As fighting in Kivus intensifies, deeper problems linger

The weekend saw a confusing situation develop in North Kivu, with serious fighting breaking out for the first time between Bosco's troops in Masisi and the Congolese army. The "mutineers," as Bosco's forces are now being called, took the upper hand and took the towns of Mweso, Mushaki and Karuba, and were even threatening the lakeside town of Sake, the gateway to Goma. Meanwhile, the Congolese army appeared disorganized and confused; the deputy regional commander, Col. Jonas Padiri, was stuck with several other senior officers for almost a whole day before he could get back to Sake.

In the meantime, troops loyal to Commander Sheka Ntaberi, a Mai-Mai commander in Walikale, have also taken control of several towns in central Walikale, as Congolese army troops have retreated from the area. The price of food items is going up dramatically in Goma, as it is cut off from important hinterlands, and thousands of people are fleeing from the violence. Rumors abound, often contradicting each other - some say that Rwandan troops have infiltrated to prop up Bosco, others conjecture that Bosco has struck a cynical alliance with the FDLR.

But behind the bluster, a deeper story is playing out. While the trigger of the conflict was Bosco's fear of being arrested and taken to the Hague, it is unlikely that he would have been able to mobilize this many troops without some help. Indeed, in the early days of his mutiny, he appeared to have faltered, as many of his ex-CNDP comrades failed to go along with him. Again and again, commanders mutinied only to see most of their troops re-defect back to the government.

Then, however, something appeared to change. The main mutineers - Cols. India Queen, Saddam, Zaire, Baudouin, Butoni, Zimurinda - converged on the Masisi highlands, their home turf. Some tactical mistakes were made by the Congolese army, such as giving Col. Baudouin, a Bosco loyalist, a truck full of ammunition and tens of thousands of dollars for supplies, only to see him reject his new assignment and head back to join Bosco, arms and all.

But there is a deeper problem, one that goes beyond just tactical mistakes and disorganization. Both Rwanda and the ex-CNDP cadres can suffer to see Bosco go - after all, many have personal quibbles with him. But they cannot suffer to see the CNDP networks and power dismantled. And this is what was lurking on the horizon as Kabila brought in loyalist troops ("special forces"), arrested prominent ex-CNDP allies, and redeployed a few ex-CNDP commanders outside of the Kivus. Now, even ex-CNDP commanders who had previously been hostile to Bosco are openly dismissive of the offensive against him and express sympathy for his cause. In sum, the foundation of the 2009 peace deal between Kigali, Kinshasa and the CNDP is being shaken.

We are likely in for some more fighting before the situation becomes any clearer. For now, Gen. Gabriel Amisi (Commander of Land Forces) and Gen. Didier Etumba (Commander of the Army) have arrived back in Goma to oversee the operations themselves. Let's see what will happen.

The new Congolese government

This posting has been slightly changed after readers picked up some mistakes (last update, Monday afternoon). Feel free to submit corrections.

As Congo Siasa readers will know, the new cabinet was officially announced yesterday, comprising 2 deputy prime ministers, 25 ministers and 11 vice-ministers. In general, it seems that Kabila and his new prime minister do not feel the need for compromise, neither with members of their own party, nor with the opposition. This make for a leaner, slightly more technocratic cabinet than previous ones.

I have pasted the cabinet below. Here are my first impressions:

