Defining a negative - When will donors un-freeze aid to Rwanda?

Yesterday, Sweden announced that it was suspending aid to Rwanda. Their aid was $32 million last year, which would come on top of the aid that the Netherlands ($6 million), the African Development Bank ($38 million), Germany ($26 million over next five years), the United Kingdom (up to $50 million), and the United States ($200,000). That's a total of $152 million. There are now suggestions that even the World Bank and the European Union, who give large amounts of aid to Rwanda, are reviewing their portfolios.

But the key word here should be: "suspended." With the exception of the US, which was legally forced to cut a symbolic amount of military aid, all these donors have frozen aid while they wait to see what Rwanda's response will be to allegations of support to the M23. After several months (in the case of the AfDB, one month), they could decide to disburse or further delay funding.

The problem is: What will convince donors to release aid? As one diplomat told me this week: "It amounts to defining a negative. We have to know when Rwanda has ceased supporting the M23, something they have denied all along." That will be very difficult. There is no acid test for Rwandan involvement, no easy way of knowing when this behavior has stopped.

The British Development Minister Andrew Mitchell tried a different tack, trying to identify what concrete steps (defining a positive?) the Rwandan government could undertake to show its good faith:

"We expect the Rwandan government to play a most important role in (regional) discussions ... and we look also, of course, to the Rwandan government to make clear where they stand on the issue of the mutiny, the rebellion which is taking place by the M23 group in the DRC."

In other words, Rwanda needs to look like part of the solution and not part of the problem. An oft-mentioned analogy is Kigali's actions in 2009, after a UN report accused it of supporting Laurent Nkunda's rebellion. Then, Kigali also denied the charge, but then swiftly arrested Nkunda and struck a deal with Kinshasa. While donors had little doubt that Rwanda was supporting Nkunda's CNDP, Rwanda was seen as a force for good. Sweden and the Netherlands, which had suspended aid, unfroze it.

It's not clear how Rwanda could carry out a similar sleight of hand now. The Khartoum and Kampala meetings, which have mulled over the creation of a "neutral force," have been received with hefty skepticism by most donors I have spoken with, who don't see how this force would be staffed or funded (nor do I). In other words - this is not the solution that donors are waiting for, at least it doesn't look like it.

Unfortunately, the furore over Rwandan involvement has led to smugness in Kinshasa and indignation in Kigali - not emotions that are exactly conducive to pragmatic problem-solving. 

Changes to comments section

I have made a slight alteration to the comments section. Readers will now have to register in order to post comments. I want to maintain this space as a place for constructive debate, but the discussion has become at times unnecessarily aggressive, even spiteful, in recent weeks. Thanks for understanding.

Resoliving the Kivus crisis: Beyond Khartoum and Kampala?

Countries from the regional International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) have been meeting, first in Khartoum and now in Kampala to discuss steps to deal with the crisis in the eastern Congo.

What are the options on the table?



While Kigali has been insisting on negotiations with the M23, Kinshasa has been emboldened by recent pressure on Rwanda and has been pushing for a military solution. Through its bumptious spokesperson, it refused negotiations with the M23. However, the government is not speaking with one voice, as the North Kivu governor suggested that the implementation of the March 23, 2009 deal (the raison d'etre of the eponymous M23) should be evaluated. In his speech last week, President Kabila also said that his government will also avail itself of political and diplomatic options to solve the crisis, and there are some reports that M23 has sent a delegation to Kampala to negotiate with the government on the sidelines of the regional summit there.

So there have been some contradictions in the government's resolve, especially given the series of defeats its soldiers have suffered in recent weeks and the possibility that Goma could be the next town to fall.

It is not surprising that Kinshasa would be looking for military support. First, its representatives, along with other states in the region, asked for a neutral force to come and hunt down the M23, FDLR and other "negative forces." Now, Foreign Minister Raymond Tshibanda is suggesting that MONUSCO be part of such a force, and that the UN Security Council change its mandate so that it can take offensive actions against these refractory groups. 

(Here is the official report of the Khartoum meeting.)


But a dose of realism would be welcome, as this chimerical force will be difficult to achieve or, worse, could become an unnecessary distraction from more worthwhile initiatives. Why?

• Money. Donors are already spending $1,4 billion per annum on the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo. It is unlikely that they would want to spend millions more on a new, aggressive mission to hunt down rebel forces. 
• Troops. Where would the troops come from? In theory, troops would have to be neutral, which could rule out many countries in the region, such as Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and perhaps others. Also, which country would want to send their troops into the deep Congolese jungles to hunt down the FDLR, and into Rutshuru's hills to fight the M23? The UN has already had a hard time to find troops to staff its peacekeeping mission, and I doubt the main contributing countries to that mission (India, Pakistan, Uruguay) would like seeing their men and women take on a more aggressive, risky role.
  
