This report concludes that military operations against the FDLR have failed to dismantle the organization’s political and military structures on the ground in eastern DRC. The increasing rate of FDLR combatant defections and the FDLR temporary removal from many of its bases are only a partial success considering that the armed group has regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and continues to recruit new fighters. This report shows that the FDLR continues to benefit from residual but significant support from top commanders of the FARDC, particularly those officers in the 10th military region (South Kivu), and has sealed strategic alliances with other armed groups in both North and South Kivu. External support networks, both regional and international, have been used by FDLR in the field to counteract the effects of Kimia II, for instance networks in Burundi and Tanzania. [...]
The Group investigated the FDLR’s ongoing exploitation of natural resources in the Kivus, notably gold and cassiterite reserves which the Group calculates continue to deliver millions of dollars in direct financing into FDLR coffers. This report illustrates how FDLR gold networks are intertwined tightly with trading networks operating within Uganda and Burundi as well as the UAE. The Group also documents that a number of minerals exporting houses, some of whom were named in the Group’s previous report in 2008, continue to trade with the FDLR. This report shows that end buyers for this cassiterite include the Malaysia Smelting Corporation and the Thailand Smelting and Refining Company, held by Amalgamated Metals Corporation, a UK entity.
The report analyzes the integration of non-state armed groups into the FARDC through the rapid integration in January 2009; as well as prior and during the FARDC/RDF joint operation Umoja Wetu and Kimia II. In this context, the CNDP officer class, in particular General Bosco Ntaganda, has continued to retain heavy weapons acquired during its period of rebellion in spite of its official integration into the FARDC and still controls revenue generating activities and parallel local administrations. The Group also presents documentary evidence showing that Gen Ntaganda continues to act as Kimia II deputy operational commander.
CNDP military officers deployed as part of FARDC Kimia II operations have profited from their deployment in mineral rich areas, notably at the Bisie mine in Walikale, North Kivu, and in the territory of Kalehe, in South Kivu. In both these areas, the FARDC commanding officers on the ground are ex-CNDP officers. The Group includes evidence in the report showing direct involvement of CNDP military officials in the supply of minerals to a number of exporting houses in North and South Kivu, some of which also supply the same international companies mentioned above. [...]
24. The Group has obtained a report from a DRC security agency (Annex 4) and a case file from the intelligence officers (T2) of the 10th military region (Annex 5) which describes the attempted diversion on 13 December 2008 of 14,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition (Kalashnikov type) from the official FARDC stockpile under the control of the commanders of the 10th military region. These documents have been archived at the United Nations.
25. The Group separately interviewed two FARDC officers of the 10th military region who were aware of the diversion of this military equipment. Both officers stated to the Group that the ammunition was destined to be delivered to the FRF, FNL and FDLR. The officers also informed the Group that there have been similar other episodes over the last year orchestrated by internal FARDC networks loyal to Colonel Baudouin Nakabaka, the deputy commander of the 10th military region in charge of logistics and administration, and his direct superior General Pacifique Masunzu. [...]
26. The case file obtained by the Group shows Col Nakabaka’s direct complicity in the attempted diversion of ammunition on 13 December 2008. Testimonies by various FARDC officials in these documents show that the ammunition was loaded onto a specially rented private vehicle by certain FARDC officials, notably Sergeant Elie Awijeo Abutumange and Captain Ikamba, the latter who was at the time in charge of the FARDC depots where this material was stored. According to several testimonies of FARDC officials, Captain Ikamba and the driver of the vehicle stated to their fellow FARDC officers present at the storage site that the material was being moved with the authority of Col Nakabaka. Four FARDC witnesses reported that Colonel Nakabaka phoned FARDC officers in charge of securing the camp at that precise moment. FARDC witnesses also reported that the driver had attempted to call Col Nakabaka just before he was arrested. The documents show that Col Nakabaka’s phone number was found in the driver’s phone.
30. The Group, in collaboration with MONUC Pakistani military contingent, uncovered two arms caches in the town of Uvira, which the Group considers to be connected to non-state armed groups, notably the Mai Mai, FNL and FDLR. Acting on the Group’s information, MONUC’s Pakistani contingent seized a stock of 139 AK-47 rifles, 34 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition, 5 hand-grenades and 6 Uzi submachine-guns (Annex 6) between the night and early morning of 15 and 16 June 2009. [...]
87. The Group obtained several testimonies that the FDLR maintain a relationship with General Adolphe Nshimirimana, Burundi’s head of intelligence, as well as with top Burundian police officers. This information has been corroborated by several active FDLR elements, regional security agencies, Burundian government officials and civil society members. The Group has also obtained phone records showing thirteen communications between Colonel Agricole Ntirampeba, the chief of staff of Gen Nshimirimana, and Major Mazuru of the FDLR during June 2009 to August 2009. In October 2009, an FDLR liaison officer also confirmed that the FDLR collaborates with Gen Nshimirimana and Col Ntirampeba, especially through the provision of logistical arrangements and medical assistance. [...]