• Where is the opposition? While Prime Minister Matata had suggested that he was open to including the opposition in his cabinet, and after many diplomats had pushed Kabila to be conciliatory with the opposition, it seems like it all made little difference. Perhaps the president realized that the opposition is relatively weak and divided, so he does not need to reach out to them for the moment. The exception seem to be Jean-Paul Nemoyato (now minister of economy) and a member of Gilbert Kiakwama's CDC party, which used to be in staunch opposition to Kabila. Francois Mwamba's ADR, who is not considered to be in the opposition, also got one ministry (Musungayi, minister of industry).
• Few big names: Very few heads of political parties made their way into government. For example, the head of the MSR party, Pierre Lumbi, which did well in elections, is nowhere to be seen. Instead his party, which is the third largest in the presidential coalition, is represented by a minister (civil service and agriculture) and a vice-minister (decentralization). Olivier Kamitatu is also absent, but his ARC party has at least one ministry (social and humanitarian affairs). On the other hand, some of the most powerful positions have gone to people who have been relatively unknown politically. For example, both deputy prime ministers are technocrats, with Daniel Mukoko having been UNDP's governance advisor for many years (before working as a technocrat in government), and Alexandre Luba having worked for the national security council.
• The cabinet has shrunk: From 48 to 38 positions. This, along with the absence of opposition members and heavyweights, seems to contradict the impression that Kabila has emerged weakened from the elections. Rather, it seems like he doesn't feel the need to give too many concessions, either to his own allies or to the opposition.
• Ministries were not really distributed according to the parties' weight in parliament - the PPRD seems to have gotten the lion's share, but the second strongest party PPPD only got one ministry. In contrast, some parties with only a one seat, like the PR and PA, got important ministries. Rwakabuba's UDCN party does not have a single seat but she obtained a vice-ministry.
• So who got what? Here's what I can glean, but I am missing some officials who are unknown to me:
• PPRD: 8 (Kasweshi, Munga, Sadok, Maker, Muyej, Atama, Mumba, and Tunda wa Kasende)
• MSR: 3 (Vahamwiti, Kibala, Ngokoso)
• PALU: 2 (Mukoko, Kabwelulu)
• PPPD: 1 (Mbuinga) 
• CCU: 1 (Mende)
• ULDC: 1 (Tshibanda) 
• ADR: 1 (Musungayi)
• NAD: 1 (Inagosi)
• ADH: 1 (Magbengu)
• UNAFEC: 1 (Sakina)
• ECT: 1 (Numbi)
• UCP: 1 (Vunabandi)
• UDCO: 1 (Banza Mukalay)
• AFDC: 1 (Bahati Lukwebo)
• PDC: (N'sa Mputu)
• CDC: 1 (Nemoyato)
• PR: 1 (Kalumba)
• PA: 1 (Kin-Kiey)
• UDCN: 1 (Rwakabuba)
• ARC: 1 (Nawej)
• Provincial distribution:
• Katanga: 8
• Province Orientale: 4
• South Kivu:4
• Kasai-Oriental: 3
• North Kivu: 3
• Bandundu: 2
• Maniema: 2
• Bas-Congo: 2
• Equateur: 2
• Kasai-Occidental:1?
• Finally, as this will be important for the East, there are several prominent Hutu and Tutsi - Celestin Vunabandi is Hutu from Rutshuru and close to Eugene Serufuli, Sadok Biganza is a Munyamulenge from South Kivu, and (I think) Maguy Rwakabuba is a Tutsi from Rutshuru.

Here is the list:

Ministers (see here for Congo Independent's bios):

1. Vice Premier Ministre du Budget : Daniel Mukoko Samba (Kongo, Bas-Congo)
2. Vice Premier Ministre de la Defense Nationale : Alexandre Luba Tamu (Lubakat, Katanga)
3. Ministre d’Affaires Etrangères, Coopération Internationale, Francophonie : Raymond Tshibanda (Luba, Kasai-Oriental)
4. Minsitres des Affaires Intérieures, Sécurité, Décentralisation : Richard Muyej (Ruund, Katanga)
5. Ministre de la Justice et des Droits de l’Homme : Wivine Mumba (Katanga)
6. Ministres des Medias et relations avec parlement : Lambert Mende (Tetela, Kasai-Oriental)
7. Plan, suivi de la révolution de la modernité : Celestin Vunabandi (Hutu, North Kivu)
8. Portefeuille : Louise Munga (Katanga)
9. Eco/Commerce : Jean-Paul Nemoyato (Province Orientale)
10. Aménagement du territoire, urbanisme, habitat, TP/AT : Fridolin Kasweshi (Lubakat, Katanga)
11. Hydrocarbures : Crispin Atama (Province Orientale)
12. Industrie et PME : Remy Musungayi (Luba, Kasai-Occidental)
13. PTT, NTIC : Kin-Kiey Mulumba (Yansi, Bandundu)
14. Emploi, Travail et Prévoyance Sociale : Modeste Bahati Lukwebo (Shi, South Kivu)
15. Sante : Felix Kabange Numbi (Lubakat, Katanga)
16. ESURS : Chelo Lotsima(Province Orientale)
17. EPSP : Maker Mwangu (Kasai-Occidental)
18. Agriculture : Jean-Chrysostome Vahamwiti (Nande, North Kivu)
19. Affaires foncières : Robert Mbuinga Bila (Bas-Congo)
20. Affaires Sociales : Charles Nawej (Ruund, Katanga)
21. Genre, famille : Genevieve Inagosi (Province Orientale)
22. Fonction Publique : Jean-Claude Kibala (Rega, South Kivu)
23. Sport, Jeunesse: Banza Mukalay (Lubakat, Katanga)
24. Transport et voies de communications : Justin Kalumba (Maniema)
25. Environnement, Conservation de la nature et Tourisme : Louis Bavon Mputu (Equateur)
26. Mines : Martin Kabwelulu (Katanga)
27. Ressources hydrauliques et electricite : Bruno Kasanji Kalala (Luba, Kasai)