• Transforming the UN mission. The Congolese government has said the UN should change MONUSCO's mission to take on a more offensive role, in effect becoming the neutral force the ICGLR has asked for. Like I said, the troop contributing countries are very unlikely to accept this kind of aggressive mandate. 
• Time. It will take months - at least - to create and deploy a neutral force. During this time, the M23 and related armed groups are likely to make moves and gain ground. 
• Other options. There have been suggestions that the M23 would be significantly weakened if it did not have support from Rwanda, or at least a rear base there. Rwanda has denied this, but why not just set up joint Rwandan-Congolese-MONUSCO patrols along key parts of this border? At the same time, it would illusory to think that we can put the genie back in the bottle with pure military force. By now, we have mobilization linked to the M23 In Ituri, the Ruwenzoris, Walikale, and perhaps parts of South Kivu. Rwanda may be playing a critical role, but it is not the only actor here. So what kind of peaceful options can we pursue without, as a previous guest post argues, undermining army reform and encouraging the mobilization of new groups? Some real thought needs to be put into a proper stabilization strategy in the Kivus that does not repeat the mistakes of the 2008 peace conference and the 2009 peace deal with the CNDP. More on that soon.

Rwanda, the Group of Experts and the M23

This post initially said that the UN Group of Experts' visit to Kigali took place in April. It took place in May. Apologies. There have also been some questions about whether the Group told the Rwandan government they would discuss allegations of support to the M23 during the May 2012 meeting. According to diplomatic sources in Kigali (as mentioned below), in their letter to the Rwandan government asking for a meeting, they also asked for information regarding groups hostile to Kigali (such as the FDLR and RNC), but did not explicitly mention Rwandan support to the mutiny (the M23 name did not yet exist when they wrote the letter). However, they planned to discuss this support and during the one 30-minute meeting the government had with them, the Group said they wanted to talk about cross-border support to the M23. However, this meeting was largely just to inform the Group that the government was not available to discuss specifics. 

There has been a noticeable souring of rhetoric in the debate surrounding the M23, including in comments on this site. People have resorted to ad hominem attacks and worse. It may help to review some of these contentions here.

Rwanda's rebuttal to the UN Group of Experts

Rwanda has provided an official 131-page response to the UN Group of Experts' report. It can be found here. The response is worth reading in full, and I can't cover all the points. But here are the main claims:

