, given the porous information networks in Kinshasa.
  
• Rwanda. There are several indications that Rwanda was directly involved. First, according to the Congolese security services, before fleeing, the Masasu crew admitted to being in cahoots with Kigali. Secondly, when they did flee, along with several affluent Lebanese businessmen, they made their way directly to Rwanda, where they were eventually given influential political and business positions by the government. Lastly, a high-ranking Rwandan security official told me that he had seen Colonel James Kabarebe on the day of the assassination. Kabarebe, who was still running Congo operations for the Rwandan army and would soon be promoted to become head of the army, reportedly slapped him on the shoulder and said: “Good news from Kinshasa. Our boys did it.” The problem with this theory is that, if it had been Rwanda, they certainly didn't take advantage of the situation - no major military activity was reported within the days and weeks after the assassination. Also, if it had been Rwanda, they seriously misjudged the consequences. Laurent Kabila's successor Joseph proved to be much more adept diplomatically than his father, and turned the tide against Rwanda amongst many donors.

Alas, as with some many parts of Congolese history, we will probably never know the answer. What is probably certain is that dozens of innocent people are sitting in Makala prison in Kinshasa for no good reason. I visited Kapend there last year - he has his own cell, with a poster of a Dutch tulip garden hanging over his bed. In the middle of the tulips, he had handwritten: "At the end of the day, both God and I know the truth, and it is that Edy Kapend is innocent." Maybe. Maybe not. But I doubt the Congolese justice system will ever tell us.

Nick Kristof on the Congo

Nicholas Kristof just spent a week in the eastern Congo and has begun publishing a series of Op-Eds in The New York Times. This first one is here, and is less than illuminating. He talks about the how women raped and children are orphaned. He says that he has come to the Kivus, "where militias rape, mutilate and kill civilians with a savagery that is almost incomprehensible." Unfortunately, Kristof does not do much in his Op-Ed to make it any more comprehensible. Instead, he slips from one stock image to the next, without providing much explanation at all - in fact, that might be antithetical to the piece, as he states: "This is a pointless war — now a dozen years old — driven by warlords, greed for minerals, ethnic tensions and complete impunity." A pointless war. Perhaps. But does it defy reason? Is there any way to explain in simple terms what the war is about? Here are some suggestions to slip into the piece:

• The Congo war has many causes, but two on the main ones were the collapse of the Congolese state after 32 years of misrule by a western-backed dictator; and the genocide of 800,000 people in Rwanda in 1994, which drove a million people across the border into the Congo, where some of the commanders involved in the genocide still terrorize the Congolese population, along with many new non-genocidaire recruits.
• In 1996, a Rwandan-backed coalition invaded the Congo to topple the this dictator, Mobutu. After Laurent Kabila came to power on the back of this rebellion, he fell out with his Rwandan backers, who then launched a new rebellion. The war lasted until 2003, when all belligerents joined a transitional government. Elections were held in 2006 and Joseph Kabila was elected president. However, his presidency has been marred by corruption, abuse and state weakness. In the East, former Rwandan allies went back to war, driving an insurrection that morphed through various phases and continues until today.
• This violence is compounded by struggles over local political and economic resources that often take place along ethnic lines. Faced with a weak state, many ethnic-based militias have emerged. The motives of the fighters vary from self-defense to trying to make money to asserting manhood. [It would be very nice if journalists took more to interview perpetrators and not just victims, it helps to dispel the specter of African savagery.]

This is still hopelessly reductive; the point is, a journalist's job is to provide intelligent context and analysis, to illuminate, not stultify. Some say that it is better that Kristof is writing even these simple tidbits - it helps mobilize interest in the West and people like myself are lost in the stratosphere. I am certainly lost in the stratosphere, but I do think there is a way of writing an Op-Ed that better reflects the conflict's dimensions. After all, it's supposed to be an opinion piece. The only opinion I could find here was: "The Congo is messed up. Please help." Imagine writing a similar piece about America's school system or health care. It would never be published in the NYT.

I am not convinced that just making people care more will solve the problem. After all, caring could lead to bad policy. There is ample precedent for this. Or, people could just shake their head when confronted with such "pointless" violence and throw their hands up in the air.

Kristof also could have spoken about policy. There are currently two pieces of important legislation in Congress on helping to regulate the mining sector in the Congo. The US Defense Department is considering how to help reform the Congolese army through AFRICOM. Several organizations are considering how to intervene to help combat sexual violence through initiatives in the justice sector. This is what an opinion piece is supposed to do: influence opinion and policy. Not reinforce stereotypes.

Maybe I spoke to soon - after all, this is his first piece. Maybe he was just prepping us for cogent policy pieces to come. I certainly hope so.

War of the cows

A friend recently sent me information regarding the ownership of cattle in the area of Masisi occupied by former CNDP rebels. He said he had gathered information about 7,200 cows in Masisi belonging to high-ranking Rwandan officials.

I have no way of independently verifying this. However, in the UN panel report I helped write in 2008 we said: "The Group has seen official agricultural documents showing that CNDP officers own over 1,500 cows in a small area of their territory, worth between $450,000 and $750,000, and probably own far more than that in other areas they occupy. According to ranchers, there could be as many as 180,000 cows in North Kivu, many of them in territory under CNDP control."

There is no doubt that thousands of cows have crossed the border from Rwanda over the past year. Several reports of Tutsi refugees returning from Rwanda to Masisi indicate that groups often cross with herds of cattle. Several factors have played into this. Rwanda has limited the public grazing of cattle and recently introduced zero-grazing (keeping cattle indoors) to prevent soil erosion. En bref, there is limited room in Rwanda for cattle. In a country where cows have huge cultural significance, people are attached to the idea of buying cattle. Many ex-CNDP officers have also invested in large herds of cattle - I remember that when General Bosco received a cash windfall after being appointed the head of the CNDP a year ago, he spent quite a bit on buying more heads of cattle.

It's hard to guess how much these cows are worth. Frisian and Brown Swiss - good milk cows - can run as high as $1,000/head, but the Ugandan Longhorn can be much cheaper, as little as $200-300/head. In any case, 7,000 cows could be anywhere between $1,4 and $7 million.

Don't laugh, but cattle play an important role in the conflict. Agriculturalists - mostly Hutu and Hunde - are sometimes pushed off their land to make way for cattle. The conquest of land often goes hand in hand with securing land for cattle grazing. Raids by the Mai-Mai or Congolese army against the CNDP in North Kivu and against the Banyamulenge in South Kivu have sometimes gone hand in hand with cattle raiding worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. In Goma for a while they had introduced a new phrase into the lexicon of natural resource wars: Blood cheese.