Deputy ministers

28. Vices Ministres Affaires Etrangères : Tunda Wa Kasende (Kasai-Oriental)
29. Coopération Internationale : Dismas Mangbengbu (Equateur)
30. Décentralisation et Affaires Coutumières : Egide Ngokoso (Bandundu)
31. Droits Humains : Mme Sakina Binti (Maniema)
32. Plan : Sadok Biganza (Munyamulenge, South Kivu)
33. Finances : Roger Shulungu (Kasai)
34. Budget : Mme Abuyuwe Vita
35. EPSP : Maggy Rwakabuba (Tutsi, North Kivu)

Supreme Court passes verdict on legislative vote

The Congolese Supreme Court issued a verdict on some of the legislative election disputes yesterday. I have posted a list of the decisions here. In general, the court went against some weighty interests, including by invalidating the two brothers of election commissioner Ngoy Mulunda (other members of the presidential majority took their places), as well as heavyweights like Jean-Jacques Mutuale (MLC), Anzuluni Bembe (opposition, former Mobutu strongman), Colette Tshomba (former deputy minister), Jean-Claude Baende (majority, governor of Equateur) and Jerome Kamate (opposition, former deputy minister).

The list comprises 32 invalidations of elected MPs; most of the disputes were among members of the ruling coalition. If I am counting correctly, three opposition MPs lost their seats to the ruling coalition, while the opposite does not seem to have occurred.

At the same time, the Supreme Court called for the remaining results from the rest of the country to be released, reversing the election commission's cancellation of the legislative vote everywhere except for Masisi, where a new vote will need to be held.

The Bosco-led mutiny sputters on

While Bosco Ntaganda's mutiny seems to have largely backfired, with many of the troops re-defecting back to the government, and over a dozen senior officers now under arrest, it is not yet over. While the names and positions of the commanders may seem confusing, the gist of it is this: A hard core of ex-CNDP (and some ex-PARECO) around Bosco has not been dissuaded, and the assassination of a two high-ranking loyalist officers has soured relations further with the national army.

Defections toward Bosco

Over the weekend, several additional officers deserted army ranks to join Bosco in his Masisi fiefdom, including Col Bauduoin Ngaruye. Col Baudouin (ex-CNDP, Masisi) had been the sector commander in Masisi and is known as a staunch Bosco loyalist. Nonetheless, as the mutiny sputtered out, he had come to Goma and had agreed to be redeployed to South Kivu - the army had even given him a new stockpile of ammunition. Then, as he was driving on the road to Bukavu, he took a right instead of following the lake, and ended up joining Bosco - ammunition and all - in Masisi.

In addition, the ex-CNDP former 811th regiment commander Col Innocent Zimurinda (ex-CNDP, Masisi) finally also defected after having been stuck in Goma. He is now also reported to be back in Masisi, although most of his troops - which were based in Kitchanga, northern Masisi - have joined the loyalists and one of his battalion commanders, Col Kashawara, is under arrest. A battalion commander from southern Masisi, Col Mutoni (ex-CNDP), has also joined Bosco with some troops.

Meanwhile, a key player behind the scenes of the mutiny, Col Sultani Makenga (ex-CNDP, Rutshuru) - who used to hold the deputy command position for South Kivu operations - is also the center of some speculation. He is back in Goma, allegedly after having traded insults with his commanding officer Col Delphin Kahimbi. However, his bodyguards took the road along the lake and were ambushed in Nyabibwe. Some are now saying that the ambush was intended for Makenga himself. Makenga is one of the most influential figures in the ex-CNDP leadership.