• The Group did not give Rwanda a right of reply and did not talk to Rwandan officials. As the rebuttal points out, according to informal UN guidelines, the Group should provide those accused of serious wrongdoing with an opportunity to respond. It is not however, true, as this document states, that the Group did not contact the relevant government agencies in Rwanda. In fact, according to diplomats in Kigali, the Group visited the Rwandan capital for three days in May to talk to the government about the ex-CNDP mutiny and allegations of Rwandan support. Since the publication of the report, the Group has visited Kigali and met with Rwandan officials at length. Again according to diplomats based there, the response has been predictable: They deny all the allegations (along the lines below).
• The report relies largely on anecdotal and unreliable sources, with little material proof. While the Group did furnish some material proof (see below), it is true than the core of its report relies on eyewitness testimony. Almost all of these sources were anonymous; not surprising, given the nature of the allegations. Is it possible that (a) the experts were biased, so they could just concoct the evidence, or (b) all the sources were biased, misinformed or manipulated by Congolese security sources? The former is unlikely - the experts' conclusions are reached by consensus among all six members, and the experts themselves are named by the UN Secretary General and can be vetoed by the UN Security Council. Several of the experts were involved in the gathering of these testimonies. The latter is also unlikely - the experts interviewed eighty M23 deserters and dozens of local villagers, former Rwandan officers, and Congolese security officials. The deserters, in particular, had little reason to lie - many had defected straight to UN bases, without going through Congolese army hands (this was the case, for example, of the eleven interviewed in the DDRRR base in Goma on 23 May, 2012, and who had surrendered to the UN base in Rugari three days earlier). It is true that, when they were interrogated by a joint Rwandan-Congolese team, some of them changed their story, but some still maintained they left Rwanda with weapons and went through Rwandan army positions. In short, it would have taken a vast conspiracy to fabricate the report, involving hundreds of people from different walks of life. 
• The material evidence provided by the Group is bogus. Some phone calls made between M23 and RDF officers, a picture of a defector in a Rwandan uniform, pictures of ammunition and weapons belonging to the M23 - all of this does not constitute incontrovertible proof, the Rwandan government says. Yes, that is true. But that does not mean it's bogus.
• The M23 does indeed have some ammunition that is not in Congolese army stocks, which deserters say they received from the Rwandan army (which says they don't have it in their stocks, either). 
• While Bosco's alleged house in Gisenyi is owned by someone else, according to official records, many people in Goma and Gisenyi have testified that it really belongs to Bosco.
• According to the Rwandan government, some of the people the Group alleges crossed into Rwanda to participate in M23 mobilization meetings do not show up on immigration registers, several other participants in the meetings say they were there. 
• Rwandan officials implicated in the report deny they were involved and have provided statements and log books to prove this - however, many of the sources interviewed by the Group state the contrary.
• UN experts are biased, in particular Steve Hege, the current coordinator. In 2009, Hege was cited as a contact person for a discussion paper on the FDLR, which stated that the militia is better understood in relation to the massacres of Hutu in the eastern Congo by the Rwandan army and its allies in 1996-1997 than in relation to the genocide (he never denied the genocide or that FDLR officers took part in it). He was also suggested that the lack of political space in Rwanda was not conducive to FDLR return, and argued that getting rid of the FDLR would not solve all the myriad problems in the region. Supporters of the Rwandan government, including some Rwandan officials, are now suggesting that Hege is a "terrorist sympathizer" and even "pro-genocide" on Twitter (just look for #Hege). An article in government-run The New Times suggests that Hege could be guilty of genocide denial and revisionism, crimes which carry heavy jail sentences in Rwanda. I see absolutely no evidence of these allegations in his FDLR piece, and no reason for this kind of tasteless denigration. In fact, Hege has been on the UN panel for three years now as the armed group expert, and has contributed to deeply critical reports of the FDLR and their criminal activities in the eastern Congo (see last year's report here, for example), as well as collaborating with German investigators in prosecution of FDLR leaders. I should mention that similar accusations, albeit not by the government, have been leveled against myself (the coordinator of the Group in 2008), as well as Dinesh Mahtani (the coordinator in 2009), after the latter wrote an article critical of Kigali in The Guardian.

So where does this leave us? Not all of the evidence in the UN report is incontrovertible proof, but taken together - and along with reports from  other organizations - they form an extremely compelling case for Rwandan support to M23. From my recent conversations in Kigali, New York, Kinshasa and Goma, very few non-Rwandan diplomats and civil society activists (Tony Blair is an exception) have any doubts about whether there is Rwandan support to M23, although there is disagreement about how much and why.

Guest blog: The M23 rebellion and the dead-end street of military integration in eastern DRC

This is a guest blog by Maria Eriksson Baaz, Associate Professor at the Nordic Africa Institute and the School of Global Studies, Gothenburg University, Sweden; and Judith Verweijen , PhD Candidate at the Centre for Conflict Studies at Utrecht University and the Faculty of Military Sciences at the Netherlands Defense Academy. 

Recent events in the Kivu provinces have highlighted, once again, the dangers of never-ending armed group integration, as well as its deleterious effects on the Congolese army. This blog post addresses some issues which, so far, have been absent in discussions of the new rebellion. By placing the M23 in the context of armed group integration into the FARDC, we intend to shed light on the processes that contributed to its formation, the weak response of the FARDC, and most importantly, what a potential peace-deal with the M23 should avoid.  

The Congolese Government has officially, so far, refused to negotiate with the M23, and has expelled its leading officers from the FARDC’s ranks. This could be judged as a non-constructive engagement from the Congolese side. However, we would argue that this position could be seen as a positive sign, reflecting a potential commitment to the recently declared non-compromising policy towards army defectors and re-mobilized armed groups.

 The vicious cycle of military integration and erosion

Let us begin by attending to the question why the FARDC, yet again, (so far) have proved unable to hold ground or make significant advances  in spite of the fact that several foreign-trained elite units (by Belgium, the US and South Africa) were deployed as reinforcements. What certainly plays a role is the relative strength of the M23, bolstered by Rwandan support in the form of the supply of ammunition and weapons, new recruits and direct operational interventions by Rwandan troops. However, the most important explanations must be sought in the weak combat capabilities of the FARDC. The main problem here is not the lack of training, as suggested by some observers. It is much more systemic and is, as we argue, to a large extent a result of the “carrots without sticks” politics of military integration.