FDLR Diaspora networks
93. To further corroborate the modus operandi of the FDLR chain of command, the Group worked in collaboration with an FDLR ex-combatant who in turn obtained information in the presence of the Group from a radio operator active in DRC. This conversation, which was heard and transcribed by the Group, related to military instructions issued in March 2009 by the FDLR high command to attack civilian populations and hospitals (see transcription made by the Group as the radio operator read them out in Annex 18). Four FDLR ex-combatants, two of whom were senior officers, reported that they had received similar orders to act against the civilian population following the end of Umoja Wetu. Dozens of FDLR ex-combatants have also stated to the Group that orders of this nature must be given by Gen Mudacumura, who in similar circumstances consults first with Mr Murwanashyaka.
94. The Group obtained testimonies from FDLR ex-combatants that Mr Murwanashyaka has been involved in coordinating the transfer of arms and ammunition to FDLR units and relaying specific instructions on their use (see paragraph 71 for one example). The Group also obtained evidence that Mr Murwanashyaka has been involved in managing large sums of money that have been raised through the illicit sale of natural resources derived from areas under the control of the FDLR. This money is used by the leadership to pay for operational needs such as the phone bills of satellite phones used by the FDLR military high command. [...]
95. The Group obtained evidence that Etablissement Muyeye, one of the biggest minerals trading houses in Bukavu, has organised the transfer of funds through Western Union to individuals in Germany who are helping Mr Murwanashyaka violate the terms of the assets freeze imposed upon him by the UN and German authorities (Etablissement Muyeye was cited in paragraphs 78-88 of the Group’s December 2008 report (S/2008/773), as well as paragraphs 164 to 172 of this report for purchasing minerals from FDLR areas). The Group was informed by an employee and a family member of Mr Muyeye Byaboshi, the owner of Etablissement Muyeye, that Mr Muyeye was transferring money to Germany on behalf of the FDLR. The employee of Mr Muyeye showed to the Group some receipts of such money transfers. They included payments of several thousand dollars, and the most recent had been made as late as April 2009. The transfers were all made in the name of Jean Marie Shamavu, an associate of Mr Muyeye in Bukavu, to Metete Nzita in Germany, who is an agent of Mr Murwanashyaka in Germany, according to several sources close to the FDLR.
112. One case relates to financial support provided to the FDLR through funding received by “Fundaciò S’Olivar” and Inshuti, both Spanish charitable organizations. On the basis of testimonies, original email correspondence, audio recordings of conversations, phone logs analysis and receipts of money transfers, as well as other documents, the Group established that the FDLR has received regular financial, logistical and political support from individuals belonging to the above charitable institutions which, in turn, were funded directly or indirectly from the government of Islas Baleares, a provincial authority in Spain.
Non-integration of the CNDP
180. In this regard, the Group would like to highlight its findings as reported in its interim report of May 2009 (S/2009/253), where it noted that according to government figures, roughly 6,000 CNDP soldiers were integrated into the FARDC but only 2,542 personal weapons were handed in by these elements. In terms of larger weapons, CNDP only handed in seven PKM machine guns, one MAG machine gun, seven RPG-7, four 60mm mortars, one 82mm mortar, six 75mm recoilless guns, two SPG-9 recoilless guns and four multiple rocket launchers according to the government’s technical commission on integration. The Group obtained multiple testimonies from demobilized CNDP elements, including child soldiers, FARDC and Congolese intelligence officials as well as MONUC that corroborate information of significant arms caches under the control of hardline ex-CNDP commanders integrated into the FARDC.[...]
185. The Group has obtained evidence and testimonies that Gen Ntaganda has centralized many of the ground-level taxation networks previously controlled by the CNDP in the territory of Masisi in North Kivu, including control of illegal checkpoints, charcoal markets and the timber trade, and has enforced parallel administrative structures particularly in his central fiefdom of the Mushake zone of Masisi territory. The Group has calculated that Gen Ntaganda’s network raises about 250,000 US dollars a month from these ground taxes (also see the Group’s interim report S/2009/253).
201. Since March 2009 the Bisie mine in Walikale, which provides approximately 70 percent of the output of cassiterite of North Kivu, has been under the control of units responding to former CNDP hardliners operating within the FARDC’s 1st integrated brigade. The Group has confirmation from military officials, miners and traders in Bisie, mining officials and demobilized ex-CNDP elements that a part of government taxation revenues and part of the production from the mine have been controlled directly by Lt Col Hassan “Shimita” Bin Mashabi, an ex-CNDP officer working for the FARDC under the 1st integrated brigade. This unit has been commanded by Lt Col Antoine Manzi until September 2009 and subsequently by Lt Col Yusuf Mboneza, both of whom are former CNDP officers. [...]
202. [...] The Group estimates that the local military commanders at Bisie can therefore earn up to 60,000 US dollars per annum from these taxes, based on industry estimates of an average of 500 tonnes a month of production from Bisie. [...]
205. The Group has also been informed by mining and military officials that the brother of Lt Col Bin Mahsabi, known as Faustin Ndahiriwe, has also been trading cassiterite produced on behalf of the ex-CNDP officers based at Walikale. [...]
206. The Group has established that Mr Ndahiriwe has directly supplied a number of businesses in Goma with cassiterite, and in particular three exporting houses, or comptoirs: Hill Side, SODEEM and Pan African Business Group (PABG). The Group obtained documentation from all these three companies showing they have purchased cassiterite from Mr Ndahiriwe in 2009 (Annex 70). Mr Ndahiriwe confirmed that he is prefinanced by some of the comptoirs in Goma although he did not specify which ones.