Assassination of army loyalists

Meanwhile on Sunday,  two prominent loyalist commanders were killed during an ambush on the border between Walikale and Masisi territories: Col Chuma Balumisa and Col Kamatimba Pilipili. The two were conducting operations aganst Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, a local Mai-Mai commander, who is now considered as the culprit. However, some officials with the Congolese army and UN see connections with the Bosco mutiny. While Sheka had previously been allied with the FDLR, on November 20 last year he helped carry out the assassination of Col Sadiki Soleil, a senior FDLR officer, allegedly in coordination with ex-CNDP and perhaps Rwandan officers. He does not have many troops left under his command, and several Congolese army officers told me he did not have either the interest or strength to carry out such an ambush alone.

In addition, according again to Congolese army officers, some of the ex-CNDP troops who were in Chuma's entourage were not hurt in the ambush and may have even defected to Sheka afterwards.

Some (just some) ex-CNDP troops leave the Kivus

For some years, a key obstacle to army reform has been the reluctance of some Kivu-based armed groups - the CNDP and FRF in particular - to be deployed outside of their home region. This is why the announcement that up to 1,000 troops were being sent to the West of the country on Monday came as welcome news to many.

But the joy was perhaps premature - when details came into the Congo Siasa newsroom (that spacious, bustling suite), it appears that only 50 ex-CNDP troops were part of the 800 soldiers who left. It included three senior ex-CNDP officers: Col Mulomba (Hutu, Kalehe), Col Santos (Mugogwe, Masisi), Col Shimita Hassan (Mugogwe, Masisi).

In the meantime, the trial of 14 mutineers will begin in South Kivu in the coming days. That province, as compared with its northern neighbor, is relatively calm at the moment.

What can we make of these developments? That the mutiny is not yet over. If new officers are defecting to join the mutineers, either Bosco must not be as isolated as he seems (again, the Congolese army is pointing fingers at Kigali) or the new mutineers must feel that the prosecutions left them with no choice, as they would too have been arrested or been left without a support network, as many of their allies are now being tried.

An update on the desertions

A previous version of this posting erroneously identified Lt. Col. Zairois as "Zaire." The former is an ex-CNDP commander from Masisi, the latter is an ex-PARECO commander from Rutshuru. It is Zairois who re-defected from the army.

A quick update on the desertions that began around March 31:

• Bosco Ntaganda is increasingly isolated in his ranch in Bunyole, Masisi (just north of Mushaki). There were two regiments loyal to Bosco in Masisi, that of Col. Innocent Zimurinda, and that of Col. Mugisha Muhimuzi, in addition to the sector command of Col. Baudouin Ngaruye. Zimurinda has been "blocked" in Goma since the beginning, and over 900 of his troops have reportedly left their positions to join loyalist troops in Nyanzale (Rutshuru territory). Bosco's protection company has also defected, under Lt Col Ndizeye, who has also gone to Nyanzale. This is in addition to the defection some time ago of Bosco's own protection officer Lt Col Kennedy. Estimates of Bosco's remaining troops in Masisi range between 400 and 600.
• In South Kivu, the rebellion died a quick, if not complete death, with most of the mutineers now in government custody. Col. Bernard Byamungu (ex-CNDP) surrendered to the Congolese army on Monday in Kaziba, along with Col. Nsabimana (ex-PARECO) and 125 soldiers. Col. Innocent Gafisha, also a former CNDP command, had previously surrendered. However, Col. Saddam "Ringo" and Lt. Col. Zairois (aka Eric Ngabo), fled back into the bush after they had surrendered to the army.
• The Rwandan government has played a key role in stabilizing the situation and pressuring defectors to return to the army. According to several sources within the Congolese army and diplomatic corps, on Sunday, April 8 several ex-CNDP officers were invited across the border to Gisenyi and attended a meeting with Rwandan and Congolese officials. Some ex-CNDP sources suggest that these officers (apparently including Cols. Makenga and Muhindo) received orders to make sure their former comrades return. Other officers were reportedly called by Rwandan officials, sealing the fate of the failed rebellion.
• A disciplinary commission composed almost entirely of rwandophone officers has been set up by the government to try to mutineers. It is currently sitting in Goma and hearing the cases one-by-one.

A new Congolese army?

President Kabila, during his visit to Goma, announced an end to the Amani Leo military structure, under whose aegis military operations had been conducted over the past two years. This stirred confusion, and rumors percolated through the region following the decision.