One explanation for the FARDC’s disappointing performance is the lack of centralized and efficient command and control, logistical support and organizational capacity. Combat requires seamless command chains and a high level of coordination and organization, as the military units involved need steady supplies of especially ammunitions, rations, medicine, and transport for rapid (re)deployments. This support has, yet again, been insufficient. Secondly, the constant leaks of military intelligence have deprived the FARDC of the element of surprise. Parts of the ex-CNDP have remained integrated into the FARDC, but are suspected to maintain links with their former colleagues. Despite some efforts to redeploy the most distrusted commanders and units, the dominance of the ex-CNDP in North Kivu’s command structures as well as their in-depth knowledge of the area and of the combat tactics of their opponents have made it both impossible and undesirable to entirely remove them from the scene. 

Thirdly, the relative lack of material (e.g. salaries) and non-material (e.g. social status, recognition) rewards for FARDC soldiers weakens their enthusiasm to risk their lives on the battlefield. It should be acknowledged that motivation has been stronger this time than previously, in that the resentment against the privileged position of ex-CNDP troops was strongly felt among military personnel. Furthermore, the demonstrated involvement of Rwanda has fully revived deeply rooted anti-Rwandan/Tutsi sentiments and unleashed a wave of popular support for the FARDC, now newly branded as patriotic heroes. However, this has not been enough to compensate for the absence of other factors generating incentives to engage in the risks involved in combat (e.g. unit cohesion and minimum standards of service conditions concerning salaries, rations, medical care and social services).

The three factors mentioned above have been immensely aggravated by what we would argue is one of the main problems in the DR Congo’s defense sector, namely the Government’s “carrots without sticks” politics of military integration. The absence of serious military pressure on non-integrated forces, the lack of sanctions for defectors, and the promises of high ranks and good positions for those (re)joining the military, has made defecting from and then renegotiating back into the FARDC an attractive option for military entrepreneurs. This has contributed to creating incentive structures that promote the proliferation of armed groups as well as army desertion, with the military becoming a revolving door for armed factions.  The M23 seems to be a direct product of this logic: rather than directly challenging the established state structures, it initially appeared to be mostly geared towards the creation of a strong position for future negotiations, although it has gradually also obtained a momentum of its own.

Aside from creating incentives for insurgent violence, never-ending military integration has weakened the military. By allowing autonomous power networks to remain partly intact, it has promoted the proliferation of parallel structures of command within the military, thus negatively impacting on its performance. Additionally, continuous armed group integration has created feelings of unpredictability and unfairness within the ranks of the FARDC: who would want to risk their lives for an enemy that might very well be welcomed back again into the army, perhaps in an even more privileged position than before? While desertion is considered the most grave form of indiscipline in other armies, subject to severe punishments, the Congolese authorities –often encouraged by the international community -  have regularly welcomed defected units and commanders back into the fold, sometimes even rewarding them (at least on paper) with better opportunities. Apart from gravely undermining cohesion within military units, this has profoundly shaken up soldiers’ understanding of the military profession and their own role and identity. 

Tackling M23: reproducing or reducing violence?

A vicious cycle has been created in which military integration has undermined the improvement of military capabilities, rendering the military defeat of armed groups infeasible. This, in turn, has encouraged the DR Government to co-opt rather than to combat armed groups, in this way further weakening the FARDC. Moreover, by allowing integrated groups to stay in their former strongholds, and granting them autonomous control over lucrative areas of deployment, this process has become intractable. In the case of the ex-CNDP, Rwandan support has exacerbated this autonomy, rendering the gradual dilution of its influence in the FARDC, as was the rationale behind its original integration, merely hypothetical. 

If this cycle continues there is little hope for progress in the military reform process. It will further demoralize already demoralized troops and feed indiscipline and continuous internal conflicts and parallel chains of command. Additionally, it will encourage a further militarization of the economy and administrative functions in the Kivus, as violence continues to be rewarded.  In this respect, it is important to stress the absence of vetting mechanisms, allowing past abusers to obtain time and again important positions in the military, sets a dubious example both within the FARDC and for society at large. 

To be clear, we are not saying there is no other solution to the M23 rebellion than a military one. However, any negotiation with this group and its foreign and domestic backers should recognize that they deserted from the army and that welcoming them back in again will have serious detrimental effects both on the military reform process and the prospects for reducing violence and armed group activity in the Kivus.  Military integration has proved to fuel rather than to reduce the militarization of eastern DR Congo: let’s not drive into this dead-end street again.

Diplomatic dance, military advance

The M23 rebellion took control of Rutshuru town for the second time in three weeks yesterday, sending Congolese soldiers running. While the army ran out of supplies, allegations immediately also began trickling in of Rwandan - and even Ugandan - support to the rebels, which had allowed them to break through the MONUSCO and army defenses after a morning of heavy fighting.