(Also refer to a report released on Monday by a group of Congolese and international NGOs on security sector reform - it can be found here.)


To dispel some misunderstandings: No, military operations themselves are not coming to a halt. Operations against the FDLR and other "residual" or "refractory" armed groups (the official lingo) are ongoing.

What will happen to all the officers who are absorbed into the Amani Leo structures? This is a good question. These structures allowed for hundreds of former members of armed groups, as well as loyalist army commanders, to get jobs. According to the army spokesman, the officers who are currently in the Amani Leo command will be placed "dispo," shorthand for "à la disposition de la hierarchie militaire." This word is the Congolese' officers' bane, as it means you don't get any of the privileges of being deployed in military operations. In addition to the Amani Leo command, the ten military sectors in North and South Kivu will be dissolved, as they are only temporary structures.

Instead, there will be three (some say four) defense zones (zones de défense).  The Kivus will be grouped together with Province Orientale into one zone. According to Col. Sylvain Ekenge, the army's spokesperson in the East, these new structures should provide more than enough positions to accommodate the officers who were previously in the Amani Leo structures.

Within these zones, there will be three kinds of troops: "Forces couverture," the regular infantry units, currently formed into regiments in the Kivus; "forces réaction rapide," special forces units; and "forces principales de défense," the artillery and other mechanized units.

All of these reforms are supposed to take three years and are guided by the law on the Congolese armed forces passed last year. Other reforms have already taken place, including the census of Congolese soldiers (there are now around 103,000 who have been identified, of whom at least 30,000 are in the Kivus); the launching of various training centers (the officer's academy at Kananga is operational again, as is the engineering school in Likasi and a various Belgian, French, US and South African ad-hoc camps); and reform of the payment system, with the help of the European assistance mission EUSEC.

Still, FARDC abuses remain at extremely high levels and many of the army's officers and deeply involved in racketeering and embezzlement. It is therefore not just a question of re-organization (especially if parallel chains of command will persist anyway), but of what happens within that new organization. Military justice and discipline is probably the most important part of this equation, but the financial management of the army goes hand in hand with that. As long as the average soldier makes $60 a month (and a Lieutenant-general a paltry $110) and the food, lodging and medicine is insufficient; and as long as bigwigs in the army make twenty-fold that each month in racketeering; and as long as hundreds of abuses each month go unpunished (although there are some slight improvements in this regard), it will be difficult to speak of success.

Further blows to the democratic process

On Thursday, the national assembly elected its new leadership, placing Aubin Minaku at its head. However, the process was controversial, as the opposition is claiming that the majority manipulated the vote and discarded the candidates it had proposed.

According to the assembly's by-laws, the seats in the various offices of the assembly are distributed in proportion to the strength of the political coalitions. Since the opposition has around one third of the 500 seats in the assembly, they were given two of the seven positions in the office: the second vice president and the deputy reporter. These positions were supposed to be given to the two strongest opposition parties: the UDPS and MLC, who had nominated Samy Badibanga and Angelique Milemba, respectively. These candidates were backed by the other main opposition parties, as well.

However, the majority substituted the opposition candidates for two other MPs of their picking: Timothée Kimbo (UDPS) and Tshimanga Bwana (ADR). Both are in theory in the opposition - or at least not officially part of the majority - but are not recognized as legitimate candidates by the rest of the opposition.

In a meeting with opposition MPs, Aubin Minaku himself lamented the process, but said that he had no say in how things had unfolded. Some MPs speculate that members of the ruling party who oppose Minaku arranged the coup so that Minaku's legitimacy and relations with the opposition would be compromised, while others just thing this is a sign of the hardline position of the ruling majority. The mood within the opposition was so bad that in their denunciation, they accused Kabila of being a traitor; some MPs didn't even want to refer to him as the president, just the "autorité morale du pays."

Either way, this is a bad sign of how the ruling party intends to deal with the opposition. After the flawed elections, some thought that Kabila would be anxious to secure his legitimacy by reaching out to the opposition and encouraging them to participate in the democratic process. Far from it.

In the meantime, the opposition is suffering a crisis of its own, with Etienne Tshisekedi officially invalidating the seats of 33 of its 42 MPs who decided to participate in the national assembly, despite their leader's call for a boycott. Also, Christian Badibangi, another opposition heavyweight, broke ranks with the rest of the opposition by endorsing the election of the assembly's new leaders.