Which begs the question: What has happened after on the international stage since the publication of the UN Group of Experts report, implicating Rwanda in support to the M23?

The main shift was initially led by the United States, a longtime friend of Rwanda. Following the publication of the UN report, the US denounced Rwandan involvement and, on July 21st, announced it was cutting $200,000 in military aid to Kigali, and would consider other cuts in aid, as well. Other reprimands have been less public: the canceling of a visit to Kigali by Gen. Hamm, the commander of Africom, as well as a visit by a delegation led by Deputy National Security Advisor, Michael Froman. In addition, the US government had put in several phone calls to Kigali, including one by an Undersecretary of State to President Kagame (it was supposed to be Secretary of State Clinton, but it didn't work out due to scheduling issues.) In early July, Special Advisor on the Great Lakes Barry Walkley visited Kigali himself and met with Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo, denouncing Rwandan support to the M23.

While Bill Clinton was effusive in praise for Rwanda last week during a visit, as was Tony Blair, very few western embassies in the Rwandan capital still doubt that their hosts are supporting the M23. This week, there were reports from diplomats that the United Kingdom, which in general has been much less aggressive that the US, has delayed the disbursement of development funds for two months, while the African Development Bank is doing the same with $38.9 million in budgetary aid, and the Dutch government with $6.1 million. This is more than symbolic; while the funds may eventually be disbursed, the delays will seriously mess up budget flows.

Almost more important than aid is Rwanda's upcoming seat on the UN Security Council, which will give the country substantial diplomatic leverage. According to diplomats present at the African Union summit in Addis a few weeks ago, Kabila - who almost never attends these summits - had gone to the meeting planning to rally member states to strip Rwanda of this seat. He would have had to convince eastern and southern African states, but South Africa was apparently ready to back him, as were countries like Angola and Zimbabwe. However, at the summit, Kagame was able to convince Kabila to back away from such drastic measures and leave time for diplomacy. The two are scheduled to meet again in Kampala on August 6 and 7 to discuss the possibility of a neutral military force. Most diplomats I have spoken to, however, think such a force would take a long time to muster, giving time for a further escalation of the conflict. Rwanda will officially be elected to the Security Council during the UN General Assembly in September.

So a lot has happened on the diplomatic circuit. And yet, the pressure on Rwanda has not been able to stem the fighting. Besides the M23 advances, other armed groups are also stirring, including in the foothills of the Ruwenzori mountains (Beni territory), as well as in Ituri.

US State Department's Statement on Rwanda

The US State Department has just released a statement, obtained by Reuters, on cutting military aid to Rwanda. It's a symbolic amount of $200,000, but I think this is the first time Washington has cut aid to Kigali for political reasons. 


Below is the entire statement, and you can see Rwanda's response here, saying they will discuss the report line-by-line with the UN Group of Experts in Kigali next week:


In light of information that Rwanda is supporting armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Department of State has decided it can no longer provide Foreign Military Financing (FMF) appropriated in the current fiscal year to Rwanda, considering a restriction imposed by the 2012 appropriation act.   

As a result, we will not obligate $200,000 in Fiscal Year 2012 FMF funds that were intended to support a Rwandan academy for non-commissioned officers.  These funds will be reallocated for programming in another country.

We will continue to provide assistance to Rwanda to enhance its capacity to support peacekeeping missions.

The Department continues to assess whether other steps should be taken in response to Rwanda’s actions with respect to the DRC. 

The United States government is deeply concerned about the evidence that Rwanda is implicated in the provision of support to Congolese rebel groups, including M23.

The United States has been actively engaged at the highest levels to urge Rwanda to halt and prevent the provision of such support, which threatens to undermine stability in the region. 

Restraint, dialogue, and respect for each other’s sovereignty offer the best opportunity for Rwanda and the DRC, with the support of their partners, to resume the difficult work of bringing peace and security to the broader region.

We are encouraged by the ongoing high-level dialogue among the states of the Great Lakes region, and we join the Security Council in taking note with interest of the communiqué issued by the eleven member states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on July 12. 

Developing a disciplined and unified army as part of a comprehensive security sector reform process remains critical to the stabilization of the DRC. 

We support efforts to bring to justice alleged human rights abusers among the mutineers, including Bosco Ntaganda, who is the subject of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant. We are concerned by reports that the mutineers have forcibly recruited child soldiers. 

Hilary Fuller Renner 
Spokesperson 
Bureau of African Affairs 
U.S. Department of State